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Do What Thou Wilt,
wrote the 16th-century humanist François Rabelais,
because men that are free, well-born, well-bred, and conversant
in honest companies, have naturally an instinct and spur that
prompteth them unto virtuous actions, and withdraws them
from vice, which is called honour. (1542/1653, ch. 57)
He was criticizing an assumption, or way of thinking, that we still often
encounter today: that what we want, or would really want, to do is
one thing, and what we should, or morally ought, to do is another thing.
The idea that “if everybody would just go around and do whatever they
please, there would be anarchy and the world would be a mess,” as some
people might put it, perhaps with the added remark that in so far as the
world already happens to be in such a state, this is exactly because people
have been going around selfishly trying to get whatever they wanted
to have. On this view, morality, by contrast, requires us to look beyond
the immanent nature of our desires for something that transcends their
contingent character. Proponents of such a view maintain that certain acts
are obligatory no matter how much we may dislike them and other acts are
wrong no matter how attractive they might seem. In the words of Thomas
Nagel, morality does not allow you to “beg off” (1970, p. 4).
But those who hold this view have difficulties in answering certain
questions about morality. How do we acquire knowledge about how we
should live? What sorts of facts, or truths, might there be for our moral
beliefs to get right? And why should we care about such a morality in the
first place? How do we explain its rational authority for reasonable agents?
In this thesis I will argue that we stand a better chance of answering these
questions if, like Rabelais, we adopt instead the view that what we should
do is going to be in accordance with what we really want. Indeed (and
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perhaps unlike Rabelais) I shall be claiming that what we should and what
we want—in a particular sense of willing—are really one and the same
thing.
The Idea of a Normative Will
To be sure, some philosophers have also held that moral acts must be willed
by the agent even though they did believe that moral truths transcend our
contingent nature. Thus, St. Augustine argued that in addition to having
knowledge of what is right, we must also have the will to do the right thing,
in the absence of which people knowingly do the wrong thing instead. In
other words, we have the capacity to decide to act either in accord with, or
against, our own beliefs about what we should do. In this thesis I will call
this capacity an “executive will.” But, according to St. Augustine, those
beliefs that we must want to act upon are still beliefs about a morality that
transcends, and to some extent opposes, our contingent—and in his view
sinful—desiderative nature.
Now I agree that our nature does involve many desires to do things
that we should not do. Our world is, in certain respects, in a sorry state as
a result of people’s actions motivated by such desires. But the reasons we
have to act differently, I submit, are themselves grounded in natural desires
as well: desires that constitute a mode of wanting that is not executive, nor
something that we actively decide or control, but rather one that is opaque.
This is the sense in which we can want something without knowing it yet.
It is what we try to figure out when we wonder “what we really want.” I
call this source of reasons the “normative will.”
The main philosophical challenge for my proposal is to explain how
certain desires can constitute such a normative mode of wanting if that
would generate reasons to disapprove of other desires. How can we even
make sense of the idea that some desires are better than others, so to speak,
without once again presupposing a morality that would transcend their
contingent nature?
Summarily, my solution is based on the idea that when we govern our
own agency, we act on our understanding of how our different desires
and affective experiences are interrelated, rather than merely being driven
by separate desires in different situations. Our affective and emotional
lives are structured in various ways and we often try to make sense of
the motivations we experience in the light of what we experienced before.
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Furthermore, we expect ourselves to have certain desires in the future
and to have positive or negative responses to certain events should they
occur. Consequently, if these expectations turn out to be false, we must
adjust our ideas about ourselves, which is how we gain self-knowledge.
My claim is that as we gain this knowledge of the ways in which our
affective dispositions are structured, patterns will manifest themselves in
our emotional lives that establish “what we really want” or “what we are
really about.” The desires that contribute to such a pattern constitute an
agent’s normative will. By contrast, the desires that the agent should not
act upon will now appear as a kind of noise in that overall picture of what
he, as a person, is about. Thus, some desires are better than others because
of how meaningful they are to the person who has them.
Perhaps it may seem that, on this view, everything could be reasonable,
or moral, as long as someone happens to exhibit a pattern of desires in
its support. Furthermore, if different persons have different desires, their
moral beliefs might conflict without either of them being at fault. But we
have substantial intuitions about the content of morality, and we are used
to moral conversations in which we treat these as having an intersubjective
scope of validity. It is true that, conceptually, my analysis of normativity
will not imply anything of moral substance. But I will argue that our
substantial intuitions about morality do not need to cover any conceptually
possible creature capable of deliberative action (for example, they need
not apply to fictitious alien invaders from Mars). Instead, intuitions about
morality’s altruistic implications, for example, are to be understood as
beliefs about how human nature has endowed different human beings
with similar affective response patterns. Our moral differences may often
be better explained by the hypothesis that some of us have poor self-
knowledge, than by the hypothesis that our inner selves (so to speak) are
radically different.
So rather than thinking of mankind as selfish and sinful by nature, my
claim is that the values and virtues we intuitively associate with morality
(insofar those intuitions are sound) are supported by the most accurate
interpretation of what human nature is first and foremost really all about.
Like Rabelais, I believe that under the appropriate conditions—conditions
that are conducive to self-understanding and for which his term “freedom”
is not at all a bad choice—we will find all our reasons for being social and
altruistic within our own passionate and emotional characteristics.
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A Debate Inspired by Hume
The picture I just sketched may appear attractive to some and unappealing
to others, but the point is of course to argue about it systematically. Why is
it so difficult for those, who defend a morality beyond the empirical nature
of our desires, to explain how we acquire knowledge of this morality,
what sort of facts or truths it involves, and why these facts or truths are
normative in a way that non-moral facts or truths are not?
An influential way to frame these difficulties is to adopt a distinction
from David Hume between what he called “reason” and the “passions”
(1886/1964, p. 193). The former refers to our capacity to form beliefs
which can be true or false, whereas the latter is his term for the desires
that motivate us towards certain goals. The point of the distinction is that
these two aspects seem conceptually independent: merely appreciating
that something is true by itself never entails a motivation towards anything.
Conversely, any motivation we actually have seems therefore to presuppose
a desire towards some end that we might in principle have regardless of
what we believe to be true.
From this analysis of the relation between truth and motivation, Hume
drew a further conclusion about the status or purpose of reason itself:
that it cannot establish any course of action as reasonable in its own right,
but only determine what we should do, contingent upon the desires we
happen to have. This claim was captured in his famous slogan that “reason
is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.” Therefore, Hume also
sought to justify moral ideas in terms of characteristics of our human
nature, which he called “moral sentiments.”
Many philosophers have questioned whether Hume’s conclusion about
reason follows from his theory of motivation. Michael Smith has construed
the issue as involving a paradox: moral knowledge seems to require facts
that true beliefs get right; moral authority seems to require rational, self-
governing agents to be motivated by those beliefs; but the Humean theory
of motivation denies that beliefs can have such motivational impact (Smith,
1994). He tries to resolve this paradox by pointing out that one is often
motivated by several conflicting desires, while we should expect a fully
rational agent to be entirely coherent in this respect. Hence, rationality
seems to require that we reject some of our desires in order to meet
this constraint of coherence. In order to resolve the paradox, we could
therefore adopt Bernard Williams’s “Internal Reasons View,” according to
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which our practical beliefs are true or false in virtue of what we would
desire after having deliberated rationally upon our actual desires (Williams,
1980/1981a).
This notion of deliberation brings us back at the aforementioned ques-
tion of how to judge that some desires are ‘better’ than others. I have
explained that my proposal is an attempt to answer this question without
once again presupposing truths that would go beyond the empirical nature
of our desires. But those who take their cue from Immanuel Kant may wish
to reason in the opposite direction: if, by reflecting upon the ways in which
the desires of rational, self-governing agents must be constrained, we run
into assumptions about a principle or principles of judgment beyond our
empirical nature, then so much the better. That way we might legitimately
arrive at something a priori by analyzing what is simply presupposed about
rationality in the very idea of having desires and being an agent in the first
place (Korsgaard, 1996).
If such a strategy could succeed, then we might nevertheless wonder
whether the particular concepts of rationality, agency, or self-government,
in terms of which such an a priori principle would have to be under-
stood, could still be distinctively human. More precisely, we might wonder
whether highly intelligent alien lifeforms could conceivably be at fault for
not acting in accordance with that principle, provided that their concepts
would be suitably different from ours or unintelligible from our point of
view. On such a theory, even a priori moral judgments might still be local
to the human perspective. By contrast, Michael Smith argues that in order
for some moral judgment to be justified, every conceptually possible agent
whose action or judgment would go against it would therefore have to be
mistaken. In his view, an a priori judgment that a certain act is right under
a certain type of circumstances is made true or false by some fact about
those circumstances, and not by a perspective towards those circumstances
that may be different depending on who is making the judgment (Smith,
1994, 2004a).
Bernard Williams, however, was not convinced that a transcendental
analysis of whatever a priori presuppositions his Internal Reasons View
might have would yield anything of moral substance: it might clarify
certain formal principles of deliberation and planning, for example, but
it would not justify altruistic behavior. Instead, he maintained that the
altruistic motivations that we would have, after rational deliberation, are
still related to the particular characteristics of the motivations from which
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we start those deliberations. If our actual motivations had been differ-
ent, then the conclusions of our deliberations might be different as well.
Williams called this “relativism,” but I will call it “relationalism,” because
“relativism” is commonly associated with certain further implications that
this view need not have, as I will argue in this thesis. Different versions of
relationalism have been defended by Harman (2000), Frankfurt (2004), and
Street (2009, forthcoming), amongst others. Conversely, I will call views
according to which morality does not depend on motivations that could
have been different “nonrelationalist.” This includes Smith’s account of a
priori moral facts about reasons that I shall discuss in detail.
The Significance of Disconfirmation
The debate between these relationalist and nonrelationalist views about
reasons has reached a stalemate. Philosophers on each side start from
their own intuitions about what it means for reasons to be normative and
presuppose their own metaphysical assumptions about what sort of facts
about reasons they claim can or cannot exist. Each side has their own
problems to deal with, problems which I shall discuss at length in this
thesis. Ultimately, I must conclude that neither side has managed to come
up with a fully convincing answer to that fundamental question of how to
explain the authority of one motivation over another when the two are in
conflict.
To be sure, fully convincing answers are rare in philosophy, and I do
not wish to suggest that my proposals will settle this issue decisively. But
I will try to offer a way out of the deadlock, and one that I think might tip
the scales in favor of relationalism. Now, it is common in meta-ethics to
start out with questions or intuitions about moral properties, facts, truths,
or truth-conditions: are they natural or not, how can they be part of the
fabric of the world, could they be a priori, must they be the same for all
agents, and so on—exactly the kind of questions I have been discussing
above. But my own line of argument will be based on the idea that there is
another question, one that might appear to be derived from these matters,
but which I am going to treat as prior to them, and that is: how do we
disconfirm our practical judgments in everyday life?
After all, one of the reasons why many of us think that morality must
be a matter of truth and knowledge, perhaps even the most important
reason, is that our practical judgments do not merely change over time in
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the manner that some of our tastes or preferences are susceptible to change.
We do not acquire a taste for free speech in the sense in which one might
acquire a taste for drinking tea after having preferred coffee for many
years. Nor do we think that over time, more and more people have come
to reject racism or sexism in the same way that sweaters with shoulder
pads have gone out of fashion. Instead, we take these changes in our
practical views to have been corrective, we think our views have improved.
Racism and sexism have been disconfirmed, and this seems to presuppose
a background norm governing such a process of disconfirmation, namely,
truth.
So if it is because of our experiences of disconfirmation in practice that
we believe in truths, or facts, about reasons for action, then why don’t
we try to come up with an account of how disconfirmation of practical
judgments actually works in real life in order to figure out what sort of
facts about reasons there might be? And this is exactly what I will set out
to do.
Philosophers have held views about this, of course, and the most widely
held account seems to be that we can disconfirm practical beliefs by testing
whether they violate certain principles of reason, such as Kant’s categorical
imperative. But I will argue that this does not explain how practical discon-
firmation happens in the real world. Instead, I will propose the theory that
we disconfirm our practical judgments in the light of unexpected affective
responses: when we are surprised by our own emotional reactions to the
consequences that we did intend our actions to have.
Not only does this rule out the nonrelationalist views of an a priori
morality, which are committed to disconfirmation by rational principles,
but it also shows us where certain relationalist approaches may have fallen
short. It turns out that the results of deliberation are not just rational trans-
formations of a conflicting desire set into a coherent one. Instead, we make
empirical discoveries about our own affective dispositions, which means
that our affective nature is significantly opaque. But traditionally, relational-
ist accounts, whether under the banner of “relativism” or “Humeanism,”
have been understood in terms of attitudes that are, at least for the most
part, readily accessible to the agent as the premises of his deliberations.
By contrast, on the theory of the normative will that I am proposing, we
deliberate upon hypotheses about dispositions that we learn more about
as we go along in order to figure out what patterns there are for us to act
upon.
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Structure of this Thesis
This thesis is divided into three parts. In part i, “Normativity and Moti-
vation: Setting the Stage,” I construct a conceptual framework in order to
articulate more precisely how the aforementioned ideas or intuitions about
practical normativity give rise to two philosophical problems: the “Facts
Problem,” which captures the issue concerning truth and truth-conditions,
and the “Disconfirmation Problem,” which focuses on the matter of discon-
firming practical judgments. In part ii, “Facts about Reasons: The Status
Quo,” I turn to the stalemate between relationalist and nonrelationalist
solutions to the Facts Problem, discussing the difficulties into which each
approach runs. Then, in part iii, “Practical Disconfirmation: A New Per-
spective,” we make the shift towards treating the Disconfirmation Problem
as the prior issue. I will propose a solution on relatively independent
grounds and then argue that this proposal subsequently leads us to a
relationalist solution to the Facts Problem as well.
Part i consists of three chapters. Chapter 1, “Five Principles of Practical
Normativity,” introduces and motivates my own preferred formulations of
the intuitions for which I want my theory to account. The “Facts Principle”
and “Disconfirmation Principle” capture the truth-conditional and discon-
firmational aspects of a cognitivist and non-skeptical approach to practical
judgment. In addition, the “Intersubjectivity Principle” allows that certain
reasons have an intersubjective scope of validity. The “Authority Princi-
ple” establishes a conceptual connection between practical judgment and
motivation, which makes it a version of motivational internalism, but one
that differs from standard accounts in that it defines the connection in
terms of self-government rather than practical rationality. Finally, the “Dis-
tinctness Principle” contains my formulation of the Humean belief-desire
distinction. The combination of these principles gives rise to the Facts and
Disconfirmation Problems mentioned above. The purpose of the rest of the
thesis is to solve these problems.
In chapter 2, “The Internal Reasons View,” I examine the famous dis-
tinction from Williams between “internal” reason statements, which must
be reachable from the agent’s own motivations by a “sound deliberative
route,” and “external” reason statements that do not have this requirement.
I discuss possible objections against his defense of the claim that only the
former type of statements can be true. I explicate the premises that we
need in order to block these objections and make Williams’s argument
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valid.
Then, in chapter 3, “Internal Reasons, Relationalism, and Motivation,”
I am going to relate his framework for talking about reasons to my own
framework from chapter 1. I argue that my Principles imply a version of
the Internal Reasons View, even though Williams himself might not have
accepted the Distinctness Principle and may have favored a motivationally
anti-Humean defense instead (his writings were rather ambiguous in this
respect, as it turns out). I also explain how the Internal Reasons View may
lead to skepticism about the plausibility of nonrelationalist convergence,
especially if the view is defended using the Distinctness Principle.
Part ii also contains three chapters. In chapter 4, “Outline of a Re-
lationalist Solution,” I explain how my defense of the Internal Reasons
View provides us with a sketch of a dispositional solution to the Facts
Problem. The idea is that we remove the mystery about why we would
be motivated, under ideal conditions, in accordance with our normative
reasons, by analyzing normative reasons in terms of the motivations that
we would have under those conditions. The relationalist version of this
approach, which I call “type-i dispositionalism,” allows us to disambiguate
the paradox resulting from the Facts, Authority, and Distinction Principles
into two different and compatible implications. However, this is only an
outline of a solution because it assumes that a deliberator can resolve
conflicts between her own desires. The problem remains of explaining
why that makes sense. Furthermore, nonrelationalists complain that no
relationalist account can do justice to the intersubjective validity of moral
considerations. Hence, the second problem for type-i dispositionalism is
to explain the Intersubjectivity Principle.
In chapter 5, “The Nonrelationalist Alternative,” I discuss Michael
Smith’s nonrelationalist solution, according to which all conceptually pos-
sible agents would desire the same states of affairs under ideal conditions
of rational agency. I distinguish a “proceduralist” and a “nonproceduralist”
interpretation of this view, which I call “type-ii” and “type-iii disposition-
alism.” I argue that critics of Smith such as David Sobel and David Enoch
seem to have presupposed the type-ii interpretation, according to which
any incoherence in our prior attitudes should in principle be demonstrable
to us from the perspective of those attitudes themselves: we cannot be
“ineliminably unlucky,” as I will call it, in the attitudes we start deliberating
with. Sobel and Enoch make a strong case that the a priori convergence
that Smith’s realism requires is highly implausible on those assumptions. I
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will discuss some strategies that Smith might wish to employ to counter
this criticism, but my conclusion is that these strategies fail.
This leaves the type-iii solution, to which I turn in chapter 6, “Dis-
positionalism Without Proceduralism?” According to this account, it is
possible for an agent to be ineliminably unlucky in his desires, such that
no amount of computational power could make him understand why his
desire set is unreasonable. Thus, certain desire configurations may seem
a priori unreasonable to us, even though we may believe or even know
that we cannot prove this to the skeptic who would uphold such desires,
and the type-iii solution allows us to postulate that what he desires is
nevertheless undesirable as a conceptual fact. I offer several objections to
this view: such postulates seem too ad-hoc in the field of moral philosophy
to warrant their theoretical expense; the presupposed facts about desir-
ability are inconsistent with the direction of fit that desires have; the view
cannot offer a real advantage in explaining intersubjectivity over type-i
dispositionalism, which avoids the expensive metaphysics; and finally, the
view seems to allow the same type of proceduralist self-knowledge that
type-i dispositionalism allows, which turns the nonprocedural residue into
a form of speculation without practical import.
Part iii contains the final four chapters of the thesis, in which I propose
and defend my account of the normative will. In chapter 7, “The Affective
Response View,” I develop the idea that we disconfirm our practical
judgments in the light of unexpected affective responses to the intended
consequences of our actions, rather than by testing those judgments against
a priori principles of reason. I argue that my view leads to an attractive
picture of deliberation as the “volitional interpretation” of his affects and
emotions by an agent in order to determine his normative will. I also argue
that this view implies type-i dispositionalism. And finally, I explain how
the Affective Response View solves the Disconfirmation Problem.
Chapter 8, “A Normative Reality Within Ourselves,” is a critical eval-
uation of Harry Frankfurt’s (2004; 2006) work on practical normativity.
Frankfurt claims that there is a “reality within ourselves,” consisting of
empirical facts about what we love, that provides us with normative rea-
sons about which we can sometimes be mistaken. He argues that love
and caring are volitional attitudes which involve a more complex mode
of wanting than the affective attitudes of mere desire, and he attempts to
answer the question of how to authorize some desires over others with
reference to how they relate in such complex volitional structures.
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I agree with him on this general picture, but I will criticize the specific
account of the nature of the volitional that Frankfurt presents. The problem
is that even though he accounts for some types of mistakes, there are many
cases of disconfirmation that his framework cannot accommodate, because
he relies on special attitudes that grant us privileged access to our inner
selves under the appropriate conditions. Furthermore, he maintains that
these attitudes are neither reducible to beliefs or desires, which makes both
their empirical status and their motivational role mysterious.
Based on this critique, I make recommendations for an alternative the-
ory: it should distinguish between “cognitive” and “normative” volitional
attitudes, such that the former can be analyzed as involving beliefs, while
the latter may be identified as structures of affective dispositions. Finally,
at the end of the chapter, I try to sort out my verbal disagreements with
Frankfurt concerning some of the things he says about “morality” and
“values” and which may seem to be at odds with what he says about
reasons.
In chapter 9, “The Nature of the Normative Will,” I propose an account
of volitional reality that follows the aforementioned recommendations.
According to the “Affective Pattern View” the relevant dispositional struc-
tures are patterns in our affective lives, which manifest themselves as we
increase our self-understanding. I borrow the idea of an ontology of pat-
terns from Daniel Dennett (1991b), but whereas he has used it to explain
desires as behavioral patterns, I am explaining volitional attitudes as affective
patterns, which requires me to ‘customize’ the notion extensively.
The result is an account that allows me to explain intuitions about both
the determinacy and the indeterminacy of moral choice. On the one hand,
I will argue that my view can account for the idea that most Nazi offi-
cers in the Holocaust (perhaps even all of them that weren’t psychopaths)
got their practical judgments wrong, without postulating nonrelationalist
moral facts. On the other hand, my view will accommodate genuine moral
dilemmas, which leave the right choice indeterminate even at the ‘intrap-
ersonal’ level. Furthermore, my account also combines intuitions about
deliberation and decision-making as ‘self-finding’ and as ‘self-making.’
I shall argue that while cognitive attitudes can get normative attitudes
wrong in some cases, there are other cases in which the latter may be
shaped by the former, such that our deliberations also play a constitutive
role in the genesis of our normative reasons.
With this account in place, I will reflect further on some of Harry
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Frankfurt’s key claims —in particular, on his ideas about wholeheartedness.
I distinguish between “inner wholeheartedness” and “epistemic resolved-
ness,” arguing that neither are to be pursued too fervently. Instead, I will
claim that allowing ambivalence in our hearts may actually be a form of
authenticity, of being true to the divided nature of our selves. Furthermore,
I will discuss the potential harm of eradicated doubt in the light of our
often heavily biased emotional mechanisms. Finally, at the end of the chap-
ter I summarize how the Affective Pattern View has allowed us to explain
why some desires can have authority over others, which now provides us
with a type-i dispositional solution to the Facts Problem.
One difficulty remains, however, which is the intersubjective dimension
that relationalist theories are allegedly poorly placed to explain. We turn
to this matter in chapter 10, “Intersubjectivity and Moral Discourse.” I will
discuss two objections against relationalism, both derived from arguments
by Michael Smith. The first is that moral discourse would be without
purpose if relationalism were true. I will meet this argument by showing,
first, that we have many good reasons to assume shared volitional attitudes
on many, if not most, occasions. In particular, it is plausible that we share
certain basic moral values as a species. Second, I argue that there are
several further reasons for engaging in moral discourse even in those cases
where our values may turn out to differ.
The second objection is that the words or concepts used by people
in moral discourse, such as “right” and “wrong” or “good” and “bad,”
simply have nonrelationalist meanings, regardless of whether purposeful
discourse about relationalist concepts would be possible or not. Rather
than simply denying this outright, I will admit that some people may
indeed mean their judgments in a nonrelationalist sense. However, other
people do not: I propose a semantic pluralism about what people actually
mean, and a conceptual revisionism about what people should mean when
they make their practical judgments.
This concludes my main line of argument, since I will then have ad-
dressed both of the difficulties for type-i dispositionalism which I had
formulated at the end of chapter 4: the authority of some desires over
others and the intersubjective relevance of practical judgments in moral
discourse.
i Normativity and Motivation :
Setting the Stage

1 Five Principles of Practical
Normativity
It is part of the human condition that life causes us to ask the normative
question of how we should live it. We wonder whether we should support
a particular charity, what we should do about an unwanted pregnancy,
and whether that interesting job offer is worth moving to another country.
Let us call such questions “practical questions,” and the answers that we
give to such questions “practical judgments.” In this chapter I will discuss
a number of intuitions about practical judgments and formulate principles
that are meant to capture these intuitions. Although each principle may
seem plausible when considered independently, certain problems arise
when we try to combine them. The purpose of the rest of this thesis is to
solve those problems.
Before we turn to the first principle, let me say a few preliminary things
about what “practical” means in this context. Very roughly speaking,
practical questions have two characteristic features. First of all, they are
normative: they are not about what we shall, but about what we should do.
And second, of course, they are primarily concerned with action: they are
about what we should do. Thus, practical questions are to be distinguished
from other normative questions, such as questions in epistemology about
the rationality of belief, questions in statistics about how correctly to
draw conclusions from experimental results in various fields of science,
or questions of spelling and grammar about which words and sentences
conform to the rules or standards of a given language.
Notice, however, that the reference to “action” is not entirely helpful in
this respect. Applying statistical rules in order to derive correct conclusions
is, after all, also a form of action. And so is the use of language. Further-
more, when I talk about practical judgments, my concern is not only with
judgments about concrete actions that the agent in question is capable of
performing. We also make practical judgments about political ideals or
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states of affairs that we do not have the power immediately to bring about,
or perhaps even to influence at all. Rather, the point of practical judgments
is to give a kind of bottom-line evaluation of approval or disapproval, to
express whether the agent is in favor of something or against it.
There are many normative terms that we might use to represent the
content of practical judgments, such as “should,” “ought,” “must,” “right”
and “wrong,” “good” and “bad,” “approve” and “disapprove,” and so
on. It seems that of these terms, “should” and “approve” have the least
philosophical commitments built into them, which is why I prefer to
use them when my purpose is to make distinctions between different
philosophical claims.
I shall often use “should” when I want to represent practical judgments
as judgments about actions on the part of the judger, as in “A judges that
she should φ.” When I want to represent practical judgments as judgments
about general ideals or states of affairs, I will often use “approve” or
“disapprove,” as in “A approves of P.” However, as far as I am concerned,
these are not essentially different types of judgments, and their terminology
is interchangeable. Thus, if we want to represent a practical judgment of
approval of a state of affairs P as a judgment on the part of the agent that
he should φ, then we may think of φ as something like “supporting P” or
“contributing to P.” In cases where the agent can do nothing at all with
respect to P we can simply equate φ with “approving of P.” Conversely,
if we want to represent the judgment of an agent A that he should φ as a
judgment of approval of some state of affairs P, then we can think of P as
the proposition “that A does φ.” With these terminological conventions in
place, let us now turn to the principles that I want to discuss.
1.1 The Facts Principle
An important intuition about practical judgments is that we are concerned
to get them right (Smith, 1994, p. 5; Frankfurt, 2006, p. 2, 27). When we
are undecided about a practical question, we cannot simply resolve what
it is that we should do by fiat. Practical normativity is not “up to us” in
this sense (Frankfurt, 2006, p. 34). We can accommodate this intuition if
we subscribe to cognitivism, the view that practical judgments express or
establish beliefs: if a person judges that he should φ, then he believes that he
should φ. Let us call such beliefs “practical beliefs.” Many cognitivists also
accept the stronger claim that there are facts which make certain practical
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beliefs true. We might think of this stronger claim as a form of realism about
the content of practical judgments, but as we shall see in section 1.3.2, there
are certain ambiguities in how moral philosophers have used the term
“realism” which make it undesirable to use that label for the more limited
claim I have just presented. In order to avoid any possible confusion, and
because the claim is going to be one of the central principles that I want to
account for in this thesis, I shall simply call it the “Facts Principle.”
Facts Principle. If a person judges that he should φ, then he
believes that he should φ; and there are facts in virtue of which
such beliefs may be true.
Cognitivism offers an explication of the intuition that we are concerned to
get our practical judgments right: we are concerned to adopt true practical
beliefs. The Facts Principle allows us to be non-skeptical about that concern:
we can get our practical judgments right because there are facts about what
we should do. However, it also raises a difficult question: what sort of facts
are facts about what we should do? What sort of facts make it true that I
should keep my promise, or that John should help the woman that just fell
downstairs? Let us call this the “Facts Question.”
I am aware that some philosophers have expressed unease about the
idea that there are such things as facts which make statements true.1
However, my use of phrases like “made true by facts” or “true in virtue
of facts” is intended in a very noncommittal sense. A fact, in this sense,
is simply what a true belief gets right. This sense of there being a fact is
meant to convey the idea that some things are “matters of fact” whereas
others are not, and that it is a meaningful philosophical question to ask
which things belong to the former category and which to the latter. Thus,
1E.g. Davidson (1974/2001b, p. 194): “Nothing, however, no thing, makes sentences and
theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world, can make a sentence
true. That experience takes a certain course, that our skin is warmed or punctured, that the
universe is finite, these facts, if we like to talk that way, make sentences and theories true.
But this point is put better without mention of facts. The sentence ‘my skin is warm’ is true if
and only if my skin is warm. Here there is no reference to a fact, a world, an experience, or a
piece of evidence.” Davidson’s unease with fact-talk stemmed from two related arguments.
According to the infamous “slingshot argument,” facts cannot be individuated into separate
truth makers for different truths; hence, there is at best really just one “Great Fact” (Davidson,
1967/2001d, p. 19; 1969/2001c, p. 42; for discussion and response, see Neale, 2001). His
second, more general line of argument involved the idea that our notion of facts, or of the
Great Fact, does not explain the notion of truth and should instead be treated as explanatorily
useless with respect to truth (Davidson, 1969/2001c, p. 43–44).
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two philosophers might agree that there is a “fact of the matter” about
whether Iron Maiden sold more albums than Judas Priest, while only one
of them thinks that there is also a fact of the matter about which of the
two is the greatest heavy metal band. The idea that there are facts, in the
noncommittal sense that I have in mind, is the idea that it makes sense to
wonder whether there is a truth about the greatest band that is ultimately
determined in the same way as the truth about who sold the most albums.
And when some people think that a certain matter is a matter of fact, while
others think it is not, then it makes sense for the latter to raise a question
for the former: to explain to them how it is that this matter belongs to the
matters of fact. In order to answer this question, one must explain ‘what
there is to get right’ in this matter, or, more conveniently formulated: what
sort of facts we are talking about. Thus, the Facts Question is the question
how the matter of whether I should keep my promise can be a matter of
fact like the number of albums sold by Judas Priest, and unlike, perhaps,
their being the greatest band or not. In the case of the number of albums
sold, there seems to be less mystery about what there is to get right. But in
the case of practical judgment, things are not so obvious.2
This idea—that we should be able to explain how certain controversial
matters could be matters of fact like other not so controversial matters
of fact—must be distinguished from the various metaphysical views that
philosophers have proposed in order to account for this idea. For example,
we can make a meta-ethical distinction between the view that ethical
matters are matters of fact and the view that they aren’t, while remaining
neutral about the question whether matters of fact involve a correspondence
between the structure of propositions in thought or language and some
structure of facts in a stronger sense. Therefore, many ‘pragmatist’ or
‘inferentialist’ philosophers who reject the idea of facts in this stronger
sense may still accept the noncommittal notion of facts alluded to in the
2Those who are so puzzled by institutional facts as to become anti-realist about the
number of sold albums may substitute even less controversial matters of fact, such as whether
my arm was cut off with an axe yesterday—it was not. In any case, there may be some
indeterminacies about what counts as an ‘album’ that bear on the number of albums sold, and
so on, but suppose I inadvertently mix up the number of albums sold by Maiden with that
of Priest when I compile a chart of popular heavy metal bands, say, then it will be obvious
to everyone what I got wrong. Instead, even though I think the Nazis got their practical
judgments wrong, I find it a puzzling philosophical endeavor to articulate what it is that I
think they were getting wrong.
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Facts Principle.3 For they might still want to be able to say that there is a
fact of the matter about whether I should pay my taxes, while there is no
fact of the matter about whether Maiden is greater than Priest.
Because many such philosophers have been afraid to talk of facts, I
might have avoided the term myself in the interest of preventing unneces-
sary confusion. However, I consider myself to be a friend of facts: the word
is part of ordinary language, and so are phrases like “facts of the matter.”
The notion of truth-making is, admittedly, a philosophical invention, but
its function is merely to explicate the relation between the concept of truth
and the common-sense intuition that some issues are matters of fact. In
other words, it seems to me that the reason why we have the word “fact”
in our language is precisely to be able to articulate the kind of intuition
that motivates the Facts Principle. Therefore, it would be counter-intuitive
not to make use of it. So to those who worry about inflated metaphysical
claims I say: please allow me to use the term as my appeal to facts is as
noncommittal as possible.
There is only one exception—one philosophical view on the basis of
which even my noncommittal notion of facts would have to be rejected.
Some philosophers take the ‘deflationist’ approach towards the truth pred-
icate to the extreme and reject all philosophical questions about what
matters of fact there could be as not well posed. This is the view known
as quietism. If quietists are right, then the Facts Principle would have to
be rejected, and the problems that I shall be trying to solve in this thesis
would simply dissolve immediately. Hence, another way to understand
my use of the notion of facts is as involving the view that philosophical
problems will not go away in the way that quietists think that they will.
Nevertheless, there are other alternatives to the Facts Principle, of
course. Error theorists agree that practical judgments express beliefs, and
they also agree that true beliefs are made true by facts (at least in the
minimal sense I have explicated), but they claim that all practical beliefs
3This also applies to Davidson’s “Great Fact” (see footnote 1 above): even though I speak
of facts in the plural, and of classes of facts such as “institutional facts” or “moral facts,”
my appeal to fact-talk is merely a way of demarcating the matters of fact, and to say that
institutional matters can be matters of fact may be understood by proponents of the slingshot
argument as a way of saying that such matters are included in the Great Fact. Furthermore,
this way of speaking does not require our understanding of something as a matter of fact
to be prior to our notion of truth in any substantial or explanatory sense, as long as we do
not trivialize the notion of truth itself in the quietist manner, explicated below, that would
prevent us from wondering about which matters belong to the matters of fact.
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are false because the facts that would make them true do not exist. In
contrast, non-cognitivists simply deny that practical judgments express
beliefs in the first place. Although the Facts Principle seems to give the
most straightforward justification of our concern to get practical judgments
right, I shall not be arguing that quietist, error theoretic, or noncognitivist
alternatives cannot accommodate this concern. I will simply treat the Facts
Principle as a premise for my arguments in this thesis.
1.2 The Disconfirmation Principle
There is another principle that we might want to accept if we are to account
for the concern to get practical judgments right. Note that it would not
be a matter of great concern if we did not worry that we might also get
them wrong. What we should do is not transparent to us, which makes us
fallible in our attempts to adopt true practical beliefs. This idea also reflects
another intuition about practical judgment: that some of the changes in
our practical views are corrections. Consider the Montgomery bus drivers
who, before the Boycott of 1955, forced African-American passengers to
give up their seats on the bus for white passengers. Suppose that one bus
driver, who used to judge that it was right for him to enforce this policy,
extensively revised his views later on in his life, to the point where he
would forcefully advocate racial equality and the abolition of any such
policies. It seems plausible that such a revision involves more than a
change in preference. Instead, we might want to be able to say that the
bus driver discovered that his practical beliefs were false. Which yields the
following principle:
Disconfirmation Principle. Practical beliefs can be false. If
someone falsely believes that she should φ, then under appro-
priate circumstances, she may discover that her approval of φ
is unjustified and be rationally required to reject it.
But how did the bus driver discover his mistake? That is the question which
follows from this second principle. How do we disconfirm practical beliefs?
What sort of consideration makes it rational for an agent to reject her belief
that she should φ? I shall call this the “Disconfirmation Question.”
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1.2.1 Proceduralism vs. Nonproceduralism
A satisfactory theory of practical normativity must be able to answer
this question for every type of mistake in our practical beliefs that the
theory allows. However, we can distinguish between a weaker and a
stronger version of this requirement, depending on how we understand
the phrase “appropriate circumstances” as it is used in the Disconfirmation
Principle. According to a strong version, these circumstances are exhausted
by concerns that lie in principle within the reach of inquiry. Roughly, that
means (1) that the agent is reasoning correctly and (2) that he has access to
the relevant empirical information. Of course, when we consider all the
practical beliefs of an agent together, no real agent may ever meet these
requirements. In contrast, if we would focus on a particular practical belief
that an agent might have, then perhaps it may be possible for him to have
access to all the empirical information relevant to that specific belief, and
to have reasoned flawlessly with respect to that particular belief, even if
he is just an imperfect fallible human being, living in the actual world.
To be sure, disconfirmation is often possible even when we do not meet
these requirements. The strong understanding merely claims that these
requirements would be sufficient in order to disconfirm a false practical
belief, not that they are necessary, so it can remain neutral about whether
these requirements are even possible to fulfill in actual cases. In other
words, the point of the strong interpretation is not that we may sometimes
be fully informed or fully coherent, but rather that there is nothing else
that might prevent us from discovering our mistakes other than empirical
ignorance or flaws in our reasoning.
In contrast, according to the weaker understanding, the appropriate
circumstances for disconfirmation may require a further ingredient: that
the agent started out with the right prior beliefs. Of course, unless some
of his prior beliefs were false he would not be able to disconfirm any
of them in the first place, but the idea is that there are two types of
false beliefs: those that could be corrected by the process of inquiry,
and those that the agent could maintain coherently regardless of any
empirical information that he might receive. Therefore, the appropriate
circumstances for disconfirmation might require that the agent did not
start out with false beliefs of the second type.
Let us call answers to the Disconfirmation Question that support the
strong understanding “procedural,” and answers that only support the
weaker understanding “nonprocedural.” Thus, according to procedural
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views, all mistakes could in principle be uncovered by the process of
inquiry. However, a few disclaimers about this terminology must be made.
First of all, being procedural in this sense does not involve the claim
that we shall actually be able to uncover all our mistakes in this way.
In fact, it does not even require that it would be physically possible to
uncover our mistakes in any finite amount of time. Second, it does not
mean that rational inquiry can be reduced to the following of “procedures”
in a fully formalized, methodological sense. It does not mean, in other
words, that we can discover our mistakes in a countable number of formal
steps. Third, the distinction between procedural and nonprocedural views
of practical disconfirmation should not be conflated with the distinction
between procedural justice (in the Rawlsian sense) and substantive justice.
The former distinction is in meta-ethics, the latter in normative political
theory, and they are orthogonal to each other.
Which of the two approaches is most plausible? On the one hand,
we might wonder whether nonprocedural views really account for the
intuition behind the Disconfirmation Principle. To be sure, they firmly
uphold the idea that practical beliefs may be false, but this idea is no longer
supported by the concept of disconfirmation in all cases of falsehood. Thus,
if I think that your practical belief that you should kill the traitor is false,
and you ask me why, then on the nonprocedural view, even if I am right
then I might not be able to explain to you, in principle, why you shouldn’t
kill the traitor. I might end up having to simply claim, dogmatically, that
you just started out with the wrong prior beliefs. The question is whether
that really gives an account of our idea that we can get our practical
judgments wrong.
On the other hand, the challenge for procedural views is whether they
can come up with an answer to the Disconfirmation Question from which
it would follow that people are getting it wrong in all the cases in which
it seems intuitively correct to say that they are getting it wrong. Think of
the hard-headed religious fundamentalist who simply sticks to his “moral”
principles and concludes that women who had pre-marital sex should be
put to death. Most of us would want to be able to say that he is getting
it wrong. But can the proceduralist explain this solely in terms of logical
coherence and empirical fact? I will return to these questions in parts ii
and iii of this thesis.
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1.3 The Intersubjectivity Principle
Practical questions are the subject of debate between different persons.
When I wonder whether I should φ, I may want to discuss the reasons
for and against φ with others. In such a situation, it is common to ask
something like “what would you do?” And when another person has a
convincing argument why he should φ under those circumstances, then
this may lead me to believe that I, too, should φ. Furthermore, once I
do believe that I should φ, I may feel criticized when yet another person
explains why she disapproves of φ, and perhaps I will then be forced to
reconsider my reasons for and against φ.
This also applies to our discussions of moral principles, political ideals,
and questions about whether to approve or disapprove of certain states
of affairs. In general, when A approves of P while B disapproves of
P, then arguments that count in favor of A’s practical judgment may
also count against the practical judgment of B. On the assumption that
practical judgments are subject to justification and disconfirmation, we can
formulate this idea as follows:
Intersubjectivity Principle. The same considerations which
justify A’s approval of P may, under the appropriate conditions,
disconfirm B’s disapproval of P and require B to judge in
approval of P instead.
1.3.1 Relationalism vs. Nonrelationalism
The most straightforward way to account for this principle is to adopt
the view that if A and B both approve of P, their practical judgments
have the same content. On this view, the content of both judgments is
something like “it should be the case that P.” This may be contrasted with
the view that the content of each judgment contains a reference to the
agent making the judgment. According to this second view, the content of
A’s judgment might be represented as “according to what is normative for
me, agent A, it should be the case that P,” or “it is normative for A that
P” or perhaps simply “it shouldA be the case that P.” Let us call the latter
view “relationalism” and the former “nonrelationalism.” Thus, according
to relationalism, for A to make a practical judgment about P is for A to
make a judgment about a relation between A and P, whereas according
to nonrelationalism, it is about P itself and need not involve any relation
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to A (it might still involve various relations to A in certain cases, but only
insofar P is itself related to A, for example when P is the proposition that
A is selling his house).
I am aware that this terminology is unusual. Some readers may feel that
“relativism” and “nonrelativism” (or perhaps “absolutism”) would be the
more common terms to use for these views. It is true that “relativism” is an
often used term in moral philosophy, whereas “relationalism” is not.4 And
there are prominent philosophers who have used the term “relativism” in
more or less the same way that I am using “relationalism” here.5 However,
there are also moral philosophers who have used the term “relativism” in
a different sense. In particular, many philosophers associate “relativism”
with the view that different moralities are normative for different human
beings, which does not follow from relationalism as I have defined it above.
In order to be able to distinguish between these two views, I shall make
use of the term “relationalism.”
With this terminology in place, it should be clear that the relationalist
will need to come up with some story about why arguments that count
in favor of “it shouldA be the case that P” would also count against “it
shouldn’tB be the case that P,” since the two judgments seem logically
independent. Instead, on the nonrelationalist view, B’s judgment in dis-
approval of P would simply be the logical negation of A’s judgment in
approval of P.
1.3.2 Relationalist Cognitivism vs. Nonrelationalist Realism
If we combine nonrelationalism with the Facts Principle, we get the view
that A and B are expressing a belief in the same proposition when both
judge in approval of P, and that there may be a fact (or collection of facts)
that makes this proposition true. On this view, practical beliefs are no
different from any other beliefs about matters of external fact: my belief
that innocent animals should not be tortured is made true by the same fact
(or collection of facts) as yours. In contrast, if we combine relationalism
with the Fact Principle, we must conclude that if A and B are both judging
in approval of P, they are expressing beliefs in different propositions—that
P shouldA be the case and that it shouldB be the case.
4Wim de Muijnck has used the term “relationism” for the general metaphysical view that
relational properties are more fundamental than intrinsic properties (2003, pp. 12–13). That
claim is logically independent from what I am calling “relationalism” here.
5Michael Smith, for example (1994, p. 164; 2000/2004e, p. 204).
The Intersubjectivity Principle 25
In order to be able to represent practical beliefs in a manner that
is neutral with respect to the disagreement between relationalism and
nonrelationalism, I will sometimes use the format “practical belief in
approval of P.” When two agents have practical beliefs in approval of
the same state of affairs, I will say that their practical beliefs are “similar.”
Thus, on the nonrelationalist reading of the Fact Principle, similar practical
beliefs are the same beliefs, whereas on the relationalist reading, they
are not. Furthermore, when A holds a practical belief in approval of P,
while B holds a practical belief in disapproval of P, I shall say that their
practical beliefs are “dissimilar.” According to the nonrelationalist reading,
dissimilar practical beliefs are logically contradictory beliefs, whereas on
the relationalist reading, they are not.
A popular doctrine holds that the nonrelationalist reading of the Facts
Principle must at least be true with respect to moral questions. Or in
other words, that there are moral facts on the basis of which all similar
moral beliefs have the same truth values, regardless of the agents holding
those beliefs. Many philosophers know this view as “moral realism,” but
because some might also think of the Facts Principle itself as a form of
realism regardless of whether it should be understood in the relationalist
or nonrelationalist sense,6 I will call this view “nonrelationalist moral
realism.”
In contrast, I shall call the view that accepts the Facts Principle on the
relationalist reading in all cases, including the moral cases, “relationalist
cognitivism.” Calling the latter view “cognitivism” instead of “realism”
introduces an asymmetry in our terminology for the two readings of the
Facts Principle, which may not be very elegant, but it has the advantage
that it avoids the aforementioned association that many philosophers make
between “realism” and nonrelationalism. Furthermore, even though “cog-
nitivism” is logically weaker than the Facts Principle, in practice the only
views which accept cognitivism while rejecting the Facts Principle (i.e.,
quietism and error theory) are always motivated by the wish to accom-
modate a nonrelationalist understanding of practical belief. Therefore,
in the relationalist camp, proponents of the Facts Principle can be called
“cognitivists” for practical purposes.
To summarize, we have now formulated two views, nonrelationalist
moral realism and relationalist cognitivism, which both claim that there are
facts which make certain practical beliefs true, but while the former view
6See for example Smith (2000/2004e, pp. 204–206).
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holds that these have to be the same facts for all agents in moral cases, the
latter allows that these may be different facts for different agents because
the truth conditions of all practical beliefs involve a relation between the
object of the judgment and the agent making the judgment.
It may not be entirely clear which practical questions qualify as moral
and which do not, but let us say that typically, when persons have dissimi-
lar practical beliefs about some moral question, this tends to lead to conflicts
in practice.7 For example, if an environmentalist believes that he should
preserve the forest and wildlife in some area, and a project developer
believes that she should start a project to build a shopping mall in that
same area, then the environmentalist and the project developer have a con-
flict, which makes the practical question of whether to build the shopping
mall a moral question. Nonrelationalist moral realists draw our attention
to the fact that in such cases of conflict, we do not merely discuss what
sort of reasons we might have individually in order to justify our beliefs.
Instead, we tend to speak in more general terms, and debate what is right,
or good, and what is wrong, or bad, or evil. Thus, the environmentalist does
not merely want to defend why he should oppose the shopping mall. A
nonrelationalist moral realist would say that the environmentalist wants to
argue that it is right to preserve the forest and that it would be wrong to
build the shopping mall and that therefore, the project developer should
not approve of the project either and must be mistaken in her practical
beliefs.
Instead, if you think you should paint your living room green, while
I think you should paint it white, then intuitively, there seems to be less
of a conflict, because it’s your house and in the end you can paint it pink
for all I care. It would be odd to exclaim that painting your room green is
wrong or evil (even though some of us may have had the experience that
certain people decorate their homes in ways that ought to be forbidden).
We may even wonder whether the issue between relationalism and
nonrelationalism can really arise in nonmoral cases. Take the last example.
There actually is a subtle ambiguity in the statement that I think you
should paint your living room white. I can make two different judgments.
I can judge, first of all, that I would paint it white if it were my house. But
I can also judge that you should paint it white because I know that you will
like it better, once you’re finished, than if you would paint it green. The
7Here I am using the term “moral” in a broad sense that includes political questions as
well as moral questions that arise in private life.
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second judgment does not require the first at all: in fact, I might judge that
you should paint it white even though I know that I myself would paint
it black if it were my house. But given this distinction, there is nothing
for the relationalist and the nonrelationalist to disagree about anymore.
In the case of the second judgment, the relationalist can happily concede
that the judgments do contradict each other: they are simply different
judgments about what color you would like best. Thus, they are really
just instrumental judgments about how you could reach a goal that you
and I are not in disagreement about (i.e. that you should pick the color
you would like best once it’s on your walls). On the other hand, in the
case of the first judgment (that I should paint the room white if it were
mine) the nonrelationalist can happily concede to the relationalist that
it does not actually contradict your judgment (that you should paint it
green). After all, your judgment is about what you would like, whereas my
first judgment is about what I would like, so the judgments are not about
the same proposition in the first place: they are not expressing dissimilar
practical beliefs.
To develop this point further: let us suppose that I actually believe that
I should paint the room green if it were my house, because I happen to
believe that the green color that you have picked matches my taste. In such
a case, I will say that our practical beliefs are “isomorphic.” In general, if
A believes that he (A) should φ, and B believes that he (B) should φ, then
A and B have isomorphic practical beliefs. Even nonrelationalist moral
realists who subscribe to the universalizability principle (that is, that the
same agents should act the same under the same circumstances) can agree
that isomorphic practical beliefs can have different truth conditions, by
considering the tastes of the respective agents as part of the circumstances.
Intuitively, differences in taste seem to make circumstances relevantly
different in non-moral cases, but leave circumstances relevantly similar in
moral cases.
With these remarks in mind, it seems to me that in order to give a
nonrelationalist account of the Intersubjectivity Principle, one really only
needs to cover the moral cases. Of course, that does not mean that there is
no intersubjectivity in nonmoral cases. It just means that intersubjectivity
in the nonmoral cases can be explained in a fairly trivial way with reference
to similarities and differences in our tastes.8 Instead of “nonrelationalist
8This does not mean that we are not going to be interested in nonmoral cases, because
accounting for the Facts and Disconfirmation principles in nonmoral cases is a lot less trivial!
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moral realism” I will therefore often speak simply of “nonrelationalist
realism.”
If nonrelationalist realism is true, then we must be able to answer the
Fact Question in such a way that for any person A, the facts which make
her practical beliefs about moral questions true or false do not involve any
particular features of A that persons in general need not necessarily possess.
Furthermore, we would have to be able to answer the Disconfirmation
Question in such a way that anything that would disconfirm such a belief
of A would in principle also disconfirm a similar belief of any other agent.
The question for nonrelationalist realism is whether it is possible to
come up with answers that meet these requirements. And the question for
relationalist cognitivists is how answers to the Facts and Disconfirmation
questions that do not meet these requirements could possibly take into
account the Intersubjectivity Principle. I will return to these questions in
the next chapters.
1.4 The Authority Principle
According to yet another intuition about practical normativity, when we
make practical judgments we exercise a kind of authority over ourselves. We
must subscribe, as agents, to our own practical judgments. This intuition
is often expressed in terms of reasons: there seems to be something very
odd about a person who would resolve his doubt about whether to φ by
making the practical judgment that he should φ, but who subsequently
would not consider himself to have any reason to act accordingly. Smith
gives us the following example:
Suppose we are sitting together one Sunday afternoon. World
Vision is out collecting money for famine relief, so we are wait-
ing to hear a knock on the door. I am wondering whether I
should give to this particular appeal. We debate the pros and
cons of contributing and, let’s suppose, after some discussion,
you convince me that I should contribute. There is a knock on
the door. What would you expect? I take it that you would
expect me to answer the door and give the collector my dona-
tion. But suppose I say instead “But wait! I know I should give
to famine relief. But what I haven’t been convinced of is that
I have any reason to do so!” And let’s suppose that I therefore
refuse to donate. What would your reaction be? (1994, p. 6)
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Smith thinks our reaction would be one of “extreme puzzlement.” Judging
that you should donate simply means that you think you have a reason to
donate. Or does it? What does it mean, exactly, to think that you have a
reason to do something? It does not imply, to be sure, that one will always
be motivated to act accordingly. Suppose that instead of being able to wait
for the collector to knock on his door, the person in the example would
have had to make a booking himself, using internet banking, say. Still a
small effort to make, but nevertheless the kind of thing people often fail
to ‘get around to.’ If the person would say “I know I have a reason to do
it, but I am a bad and lazy person and I didn’t get around to it yet” then
we might agree that he is lazy, and perhaps also that that is a bad thing,
but we would not be puzzled about what he is saying. It is, after all, an
unfortunate characteristic of our human nature that we are susceptible to
weaknesses that may prevent us from being motivated to act upon our
own reasons. The resulting disparity between our judgments and our
motivational tendencies can be understood as a limitation on the freedom
of our agency:
[H]uman beings are only more or less free agents, typically less.
They are free agents only in some respects. With regard to the
appetites and passions, it is plain that in some situations the
motivational systems of human beings exhibit an independence
from their values which is inconsistent with free agency; that
is to say, people are sometimes moved by their appetites and
passions in conflict with their practical judgments. (Watson,
1975/2004b, pp. 31–32)
In a later article, Gary Watson identifies this mode of freedom as the
“power of self-government” (1996/2004c, pp. 260–261).9 Following up on
this terminology, let us say that a person acts upon her “self-adopted
reasons” when she is self-governing in her agency. The intuition that we
9See also Dewey (1891/1957, pp. 160–161). Interestingly, Watson has also revised his
original statement about the conceptual relation between practical judgment and freedom in
this sense of self-government. For he argued that there could be “perverse cases” in which
people endorse, in the self-government sense, a course of action that they do not judge to be
the best (1987/2004a, p. 169). Thus, Watson would no longer accept the Authority Principle
as I define it in this section. I return to this matter in section 10.5.5. Furthermore, note also
that the sense of “freedom” alluded to in this context is not the kind that includes weakness
of will and may be used to hold people responsible for their lackings in self-government. I
distinguish these and other concepts of free agency in section 8.4.2.
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exercise authority over ourselves when we make practical judgments may
now be formulated as follows:
Authority Principle. When someone makes the practical
judgment that she should φ, then it follows with conceptual
necessity that she has a self-adopted reason to φ: she is either
sufficiently motivated to φ (she has a “motivating reason” to
φ), or insofar she lacks that motivation, this is due to an impair-
ment in her self-government, such as a compulsive disorder or
weakness of will.
The Authority Principle explains the normative character, the “demand-
ingness” of practical judgments. For what could this normative character
possibly consist in, we may ask, if the person who makes the judgment
would herself not feel required to live up to it? That is exactly what puzzles
us in the case of Smith’s example. The person in the example does not seem
to be acknowledging any lack of freedom or self-government, because he
claims to be acting in according to the reasons he has. But if his practical
judgment does not provide him with reasons, it becomes unclear what that
judgment really means. Instead, if we adopt the Authority Principle, then
we can explain our puzzlement by claiming that what this person is saying
is simply incoherent.
Note that the concept of “being sufficiently motivated to φ” allows that
one also has a desire not to φ, or that one experiences other negative feelings
about φ-ing, as long as the resultant force, so to speak, of the totality of
one’s affective attitudes towards φ, is positive. Let us call such a positive
resultant attitude a “resultant desire” to φ, or a desire to φ in “the resultant
sense.” Thus, the resultant desire may incorporate a multiplicity of desires,
but also sensation responses such as pain and pleasure, and emotions
such as regret or jealousy: all states that contribute motivating impetus.
Where φ is a concrete action that the agent is capable of performing, having
a resultant desire to φ means that she will φ. In the case of a practical
judgment about a political ideal or states of affairs P that the agent does not
have the power immediately to bring about, we can represent the resultant
desire as a propositional attitude. In such cases, according to the Authority
Principle, if A judges in approval of P, then it follows with conceptual
necessity that either A has a resultant desire that P, or A is impaired in
her self-government. Depending on the circumstances, having a resultant
desire that P may involve actions like “supporting P” or “contributing
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to P” that the agent will perform in some way, when presented with the
opportunity. Furthermore, it may involve various intentions, plans or
strategies that the agent is pursuing in order to create such opportunities.10
1.4.1 Internalism vs. Externalism
A more conventional term for the Authority Principle in meta-ethics is
“internalism,” and the view that rejects it is known as “externalism” (Brink,
1986). However, like “realism” and “relativism,” these terms have lead to
a considerable amount of terminological controversy. First of all, some-
times “internalism” refers to those views who claim that judgments carry
motivational implications, of which the Authority Principle is an example,
whereas on other occasions, “internalism” may refer to views according to
which reasons have motivational implications, of which Williams’s claim
that all reasons are “internal reasons” is an example. I will discuss the
distinction between internal and external reasons in chapter 2.
The second thing we should be aware of is that externalism is usually
defended as a view about moral judgments, whereas internalism is usually
a view about practical judgments. This is not a problem if all participants in
the discussion agree that all moral judgments are practical judgments, but
the problem is that some authors have used the term “moral” differently
in this context. For example, Harry Frankfurt maintains that “Morality
is most particularly concerned with how our attitudes and our actions
should take into account the needs, the desires, and the entitlements of
other people” (2004, p. 7). As Frankfurt sees it, such concerns may be
outweighed by others. Thus, in his usage of the term “moral,” moral
judgments are not ‘all things considered’ judgments, whereas practical
judgments are. This is important because, as we shall see below, Frankfurt
is an internalist about practical judgments in the ‘all things considered’
sense. In other words, he does accept the Authority Principle. But at
the same time, his way of using the term “morality” leads to a kind of
10The more abstract or ‘remote’ the proposition P becomes, the more difficult it gets to
specify necessary and sufficient behavior dispositions in order to capture the idea that the
agent possesses a resultant desire that P. At some point, this conceptual question seems to
turn into a question of practical reason for the agent himself: “Given that I approve of P,
what concrete steps should I take in order to promote it?” In such cases, we might perhaps
answer the conceptual question as follows: the agent has a resultant desire that P if he has
a resultant desire to turn whatever answer he himself gives to that practical question into
action.
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externalism about moral judgments.11
Thirdly, internalist theses about practical judgment are usually defined
as claims about rationality in the literature, not as claims about authority or
self-government. For example, Smith defines his internalist thesis about
practical judgments as follows: “If an agent judges that it is right for
her to φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to φ or she
is practically irrational” (1994, p. 61). In order to distinguish it from
other varieties and definitions of internalism, he calls this the “Practicality
Requirement.” The purpose of this reference to rationality is similar to that
of my reference to self-government: namely, to account for the well-known
weaknesses that we have briefly discussed. Both the reference to rationality
in the Practicality Requirement and the reference to self-government in the
Authority Principle need to be further explicated, of course, in order to
argue convincingly for or from these principles. However, at a first glance,
“self-government” seems to me to express better the connection between
judgment and motivation that we are after, and the one that externalists
mean to deny, for two reasons.
The first reason is as follows. Let us consider Smith’s example of the
person who refuses to donate once more. Externalism is basically the
view that what this person claims is coherent and that there needs to be no
weakness in his motivational apparatus. But some externalists might be
willing to say that coherence, even though necessary, is not sufficient for
rationality, and that such a person may still be called irrational. Such an
externalist could therefore happily accept the Practicality Requirement.12
But he could not accept the Authority Principle, because he is committed
to the idea that the person in the example is, motivationally speaking,
fully-functional and in charge of his own agency.
The second reason is that it seems that a person may be fully rational
in his dealings with his motivational weaknesses. For example, an addict
may be well aware of the motivational problems that his addiction gives
rise to, and make the most rational plans in order to deal with those
problems. In fact, certain motivational disorders seem hardly to have
anything to do with rationality at all, as they are not disorders of rational
faculties. In clinical terms, there is a distinction between anxiety disorders,
such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and impulse-control disorders,
such as trichotillomania, kleptomania or pyromania (urges to pull one’s
11I shall discuss Frankfurt’s take on moral normativity in further detail in section 8.5.
12See Schaubroeck (2008, p. 11) for a brief discussion of this objection.
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own hair, to steal, or to set things on fire, respectively, that the patient
structurally fails to resist).13 What these disorders have in common is that
they typically involve behavior against the patient’s own better judgment.
However, whereas anxiety disorders are typically explained and treated
with reference to irrational thoughts, impulse-control disorders typically
aren’t.14
Thus, in the case of obsessive-compulsive disorder, there may be all
sorts of irrational thoughts that the patient has (the obsessions) and which,
even though he does not endorse them (they are not his beliefs), drive his
pathological behavior (the compulsions). But in the case of kleptomania,
the drive to steal does not have such a cognitive origin. It is first and
foremost an urge, a temptation, triggered by an opportunity which presents
itself, that the kleptomaniac fails to resist. All the rational faculties of the
kleptomaniac may therefore be fully-functional, yet his motivating system
is not. If we understand the difference between rationality and irrationality
along these lines, then the Practicality Requirement would account for
anxiety disorders, but not for impulse-control disorders. Of course, Smith’s
notion of “practical irrationality” is meant in a different sense, which does
cover such cases. But that only goes to show that his requirement offers
little plausibility in its own right, and that it depends heavily on whether
Smith can unpack “practical rationality” in an instructive manner. And
if in the end Smith will be forced to simply stipulate that certain conative
contents ‘just are’ irrational, then we may wonder whether “rationality”
was really the appropriate term to begin with. I will return to this matter
later on. For now, let me just conclude that the Authority Principle has
13Note that addiction, the example I just gave, belongs to neither categories. Instead,
addictions are classified as substance-related disorders, which include varying sorts of motiva-
tional problems. Some addicts may be fully rational in the sense that they have no irrational
thoughts and just have to overcome the need for the drugs. Others may have irrational
thoughts, but know that these thoughts are false. And yet others may be completely unaware
of their addiction or its pathological extent, which means that they are no longer acting
against their better judgments—instead, they are simply getting their judgments wrong.
14The distinction is not so clear-cut, of course. Some anxiety disorders may not involve
thoughts so prominently: a patient suffering from a phobia for spiders does not have the
thought that spiders are dangerous or that something bad will happen when they are exposed
to them. The fear for spiders is perhaps better explained as a form of disgust. Conversely, in
some cases, treating someone who has been diagnosed with an impulse-control disorder may
involve the correction of irrational thoughts. But these nuances do not affect my argument.
The point is that in so far as disorders involve actions against the patient’s better judgment,
some of these actions are explained with reference to irrational thoughts, whereas others are
not.
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no such problems. After all, if the kleptomaniac judges that he shouldn’t
steal but simply fails to resist the temptation, then he is clearly not fully
self-governing. The failure of self-government is exactly that which anxiety
disorders and impulse-control disorders have in common.
1.4.2 Normative Reasons for Action
With these remarks in mind, we may wonder what sort of implications
the Authority Principle has. If cognitivism is true, then the Authority
Principle implies that practical judgments have a kind of dual nature: they
express or establish both practical beliefs and self-adopted reasons for
action. This implication reflects what Smith has called the “Janus-faced
character” of practical judgments, which in his view drives the debate
between cognitivists and noncognitivists (2002/2004b, p. 343). Those who
want to accept both cognitivism and the Authority Principle are committed
not just to the view that practical beliefs and self-adopted reasons often
go hand in hand, but rather to the view that it is conceptually impossible
for them to ever come apart. This means that in the case of a fully self-
governing agent, his practical beliefs would be beliefs that determine his
motivations.
Furthermore, what would be the implication for the Facts Principle?
Suppose that some fact makes it true that A should φ. Then if the Authority
Principle is correct, A could not come to believe this truth without adopting
it as a reason for himself to φ. “Normative truths,” as Harry Frankfurt
puts it, “require that we submit to them” (2006, p. 34). Following Smith,
let us call such truths “normative reasons for action” (1994, p. 94). Thus,
a normative reason for action is a truth that determines a self-adopted
reason for action once it becomes known to the agent whose action it is a
reason for. The conjunction of the Facts and Authority Principles may now
be summarized as the view that there are facts about normative reasons for
action. As we shall see in the next section, this view is deeply problematic.
1.5 The Distinctness Principle
The idea that there would have to be a conceptual connection between
what we believe and how we are motivated has troubled many philosophers.
Their worry stems from a widely accepted theory of motivation, which
is often credited to David Hume. In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume
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made the following two claims:
I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never be a
motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never
oppose passion in the direction of the will. (1886/1964, p. 193)
Nowadays, we would say that no set of beliefs could by itself motivate
us to action. Instead, we are motivated by attitudes of a different kind,
which may include desires, passions, appetites, and emotions—all the affective
attitudes that contribute motivational force to what I have called our desires
in the “resultant sense” in the previous section. Perhaps some affective
attitudes, such as emotions, are better thought of as complex attitudes
which involve both belief and affect. The point of the theory is not to rule
out such possibilities, but rather to affirm that such attitudes would indeed
have to be complex, in the sense that they can be analyzed as structures of
more elementary belief-like attitudes whose content is not motivational,
and more elementary affective attitudes whose content is not belief-like.
For the sake of simplicity, I will sometimes represent all affective attitudes
of this more elementary kind as desires. In this broad sense, desires include
both the motivating content of complex attitudes like jealousy or anger as
well as that of affective sensations like pain or nausea. This convention is
consistent with our notion of desires in the resultant sense: it follows that
an agent’s resultant desire about something is the result of all his desires
about it. In terms of this terminology, what the theory says is that beliefs
cannot play the role of desires (which roughly corresponds to Hume’s first
claim) and furthermore, that beliefs cannot by themselves contradict any
desires (roughly the second claim).
Of course, citing a belief may explain why someone is motivated to
act the way he does. My belief that it is raining explains why I bring my
umbrella with me. Furthermore, citing a belief revision may explain a
motivational change. If I were to discover that it is neither raining nor
likely that it will rain for the rest of the day, then I will no longer be
motivated to carry my umbrella with me. Let us say that the belief that it
is raining generates my desire to take the umbrella, and that the rejection of
that belief terminates the desire.
The idea behind the theory is that citing the relevant beliefs in this
example only explains my motivation on the assumption that I already had
the desire to prevent myself from getting wet (and, perhaps, the desire to
carry as little stuff with me as possible). In general, if an agent already
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desires that P, then her belief that φ would realize P may generate a desire
to φ. In that case she has a “primary reason” (Davidson, 1963/2001a, p. 4)
or “motivating reason” (Smith, 1994, p. 92) to φ. But this is a reason to φ
only because she already had the desire that P. Of course, her desire that
P may also be motivated in the light of what she believes. But then her
relevant belief would be that P would realize some further end Q, which
means that she would have to already have the desire that Q. We may
summarize this view into the following principle:
Distinctness Principle. In order for an agent to be motivated
to act in a certain way, she must desire that she acts in that way.
Desires can be generated or terminated on the basis of what
the agent believes, but only under the following condition: if a
desire that P is generated by a belief that Z, or if it is terminated
by a rejection of a belief that Z, then there is a Q such that (i)
the agent desires that Q; (ii) the desire that Q is not generated
by the belief that Z; (iii) Z implies that P would realize Q (or
contribute to the realization thereof).
This principle implies that ultimately, motivated agents must have so-
called “intrinsic desires,” which are not generated by any beliefs at all.15
Furthermore, the principle implies that every desire that is not intrinsic
depends on one that is. An intrinsic desire is conceptually distinct from
what the agent believes (hence the name of the principle). It is an “original
existence” (Hume, 1886/1964, p. 195): it is its own reason for having the
content it has, as it were; it does not have to represent what is true in the
actual world. Moreover, even desires that are generated by beliefs do not
have to represent the actual world. Instead, they represent how the agent
wants the actual world to change given his beliefs about its current state.
Unlike beliefs, therefore, desires are non-cognitive attitudes: they have no
truth-conditions.
15I take this to be a material implication. In order to turn it into a logical entailment
we’d presumably have to explicate certain plausible assumptions against deriving desires in
cycles that would undermine their role in explaining behavior. Of course, the interrelated
desires that we talk about when we explain our behavior often have dependencies in mutual
directions, but if a desire that P were fully derived from a desire that Q then the desire that Q
could not ultimately be fully derived from the desire that P. It might be, due to the holistic
nature of language or consciousness perhaps, that no particular desire attribution, or even no
particular desire experience, is ever fully intrinsic, but then a certain form of “original” desire
which for conceptual reasons always escapes full articulation must still be presupposed. The
content of desire has to come from somewhere, it cannot just be running in circles.
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1.5.1 The Facts Problem
We can now see how taken together, the cognitivist analysis of practical
judgments, the Authority Principle and the Distinctness Principle yield
a puzzling conceptual connection between what self-governing agents
believe and how they are motivated. For if believing something cannot
by itself, without the help of any intrinsic desires, terminate an existing
desire nor generate a new one, then how can it be a requirement of self-
governing agency that we must be motivated in certain ways if we have
certain beliefs?
Things become even more puzzling if we also accept the Facts Principle.
On the one hand, recall that together, the Facts and Authority Principles
yield the view that there are facts about normative reasons for action, which
are such that merely knowing them would make it conceptually impossible
for self-governing agents not to be motivated in certain ways. On the other
hand, according to the Distinctness Principle, for an agent to be motivated
in certain ways, the agent must always possess certain intrinsic desires
which do not depend on his beliefs. This seems to suggest that, whatever
the agent believes, he could always have had different intrinsic desires,
in which case his concrete motivations might also have been different.
But now it becomes really difficult to answer the Facts Question. What
sort of facts could make beliefs true in such a way that (a) self-governing
agents who had those beliefs would have to be motivated in certain ways,
if it is also true that (b) their motivation depends on intrinsic desires that
could have been different regardless of their beliefs? Requirement (a),
which follows from the Facts and Authority Principles, seems to contradict
requirement (b), which follows from the Distinctness Principle. Let us call
this the “Facts Problem.”16
1.5.2 The Disconfirmation Problem
A similar problem presents itself when we try to answer the Disconfirma-
tion Question. If the Authority Principle is correct, then it is conceptually
necessary that a change in our practical views implies a corresponding change
in our self-adopted reasons for action. If the Disconfirmation Principle is
also correct, then this means that if an agent realizes that X disconfirms
16This is basically my version of Smith’s “moral problem,” which he constructs as a
paradox resulting from three requirements that are similar to the three principles employed
here (1994, p. 12).
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her belief that she should φ, and requires her to adopt the belief that she
should ψ instead, then in the light of X, she would not only be irrational if
she failed to change her beliefs accordingly, but she would also be lacking
in self-government if she would not lose her resultant desire to φ and gain
a resultant desire to ψ. The question is, what sort of X might have this
dual impact on her attitudes?
Cases of instrumental reasoning are easy, of course: suppose that X
is evidence that ψ, rather than φ, would allow the agent to make it the
case that P. If she had a derived desire to φ in order to fulfill her intrinsic
desire that P, she may be expected, upon learning of X, to lose her desire
to φ and acquire a desire to ψ instead. The problem is how to answer the
Disconfirmation Question in non-instrumental cases. If, as the Distinctness
Principle implies, intrinsic desires are entirely non-cognitive attitudes,
which are not subject to matters of belief, then how could there be any X
such that X would both disconfirm a belief and diminish an intrinsic desire
of a self-governing agent? Let us call this the “Disconfirmation Problem.”
We have now seen how the Facts, Disconfirmation, Authority and
Distinctness Principles lead to two philosophical problems: the Facts
Problem and the Disconfirmation Problem. I have not yet discussed how
the Intersubjectivity Principle relates to these problems, and whether the
difference between relationalism and nonrelationalism is relevant in this
context. Furthermore, I have also not yet made a connection between
the Disconfirmation Problem and the distinction between procedural and
nonprocedural answers to the Disconfirmation Question.
I will turn to these matters in the remaining chapters of part i. In part
ii my strategy will be to discuss possible solutions to the two problems as
I have constructed them in this chapter, and then to investigate whether
those solutions become more or less plausible, or perhaps even impos-
sible, depending on whether we adopt proceduralist, nonproceduralist,
relationalist, or nonrelationalist interpretations of the Disconfirmation and
Intersubjectivity Principles.
However, before we discuss any solutions to the problems as I have set
them up, I will first, in chapters 2 and 3, discuss an important historical
precursor to the solutions that I will later on propose. This precursor is a
view defended by Bernard Williams, which bears important similarities to
the view that I will develop in this thesis. Whereas this chapter has been
a thematic introduction to the project of this thesis, in which I have set up
the subject matter in my own preferred terms, the next chapter may be
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thought of as a historical introduction. Its purpose is not only to give credit
where it is due, but also to help those who are familiar with the debate
locate my proposal within the literature. In chapter 3, Williams’s ideas will
be connected to some of the terminology from the present chapter, setting
the stage for the further development of my own framework in chapter 4.

2 The Internal Reasons View
The proposal that I want to develop in this thesis bears certain similarities to
the view that Bernard Williams defended in “Internal and External Reasons”
(1980/1981a). Although I will often refer to some of the concepts and
distinctions from the previous chapter in order to disambiguate Williams’s
terminology, my purpose in this chapter is to discuss his proposal on its
own terms, while the next chapter will be devoted to questions about how
the view may be related to the Principles from chapter 1.
In section 2.1 we take a look at the central claim that Williams puts
forward, the “Internal Reasons View,” and how it differs, exactly, from its
opponent, the “External Reasons View.” In section 2.2 we focus in more
detail on the central distinguishing notion, that of the “sound deliberative
route.” Then, in section 2.3, I discuss Williams’s argument in defense of
the view, and in the final sections 2.4 and 2.5 we will examine two possible
objections against his defense. In order to counter these objections, we
must explicate certain premises that with help me to clarify some of my
own purposes in the next chapters.
2.1 Internal and External Reasons
According to Williams, we should distinguish between an “internal” and
an “external” interpretation of statements about reasons for action. On the
internal interpretation, in order for such a statement to be true there must
be elements in the “subjective motivational set” of the agent in question
from which the agent could, by means of sound deliberation, acquire
the motivation to do what the statement says he has reason to do. The
subjective motivational set, abbreviated by Williams as “the S,” contains
the motivational characteristics of the agent, but construed in a very broad
sense, so as to include:
such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional
reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may
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be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent.
(p. 105)
In contrast, on the external interpretation, there can be a reason for an
agent to φ even if no amount of deliberation on the basis of his S could
provide him with the motivation to φ. Williams discusses the example of
Owen Wingrave, who is urged by his family to join the army. Owen hates
everything about the military. All his attitudes are against it. Ex hypothesi,
Owen has no reason, on the internal interpretation, to join the military.
But according to his family members, there is nevertheless a reason why
he should join: all his male ancestors had done the same before him, and
he would violate the family pride if he would not follow them in their
footsteps. As Williams put it:
Knowing that there was nothing in Owen’s S which would
lead, through deliberative reasoning, to his doing this would
not make them withdraw the claim or admit that they made it
under a misapprehension. They meant it in an external sense.
(p. 106)
If a reason statement is true on the internal interpretation, then the agent
has an “internal reason” in Williams’s terminology; if it is true on the
external interpretation, then he has an “external reason.” Having estab-
lished this distinction, Williams goes on to argue that there are no external
reasons: all reason statements that are meant in the external sense, such as
the statement made by Owen’s family members, are “false, or incoherent,
or really something else misleadingly expressed” (1980/1981a, p. 111).
Conversely, any reason statement which is true must be understood in
the internal sense. Let us call this view the “Internal Reasons View.” In
contrast, let us call the view that some reason statements are true in the
external sense, and thus that there are external reasons, the “External
Reasons View.”
2.1.1 External Reasons and Externalism
Some authors have, instead, used the terms “internalism” and “externalism”
to refer to these two views, including Williams himself (2001, p. 91; see
also Skorupski, 2007, p. 93). However, we should distinguish the External
Reasons View from the various other views that have been going under
the name of “externalism” in practical philosophy which I discussed in
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section 1.4.1. In particular, note that the view differs from the type of
externalism according to which an agent might coherently judge that he
should φ without having a self-adopted reason to φ. In other words, the
External Reasons View differs from the sort of externalism that would
reject my Authority Principle or Smith’s practicality principle. Recall, once
more, Smith’s example of the person who admits that he should give to
famine relief, but denies that he also has a reason to do so. This seems to
be different from what Owen’s family members are claiming about Owen:
their claim is that Owen does have a reason to join the army. And the
difference is not just a verbal matter of when to use the phrase “having a
reason.” The point of the famine relief example was to illustrate the idea
that there might be nothing irrational or deficient about acknowledging,
on the one hand, that one should do something, and deciding, on the
other hand, nevertheless not to do it. On such a view, self-governing
agency does not by itself demand submission to this sense of ‘should.’ In
contrast, Williams is using the example of the Wingraves to articulate a
more demanding way in which people mean their statements when they
attribute reasons to others: a way that does involve the implication that the
agent is flawed, deficient, or mistaken, in his agency if he is not responsive
to the reason. Initially, Williams thought this would commit the external
reasons theorist to the claim that such an agent would be irrational:
There are of course many things that a speaker may say to
one who is not disposed to φ when the speaker thinks that he
should be, as that he is inconsiderate, or cruel, or selfish, or
imprudent; or that things, and he, would be a lot nicer if he
were so motivated. Any of these can be sensible to say. But one
who makes a great deal out of putting the criticism in the form
of an external reason statement seems concerned to say that
what is particularly wrong with the agent is that he is irrational.
(1980/1981a, p. 110)
Thus, if Owen would deliberate correctly upon his S and still lack any
motivation to join the army, then to say that he nevertheless has an external
reason to join the army is to say that he is irrational in not having any
motivation to do so. Later on, Williams has retracted this explication of
the meaning of external reason statements, saying that it was “too strong”
(2001, p. 93). Nevertheless, what seems essential to the reasons attributed
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by external reason statements is that the agent is held to be mistaken or
deficient in some sense if he does not act upon those reasons.
If Owen were indeed mistaken in this sense, then it follows that, if
he were to recognize and correct his mistake, he would also have to act
accordingly. After all, if he would not act accordingly, then given the above
analysis of his purported external reason, he would still be mistaken or
deficient. Of course, it might be that in addition to his mistake, Owen was
also suffering from a weakness of will that would still prevent him from
joining the army even if he were to recognize the reason why he must
join. But let us suppose that, instead, Owen was fully self-governing in his
agency. And let us suppose furthermore that his external reason outweighs
any reasons not to join the army. Then, given the idea that he is mistaken
if he does not join the army, it follows that recognizing his mistake would
make Owen join the army.
This implication reflects another general feature of every reason state-
ment: that it must be a “possible explanation” of the agent’s action
(Williams, 1980/1981a, p. 106). As has often been remarked, reasons
have a dual nature: they play both explanatory and justificatory roles.
The justificatory role lies in the implication that Owen must somehow be
mistaken if he does not act upon the reason he has. The explanatory role,
conversely, lies in the implication that Owen will act upon the reason if he
is not mistaken. So construed, the two roles are clearly two sides of the
same coin.
2.1.2 Internal and External Reasons Are Normative Reasons
It may seem that this dual role is at odds with the distinction between
normative reasons and motivating reasons for action. Indeed, Williams
seems to be rejecting such a distinction:
Some writers make a distinction between “normative” and
“explanatory” reasons, but this does not seem to me to be
helpful, because normative and explanatory considerations are
closely involved with one another. (2001, p. 93)
However, I think the interrelatedness between the justificatory and explana-
tory dimensions of reasons do not preclude making such a distinction. The
distinction may be unhelpful for those who would want to rid normative
reasons of all explanatory relevance, but we need not deny the explanatory
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relevance of normative reasons in order to distinguish them from moti-
vating reasons. Recall that motivating reasons are reasons that actually
explain the agent’s behavior on the basis of the motivating attitudes the
agent has (however construed). But the fact that normative reasons are
not explanatory in this actual sense does not mean they are not “possibly”
explanatory in the sense that Williams has in mind, i.e., explanatory if
certain conditions are met. On the contrary, it is in terms of the conditions
under which they would explain the agent’s actions that we have defined
normative reasons in the first place: a normative reason for A to φ is a
truth such that, if A believes this truth and is self-governing in his agency,
then A will φ.
One might still object that, according to the distinction, at least moti-
vating reasons would only have a single role: they only explain, but they
do not justify actions. In terms of the notion of justification we are here
discussing, that would be correct. Nevertheless, there is still something
of a justificatory aspect to motivating reasons. When an agent acts upon
a motivating reason to φ, then his action can be made sense of in terms
of that reason, even if it is not what he has a normative reason to do.
Motivating reasons “rationalize” actions, as it is sometimes put, which is
what makes explanations in terms of motivating reasons different from
physiological explanations of behavior. Indeed, it is this very consideration
which Williams also cites when he argues that every reason that we use to
explain what an agent actually does must have a certain normative aspect:
if we explain what A does in terms of his reason for doing that
thing, which is one type of giving a reason why he did it, we
rationalize his conduct (in the phrase familiar from Davidson’s
work): that is to say, we cite a consideration which was effective
in his coming to act because it made normative sense to him.
(2001, p. 93)
But it seems to me that this normative aspect does not make motivating
reasons indistinguishable from normative reasons. After all, the attitudes
that make the agent’s actual actions intelligible need not be attitudes
that he would ever act upon under the conditions in terms of which his
normative reasons are understood. In fact, the attitudes which rationalize
his current behavior might not even be part of his motivations at all under
those conditions. Thus, we can accommodate the intuition that all reasons
for action must have justificatory as well as explanatory aspects and still
46 The Internal Reasons View
make the distinction between motivating and normative reasons for action,
such that an agent might be said to have a motivating reason to φ in the
absence of a normative reason to do so, and vice versa. It turns out that
normative reasons do have an explanatory aspect, but that it is different
from that of motivating reasons, and conversely, that motivating reasons
have a justificatory aspect that is different from that of normative reasons.
Another thing to note is that we have been using the notion of normative
reasons in an ‘all things considered sense,’ such that the agent would have
a resultant motivation to φ under the conditions in which such reasons
explain the agent’s actions. But sometimes Williams talks about having
reasons in a sense that may be outweighed by other reasons:
“A has reason to φ” does not mean “the action which A has
overall, all-in, reason to do is φ-ing”. He can have reason to do
a lot of things which he has other and stronger reasons not to
do. (1980/1981a, p. 104)
However, we can make the same distinction between normative reasons and
motivating reasons at this non-resultant level of reason talk. Thus, a ‘non-
resultant’ motivating reason explains a non-resultant amount of motivation
that the agent actually has. And a ‘non-resultant’ normative reason is a
truth such that the agent would have that ’non-resultant’ motivation if she
believed this truth and were self-governing in her agency.
Given the distinction between normative reasons in the all things con-
sidered and the non-resultant sense, there is now a further question we
can ask about the interrelatedness of motivating and normative reasons.
We have seen that an agent lacks in self-governance if he does not act
in accordance with his self-adopted reason, i.e., with what he takes his
all-things-considered normative reason to be. It could be the case that the
agent did believe there was some, non-resultant, normative reason in favor
of what he did, but that there were stronger normative reasons not to do
it. We may wonder, however, if his action could still be explained by a
motivating reason that he had, if the agent did not think there was any
non-resultant normative reason in favor of it whatsoever. Perhaps it is this
possibility that Williams wanted to deny when he said that the reasons
which explain an agent’s actions must always make some normative sense
to him. And that it is in this sense that we cannot fully distinguish between
motivating and normative reasons.
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I have my doubts about whether this is plausible, however. Consider
Harry Frankfurt’s example of the unwilling addict (Frankfurt, 1971/1988b,
p. 17). The addict may be wholehearted in his rejection of his drug use,
it seems, and still fail to resist it. His desire for the drugs may be too
strong, and in combination with beliefs about where to get the drugs, or
how to operate them, explain how it came to be that, once again, he’s
heating up the heroine. That seems like a perfect case of a motivating
reason without that reason having any normative credibility whatsoever
in the eye of the agent himself. The justificatory aspect of this motivating
reason is solely with reference to a disenfranchised desire that the agent
has come to regard as fully external to his evaluative outlook. Under the
idealized circumstances in terms of which we understand his normative
reasons, the agent might not have any remaining desire for the drugs.1
However, note that this possibility is not a necessary condition for the
distinction between motivating and normative reasons. For without this
possibility it would still follow that a motivating reason in the resultant
sense only requires the agent to believe that he has a normative reason in
the non-resultant sense, and that clearly distinguishes the limited sense
in which motivating reasons are justificatory from the full-blown sense in
which normative reasons are.
With these remarks in mind, we are now in a position to observe that
the conditions on the explanatory role of normative reasons as I have
explicated them (whether understood in the all-things-considered or the
non-resultant sense) are the exact same conditions that Williams places
on the reason statements that he is considering, including external reason
statements:
Does believing that a particular consideration is a reason to act
in a particular way provide, or indeed constitute, a motivation
to act? [. . . ] Let us grant that it does—this claim indeed seems
plausible, so long at least as the connexion between such beliefs
and the disposition to act is not tightened to that unnecessary
degree which excludes akrasia. (1980/1981a, p. 107)
Provided that we identify Williams’s use here of the notion of akrasia with
our notion of lackings in self-governance, it follows that we may apply
1For a different line of argument in support of roughly the same conclusion, see also
Setiya (2010).
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Williams’s arguments about internal and external reason statements to our
notion of normative reasons.2
2.1.3 Self-Attributed External Reasons Entail Internal Reasons
Given the explanatory requirement on external reasons that we have now
established, it follows that once Owen would recognize that he has an ex-
ternal reason to join the army, because this would give him the motivation
to act accordingly (absent lackings in self-governance), he would thereby
also acquire an internal reason to join the army:
The claim [that the agent would be motivated to act if he be-
lieved himself to have an external reason] is in fact so plausible,
that this agent, with this belief, appears to be one about whom,
now, an internal reason statement could truly be made: he is
one with an appropriate motivation in his S. A man who does
believe that considerations of family honour constitute reasons
for action is a man with a certain disposition to action, and also
dispositions of approval, sentiment, emotional reaction, and so
forth. (1980/1981a, p. 107)
This implication is interesting for two reasons. First of all, it means that an
agent can never coherently attribute an external reason to himself without
also attributing an internal reason to himself. This gives us another way
of understanding the difference between the Wingrave example and the
famine relief example. According to the sort of externalist who rejects the
Authority Principle, a person might coherently claim that, even though he
should give to famine relief, he does not have a reason to do so. By contrast,
the External Reasons View is not the view that Owen might coherently
claim of himself that he has an external reason to join the army without
having an internal reason to do so. Or that the person in the famine relief
example might also have said, coherently, that even though he knows he
2This conforms to the loose sense in which the term “akrasia” is often used nowadays, as
the lack of motivation to execute one’s judgment about what one has reason to do. Instead,
for Aristotle, akrasia involved a failure to translate one’s general sense of how to act to the
appropriate concrete action as a result of a misapprehension of the concrete situation. But
that does not seem to be what Williams has in mind here, for such a misapprehension would
simply be reflected in another false belief about which action the agent has reason to perform
in the present situation. Despite his great affinity with the classics, I therefore take Williams
to have been using “akrasia” in the modern sense here.
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has an external reason to donate, he does not think he has an internal
reason to do so. The External Reasons View only allows others to attribute
an external reason to an agent without attributing an internal reason to
him.
Second, the implication is interesting because it means that the External
Reasons View is committed to the idea that external reasons are a kind
of counterfactual internal reasons. If an external reason statement is true,
then that truth determines certain elements that would be in the agent’s S if
the agent would believe that truth. The challenge for the External Reasons
View is to explain what sort of reasons could have such implications for
the agent’s S without being internal reasons. In order to see whether
this challenge can be met, we must first take a closer look at the precise
requirements that constrain the notion of an internal reason.
2.2 The Deliberative Route
In his latest writing on the subject, Williams summarized the Internal
Reasons View as follows:
The formulation of the internalist position which I now prefer
is: A has a reason to φ if and only if there is a sound deliberative
route from A’s subjective motivational set (which I label “S,” as
in the original article) to A’s φ-ing. (2001, p. 91)
Note that Williams has now switched to talk of reasons in the all things
considered sense. If the agent would φ after sound deliberation, then
deliberation would have provided him with a resultant motivation to do
so, rather than merely a certain non-resultant amount of motivation. And
a resultant motivation after sound deliberation constitutes a reason in the
all things considered sense:
It is natural to take the condition as implying not just that A
has a reason to φ, but that he or she has more reason to do that
than to do anything else. (2001, p. 91)
From now on I will stick to the discussion of all-things-considered reasons,
except when explicitly noted otherwise. Nevertheless, there is nothing
in the above two remarks from Williams that would prevent us from
translating his view back into non-resultant reason talk: if an all-things
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considered reason is constituted by a resultant motivation after sound
deliberation, then a non-resultant reason may still be understood in terms
of a non-resultant amount of motivation after sound deliberation.
With that out of the way, let us now focus on the crucial notion in the
formulation: that of a “sound deliberative route.” Essential to the idea of
such a route is that it must start from somewhere, and if the agent is to have
an internal reason, then that starting point must be his actual S. However,
it may seem strange that Williams is using the notion of soundness to
depict this idea with. In logic, we say that an argument is sound when (a) it
is valid and (b) its premises are true. Thus, in order for an argument to be
sound, there has to be something right about the premises it started from.
Instead, the Internal Reasons View seems committed to the opposite idea:
that whatever S we happen to have can and should be the starting point for
the deliberative route that we must take, and that there is no additional
sense in which there has to be anything true about this S in order for us to
be able, in principle, to reach our reasons by means of that route.
2.2.1 Instrumental Deliberation
Nevertheless, there is an important feature of deliberation that might
explain why Williams may have used the word “sound,” which is that it
is in the interest of a deliberating agent that he takes the correct means
to his ends. It follows that deliberation should lead him to correct errors
in his beliefs. Williams gave the example of a person who wants to drink
tonic and mistakes a glass of gin for a glass of tonic. The notion of sound
deliberation is meant to cover the correction of such false beliefs, so that
we can say that the person does not have an internal reason to drink from
the glass. Thus, we can say that the deliberative route must lead to sound
instrumental arguments that are based on true beliefs, even though the
agent might have false beliefs at the starting point of his deliberations.
Note, by the way, that the gin and tonic example already presupposes
our distinction between normative and motivating reasons. For suppose
that the agent goes and drinks from the glass. Surely, there is now a reason
why he did that (the motivating reason), even though he did not, according
to Williams, have a reason to do so (the normative reason). The example
does, however, lie within the requirement that the motivating reason must
at least make normative sense to the agent himself. Given that the agent
really believes that the glass contains tonic, it makes sense to him to drink
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from it.
There is a further limitation that Williams places on the possible dis-
tance between the actual motivations of the agent and what he has nor-
mative reason to do. Williams distinguishes between, on the one hand,
rejecting false beliefs and adopting true ones to replace them with, and on
the other hand, the adoption of true beliefs on matters that the agent did
not initially hold beliefs about at all. With respect to the first type of revi-
sion, Williams thinks that any considerations that depend on false beliefs
are not really justified, and therefore, internal reasons must correspond to
what the agent would do if all such falsehoods were removed. However,
with respect to the second type of belief change, the mere addition of true
beliefs without thereby removing any falsehoods from the original belief
base, Williams proposed the following restriction:
A may be ignorant of some fact such that if he did know it he
would, in virtue of some element in S, be disposed to φ: we can
say that he has a reason to φ, though he does not know it. For
it to be the case that he actually has such a reason, however, it
seems that the relevance of the unknown fact to his actions has
to be fairly close and immediate; otherwise one merely says
that A would have a reason to φ if he knew the fact. I shall not
pursue the question of the conditions for saying the one thing
or the other, but it must be closely connected with the question
of when the ignorance forms part of the explanation of what A
actually does. (1980/1981a, p. 103)
I mention this restriction in the interest of getting Williams right; neverthe-
less, I must admit that I find it wholly unconvincing, for several reasons.
First of all, I would say that if an unknown fact is relevant to an element in
the agent’s S, then the agent has an interest in discovering this fact, just
like the agent would have an interest in removing one of his false beliefs
if that were relevant to an element in his S. If the latter type of interest
is not constrained by how “close and immediate” the relevance has to be
(whatever that is supposed to mean), then why should such a constraint
apply to the former type of interest? The first argument that Williams
gives is that it would be more natural to say that the agent “would have a
reason,” but this seems rather weak as a defense of a constraint with such
normative implications for the agent.
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Consider the following example. Suppose that the facts about global
warming and the elements in our Ss are such that, the more we learn
about these facts, the greater our motivation becomes to reduce our carbon
emissions. Because of the attention for the issue in the media, most adults
in the West will hold beliefs about this matter nowadays, and a certain
amount of the unwillingness to reduce emissions is due to widespread
false beliefs about the matter. Nevertheless, the devil is in the details, and
about many relevant details even our best scientists remain simply ignorant.
Furthermore, global warming was well underway thirty years ago, when
many people lacked any beliefs on the matter whatsoever. Suppose that
such ignorance, in the absence of concrete false beliefs, would not be closely
connected enough to the explanation of these people’s carbon emitting
behavior in the manner that Williams had in mind. Then, according to
Williams, they had no reason to behave in ways that would have prevented
the current climate crisis. They only “would have had” such a reason if
they had known what we know now (or what the scientists of tomorrow
will know in further detail).
I am not convinced that this would be more natural to say for a native
English speaker. However, even if we would grant Williams this point
in the linguistic sense, then it still seems that the ambitions of the Inter-
nal Reasons View should go beyond the contingent semantics of English
natural language. Surely ignorance about global warming does not elim-
inate its normative relevance? Surely, if our Ss contain attitudes about
famine, flooding, and various other types of natural disaster, then a sound
deliberative route should lead us to discover the facts about global warming?
Of course, we cannot expect ourselves to know everything that would
be relevant to our interests if we did know it. We are finite creatures, after
all, and thus it is only rational that we expect from ourselves and each
other only what lies within the boundaries of our cognitive capacities and
the state of knowledge in our times. However, a normative reason, in the
all-things-considered sense, does not determine what may be expected
from us, but merely what would be best for us to do. It does not follow
from saying that it would have been best for us to reduce our emissions,
that this could also reasonably be expected from us. The latter would
be a claim about what we could be reasonably held responsible for, not
merely about what we have reason to do. Thus, even if people could not
be blamed for their failure to understand that cutting emissions would
have been a correct means to their ends, doesn’t mean we cannot say that
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people did have a normative reason to cut emissions.
Perhaps Williams would have wanted to reject the global warming
case as a relevant example, by simply responding that in this case, the
facts about global warming simply are sufficiently close to our interests
to warrant their normative relevance. But then he would run into his
own second argument, which is that the ignorance must be part of the
explanation of the agent’s behavior. After all, it seems that we can simply
explain why people drive cars, take planes, and use lots of electricity
without bringing in their ignorance about global warming. We can simply
explain their behavior given their interests and the things they do know. Of
course, we need to explain their behavior in terms of their ignorance if we
wanted to answer the question why they didn’t emit less carbon dioxide given
the dangers of such emissions. But if that already counts as a relevance
to the explanation of behavior, then it becomes hard to see how any sort
of ignorance that would fulfill the role of making a “would have a reason”
statement true could possibly fail to also make a “has a reason” statement
true.
Furthermore, the restriction requires a lot of distinctions in the logic
of belief revision that I am not so sure about. First of all, the distinction
between correcting false beliefs and adding new beliefs can, I suppose,
be modeled in various ways, but would such a model capture the reality
of the interconnectedness and holism of our beliefs? Second, the idea
that a fact, of which the relevance to our interests can be established,
might nevertheless be too “distant” to be granted normative significance
presupposes not only that we can articulate such a scale of proximity, but
also that we can make a case for a boundary value beyond which talk of
“having reasons” would no longer be justified. I have just argued that the
criterion of explanatory relevance is problematic, but other criteria might
be equally problematic.
Furthermore, even if we could determine such a value, we would run
into another problem. For suppose that the relevance of some fact F would
be too distant from the interests in an agent’s S. Then there might be
another fact, G, that would be close enough to have relevance. However,
it is conceivable that once the agent would learn about G, the relevance
of F would become suddenly much more immediate. Hence, a sound
deliberative route would, through the discovery of G, also lead to the
discovery of F. But now we may wonder if there could be any sort of facts
that would be relevant to us if we knew them, but which might not be
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reached, in principle, through the discovery of intermediate facts that make
the more distant facts more accessible to us, and their relevance clearer?3
It seems to me that Williams is getting himself into a lot of trouble over
what should have remained an innocent and normatively irrelevant matter
about when people are more likely to say, in everyday natural language,
that an agent “would have had a reason” if he knew some fact, rather
than that he “had a reason” in the light of that fact. Furthermore, if we
accept the distinction between normative and motivating reasons, we can
even accommodate the sense in which such agents do not have a reason by
saying that they do not have a motivating reason. And we can be specific
about the sense in which they do have a reason: they have a normative
reason because it is based on facts that are relevant to their interests, which
means that their sound deliberative route would not be completed if they
remained ignorant of these facts. In what follows, I will therefore discuss
the prospects of the Internal Reasons View without holding this restriction
against it. Instead, I will understand the deliberative route as involving
both the removal of all false beliefs and the adoption of all true beliefs that
are relevant to the ends of the agent.4
3Perhaps if G could be discovered on the basis of our current “paradigm,” in Kuhn’s
sense, while the discovery of F would require a “scientific revolution,” then we might say
that F would be too far removed. Indeed, the difficulty of understanding such a transition as
rationally required from a deliberative point of view was at the heart of Kuhn’s philosophical
interests. However, this difficulty is closely related to Kuhn’s famous incommensurability
thesis, which makes it impossible to migrate the truth conditions of the beliefs in the old
paradigm to those in the new paradigm. I am not sure that the Internal Reasons View is even
compatible with that, but even if it were, then I would be unhappy about making it dependent
upon the Kuhnian framework.
4Michael Smith’s interpretation of Williams’s view is that an agent has a normative reason
to φ iff he would be motivated to φ under the following conditions: “i. the agent must have
no false beliefs”; “ii. the agent must have all the relevant true beliefs”; and “iii. the agent
must deliberate correctly” (Smith, 1995/2004d, p. 20). Condition iii. covers non-instrumental
deliberation about the agent’s ends themselves, to which I shall turn below. Conditions i.
and ii. cover the types of belief revision which I have just discussed. By “all the relevant
true beliefs” Smith means all beliefs that are relevant to the agent’s ends. Nicole Saunders
has noted (in a paper of which I only have a draft version) that condition ii. is therefore
a misrepresentation of Williams’s view, because it does not accommodate the proximity
restriction that I have just discussed. She also argues that ii. is implausible because practical
rationality should be on a par with the justification of beliefs, rather than with their truth. I
think her argument equivocates on what “justification” means, however. In contrast, I have
just argued at length against the proximity restriction, and proposed to include all true beliefs
relevant to the agent’s interests, which is identical to Smith’s condition ii. Thus, in my view,
Smith’s portrayal of Williams, though exegetically inaccurate, is at least in this respect also an
improvement.
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2.2.2 Deliberation about Ends
The second aspect of the deliberative route is, of course, to establish those
ends themselves. For now I will speak neutrally about “ends” as the
possible elements of an agent’s S that provide the intrinsic normativity,
so to speak, without yet considering whether such elements should be
thought of as Humean, non-cognitive desires, or as anti-Humean attitudes
that are truth-apt and motivational at the same time. Now first of all,
Williams remarks that deliberation about the ends themselves may involve
considerations of planning and time-ordering so as to be able to combine
the satisfaction of different ends. This is an interesting topic in its own
right, but at the same time we can see how the normative relevance of
such considerations is pretty much on a par with the normative relevance
of instrumental reasoning. From a meta-ethical point of view, even if
considerations of planning and organizing constrain plausible theories
of practical reason, the reason why planning has normative relevance is
not such a mystery. Furthermore, the normative substance that such
considerations provide us with seems limited: even if the very fact that
deliberators must be planners would provide us with some substantial
values that all agents would have to recognize, then it still seems that (a)
deliberators must also hold further ends in the interest of which they make
their plans, and (b) the relatively formal considerations of good planning
will be entirely neutral about what those ends might be.
A second possibility for deliberation about ends, which is more impor-
tant for our present purposes, involves “where there is some irresoluble
conflict among the elements of S, considering which one attaches most
weight to” (1980/1981a, p. 104). Here we begin to touch upon the prospects
for a dispositional solution that I mentioned at the beginning of this chap-
ter. Note that this idea harbors an important assumption, however, which
is that the relative “weights” of the different elements in the agent’s S are
not simply given as part of those elements themselves, at least not in a
manner that is immediately transparent to the agent himself. Thus, one of
the things that the deliberative route involves is the resolution of conflicts
within the S by making the relative weights of the conflicting elements
more explicit.
In fact, not only the importance of a certain end, but the very presence
of that end in the S of an agent might not be transparent to the agent
himself. Williams briefly mentions this possibility when he discusses
the ways in which agents might misjudge their internal reasons due to
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ignorance (1980/1981a, p. 103). However, this idea does not play much
of a role in the rest of his account. Instead, a similar idea of volitional
opacity will become the central element of the account that I will develop
in chapters 7 and 9.
Besides making elements in the S more explicit or transparent, deliber-
ation can also, according to Williams, add new elements, or subtract old
ones, and this seems to include elements that constitute ends. One of his
examples is that we might lose our desire to pursue a certain end once
we arrive at a more concrete sense of what would be involved in attaining
it. Conversely, deliberation might provide us with “constitutive solutions,
such as deciding what would make for an interesting evening” (p. 104).
These may initially be understood as a kind of means to more abstract
ends (“an interesting evening”), but the means become ends in their own
right once we have set our minds to them. For example, once I got the idea
of ordering pizza in my head, I might no longer be happy with anything
else, even though ordering Chinese takeaway food might have satisfied me
if I had thought about it first. Note that this type of deliberation makes
internal reasons to a certain extent indeterminate: on the basis of my S at
time t0, I merely have a reason to make my desire for something to eat
more concrete, such that both pizza or Chinese food would do, but if I
were to settle for pizza, then at t1 I would have a reason to order pizza
rather than Chinese. We shall be discussing this sort of indeterminacies
extensively later on.5
Despite these suggestions, Williams remains intentionally vague about
the various ways in which we deliberate on our ends. As we shall see later
in this chapter, this vagueness poses a problem, and in fact this will be
one of the problems that this thesis is meant to address. For now, however,
we should note that whatever the principles or methods of deliberation
may be, in Williams’s view they must always work from the current S of
the agent. For example, if a certain adjustment in the S resolves a conflict
among its elements, then the adjustment would itself be motivated by the
fact that the conflict in the prior S called for such an adjustment. Thus,
even though the motivational set has changed, the change was motivated
by the state of the initial set, maintaining a kind of motivational continuity.
This is what I take to be the idea of a deliberative route. The constraint
that this idea places on normative reasons is that the reason why they are
reasons for a particular agent can always be traced back to elements in
5See section 9.2.3.
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the S of that agent at any stage in the deliberative process. That’s what
makes reasons, understood along these lines, “internal” to the S of the
agent. Given this explication of the notion of an internal reason, let us now
take a look at Williams’s argument for the Internal Reasons View—the
view that all normative reasons must be internal in this sense.
2.3 Williams’s Defense of the Internal Reasons View
The central objection that Williams raises against the External Reasons
View is that it cannot explain what it would mean for an agent to come to
believe an external reason statement about himself. As we have explicated
above, an external reason statement has the following two features. First of
all, the statement that A has an external reason to φ may be true even if A
does not have an internal reason to φ. Second, however, this discrepancy
can only exist as long as A does not believe the external reason statement
about himself. If A would have believed in the truth of the external reason
statement, then he would have had an internal reason as well. Hence, it
seems that by merely coming to believe the external reason statement, A
would have to acquire an accompanying internal reason to φ.
But how could that happen? If A acquires an internal reason that he
did not have before, that means an element is being added to his S that
bears no motivational continuity to the prior elements in his S. His new
belief in the truth of the external reason statement would have to “inject”
this element in his S entirely on its own accord, as it were, without using
the existing elements as leverage, and furthermore, if A is self-governing
in his agency, then the newly injected element would motivate his actions
without those prior elements getting in the way, so to speak, regardless of
what their content or their strength happened to be. As Williams put it:
Given the agent’s earlier existing motivations, and this new
motivation, what has to hold for external reason statements
to be true is that the new motivation could be in some way
rationally arrived at, granted the earlier motivations. Yet at
the same time it must not bear to the earlier motivations the
kind of rational relation which we considered in the earlier
discussion of motivation—for in that case an internal reason
statement would have been true in the first place. I see no
reason to suppose that these conditions could possibly be met.
(1980/1981a, p. 109)
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The question, how our rational appreciation of truths which do not already
involve or link up with our existing motivations, could make us motivated
in wholly new ways, resembles the old Humean question about how rea-
son (or beliefs) could motivate in non-instrumental ways. However, in
Williams’s view it is also a refinement of that question, because it now
focuses on the possibility of new motivations that have no deliberative
connection to the old ones whatsoever, rather than merely on the possibil-
ity of new motivations that have no instrumental, means-end connection
to the old motivations. Thus, the question can no longer be answered
by merely rejecting a reduction of deliberation to means-end reasoning.
Instead, answering the refined question requires showing how the rational
appreciation of certain truths could require, and bring about, new motiva-
tions which were not in any way called for on the basis of the pre-existing
motivations. But if they were not called for by his present motivations, then
why would the agent be rationally driven towards the new motivation?
Another way to articulate this line of argument, which I myself find
helpful, is to explore the implication that the agent would be deficient
or irrational if he would not acquire this new motivation upon learning
such a truth. So for any candidate truth T, consider an agent A whose
motivations do not change one bit upon his learning that T. Now let us
suppose that A is wholly coherent, unified, harmonious, and what not, in
his motivations: his motivational set, in its present state, does not in any
way call for changes in that set. Furthermore, from the perspective of this
harmonious unity of motivations that he has, A could not care less about
whether T or not T. Then surely we have run out of resources for giving
meaning to the claim that A would be deficient or irrational for not having
acquired a new motivation?
My intuition is that we are at least close to a sound line of argument
here. However, many critics of Williams have felt otherwise, and it is
not my purpose to discuss all their objections or to evaluate the merits
of Williams’s defense.6 Rather, my purpose is to discuss Williams’s view
as a historical precursor to the view that I want to put forward myself in
the chapter 4. Nevertheless, there are two objections to the above line of
argument that I do want to discuss at this point, because they will help us
to explicate premises of Williams’s argument that are of crucial importance
to my own view as well.
6For an in-depth discussion of the dialectical nightmare surrounding the Internal Reasons
View, see Thomas (2006, ch. 4, pp. 67–97).
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2.4 The Nonproceduralist Objection
The first objection exploits a possibility that Williams seems to have over-
looked, or at least does not address, which is that the external reasons
theorist might simply agree that it is impossible for someone who does not
already have an internal reason to φ to come to have the belief that he has
an external reason to φ. The objection would then be that this does not
show that there is no such external reason for the agent. It merely shows
that the truths about external reasons will be epistemically inaccessible to
those agents who did not have the appropriate internal reasons to begin
with.
In order to refute this objection, we might simply want to insist on the
idea that it is essential to a reason that it can motivate. If external reasons
are epistemically inaccessible to those agents who lack the corresponding
internal reasons, then it seems no longer possible for those agents to
be motivated by the external reasons, so that they no longer satisfy this
requirement on reasons generally. We have already seen that the external
reasons theorist cannot simply deny this requirement, because it is this
requirement that distinguishes the External Reasons View from the sort
of view according to which there is an external normativity that does not
generate reasons at all.
Nevertheless, I think this sort of argument against the objection is
invalid, because it equivocates on two different interpretations of the idea
that reasons must be possible motivations. On a weak interpretation, the
motivational implication is merely a counterfactual one: if the agent would
have believed in the truth of the external reason statement, then the agent
would have had the corresponding behavioral disposition. In contrast, on
the stronger interpretation, there would be a further condition that we
must add: namely, that it is also possible for the agent to acquire that
belief.
In support of the strong reading, we might say that unless it is possible
for the agent to come to believe the statement, the fact that he would be
motivated if he would have the belief does not show that it is possible for
him to have that motivation. But that argument simply trades on the same
ambiguity in the phrase “it is possible for the agent to x.” The external
reasons theorist can admit that it must be possible in the counterfactual
sense for the agent to have the belief, without admitting that it must be
possible for the agent in the stronger sense, i.e. given his actual state. As
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long as there is a possible world in which the agent has the belief, one
can still say that it is possible for the agent to have the motivation, given
the counterfactual implication from the belief to the motivation, even if
the agent were unable to reach that state in the actual world. In order to
distinguish the External Reasons View from the ‘no reasons’ versions of
externalism, it would be enough to accept only this weak reading. After
all, if external facts about normativity would not provide us with reasons,
then they would not even support this merely counterfactual claim about
the agent’s motivation should he come to have true beliefs about those
facts.
This distinction between a strong and a weak sense in which it may
be possible for an agent to believe something which he actually does not
is very similar to our earlier distinction between the procedural and non-
procedural interpretations of the Disconfirmation Principle. The premise
that Williams has been presupposing is a kind of proceduralism about
normative reasons, and this is a premise that the external reasons theorist
may want to deny.
Now, there are three remarks I want to make at this point. First of all,
if we reject the possibility of a ‘no reasons’ form of practical normativity
and accept the Authority Principle instead, then Williams’s proceduralism
about normative reasons follows directly from the proceduralist interpre-
tation of the Disconfirmation Principle about practical judgments. The
second remark is that nonproceduralism is an option which we should
take seriously. However, I will discuss the prospects of nonproceduralism
extensively in chapter 6. For now, we should simply keep in mind that
Williams’s defense of the Internal Reasons View is premised on procedu-
ralism.
Third, and most importantly for our present purpose, even though
nonproceduralism does seem to offer an escape route, not every external
reasons theorist may be satisfied with it. After all, if the only external
reasons that agents may have, in the absence of corresponding internal
reasons, are those external reasons which they can never become convinced
of having, then external reasons could play no justificatory role in accounts
of the sort of interpersonal moral discussions in which we try to convince
our opponents of our views. Suppose that Owen’s father understood that
Owen did not have an internal reason to join the army. Then according
to the nonproceduralist escape strategy, Owen’s father would also, upon
reflection, have to conclude that all his attempts to convince Owen of his
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external reason are utterly pointless. There may be cases in which such a
conclusion is not prima facie implausible, such as when one is dealing with
a psychopath, say, or with a hopelessly dogmatic religious fundamentalist
who seems totally unresponsive to the sort of reasons that we see against
the choices that he makes. However, the Wingrave example does not seem
to be such a case, at least not at first approximation. Instead, the external
reasons theorist may want to be able to claim that at least some external
reasons can be understood proceduralistically, even when the relevant
agents do not start out with the appropriate internal reasons.
2.5 The ‘Non-Route-Like’ Deliberation Objection
This brings us to the second objection. According to this objection Williams’s
argument simply begs the question against the idea that an agent can come
to believe an external reasons statement, and thereby acquire the accom-
panying internal reason, without having had that internal reason before
(Hooker, 1987; see also Thomas, 2006, p. 76). Recall that in Williams’s
view, our notion of deliberation needs to be broader than mere instru-
mental reasoning, but not so broad as to violate the requirement that the
deliberative process has to be a kind of “route” and that the starting point
of the route must be existing motivations. However, if that is the notion
that Williams uses to spell out the Internal Reasons View, then it better not
also be the premise of his argument in defense of that view. But when
he tries to argue for the implausibility of the idea that acquiring a new
belief could provide us with new motivations that have no deliberative
connections to our old motivations whatsoever, it seems that Williams is
simply inserting that same notion of deliberation into his views of how we
can and cannot acquire new motivations. And it is precisely this notion of
deliberation that the external reasons theorist is going to want to reject. His
response to Williams could now simply be as follows: “just as Williams
has liberated himself from a strictly ‘instrumental’ notion of deliberation,
so I, the external reasons theorist, have liberated myself from a strictly
‘route-like’ notion of deliberation. My notion of deliberation simply does
not require that it starts from the actual motivations of the agent.” Or, as
Hooker put it:
the external theorist is likely to think that (at least some) rational
deliberation about reasons for action starts not from the agent’s
own subjective present motivations, but from some objective
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(‘external’) values and requirements, fixed independently of the
agent’s present motivations. (1987, p. 43)
Thus, the objection is that Williams begs the question against this ‘non-
route-like’ notion of deliberation. His route-like account of deliberation is
premised upon a theory of motivation that seems in turn premised upon
the route-like account of deliberation.
As I see it, there are two ways in which the internal reasons theorist
might respond to this objection. The first is to explicate an account of
motivation as a premise of the argument for the Internal Reasons View
in such a way that we can provide independent support for this premise
rather than deriving it in a viciously circular way from the Internal Reasons
View itself. The key to such an approach would be to make sure that,
whereas the Internal Reasons View is a view about normative reasons,
the motivational account remains solely a claim about motivating reasons,
such that any conclusions about normative reasons derived from it would
be non-circular.
In contrast, according to the second type of response we should rather
agree that the motivational story depends on the much more normative
story about the soundness of deliberation and the scope of reason, but
defend the idea that this normative story behind the Internal Reasons View
can stand on its own.
Very roughly, the former approach is the one that I prefer and which
has, I think, been presupposed by many philosophers who read Williams as
a motivational ‘Humean,’ while the latter approach has been advocated by
Thomas (2006, p. 76), who offers a much more ‘anti-Humean’ interpretation
of Williams’s argument. However, my intention is to remain neutral about
Williams-exegesis in this matter. Furthermore, as we shall see below, the
strategies are not as much at odds with each other as they initially seem to
be.
2.5.1 The Descriptive Motivational Response
Let me explain the first response first. The trick is to think of the relevant
premise of Williams’s argument as a premise that is more or less descriptive
about the ways in which motivational dispositions of agents can actually
change across time. Therefore, it should be possible to evaluate such a
premise independently of our ideas about how we should reason or how we
should deliberate. When I say that the premise is “more or less” descriptive,
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what I mean is that it lacks that particular type of normativity, however, not
that it lacks normativity whatsoever. At this point, our previous discussion
of the explanatory and justificatory aspects of normative and motivating
reasons will be helpful once more. We have seen, not only that normative
reasons also have an explanatory dimension (which played an important
role in the argument for the Internal Reasons View so far), but also that
motivating reasons have certain justificatory aspects: when we attribute a
motivating reason to an agent we attribute a way in which his action ‘made
sense’ to the agent, and we presuppose that the agent satisfies certain
minimal conditions of rationality, conditions without which we would not
be able to understand him as an agent in the first place.
From a ‘Humean’ perspective on motivation, what this means is that
there are certain normative aspects involved when we make claims about
how the motivations of agents might change, but that these are not yet the
type of normativity that meta-ethics is concerned with, the type that moral
philosophers must analyze rather than merely presuppose. Instead, the
normative aspects built into the theory of motivation are the normative
aspects of general talk about beliefs and desires, which are ultimately
normative notions in their own right. However, this way of thinking about
normativity can be generalized to anti-Humean ideas about motivation
as well: regardless of whether one submits to the specifics of belief-desire
psychology, one may still feel that a theory of motivation only needs to pre-
suppose the general normative aspects of agency, knowledge, and meaning:
the modes of normativity that other branches of philosophy are concerned
with—primarily, philosophy of action and epistemology. Therefore, any
theory of motivation that pretends to be dialectically independent from
and prior to the meta-ethical question of practical normativity, essentially
consists in an attempt to get the normative aspects of motivating reasons
from the sorts of normativity that are at stake in epistemology and the
philosophy of action. The first type of response to the ‘non-route-like’
deliberation objection represents the philosophical ideology that these
branches of philosophy must come first, as it were, and that meta-ethics
must be built upon them.
Provided that this is our take on theories of motivation more generally,
what then is the specific premise concerning motivation that we must de-
ploy in order to make Williams’s defense valid and non-question begging?
And is there going to be independent support for this premise? To begin,
let me note that in order to make the argument valid, the motivational
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premise need not be Humean—it doesn’t require belief-desire psychology.
In fact, one might even be inclined to think that it is incompatible with
Humean motivation because of the generalization in Williams’s argument
from ‘instrumental’ deliberation to ‘route-like’ forms of deliberation that
include non-instrumental deliberative moves. However, in the next chapter
I shall argue that there actually is no such incompatibility and that the
motivational premise that Williams’s argument requires can be supported
by a Humean theory of motivation, even if it may also be supported by
non-Humean views.7 For now, however, let us set the matter of belief-
desire psychology aside, and focus on what it is that the Internal Reasons
View requires.
With these remarks in mind, the premise that would make the argument
non-question begging, if there is independent support for it, may now
simply be formulated as follows: that by itself, reason or knowledge cannot
produce new motivations that do not in any way follow up on pre-existing
motivations. Let us call this the “Motivational Continuity Thesis.” To
be sure, the thesis does not claim that motivational changes are never
discontinuous, but only that motivational discontinuities could never be
the product of rational insight alone. Essentially, this thesis is simply a
“descriptive” counterpart to the Internal Reasons View, in the “more or less”
descriptive sense explained above, i.e., as a view about motivating rather
than normative reasons. What it claims is that the rational production of
new motivating reasons must be “route like” without thereby presupposing
that practical deliberation about normative reasons should be “route like”
as well. It merely claims that any instances of non-route-like deliberation
are not going to actually produce new motivations on their own.
However, even though the Motivational Continuity Thesis does not
presuppose the Internal Reasons View, it does imply the Internal Reasons
View when we combine it with the other premises of the argument, thereby
satisfying the demand for a non-circular defense. In particular, when
we add the premise that true reason statements motivate self-governing
agents if they are known by those agents, and the premise that true reason
statements must not be made epistemically inaccessible by the absence of
certain motivations, then it seems we can arrive at a conclusion about de-
liberation and normative reasons. After all, suppose that A has an external
reason to φ without an internal reason to do so. From the proceduralist
premise about accessibility it follows that A can come to believe that he
7See section 3.3.
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has this external reason in the absence of his internal reason, and from
the premise that self-governing agents are motivated by their beliefs about
their reasons it follows that A subsequently acquires the internal reason.
Which means that the disposition to φ under conditions of self-governance
must have been added to his S. But from the motivational continuity
premise it follows that he cannot have acquired an actual motivation to φ on
the basis of his rational appreciation of his external reason alone, since that
appreciation did not connect to his pre-existing motivations. Therefore,
it is possible that A does not gain any motivation to φ, in which case the
external reasons theorist must declare him to be lacking in self-governance.
Furthermore, in the case that A does acquire the motivation to φ, this
must be due to something over and above his rational appreciation of
his external reason. But there is nothing that could play this role. Any
causes of this new motivation that were neither based on earlier motiva-
tions nor rooted in the rational appreciation of his external reason would
seem wholly accidental. And given their accidental nature, it would seem
entirely stipulative to make such causes requirements for self-governance.
Thus, given our premises, we can now reach the conclusion that in the case
where A does not become motivated to φ, the external reasons theorist
has no way of explaining his claim that A would have to be lacking in
self-governance.
In other words, the argument shows that if we start with a ‘route-like’
account of the rational production of motivating reasons, and we add inde-
pendent insights about self-governance and the accessibility of normative
reasons, then we can arrive at a ‘route-like’ account of deliberation about
normative reasons as well. However, even though this makes the argument
non-circular, strictly speaking, the air of begging the question will remain
if there is no independent support for the ‘route like’ perspective on the
production of motivating reasons that the Motivational Continuity Thesis
offers. Otherwise, we would merely have argued for the non-trivial route-
likeness of practical deliberation on the basis of a presumed, but equally
non-trivial, route-likeness of the rational production of motivating reasons.
As it happens, I think there is independent support for the Motivational
Continuity Thesis, and that it may be defended on the basis of both
‘Humean’ and ‘anti-Humean’ theories of motivation. I will provide this
defense in the next chapter.8 For now, however, let us simply note that
according to the first type of response, such a defense of the Motivational
8See sections 3.4 and 3.5.
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Continuity Thesis would refute the ‘non-route-like’ deliberation objection.
2.5.2 The Content Skeptical Response
In contrast, the second type of response de-emphasizes the importance
of such an account of motivation. In his own attempt to refute Hooker’s
objection, Alan Thomas draws on a distinction from Christine Korsgaard
between two types of skepticism about the practical impact that reason
can make. The first is “motivational skepticism,” which he formulates as
“scepticism as to whether a reason grounded on practical reason alone has
motivational efficacy” (2006, p. 77). In contrast, “content skepticism” is a
“Hegelian scepticism about whether Kantian formalism about practical rea-
son yields any substantive conclusion” (pp. 76–77). A detailed discussion
of Korsgaard’s account would take us too far at this point, so I will simply
focus on the way in which Thomas applies her insights. Now the idea
behind the distinction, in Thomas’s words, “is to argue that any scepticism
about the pretensions of practical reasons must be a content based one and
that motivational scepticism has no independent force” (2006, p. 77). He
seems to be in agreement with Korsgaard about this, but disagrees about
what it means for the Internal Reasons View. He presents Korsgaard as
criticizing Williams for being a motivational skeptic, which in his view is
a mistake, as Williams should be understood as having been “primarily”
a content skeptic. According to Thomas, the independent plausibility of
content skepticism allows us to refute the charge of begging the question.
Being a Kantian, of course, Korsgaard means to show that content
skepticism fails, but as Thomas notes, she is not entirely against the
Internal Reasons View, and especially in her later writings has showed
sympathy for a Williams-like criticism of “dogmatic rationalism.” Thomas
writes:
Korsgaard now no longer views it as acceptable simply to stipu-
late that rational agents are such as to be motivated by principles
of reason. This seems to me to be a tactical withdrawal from
the argument directed against the internal reasons theory in
‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’ and, indeed, to constitute a
form of content scepticism in its own right. (2006, p. 81)
However, it seems to me that in order to present Korsgaard as a kind of
content skeptic herself, Thomas has significantly widened the notion of
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content skepticism compared to his previous definition of a skepticism
about the implications of Kantian formalism. After all, the whole reason
why Kantians want to keep their conception of reason formalistic is because
they want to avoid being dogmatic in their rationalism. To be sure, the term
“content skepticism” may seem to suggest a skepticism about any view that
substantial content may be based on reason alone, especially if the term is
meant in contrast to motivational skepticism. But in that case we should
distinguish between two types of content skepticism: first, the skepticism
about the possibility of pulling substantial content out of a purely formal
conception of reason, and second, a skepticism about the plausibility of a
conception of reason that is simply non-formal from the start and that may
therefore include very substantial principles of reason to begin with. The
former type of content skepticism is the one that Korsgaard means to prove
wrong. Let’s call it “anti-formal” content skepticism. The latter type is
the skepticism about dogmatic rationalism, so let us call it “anti-dogmatic”
content skepticism. Korsgaard subscribes to anti-dogmatic, but not to
anti-formal content skepticism, while Thomas subscribes to both.
With this distinction in place, it should now be obvious that even if
we reject anti-formal content skepticism, we need not reject the Internal
Reasons View at all. After all, if the principles of reason are purely formal,
then they need substance from elsewhere to be applied to, and the Kantian
project is to transcendentally arrive at necessary conclusions about what
reason would deliver regardless of what that substance from elsewhere
would be like. In other words, Kantians may simply adopt the Internal
Reasons View, and maintain that formal considerations of reason will yield
certain deliberative results that can be arrived at from any subjective moti-
vational set. That is why Williams thought of Kant’s practical philosophy
as the “limiting case” of the Internal Reasons View. As we shall see in
the next chapter, however, anti-formal content skepticism does become
relevant if we wonder whether the Internal Reasons View implies relation-
alism. The Internal Reasons View pushes us towards relationalism, a view
that Williams seemed to endorse, but the Kantian project is an attempt to
prevent that implication and reconcile an internal conception of reasons
with a nonrelationalist view of practical judgment. It is for this reason,
I think, that Williams referred to Kant’s theory as a limiting case of the
Internal Reasons View.
Rejecting anti-formal content skepticism is not only compatible with
the Internal Reasons View, but conversely, accepting anti-formal content
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skepticism also fails to help us refute the ‘non-route-like’ deliberation
objection. After all, the external reasons theorist who claims that delibera-
tion is not route-like, or that it does not have to commence from present
motivations, can simply deny that reason has to be purely formal. If he
claims that there are substantial principles of reason that deliberation can
start from, then he does not have to squeeze the substance out of form,
and thereby evades anti-formal content skepticism. What this move would
make him vulnerable to, however, is the anti-dogmatic content skepticism,
which Korsgaard and Thomas seem to agree on.
However, it seems to me that proponents of the idea that there are
substantial principles of reason on which deliberations can be based in-
dependently of pre-existing motivations would rightly protest at being
called “dogmatic” so easily. From their point of view, there might be very
good reasons to think that reason is substantial, and any reasons they
would give could hardly be refuted by objecting that those, too, depend
on substantial principles of reason. This seems to be the sort of stalemate
that Thomas has in mind when he remarks that each camp in the internal
reasons debate accuses the other of begging the question.
Furthermore, it seems to me that if we want to provide a defense of
the Internal Reasons View, then the burden of proof must at least start
on our side of the divide, which gives the external reasons theorist’s
complaint of begging the question against that defense a certain merit if
the stalemate cannot be avoided. Thus, it seems to me that anti-dogmatic
content skepticism cannot stand on its own, at least not if standing on its
own means it can do without independent support.
Personally, I think anti-dogmatic content skepticism is very plausible,
at least with respect to deliberation about normative reasons, but I think it
is plausible because of the line of argument from the first response, which
is premised on the Motivational Continuity Thesis. However, that thesis
seems a lot like a version of motivational skepticism, and according to the
Korsgaard/Thomas view, motivational skepticism is besides the point. For
the most part, this depends on whether any support for the Motivational
Continuity Thesis would not ultimately presuppose anti-dogmatic content
skepticism about normative reasons. I will return to this question in the
next chapter.9
For now, however, note that Korsgaard’s real issues seem to be not so
much with the Internal Reasons View itself, but rather with a relational-
9See section 3.4.2.
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ism that might be derived from the Internal Reasons View in conjunction
with anti-formal content skepticism. Thus, her insight that motivational
skepticism cannot by itself (i.e., without the help of content skepticism)
establish such a relationalism may be compatible with my claim that a form
of motivational skepticism does play a role in the defense of the Internal
Reasons View itself—that is, in the form of which Kant is still a ‘limiting
case’ rather than an opponent. In other words, motivational skepticism
may not, by itself, harm Kantianism about practical deliberation, but that
doesn’t mean it cannot harm the External Reasons View.
In the next chapter I will discuss in further detail what the implications
of the Internal Reasons View for meta-ethics might be, and on which
additional premises those implications would depend. This will help
us to relate the debate concerning internal reasons to the principles and
distinctions from the previous chapter. Furthermore, I will also return
to the question of whether the Motivational Continuity Thesis can be
supported independent of assumptions about practical normativity. In
particular, I will investigate whether this thesis might be defended on
the basis of the Distinctness Principle from the previous chapter, and
whether such a defense would be ‘independent’ in the required sense.
Thus, whereas the current chapter has been focused on a discussion of the
Internal Reasons View on its own terms, the next chapter will examine
Williams’s account from the point of view of the framework established in
chapter 1.

3 Internal Reasons, Relationalism,
and Motivation
In this chapter I investigate how Williams’s Internal Reasons View, which I
introduced and discussed in the previous chapter, may be related to the
concepts and distinctions from chapter 1. The first two sections cover meta-
ethical implications of the view to which Williams seemed sympathetic.
In section 3.1 we combine the Internal Reasons View with the Facts and
Authority Principles so as to make the view pertain to practical normativity
as construed in chapter 1. Then, in section 3.2 I discuss the question of
whether this comprehensive view would imply a relationalist interpretation
of the Intersubjectivity Principle. This possible implication seems to be the
central point of controversy surrounding Williams’s account.
The final three sections of this chapter deal with the relation between
the Internal Reasons View and the Distinctness Principle. I argue in section
3.3 that the two are at least compatible with each other, and that Williams
does not ‘revise’ the Humean view. Then, in section 3.4, I claim that the
Distinctness Principle can be used to defend the Internal Reasons View, by
providing the independent support for the Motivational Continuity Thesis
that, according to my diagnosis from section 2.5.1 in the previous chapter, is
needed in order to refute the ‘non-route-like’ deliberation objection against
Williams’s argument. Finally, however, I will give a sketch of a similar
defense on the basis of an anti-Humean theory of motivation in section
3.5, to show that my interpretation of Williams’s defense is not committed
to the exegetical claim that Williams himself had to be a Humean about
motivation.
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to expand our understanding of
the Internal Reasons View from the previous chapter in order to meet
the following three criteria: first, to make it applicable to issues that
were raised in chapter 1 concerning practical normativity; two, to make it
defensible upon a Humean premise about motivation; and three, to do this
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without reading the motivational Humeanism into Williams’s own line of
argument.
3.1 Implications for the Facts and Authority Principles
In the previous chapter I’ve elaborated on the Internal Reasons View and
identified which premises we need in order to make Williams’s defense of
this view work. But why should we care about all this? So what, if reasons
are internal? Even if Williams is right that the external interpretation
applies to many people’s reason statements in everyday life, why should
it be a big deal if people ought to have meant their statements in the
internal sense instead? By itself, this does not seem to be very interesting.
However, the view becomes more significant if we explore its implications
in conjunction with certain other assumptions that we may find plausible.
In this section we take a look at the implications of the Internal Reasons
View for the Facts and Authority Principles. In section 3.2 we turn to its
implications for the Intersubjectivity Principle.
Everything that the Internal Reasons View says about reason statements
will also apply to practical judgments if we adopt the Facts and Authority
Principles from chapter 1. To be sure, the Internal Reasons View does
not commit us to these principles. We have already seen that the external
reasons view differs from the ‘no reasons’ varieties of externalism which
deny the Authority Principle. Even though these two views may not
exclude each other, defending both seems like overkill: if one would already
think that we have reasons beyond the reach of deliberation from our
actual dispositions, as the External Reasons View states, then what would
be the point of postulating additional, further normative facts beyond
the reach of those external reasons? Instead, it seems more plausible
for ‘no reasons’ externalists to combine their externalism about practical
normativity with the Internal Reasons View about reason statements, and
for external reasons theorists to adopt the Authority Principle or a similar
internalist criterion according to which reason statements—external reason
statements, in their case—express practical judgments. This already shows
that the Authority Principle and the Internal Reasons View represent two
forms of ‘internalism’ that may be defended independently of each other.
Nevertheless, combining the two is a much more viable option than the
combination of their opposites, and several theorists in meta-ethics have
understood the Internal Reasons View as a view about practical normativity
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in the ‘bottom line’ sense, including Williams himself.
This does not mean that Williams understood the Internal Reasons View
as a view about morality, however. As we have seen in section 1.4.1, some
philosophers distinguish between practical normativity in the ‘bottom line’
or ‘all things considered’ sense on the one hand, and morality as a much
more narrow or particular set of considerations on the other, which an
agent may or may not have reason to care very much about. Williams
refers to the former as the “practical ought,” which “is to be taken to be
equivalent to the ‘all-in’ or ‘conclusive’ answer to the question ‘What ought
I to do?’” (1981b, p. 119). In contrast, the latter—moral obligation—is
understood by Williams as a particular form of the “general propositional
ought,” as he calls it, which is not established from the deliberative point
of view. Williams is an internalist, in a manner similar to the Authority
Principle, about the former, practical ought, which provides the agent with
a reason, unlike the latter ought, which includes moral obligation. Hence,
for Williams, the Internal Reasons View applies to practical oughts, even
though it does not apply to moral obligations:
In the practical or deliberative sense, ‘A ought to do X’ will en-
tail ‘A has a reason to do X,’ in what I have called the ‘internal’
sense of that claim; the two are, however, not equivalent, since
‘A has a reason to do X’ is not exclusive. (1981b, p. 120)
Note that in the above quotation, Williams is using the notion of having a
reason in the non-resultant sense again. Since this non-resultance is the
only consideration that he cites for the distinction between practical ought
statements and internal reason statements, it seems safe to assume that
if we switch back to reason-talk in the all-things-considered sense, then
on Williams’s view practical ought statements are equivalent to internal
reasons statements. Note that this also commits Williams to the Facts
Principle: if there are facts which make internal reason statements true,
and internal reason statements are equivalent to statements that express
practical judgments, then there must also be facts that make practical judg-
ments true.1 Therefore, I will from now on interpret Williams’s arguments
from the point of view of the Facts and Authority Principles. Given these
1Remember that my notion of ‘facts’ is so noncommittal as to merely rule out an extreme
form of quietism about truth, and this quietism would be inconsistent, I think, with Williams’s
account of the truth of internal reasons, and moreover with Williams’s views about truth
elsewhere in his work.
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two principles, any further implications of the Internal Reasons View must
be implications for practical normativity as such.
With respect to the question of moral obligation, I suspect that the
dispute about whether morality is practically normative involves a great
deal of verbal disagreement over the use of words like “morality,” “ethics,”
and “obligation.” Even though Williams refuses to be an internalist about
moral obligation, that does not mean he is committing himself to sui generis
externalist metaphysical truths about morals. Rather, he is simply using the
term “morality” to refer to norms that are essentially social, institutional, or
perhaps even linguistic, in a manner similar to other varieties of the “gen-
eral propositional ought,” such as those of correct language use, or positive
legal normativity, for example. However, this usage of the word “moral” is
markedly different from the way in which I have used the word, for exam-
ple, in section 1.3.2 in the first chapter, when I discussed the distinction
between relationalist cognitivism and nonrelationalist moral realism. On
my usage, which I think several philosophers share, “moral judgments”
are simply full-blown, ‘bottom line normative’ practical judgments about
particular types of situations, namely, those situations where one agent’s
acts may conflict with those of others. This characterization is admittedly
sketchy, and I will return to this matter later. What matters for now is that
unlike Williams, I use the term “moral” in such a way that every moral
judgment is a practical judgment in the ‘bottom line’ normative sense, even
if not every practical judgment is a moral judgment. Thus, on my view, if I
agree that I have a certain obligation in some sense, but I disagree that I
should, in the practically normative sense, fulfill this obligation, then I will
deny that it is really a moral obligation. As I have already noted in section
1.4.1, I am not alone in this matter, as there are many philosophers who
use the term “morality” in this practically normative sense. Now, if you
are on our side in this verbal dispute, and if, furthermore, you should also
subscribe to the Internal Reasons View and the Authority Principle, then
your conclusion is going to be, pace Williams, that the Internal Reasons
View applies to morality as well.
Finally, as we have seen in section 2.4, Williams’s defense of the Internal
Reasons View is premised on a proceduralism about reasons for action,
and if the Facts and Authority Principles are true, then this procedural-
ism about reasons is equivalent to the proceduralist interpretation of the
Disconfirmation Principle. Thus, it seems that if we combine Williams’s
defense of the Internal Reasons View with the Authority Principle, then
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both the Facts Principle and the proceduralist version of the Disconfirma-
tion Principle come along automatically as a kind of ‘package deal.’ Let
us refer to the combination of these four items as the “Comprehensive
Internal Reasons View,” or CIRV. This view offers a picture of practical
normativity as being a matter of fact about the motivational characteristics
we would have if we took the path of sound deliberation from our current
motivational characteristics. Even though CIRV depends on my preferred
formulations from chapter 1, it seems sufficiently close to what Williams
had in mind.2
However, what about our other two Principles: those of Intersubjectivity
and Distinctness? Let us first take a look at the implications of CIRV for
the dispute between relationalist and nonrelationalist accounts of the
Intersubjectivity Principle. We shall return to the Distinctness Principle in
section 3.3.
3.2 Implications for the Intersubjectivity Principle
As we have seen in chapter 1, the most straightforward way to account
for the Intersubjectivity Principle is to adopt a nonrelationalist view of
the content of practical judgments. However, if we also adopt the Facts
and Authority Principles, then it follows from nonrelationalism that there
are normative reasons for action which do not depend on any particular
features of the specific, actual agents for which they are reasons. And the
most straightforward way to account for this implication, it may now seem,
is to adopt the External Reasons View. In fact, it might even seem that this
implication simply is the External Reasons View. But that would be too
quick, because there might be ways in which an internal reasons theorist
could account for nonrelationalist normative reasons as well. Again, it all
depends on what our premises are going to be. Let me explain.
As I see it, there are two ways in which one might try to combine
CIRV with nonrelationalist realism. The first is to argue that even though
different agents must start their deliberations from their own respective
motivational starting points, which might differ very much in terms of their
content, it might still be true that all agents would end up with the same
ends after sound deliberation, simply because the features of rationality
2With one important exception, which is that I will treat CIRV as not including Williams’s
proximity requirement with respect to facts that are relevant to instrumental deliberation, as I
have argued in section 2.2.1 in the previous chapter.
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are such that, on the basis of any contingent motivational set, deliberative
transformations would lead towards the same motivational dispositions
eventually. Let us call this the “convergence strategy.”
The second strategy would be rather to deny that the motivational
starting points that agents actually have could be so contingent from the
perspective of rational agency that no final ends will be featured in every
agent’s S from the start. If we deny this, so that there are final ends that we
can place in every agent’s S from the start, then any deliberative outcome
based on such elements might therefore be nonrelationalistic. Usually, the
idea behind such an approach is that we can place these elements in every
agent’s S because they are constitutive of agency: without them, one could
not be an agent. Let us therefore call this the “constitution strategy.”
3.2.1 The Convergence Strategy
Ingenious as both strategies may sound, Williams didn’t buy either of them.
The problem for the convergence strategy is that it cannot simply allow the
method of deliberation to make the different motivational sets converge
by presupposing substantial principles of rationality that simply rule out
various motivational elements by being inconsistent with them. Because
such an approach would already presuppose a ‘non-route-like’ conception
of deliberation, which means that the view defended would be an External
Reasons View. Instead, in order for the convergence strategy to yield an
Internal Reasons View, it must be shown how deliberation, by operating
upon the different elements already in the various motivational sets of
wholly different agents, transforms those different sets into a common
direction, bringing them closer together and ultimately making them
exhibit shared attitudes on moral issues.
There are two ways in which one might try to make the idea of con-
vergence plausible. The first way is to argue that practical reason is a
pursuit of knowledge that, as far as its objectivity is concerned, may be
understood as relevantly similar to other areas of knowledge in which we’d
expect attitudes to converge when agents become more knowledgeable.3
On this version of the convergence strategy, the converging motivational
attitudes are essentially beliefs, or if they are not strictly identical to beliefs,
3I take it that this is more or less Thomas’s view. He maintains that the objectivity of
scientific knowledge is secured by epistemological contextualism, and then tries to argue that
this contextualism also provides the key to defending objective knowledge in the field of
ethics.
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then their convergence is driven by the convergence of beliefs in a manner
that requires an anti-Humean theory of motivation, and will be incom-
patible with the Distinctness Principle from chapter 1. Nevertheless, this
anti-Humean approach is certainly compatible with the Internal Reasons
View and the ‘route like’ conception of deliberation, because it may be
argued that in certain areas of knowledge, if not all of them, advancing
our knowledge is only possible by building upon our current beliefs. Even
physical science seems to be like that, after all, since empirical observation
is “theory laden” and the revision of our scientific theories should be
thought of, in Neurath’s famous metaphor, as the improvement of a boat
while being already at sea. Given this general picture of belief-revision,
there is no reason why the anti-Humean should not allow that new beliefs
in the field of practical reason must be formed in a manner that continues
upon old beliefs as well.
Furthermore, some proponents of this approach may argue that in
the field of practical reason and ethics especially, there are no ethically
neutral concepts in order to evaluate different ethical points of view with.
Nevertheless, if theory-ladenness does not undermine nonrelationalism
in physical science, then why should it give us reason to be relationalists
in ethics? From their different theory-laden perspectives, scientists are
still pushed towards the same direction by the objective facts that they
are studying, and which underlie their observations. By analogy, certain
moral philosophers have proposed the idea of “moral perception,” a way
to arrive at new practical beliefs about moral facts by ‘perceiving’ them
from a perspective that is constituted by one’s pre-existing attitudes and
concepts.
At this point, however, we may start to worry that the analogy between
moral knowledge, on the one hand, and scientific or everyday empirical
knowledge on the other hand, has been taken too far. The Internal Reasons
View was supposed to be a view specifically of the nature of practical
reason, so it would be strange if all its implications would amount to no
more than that which holds for belief formation generally. Williams’s point
was not that practical reasons are internal in a sense in which reasons to
believe in the theory of evolution, say, would be ‘internal’ as well. Even
if belief formation in other areas of inquiry would follow a pattern of
continuous, ‘route like’ deliberation as well, then it still seems that the
role of empirical evidence in natural science allows substantially more
content to be imported into our belief sets during this process of inquiry
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than the Internal Reasons View would allow in the field of practical reason.
If practical deliberation could incorporate facts about normative ends that
would be just as ‘external’ to us as the facts of empirical science, so to
speak, then we should simply subscribe to the External Reasons View.
This means that this version of the convergence strategy must accom-
plish two things. The first is to show that other areas of inquiry are not as
different from practical reason as we might have thought. But the second
thing is to nevertheless also do justice to the spirit of the Internal Reasons
View that practical reason is ‘internal’ in a manner that is dis-analogous
to theoretical reason. In order to satisfy both requirements, Alan Thomas
has tried to develop a notion of the ‘distinctiveness’ of internal reasons
that is, if I understand it correctly, meant as something different from my
notion of relationalism, and therefore compatible with nonrelationalism.
Roughly, the view is as follows: skepticism about nonrelationalist moral
knowledge is based on the idea that, whereas scientific knowledge can
be justified on the basis of some kind of objective foundation (empirical
evidence, sense-data, or whatever), there is no such foundation to be had
in the field of ethics. However, the idea that scientific knowledge should
be based on such a foundation has been challenged by contextualist and
inferentialist developments in epistemology. Now, the features that infer-
ential contextualists allude to in order to give their alternative account of
nonrelationalist objectivity are also available in the field of ethics, or so
Thomas means to argue. The difference between the relatively ‘external’
reasons of empirical science and the internal reasons of practical delibera-
tion, however, is that an internal reason is distinctive of the particular agent
for which it is a reason, in a manner in which the reason to believe that the
earth is four billion years old would not be distinctive. It is this feature,
Thomas argues, that helps to distinguish between the Internal Reasons
View and the External Reasons View from a motivationally anti-Humean
perspective.
In order to illustrate this, Thomas compares his own account to McDow-
ell’s account of practical reason. Both are anti-Humeans about motivation,
both subscribe, in some form or another, to the metaphor of ‘moral per-
ception,’ and both defend a nonrelationalist realism about the content of
practical judgments. However, for McDowell, this means that belief revi-
sions due to practical deliberation can be much more ‘discontinuous’ than
the Internal Reasons View allows, because the justification of practical judg-
ments is to be found in the “space of reasons” that the agent participates in,
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rather than in any psychological idiosyncrasies that are distinctive of the
particular agent. Hence, an agent may come to ‘see’ that he has to adopt a
practical judgment which, even if it presupposes some of his previously
held beliefs, does not continue upon any of his attitudes that were peculiar
to him as an individual. In this respect, McDowell understands ‘seeing the
truth’ in ethics in a manner that might be compared to ‘seeing’ the truth
in, say, mathematics.
But for Williams, mathematical truths do not have the power to move
us in the way that truths about our reasons for action can move us, and
this difference must be explained by assuming that true practical reason
statements must be internal in a manner which true mathematical state-
ments are not. Thomas sides with Williams on this point, but he thinks
that this insight can be incorporated in a more or less McDowellian scheme
by stressing the fact that all psychological ascriptions are governed by
normative principles constitutive of the space of reasons. What makes
practical reasons distinctive, on Thomas’s view, is that our knowledge of
them is perspectival in a way that gives our thick ethical concepts a much
more constitutive role with respect to those reasons than the concepts we
use to do scientific research, say.
Now I must admit I do not see immediately how this argument against
McDowell is supposed to work. Surely, insofar those thick concepts are
constitutive of the space of reasons, they are no longer distinctive of any
particular agent operating within that space, and insofar they are distinctive
of any particular individual, they would no longer be constitutive of the
space of reasons that all agents are bound to. Perhaps what Thomas really
means to say is that on the one hand, internal reasons are not distinctive
of us as individuals, but rather of us as human beings—as a species, and
that on the other hand, the space of reasons is not an a priori entity that
all conceptually possible agents would have to participate in, but rather
a specifically human development. The thick concepts constitutive of our
space of reasons are, in Thomas’s own terminology, “relativised a priori”—
they are conceptually necessary presuppositions of our current contingent
practice, not of every conceptually possible practice.
Such a line of argument would seem to do justice to Thomas’s Aris-
totelian outlook, and in fact, I am fairly sympathetic to such a proposal, but
I cannot help but conclude that it would no longer be nonrelationalist. Be-
cause strictly speaking, it would imply that the truth conditions of practical
judgments always carry a ‘for human beings’ subscript, and that in order
80 Internal Reasons, Relationalism, and Motivation
to determine whether such a judgment applies to a particular individual,
we must know whether that individual is human, and that would be a
particular fact about the individual that all conceptually possible agents
may not share, which means that the content of practical judgments is
essentially going to be relationalist.4
We will return to the problems of relationalism later on, to be sure, and
it might be that Thomas’s preference for “perspectival” moral knowledge
over relationalist moral knowledge is merely a matter of semantics—of
how to construe the content of practical judgments as we communicate
and exchange those judgments in our linguistic practices. But as we will
also see later on, I am not at all committed to the idea that relationalist
subscripts have to be explicit in our judgments as we exchange them in
those practices, and I think a ‘quasi-nonrelationalist’ semantics can be
built upon a relationalist cognitivist metaphysics in a manner that might,
in the final instance, amount to a view that is very similar to Thomas’s
proposal (with the key difference being that of my Humeanism vs. his
anti-Humeanism about motivation).5 I shall return to these issues later
on.6
In any case, Williams did not even seem to think that internal rea-
sons would have to be similar among all human beings in this sense, but
if Thomas is right that Williams may not have been a Humean about
motivation, then the reason why Williams was skeptical about such an
4Perhaps this objection might be circumvented by replacing the “for humans” subscript
with a “for participants in our practice” subscript, such that whenever outsiders to our
practice were encountered, they could be incorporated into a new, more encompassing
practice, with the possible consequence that the constitutive principles of this new practice
might change. Then it might be argued that the only objectivity we should aim for in ethics is
the objectivity that all agents we’ll ever encounter in the real world should submit to, rather
than an objective validity that would range over physically impossible agents in remote a
priori possible worlds. This would be a more ‘Hegelian’ rather than ‘Aristotelian’ line of
argument, I suppose. However, while I do see how commonalities across human beings
might provide substance for shared values, I do not at all see why mere physical possibility,
or the difference between agents that we will and agents that we won’t actually meet, are
going to provide any reason whatsoever for making the possibility of shared thick concepts
plausible. In fact, this line of argument simply seems to presuppose that (1) every agent can
be incorporated in our practice and (2) our practice must always be based on constitutive
ethical concepts. But accepting (1) might be a reason for rejecting (2), and vice versa, so the
argument has not shown anything.
5Perhaps I could even subscribe to a ‘quasi-anti-Humean’ semantics of our everyday
practice of giving and asking for reasons, and show that it is compatible with my Distinctness
Principle. This idea will have to await another occasion, however.
6See section 10.5.4.
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attempt to secure nonrelationalist ethical knowledge was not due to its
anti-Humean motivational underpinnings. Instead, Thomas looks for argu-
ments against nonrelationalism elsewhere in Williams’s work. In particular,
it is Williams’s thought experiment about the “hypertraditional society”
that would contain the key argument against nonrelationalism. Thomas
means to show that whereas Williams’s defense of the Internal Reasons
View succeeds, his hypertraditionalism argument against nonrelationalism
does not, because the latter presupposes the foundationalism that Thomas
has rejected on contextualist grounds. Therefore, a nonrelationalist version
of the Internal Reasons View, premised upon an anti-Humean theory of
motivation and an inferential contextualist epistemology, can be defended.
A discussion of the hypertraditionalism argument will be beyond the scope
of this thesis, as is the discussion of the merits of inferential contextualism,
but since my purpose will be to defend an account based on motivational
Humeanism, I shall simply flag the anti-Humeanism as the conditio sine
qua non for any ‘belief-based’ version of the convergence strategy.
However, there is a second way in which the convergence strategy
might be made to work, and which is neutral about the Humean theory
of motivation. This second approach is to show that we can pull the
convergence out of a purely formal notion of rationality.7 On such a view,
no substantial information is ‘perceived’ or in any other way added to the
agent’s S from the outside, as it were, by the process of deliberation, but
instead it is merely by reflecting on the formal consequences of the elements
already in the S that a convergence among agents with different sets can
be expected. However, even though formal constraints can certainly lead
to various sorts of revisions in an agent’s motivational set, it is hard to see
how any substantial final end could in principle be ruled out, or ruled in, as
the outcome of correct deliberation when there are no limits whatsoever on
the content of the motivational set that the agent might start out with. This
is the aforementioned worry of anti-formal content skepticism: skepticism
about the possibility to pull substance out of form. In chapter 5 I will
return to the prospects for the formalistic convergence strategy.8 For now,
we can flag the thesis of anti-formal content skepticism as a premise that
rules this strategy out.
7This view is sometimes associated with Michael Smith’s position, although as we shall see
in chapters 5 and 6, Smith’s view might actually be better understood as a nonproceduralist
account, in which case it is not a version of CIRV.
8See section 5.4.1.
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3.2.2 The Constitution Strategy
If unlimited variety in the motivational sets from which agents might start
their deliberations would make nonrelationalist ends impossible, then the
only other way to get the nonrelationalist ends is by placing limits on the
possible deliberative starting points, as the constitution strategy attempts
to accomplish. After all, who ever said that it is in principle possible for
agents to desire everything? Or why should we assume, conversely, that
there could be no motivational elements that every agent, in virtue of being
an agent, must already posses?
In fact, Williams allows that there could be such elements. The interest
that every agent has in finding out about the facts that are relevant to his
instrumental deliberations is just such an element.9 The very idea of being
a goal-directed agent presupposes having this interest. However, Williams
also claims that we can argue why all agents must have this interest: if
agents would not desire to know the means to their ends, their actions
would not be connected to their ends in means-end fashion and they would
fail to be agents in the first place. And so it should be for any other interest
that we might want to place in every agent’s S regardless of the contingent
features of each particular agent: we are only allowed to do this if we
can argue on conceptual grounds that an agent would fail to be an agent
without having that element in his S.10
Given that the interest in knowing the means to one’s ends is hardly
the sort of thing that will give us substantial, nonrelationalist moral ends
such as those of altruism, Williams essentially employs a burden of proof
argument against the constitution strategy. He invites his opponents
to come up with such an argument, and concludes that no satisfactory
proposals have been done so far.
However, I personally think a much stronger argument can be given,
which I will discuss in more detail later on. Briefly put, the argument is as
follows: if the interest in knowing the means to one’s ends is to serve as a
kind of ‘existence proof’ of universal motivations that are constitutive of
9“any rational deliberative agent has in his S a general interest in being factually and
rationally correctly informed” (1989/1995, p. 37).
10“Somebody may say that every rational deliberator is committed to constraints of
morality as much as to the requirements of truth and reasoning. But if this is so, then the
constraints of morality are part of everybody’s S, and every correct moral reason will be an
internal reason. But there has to be an argument for that conclusion. Someone who claims
the constraints of morality are themselves built into the notion of what it is to be a rational
deliberator cannot get that conclusion for nothing.” (Williams, 1989/1995, p. 37)
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being an agent in the first place, then we should expect all such interests
to be self-referencing in the same manner that the interest in having true
beliefs about the means to one’s ends is self-referencing. For note that
agent A’s interest in having such knowledge is essentially a desire that it
be the case that A has true beliefs about the means to A’s ends. In contrast,
B’s interest concerns the beliefs of B about the means to B’s ends. Recall
the distinction between practical beliefs that are similar and those that are
isomorphic in section 1.3.2 of the first chapter. We can apply this same
distinction to desires, or motivating states generally. It turns out that the
aforementioned interests of A and B are isomorphic, because they have the
same structure from the indexical, first person point of view, but they are
not at all similar, because they need not be directed towards the same states
of affairs. In fact, there might be cases where in order for A to find out
the facts about the means to his ends, A must act in ways that happen to
prevent B from finding out the facts about the means to her ends.
But as we have already seen in section 1.3.2, nonrelationalist realism
implies that our true practical beliefs must be similar to each other, not (or
not necessarily) isomorphic. Hence, the constitutive interest in finding out
about the means to one’s ends is universally shared in the wrong way, and
even if there would be other interests that had this same, isomorphically
understood universal presence, they could never provide us with nonrela-
tionalist moral values because they do not satisfy the similarity condition
across agents.
However, there is one further possibility that we should consider. It
may be that even if the constitution strategy cannot deliver similarity on
its own, it can nevertheless be used to give the idea of a formal rationality-
based convergence a head start, as it were. We have reasons to doubt
that formal rationality could squeeze substance out of an unlimited range
of starting points, and we have seen that constitution considerations are
going to have a hard time placing nonrelationalist substance into the
starting points, but perhaps the constitution strategy can limit the range
of starting points in such a way that the convergence strategy can develop
nonrelationalist substance from it using exclusively formal methods. In
other words, perhaps the two strategies can compensate for each other’s
shortcomings. This is, very roughly, what I think Korsgaard tries to
accomplish. I will return to this idea in chapter 5.11
However, for now, let me note that with respect to this combined strat-
11See section 5.4.3.
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egy, a burden of proof argument still makes sense. On the combined
account, what formal rationality has to accomplish is a move from iso-
morphic states to similar states, and that still seems quite a daunting task.
Prima facie, it is not at all plausible that this can be done. Essentially, this
worry is still the worry of anti-formal content skepticism, admitting that
“Kantian formalism” may include transcendental considerations about the
motivational elements that all agents must actually have on the pain of no
longer being agents, but insisting that due to the essentially isomorphic
structure of such considerations, convergence onto similarity is still not to
be expected. From now on, I mean to use the notion of anti-formal content
skepticism in this transcendental sense.
With these explications made, it now follows that in conjunction with
anti-formal content skepticism (which rules out Korsgaard’s formalist com-
bined strategy) and the Distinctness Principle (which rules out Thomas’s
anti-Humean strategy), CIRV implies relationalist cognitivism. It may be
that Williams (who used the term “relativism” instead) was a relationalist
for this same reason, or it may be that even though he was an anti-Humean,
as Thomas suggests, Williams had an additional argument that would block
the convergence strategy, such that the relationalist implication of CIRV
would still follow through. This is an exegetical matter about which I
want to remain neutral. But in any case, the relationalist implication is
the major one, meta-ethically speaking, the one that everybody worries
about. If CIRV implies relationalism, then how is it going to account for
the Intersubjectivity Principle? This question will play an important role
in the chapters to come, since my own view is going to be relationalist as
well, and for more or less similar reasons.
There is now one final loose end from chapter 2 that we must take
care of, and that is the defense of the Motivational Continuity Thesis,
which must receive independent support in order to ward CIRV against
the ‘non-route-like’ deliberation objection. Again, we shall have to keep
the division between Humeans and anti-Humeans about motivation in
mind. However, as I shall argue in the following sections, the thesis can be
defended on both types of accounts.
3.3 No Revision of Humeanism Is Needed
In the remainder of this chapter I mean to do three things. First, I will show
that it is a mistake to think of the Internal Reasons View as containing an
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‘update’ or ‘revision’ of the purely instrumental Humean theory of moti-
vation. Instead, I will argue that the two are fully compatible: nothing in
the purely instrumental account of the belief-desire structure of motivating
reasons, as captured in my Distinctness Principle, needs to be altered in
order to be able to combine it with the Internal Reasons View.
Second, I will argue in section 3.4 that the Distinctness Principle is not
merely compatible with the Internal Reasons View, but that it also provides
the kind of independent support for the Motivational Continuity Thesis
that we need in order to make the defense of the Internal Reasons View
non-question begging.
Third, however, I will argue in section 3.5 that motivational conti-
nuity can also be defended within the framework of motivational anti-
Humeanism, provided that certain further assumptions about motivation
are made. This means I will be in partial agreement with Thomas con-
cerning Williams’s defense of the Internal Reasons View. I agree that
the defense is not exclusive to motivational Humeanism, but I disagree
that it does not require any motivational premises at all and that it could
be based on content skepticism alone. As I have argued in section 2.5.2,
anti-dogmatic content skepticism does rule out external reasons, but it
cannot be defended independently from motivational considerations, while
anti-formal content skepticism is not directed against external reasons in
the first place, but rather against the formalist strategy required to make
the Internal Reasons View nonrelationalist. However, let us first turn to the
matter of the compatibility between Humeanism and the Internal Reasons
View.
3.3.1 Motivational vs. Metanormative Humean Theories
For starters, note that if the distinction between normative and motivat-
ing reasons is sound, then that means that when people talk about the
“Humean” theory of reasons for action, there are actually two very different
claims that they might have in mind. Michael Smith has exploited this
insight by advertising his view as a combination of a “Humean theory of
motivating reasons” with an “anti-Humean theory of normative reasons”
(1994, p. 130). This rhetorical way of putting things is certainly elegant, but
it is also misleading, because it suggests that there is this particular feature
that practical reasons might have—the property of being ‘Humean’—which,
according to Smith, motivating reasons have, and normative reasons do not
86 Internal Reasons, Relationalism, and Motivation
have. This is misleading because, at least in contemporary usage of these
terms, when moral philosophers speak of “Humeanism” in the context of
motivating reasons, they usually have a wholly different feature in mind
from the feature that is considered “Humean” with respect to normative
reasons.
When a theory is Humean about motivation, then according to the
theory, a motivation to φ requires a means-end relation between φ-ing and
some intrinsic desire of the agent. This is the idea that I have meant to cap-
ture in the Distinctness Principle (in the context of our current discussion
about different forms of Humeanism, I will also refer to this view as the
“motivational Humean” theory or simply “motivational Humeanism”). In
contrast, when someone is considered a “Humean” with respect to norma-
tive reasons (a view to which I shall refer as the “metanormative Humean”
theory or “metanormative Humeanism”), we usually only mean to say
that he claims there to be an essential dependence between any normative
reason that an agent has and his contingent motivational attitudes. In the
context of cognitivism, this is basically a combination of relationalism and
the Authority Principle.12 But in order to qualify as a “Humean” about
normative reasons, one need not think that the dependence is a means-end
relation, nor that the attitude depended on has to be an intrinsic desire.
This dis-analogy between the meaning of Humeanism with respect to
the normative and the motivational is perfectly logical, too. For suppose
that normative reasons were to be analyzed in terms of the same belief-
desire criterion as motivating reasons. Then by necessity, normative and
motivating reasons would coincide, with the absurd consequence that
one could never act against one’s normative reasons. Lacking in self-
governance would be impossible. I can think of no philosopher who would
defend such a view, and even though I am not a Hume scholar, I doubt this
was what Hume had in mind. Moreover, I also doubt that by calling his
theory of normative reasons “anti-Humean,” Michael Smith merely meant
12Of course, noncognitivists can also be Humeans about practical normativity, and I
suppose they usually will be. However, strictly speaking they would not be Humeans about
“normative reasons” according to the definition of such reasons from section 1.4.2, i.e. about
truths that determine self-adopted reasons for action once they become known to the agents
whose actions they are reasons for. According to the noncognitivist, after all, there are
no such truths to be known. But what would make a noncognitivist a “Humean” in the
metanormative sense, I suppose, is a claim to the effect that our deliberations must be geared
towards ends that are constituted by our particular, contingent noncognitive attitudes, and
that there will be no convergence from such attitudes across all possible agents.
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to assert his belief in the possibility of weakness of will. Instead, what
Smith means when he calls his theory of normative reasons “anti-Humean”
is that he is a nonrelationalist about those reasons.
In similar fashion, when Schroeder speaks of the “Humean Theory of
Reasons” (2007, p. 2), which he distinguishes from the “Humean Theory of
Motivation” (p. 7), he means the claim that any “objective normative reason”
(pp. 12–15) must be explained with reference to some psychological feature
of the agent.13 As Schroeder construes it, this theory is essentially a “parity
thesis” which claims that all normative reasons depend on attitudes in a
manner structurally similar to the manner in which reasons concerning
matters of personal preference depend on attitudes of personal prefer-
ence.14 Now Schroeder is sympathetic to what he calls “hypotheticalism,”
the idea that the attitudes referred to by the Humean Theory of Reasons
must be desires, but this is largely due to a very liberal definition of desires
(similar to the one I have given in section 1.5). However, Schroeder defends
himself against the charge of being committed to “instrumentalism,” the
aforementioned radical view that the relation between normative reasons
and the desires they depend upon must be instrumental (pp. 179–191).
That is simply not what being a Humean about normative reasons means.
Note that this also makes it valid to count Williams as a Humean
about normative reasons, regardless of whether he was a Humean about
motivation. The fact that Williams favored a relationalist version of the
Internal Reasons View makes him a Humean about normative reasons,
and since metanormative Humeanism is not restricted to an instrumental
13In Schroeder’s terminology, however, the “Humean Theory of Motivation” is not under-
stood as a theory of motivating reasons, because Schroeder uses the notion of a “motivating
reason” in a different sense. In his usage, something counts as a motivating reason when it is
both a “subjective normative reason” and an “explanatory reason” for an action (p. 14). His
notion of a “subjective normative reason” is identical to what I have called a “self-adopted
reason” in section 1.4, and the “explanatory reason” comes closer to what I am calling a
“motivating reason.” The advantage of Schroeder’s terminology, I must admit, is that it
preserves a certain symmetry between the notions of motivating and normative reasons that
my own terminology lacks. However, the disadvantage is that in Schroeder’s terminology, all
cases of acting against one’s better judgment are going to be cases in which the explanatory
reason involves being motivated by a desire without this counting as a “motivating reason,”
which seems rather artificial and a counter-intuitive thing to say. In any case, what matters is
that the “Humean Theory of Motivation” in Schroeder’s framework is still dis-analogous to
the “Humean Theory of Reasons” in the manner that I have made explicit here.
14In Schroeder’s leading example, the fact that there will be dancing at some party is a
reason for the protagonist, Ronnie, to go to that party, and the fact that this is a reason for
Ronnie depends on the fact that Ronnie loves to dance.
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dependence relation, Williams’s notion of the deliberative route does
not break with the Humean tradition in this respect. Furthermore, if
Williams’s arguments in favor of a relationalist Internal Reasons View were
indeed independent from motivational Humeanism, then we can think
of Williams’s account as the diametric opposite of Smith’s view: whereas
Smith has been trying to show that he can be a Humean about motivation
without being Humean about normative reasons, Williams was arguing
for being Humean about normative reasons without (necessarily) being
Humean about motivation. In any case, the fact that Williams is not revising
metanormative Humeanism does not mean that he has nothing to offer to
Humean thinking: what he does have to offer is a way of understanding
how, on a Humean conception of normative reasons, such reasons could
still be different from our self-adopted reasons.15 Furthermore, even if
Williams may not have been a motivational Humean himself, we shall see
in the next chapter that the Internal Reasons View may also help us to solve
the Facts Problem and explain how Humeanism about both motivation
and normativity may be combined.
3.3.2 The Instrumental Character of the Distinctness Principle
Of course, one might still wonder why motivational Humeans would want
to think that the dependency relation must be instrumental in the case
of motivating reasons. Surely, people are motivated by the results of their
non-instrumental deliberations as well? In order to avoid any further
confusion, let me switch back to my own terminology from chapter 1, and
speak of the Distinctness Principle in the context of motivating reasons
and of relationalism in the context of normative reasons (provided that
we accept the Authority Principle). Now the question is: if relationalism
about normative reasons does not even presuppose a strictly means-end
dependency relation, then why formulate a Distinctness Principle about
motivating reasons that does involve such a strict relation? Or to repeat
my previous, rhetorical question: surely people are also motivated by
intentions that were formed by non-instrumental deliberation?
The answer, as far as I’m concerned, is that the Distinctness Principle is
simply not a principle about deliberation in the first place. It is a principle
about the limitations of belief, namely, that beliefs cannot motivate in their
15In the words of Schroeder: “One of the main contributions of Williams’s seminal paper
was to point out that it is possible to give a Humean account of objective normative reasons”
(p. 13, n. 18).
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own right. This means that whenever we are motivated, there is something
in addition to our beliefs, and this something we call intrinsic desire. Now
the crucial thing to understand is that the Distinctness Principle is a claim
about the synchronic structure of an agent’s attitudes. In order to describe
this structure, the intrinsic desires of the agent are simply defined as the
ends that we must attribute to the agent in order to understand her current
motivation as directed towards what, according to her beliefs, are the
means to those ends. Therefore, motivating reasons explain actions in a
purely instrumental manner by definition.
But that does not mean that the Distinctness Principle cannot accom-
modate non-instrumental deliberation as something that we may refer to
in order to explain what people do, because deliberation is a diachronic
process, not a synchronic structure. This applies even to instrumental delib-
eration, which means that mental acts of instrumental deliberation are not
identical to the things we attribute when we attribute motivating reasons,
and I think that actually makes perfect sense. What we attribute when
we attribute a motivating reason is, essentially, the intelligibility of the
agent’s behavior as an action that satisfies the requirements of instrumental
rationality. On the assumption that the behavior is indeed an action in
this sense, we may then look for a diachronic explanation of the action by
attributing an instrumental deliberation on the basis of prior beliefs and
intrinsic desires that, insofar the agent actually was behaving instrumen-
tally rationally, will be equivalent to the beliefs and desires that constituted
the motivating reason. Finally, we may explain the existence of the prior
intrinsic desires by processes that produce and alter intrinsic desires, which
include non-instrumental deliberation, but also processes that generate
intrinsic desires that are at odds with our practical deliberations and un-
dermine our self-governance, such as addiction, weakness of will, and the
like.
So even though the ‘route-like’ character of the Motivational Continuity
Thesis includes non-instrumental deliberation, that does not at all make it
a revision of the synchronic Distinctness Principle, which merely defines
intrinsic desire as a construct related in means-end manner to motivation
in order to explicate the motivational inertia of belief. Nevertheless, the
Distinctness Principle does put some pressure on the idea that certain
changes amongst our intrinsic desires across time would be instances of
deliberative correctness while others wouldn’t. If there are truths about
how our intrinsic desires should be changed, then getting those truths
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right would be a matter of belief, which seems to undermine the funda-
mental independence that intrinsic desires should enjoy with respect to the
supposedly inert sphere of belief. This apparent inconsistency ought not to
surprise us, however: it is simply a reformulation of the Disconfirmation
Problem from section 1.5.2. The solution to this problem will have to be
deferred until later in this thesis, though: I turn to this issue in chapter 7.
Nevertheless, there is an important point to note right now: if the
Disconfirmation Problem could not be solved, then this might be a reason
to convert to anti-Humeanism and reject the Distinctness Principle, but it
does not seem to be a viable alternative to simply try to keep the Principle
by adding non-instrumental rationality to it. There are two arguments
for this. The first argument is that it would make it impossible for the
Distinctness Principle to explain various forms of non-self-governed agency.
The kleptomaniac is driven by an intrinsic desire that explains his actions
in an instrumental fashion, but we could no longer explain his motivation
if motivation would require intrinsic desires to satisfy further constraints
of non-instrumental rationality, or to have their origins in non-instrumental
deliberations upon prior intrinsic desires, since the crucial thing about
kleptomania is that it does not meet such criteria. The Humean Theory of
Motivation must account for all actions, not just self-governed actions.
The second argument is that any revision of the Distinctness Principle
that would replace the instrumental relation between intrinsic desire and
motivation with a non-instrumental relation, would thereby simply have
changed the meaning of the term “intrinsic desire,” such that the new
formulation would not really contradict the old formulation. What this
means is that even if we would reformulate the Distinctness Principle
so as to incorporate non-instrumental rationality, we could then simply
re-introduce a notion of “intrinsic* desires,” or “desired ends” perhaps,
which we could define, again, as the ends that are related in strictly
means-end fashion to the motivations of the agent. It seems that what our
current Distinctness Principle says would still hold with respect to this
re-introduced notion.
Now perhaps a ‘revisionary’ motivational Humean might want to
accept this, and simply claim that the Distinctness Principle is to be extended
by making the distinction between “instrumentally intrinsic desires,” say,
and what we might call “ultimately intrinsic desires,” such that in order
to explain how agents are motivated, beliefs can play two explanatory
roles: they can explain the relation between the motivations and the
No Revision of Humeanism Is Needed 91
instrumentally intrinsic desires, but they might also, furthermore, explain
the relation between the ultimately intrinsic desires and the instrumentally
intrinsic desires. Such a view would keep the Humean intuition that beliefs
cannot motivate in the absence of desires, while incorporating the idea
that beliefs about what would be rational in a non-instrumental sense can
play a role in explaining the agent’s motivation.
I am sympathetic to this idea in principle, but it seems to me that
because of the need to account for defects in self-governance, this expanded
version of the Humean theory of motivation would not really constitute a
revision of the Distinctness Principle, either. After all, there might be all
sorts of behavior to which we can attribute intelligibility as agency that
satisfies instrumental rationality, but which would not be intelligible on
the assumption that the instrumentally intrinsic desires thus attributed
reflected certain further, ultimate intrinsic desires in the light of the agent’s
beliefs about non-instrumental rationality. However, it seems that the
weaker intelligibility attribution is already sufficient to attribute beliefs to
the agent.
Now one might object that unless the agent would at least sometimes
exhibit behavior that did satisfy the stronger type of intelligibility, we
would not have reasons to attribute the non-instrumentally relevant beliefs
to the agent. And this might help to distinguish between agents in a
weak sense, like spiders, and agents in a strong sense, like human adults.
However, the only beliefs which we may cite in order to promote the ‘level
of rational agency’ in such a way would be beliefs about how to be a
rational agent that, in Williams’s sense, would ‘come for free’ in the same
sense in which the logic of means-end rationality ‘comes for free.’ And
all such concerns would essentially be concerns of self-governance: they
correspond to the isomorphically universal interests that are constitutive
of being an agent. And thus we are back at the first point about self-
governance: any ‘expanded’ version of the Distinctness Principle which
would incorporate non-instrumental notions of rationality would no longer
be explicating a Humean theory of motivation, but rather a Humean theory
of self-governed motivation. But there is nothing in the original Humean
theory of motivation that explicitly denies that the requirements of self-
governance might include certain beliefs. And even if there were, then it
now seems we could simply reduce these beliefs to instrumental beliefs, by
adding the interest in being self-governing as an instrumentally intrinsic
desire constitutive of being a self-governing agent. Again, all this stuff is
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okay as long as it ‘comes for free’ with the concept of agency, and when it
does it won’t really contradict the Distinctness Principle.
In contrast, consider now a principle of non-instrumental rationality,
which says that whenever you desire P, then reason requires you to also
desire Q, and which does not come ‘for free’ in the aforementioned sense.
All parties agree that this would be a principle of substantial reason, which
could not possibly be derived from formal considerations alone. Because of
this, it seems that violating such a principle should no longer be considered
a failure of self-governance by itself. Instead, the principle seems to be a
matter of substantial belief: an agent who desires P, but does not himself
believe in the principle, may be called unreasonable for not desiring Q,
but it does not make him less of an agent in any sense. This means
that, if we think that there are such principles, we cannot square them
with the unrevised Distinctness Principle in the manner just described.
However, let us now suppose that the agent does believe in the principle,
and he desires P, but yet he does not desire Q. Now the agent does
seem motivationally deficient: under conditions of full self-governance,
we would expect him to desire that which he himself believes he has
reason to desire. But the only way to ‘revise’ the Distinctness Principle
in order to accommodate this, it seems to me, would be to simply give
up on the motivational inertia of beliefs. For even though the belief in
question cannot motivate on its own, as it depends on the presence of a
desire that P, the belief is nevertheless supposed to bring about the desire
that Q when no governance-undermining factors intervene, and to do this
without the help of either a formal connection between Q and P nor that
of an additional, intrinsic desire that Q when desiring P. Allowing this
would amount to endorsing anti-Humeanism.
However, note that the latter argument is premised on the idea that
there are such substantial principles. But there is nothing in the diachronic
continuity thesis or the Internal Reasons View that says we should believe
that. If anything, the Internal Reasons View casts a serious doubt on the
existence of such principles, because we may wonder how ‘route-like’ they
really are. In any case, the Internal Reasons View is perfectly consistent
with the idea that all non-instrumental principles of reason must be just
as formal as the instrumental principle of means-end rationality, and that
anything else would not be required by reason alone. This, we have just
seen, is compatible with the synchronic Distinctness Principle in its current
form, provided that there is a solution to the Disconfirmation Problem.
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It follows, therefore, not only that Williams’s relationalist version of the
Internal Reasons View is not a revision of metanormative Humeanism, but
also that the Motivational Continuity Thesis, which is required in order
to defend the Internal Reasons View, is not a revision of motivational
Humeanism. The whole project of the Internal Reasons View is compatible
with both dimensions of the Humean outlook. It might not demand either,
but it will at least tolerate both.
3.4 A Humean Defense of the Motivational Continuity Thesis
Now that we have seen that the Motivational Continuity Thesis does not
rule out the Distinctness Principle, let us see whether we can go a step
further and deploy the Distinctness Principle in order to defend the thesis.
Recall what the thesis requires: independent support for the idea that
rational considerations can only produce new motivational attitudes in
ways that continue upon what was ‘called for’ from the perspective of the
pre-existing motivational attitudes. Less continuous developments in the
motivational set are possible, but they would not be cases in which the
development may be considered as demanded by a rational consideration,
meaning that the absence of any such development would not have made
the agent practically deficient or irrational.
The Humean defense consists of two steps. The first step is to argue that
the Motivational Continuity Thesis follows from the Distinctness Principle.
The second step is to argue that the reason for a motivational Humean to
believe in the Distinctness Principle does not already presuppose some
sort of claim about practical normativity—in particular, that it does not
already presuppose anti-dogmatic content skepticism. The second step
is needed in order to establish the idea that the Distinctness Principle
provides independent support for the Motivational Continuity Thesis.
3.4.1 How the Thesis Follows from the Distinctness Principle
So what is the first step? Recall that in order to demonstrate the compatibil-
ity between the Motivational Continuity Thesis and the ‘unrevised’ version
of the Distinctness Principle, I started out by noting that the latter is a prin-
ciple about synchronic structure, whereas the former is about diachronic
change. But insofar that distinction helps to put distance between the two
claims, it would also seem to make it difficult to defend the former on the
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basis of the latter. If the Distinctness Principle is purely synchronic, then
nothing diachronic could follow from it, we might be inclined to think.
However, as I continued to discuss the matter in the previous section,
I noted various interrelations between the synchronic and the diachronic
matters, and it is in the light of those relations that our defense may
now be formulated. Essentially, what the Distinctness Principle does is
to explicate the inertia of belief by stating how belief is synchronically
related to intrinsic desire, but the inertia of belief which is thus established
carries implications for diachronic considerations as well. Suppose, for
example, that an agent is motivated to φ and that his belief that φ would
contribute to P seems part of his reason to do so. One may then adopt
the Distinctness Principle and claim that this can only be the case on
the grounds of a desire that P which did not depend on the belief just
mentioned, and that furthermore, any belief on which the desire that P
might in turn depend on would in turn presuppose a desire independent
from that belief, such that there must be a Q so that the agent is motivated
to φ because she desires Q intrinsically. But it would surely be odd if one
would then go on to claim that this intrinsic desire to Q were diachronically
and rationally produced by a prior belief “that Q should be the case” that
did not depend on any desires whatsoever, and that the mere fact that the
agent believed that he should Q would count as an explanation why, other
things being equal, he would acquire the desire that Q. Given the idea that
synchronic intelligibility requires beliefs to be inert in the sense postulated
by the Distinctness Principle, it is completely unclear why it should be
rational for any such belief to produce, without the help of desires, such
an intrinsic desire at a later instant.
Given that the Distinctness Principle does not allow us simply to point
at belief change in order to explain intrinsic desire change under condi-
tions of sustained self-governance, what the Principle requires is that we
give some kind of further explanation of why it would take a breach in
self-governance to explain situations in which the belief change would
not be accompanied by a desire change in this manner. This is, once
again, the Disconfirmation Problem. Thus, the diachronic impact of the
synchronic Distinctness Principle is that belief adoption cannot by itself
explain intrinsic desire addition (as the anti-Humean might want to say),
but that instead it now requires explanation why belief adoption should be
accompanied by intrinsic desire addition. In other words, where the belief
counts as an explanans for the motivational anti-Humean, it is part of the
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explanandum for the motivational Humean.
Now, we have already seen in the previous section that with respect to
certain general non-instrumental principles of reason, we might be able
to give a straightforward explanation of their capacity to generate new
intrinsic desires upon the basis of old intrinsic desires in non-instrumental
ways by pointing to the fact that the satisfaction of such requirements
is constitutive of the very idea of self-government. In such cases, the
diachronic addition or removal of intrinsic desires comes ‘on the cheap.’
I then discussed the question of why we shouldn’t then also allow such
principles in the synchronic Distinctness Principle, but remarked that doing
so would amount to re-defining the notion of intrinsic desire in a manner
that would therefore not strictly revise the original principle. However,
what that does show is that the unrevised version of the Distinctness
Principle permits us to introduce a meaningful notion of non-instrumental
rationality with respect to synchronic structure, precisely because it does
not imply a revision of the original principle. Hence, the principle allows us
to introduce the idea of synchronic intelligibility of behavior as action that
satisfies the requirements of non-instrumentally rational self-governing
agency.
It is such an attribution of the intelligibility of the synchronic structure
of the agent’s attitudes that would ‘match’ the non-instrumental delib-
erative process when the agent actually is functioning rationally, in the
same sense in which the instrumental synchronic intelligibility attribution
‘matches’ the diachronic instrumental deliberative process when the agent
actually is functioning instrumentally rationally. However, we have also
seen that what may be synchronically attributed as intelligibility in the light
of principles of rational agency is constrained by the Distinctness Principle
to formal considerations. Even principles that are conditional upon desires,
such as the principle that when you desire P, reason requires you to also
desire Q, are ruled out by the Distinctness Principle if no formal connection
between desiring P and desiring Q can be made. Instead, such a principle
would be the object of substantial belief, and for intrinsic desires to be
under a requirement of reason to comply with such a belief would violate
the Distinctness Principle.
But now we can reason as follows: surely, if the motivational efficacy
of such a conditional substantial belief is already ruled out by the Distinct-
ness Principle, then the same would hold for unconditional, ‘non-route-like’
substantial beliefs about what sort of intrinsic desires reason would re-
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quire us to have—for example, the belief that desiring P is a substantial
feature of being reasonable. If we accept the Distinctness Principle, then
it becomes impossible to explain why self-governance could be subject to
such a belief, in the sense that having the belief and not desiring P would
constitute a lacking in self-governance. This means that the idea of such
beliefs rationally producing intrinsic desires diachronically will not come
‘on the cheap’ in the sense that we can simply explain such a deliberative
process as ‘matching’ a synchronic intelligibility attribution permitted by
the Distinctness Principle.
So given the Distinctness Principle, there can be no substantial princi-
ples of reason such that an agent might be considered to be unreasonable
if the synchronic structure of his attitudes would violate such a princi-
ple. But now we may wonder: how could any substantial principle of
reason require the diachronic generation of intrinsic desires, irrespective
of pre-existing desires, if the synchronic outcome of that process would not
be required by reason at all? If the S of the agent at some point in time
would not, synchronically, violate any principles of reason, then what sort
of requirement could there be upon the agent to have arrived at a different
S if not on the basis of the state of his S at a prior instant? I don’t see how
these questions could possibly receive positive answers.
There is a different, but perhaps superficially similar question, which
could receive a positive answer. That question would be as follows: how
could any diachronic process be called irrational if it’s outcome, considered
synchronically, would not violate any rational requirements? The answer
to such a question is simply that there might be requirements of self-
governing rational agency that were due to the fact that self-governance
is itself a diachronic concept. So far, I have mainly used the notion of
self-governance as part of a synchronic requirement: that an agent who has
a self-adopted reason to φ at time T, but who is not effectively motivated
to φ at T, is lacking in self-governance. However, note that this principle
is not meant to define or capture the notion of self-governance. On the
contrary, it is meant to define the concept of a self-adopted reason by
referring to a presumably already meaningful notion of self-governance.
The synchronic implications of this notion do not preclude that it has
constitutive diachronic features as well. And in fact, it seems very plausible
that self-government is a thoroughly diachronic concept.16
However, there are two things to note about this insight. The first
16For various diachronic aspects due to intending and planning, see Bratman (1987).
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is that diachronic features of self-governance are primarily about cross-
temporal coherence, which puts various constraints on how we make plans
and organize our schedules and priorities. Such constraints are usually
rather conservative with respect to our pre-existing ends: if anything, they
help articulating the costs rather than the benefits of major revisions in
our subjective motivational sets. In the light of this, we can think of the
synchronic-diachronic distinction in two ways. The first way is by thinking
of the synchronic in terms of ‘time-slices’—configurations of attitudes
that have no duration associated with them. However, talking about an
action at a time in the ‘time slice’ sense is at best highly abstract: it may
serve a purpose when simplification is a necessity, but we should keep in
mind that with respect to the ‘time slice’ notion of synchronicity, every
action is already a diachronic phenomenon in itself. However, there is a
second, looser and more pragmatic notion of talking about things being
synchronous, and that is simply for two things to exist ‘during the same
phase,’ without either being considered as temporally, and in particular
causally, prior to the other. Talking about an agent having a structure
of attitudes in this synchronic sense is also an abstraction, but in a more
pragmatic sense: it allows us to abstract away from the complex underlying
causal mechanisms which sustain, or realize, the intelligibility of the agent
as having that structure of attitudes during the period of time under
consideration.
In terms of this second notion of synchronicity, the distinction between
the diachronic and the synchronic becomes a relative one, and the require-
ments of cross-temporal coherence that self-government places upon us
helps to understand how we can shift between different scales of syn-
chronicity. Thus, from a diachronic perspective, self-government requires
us to update our attitudes, and respond to various events, so as to keep
some of our ‘overarching’ attitudes intact across that period of time, allow-
ing us to be intelligible as having a synchronic structure of those attitudes
during that period of time.
However, whereas self-governance guides the diachronic constancy of
attitudes over time, the idea of substantial principles of reason requiring the
addition of intrinsic desires in ‘non-route-like’ fashion would rather repre-
sent a breaching of cross-temporal coherence. The sort of non-instrumental
deliberation that would bring about major revisions in the agent’s S would
be diachronic in the sense that it moves from one self-governmentally
synchronic ‘phase’ to the next one.
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Now it does seems to me that certain conditions which are constitutive
of self-governing agency in the diachronic sense would actually make it
rational for us to seek changes that upset cross-temporal coherence to
a great extent—I will discuss this idea in much more detail later on in
this thesis. But given the way in which self-governance is ‘prejudiced’
towards coherence and conservatism, so to speak, it seems to me that
any reason to ‘rock the boat’ which would be a reason for the sake of
self-governance, would have to be justified in the light of something sitting
uneasily, something being not entirely coherent or governmentally at rest,
so to speak, within the S of the agent during the period of time before
the decision to make a change. Which means that the relevant concern
of self-governance itself would be formal, and the way it would make its
impact would be ‘route like,’ by picking up on some tension within the S.
To conclude, diachronic considerations which may be constitutive of
agency will not help to answer the question how a substantial principle of
reason would make it irrational for an agent not to develop a desire that P,
if his prior S did not in any way demand a desire for P to be added, and
if the state in which he does not desire P does not violate any synchronic
principles of reason, as must follow from the Distinctness Principle. The
point is simply that there is nothing essentially diachronic about the idea
of substantial principles of reason. It is the concept of deliberation that is
diachronic, but if there are any ‘non-route-like’ substantial principles of
reason then the only reason that an agent would have to come to adopt
them is because he had not adopted them already. Since such principles
would not depend on anything called for by the prior S of the agent, there
are simply no diachronic considerations for such principles to call upon in
order to escape from the clutches of the synchronic Distinctness Principle.
Thus, it follows, that if the Distinctness Principle is true, there can be no
beliefs about what reason requires which would explain how an agent
could rationally arrive at some motivation that was not in any way called
for by the state of his S. Which is what the Motivational Continuity Thesis
claims.
3.4.2 Why the Distinctness Principle Provides Independent Support
On to the second step of our argument. Why should we believe that the
Distinctness Principle is true? Now the project of this thesis is not to defend
motivational Humeanism; it is rather to build a meta-ethical account
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on the assumption that the Distinctness Principle is true. But without
demonstrating that my reasons for this assumption are sound, I shall try
to explain why they do not already presuppose a settled view on the
scope of practical reason. I have already made the distinction between the
normativity of normative reasons and the normative aspect of motivating
reasons. In my view, the normativity of motivating reasons does not derive
from that of normative reasons, but rather from that of the normativity
of beliefs and desires—the concepts in terms of which, according to the
motivational Humean, we must analyze motivating reasons.
Now the normativity of desires, in a sense which does not presuppose
normative reasons, is simply that of teleology, of goal-directedness. This
notion, it seems to me, is not at all restricted to deliberating agents like
us, but is instead something that we share, on some level, with ‘lesser’
agents such as various members of the animal kingdom. I shall make no
assumption about where on the evolutionary ladder the lesser agents begin,
nor about where they get promoted to a higher status or what sort of inter-
mediary concepts of agency we might discern along the way. What matters
is that we need not invoke our concepts of normative reason or practical
judgment in order to attribute goal-directedness, and therefore the notion
does not seem guilty of presupposing our meta-ethical analysandum.
Regardless of how this notion of teleology is understood precisely, the
intuition behind Humeanism is that getting something right has nothing to
do with it. Belief may derive its meaning from the context of agency, as
interpretationists about the mental like Dennett and Davidson have argued,
but within that context, the role of belief is precisely that of representing
the world in a manner which is not geared towards a goal. Of course, it
may be in the interest of an agent, given his desires, to hold beliefs about
the things which interest him, and in that sense his beliefs are geared
towards his goals, but they are still disinterested in terms of their content.
And the reason for that, I submit, is that motivational Humeanism
ultimately captures an intuition about truth: that truth itself is disinterested.
By that I don’t mean that “reality,” or “the world” is disinterested (whatever
that, or its opposite, would be supposed to mean), but rather that the
concept of truth is disinterested: what it means to say that a proposition is
true would not be different if one were motivated by different interests.
It might have different meaning in the sense of what “it meant to you”
but that is already a much richer notion of meaning, incorporating the
interaction of the belief in the truth with one’s desires. But in the pure
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assertive sense of meaning, which the concept of truth is about, what it
means to say that a proposition is true is completely independent from
what one’s motivations might be, as long as the proposition stays the same.
This also means that any results from cognitive science which point
to the fact that our behavior is best explained in terms of attitudes or
cognitive structures that do not represent, separately, our understanding
of the world and our ideas on how to interact with it, are besides the point.
From the interpretationist perspective on the mental, insofar as any such
cognitive structure implements an understanding of the world, we may
attribute to the agent the attitude of holding certain things to be true, and
what that means, by itself, carries no interests one way or another. Now it
may be remarked that truth, itself, is also a normative notion. One might
even say that it is the normative notion. But any Humean who would
agree with this could hardly be accused of building ideas about practical
normativity into his understanding of truth. It should be obvious that the
sense in which our concept of truth is normative is a much more theoretical
one: it is the normativity that concerns all areas of knowledge, as studied
by epistemology in the general sense.
If the reasons that motivational Humeans have for believing in the
motivational inertia of belief are grounded in an understanding of epis-
temic normativity, then I think we have established that the Distinctness
Principle need not presuppose anything practically normative. Therefore,
anti-dogmatic content skepticism is not dialectically prior to the Distinct-
ness Principle. Which means that the Distinctness Principle provides
independent support for the Motivational Continuity Thesis. And that
means, as I have argued in section 2.5.1 from the previous chapter, that with
the Distinctness Principle on our side, we can refute the ‘non-route-like’
deliberation objection against Williams’s defense of the Internal Reasons
View.
Assembling the different arguments that we have seen in this chap-
ter and chapter 2, we now have a defense of CIRV premised on various
elements from chapter 1. On the assumption that the Disconfirmation
Problem can be solved, we have seen that the Distinctness Principle implies
the Motivational Continuity Thesis, which together with the proceduralist
version of the Disconfirmation Principle, and the premise that captured
our intuition about self-government, yields the Internal Reasons View.
Coupled with the Facts and Authority Principles, this leads to the Compre-
hensive Internal Reasons View, or CIRV. Finally, we have seen two strategies
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for combining CIRV with nonrelationalism. The former, Thomas’s anti-
Humean strategy, would be ruled out if the Distinctness Principle is true.
The latter strategy, which consisted in a combination of formal considera-
tions about convergence and what is constitutive of agency, is ruled out by
Williams’s anti-formal content skepticism. Note that this may still be an
independent premise, of which I have not claimed that it could be derived
from the Distinctness Principle. In any case, if we add this premise then
relationalist CIRV follows, and we get the motivational Humean ‘version’
of Williams’s view, so to speak. This is the view that I will take as the inspi-
ration for the account that I am going to develop in this thesis. Note that
it leaves a lot to be answered: how to solve the Disconfirmation Problem,
a fuller understanding of the notion of self-governance that I have relied
upon so often, as well as a more detailed account of what non-instrumental
deliberation may consist in within the ‘route-like’ boundaries.
As noted before, however, I mean to stay neutral about the exegetical
question of whether Williams actually had a motivationally Humean view
in mind. In any case, the Humean defense that I have just offered in
support of the Internal Reasons View is certainly my own. For the sake
of completeness, I shall now turn briefly to the prospects for a defense of
CIRV on the basis of an anti-Humean theory of motivation.
3.5 The Anti-Humean Defense of the Motivational Continu-
ity Thesis
We have seen that the Motivational Continuity Thesis is compatible with
the Distinctness Principle, and furthermore, that it actually follows from
that principle. But does a defense of the thesis also require the Principle?
A crucial step in the above line of argument was to show that, in order to
accommodate the idea that substantial principles of reason might produce
new intrinsic desires, we would have to reject the Distinctness Principle
and adopt an anti-Humean theory of motivation. This may seem to suggest
that, on the basis of motivational anti-Humeanism, we could reject the
Motivational Continuity Thesis, and adopt the External Reasons View.
I think this is correct, in the sense that without further qualification,
being an anti-Humean about motivation is compatible with being an
external reasons theorist. However, from that it does not follow that
all anti-Humean theories of motivation are compatible with the External
Reasons View—only that some might be. It depends on the specifics of
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the theory. Now if we ask ourselves what sort of anti-Humean theory of
motivation Williams might have been most sympathetic to, then the most
obvious candidate, it seems to me, would be the theory that we must be
anti-Humeans in order to make sense of Williams’s notion of thick concepts.
3.5.1 The Argument from Thick Concepts
Williams famously distinguished between “thin” and “thick” ethical con-
cepts. Examples of thin concepts are good and ought, which can be used
meaningfully to give a positive or negative evaluation of basically any
action, state of affairs, or matter of fact. The concept of good only ex-
presses that something is evaluated positively, not what sort of thing or
why. By contrast, examples of thick concepts are cowardice and bravery,
which not only express the positive or negative evaluation, but also describe
the evaluated action as being, empirically, of a certain kind, such that it is
in virtue of it being of that kind that it is to be evaluated in that manner.
The question with respect to thick concepts is whether we can give
a “two-factor analysis” of them, such that the attribution of any thick
concept to an action φ may be reduced to the combination of a purely
descriptive characterization D of φ and a pure evaluation, using a thin
concept, of φ’s being D. Harcourt & Thomas (forthcoming) argue that the
nature of thick concepts is such that they resist this kind of analysis. A
discussion of their detailed arguments against specific two-factor proposals
is beyond the scope of this thesis, but their general explanation for the
phenomenon is that grasping the extension of the concept involves sharing
a social perspective with its users that already constitutes the evaluative
interest that gives ethical concepts their directive potential. There are two
implications which this argument may be thought to have, both of which
are endorsed by Thomas. The first is that this feature of thick concepts
makes ethical knowledge possible—the knowledge contained in true and
justified thick concept attributions. The second is that this feature of thick
concepts disproves motivational Humeanism.
With respect to the first implication, as we have already seen, Williams
was skeptical about the idea of nonrelationalist ethical knowledge. Never-
theless, Williams may have been more sympathetic to the second implica-
tion. The reasoning behind it should be more or less as follows. Under
conditions of self-governance, our practical judgments have motivational
implications. Therefore, if our practical judgments involve thick concept
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attributions, then the evaluative aspect of thick concepts must be motiva-
tionally efficacious in some sense (i.e., a ‘defeasible’ sense that can only
be thwarted by factors that explain the impairment of self-governance).
However, if a two-factor analysis of such concepts is impossible, then this
motivationally efficacious part cannot be separated from the belief-like
attitude that the descriptive part of the thick concept attribution involves.
Hence, the motivation provided by thick concept use cannot be analyzed
by separating the non-motivational role of belief from the motivational
impetus of intrinsic desires in the manner that the Distinctness Principle
requires.
Of course, this way of presenting the argument is very sketchy, and
in order to demonstrate its validity a number of premises would have to
be explicated about what the two-factor analysis is supposed, exactly, to
accomplish and whether that corresponds, exactly, to what the Distinctness
Principle would require. I do not think the argument is sound, so I would
probably reject one of those premises, but to figure this out is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
In any case, what matters for my present purpose is that some versions
of motivational anti-Humeanism may be based on this argument, and
if they are, they might furthermore accept the restriction that it is only
through this role of thick concepts that beliefs may have non-instrumental
motivational efficacy. In other words, according to this version of the anti-
Humean theory, a belief may motivate non-instrumentally if and only if the
belief involves the attribution of a concept that resists two-factor analysis.
Suppose furthermore, that the only reason why concepts may resist such
analysis is Thomas’s claim, that one cannot determine the extension of the
concept unless one already shares the interest implicated in that concept.
Now the point is not that one would just lack all sort of accidental
knowledge required to determine the extension of the concept. The point
seems rather that one would simply fail to grasp the intension of the concept
if one does not share the interest implicit in it—one can only grasp the
concept from the perspective of the interest. But if that is true, then it would
seem that for an agent who does not share that interest, there is no way of
acquiring the concept in the light of its descriptive merits alone, such that
the interest implicated in it would then come along and get added to one’s
S. Instead, it would seem that in order to develop the grasp of the concept,
one would have to develop the interest needed to grasp that concept from
the inside, as it were, on the basis of one’s pre-existing interests. Which is
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exactly what the Motivational Continuity Thesis requires.
3.5.2 Does the Argument Provide Independent Support for the Thesis?
There are two possible interpretations of the argument I have just sketched.
According to one interpretation, which Thomas seems to have in mind, it
does not provide independent support for the Motivational Continuity The-
sis, because the notion of a thick ethical concept on which it relies already
involves the idea of practical normativity. Therefore, the motivational skep-
ticism about learning thick concepts on the basis of rational insight and
acquiring new motivations as a result from it, would not be ‘dialectically
prior’ to the content skepticism implicit in such an understanding of the
nature of thick concepts.
According to a second version of the argument, even though thick
ethical concepts are in a sense ‘culturally holistic,’ presupposing a historical
background that is already rich with our idea of practical normativity, the
reason why culture does function in this sense can be explained in terms of
the psychological mechanisms that enable us to be cultural beings, and it
is because of psychological reasons that we cannot distinguish between the
ability to grasp the concept and the motivational interest that is implicated
by the possession of the concept. On this version of the argument, the
motivational skepticism would be prior to the normative skepticism.
I have no idea which version, if Williams was indeed a motivational anti-
Humean, would be closest to how he meant to defend the Internal Reasons
View. However, as I have argued in section 2.5.2, it does seem to me that
insofar as Williams was an anti-formal content skeptic for ‘dialectically
prior’ reasons, this skepticism was directed against the Kantian version
of the Internal Reasons View, rather than against the External Reasons
View. But anti-dogmatic content skepticism seemed ill-suited to stand on
its own as a nonreducible meta-ethical claim about the nature of practical
normativity, because it would continue to beg the question against the idea
that reason might be intrinsically non-formal.
Thus, it seems that against the first version of the argument, an external
reasons theorist might simply reply that thick ethical concepts are not
the only way in which beliefs can non-instrumentally motivate, and that
having beliefs about substantial principles of reason is a further way in
which beliefs can do this. The proponent of the first version would then
be back at square one in the question-beg stalemate over the scope of
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practical reason. Instead, the proponent of the second line of argument
might have some story about why our psychology does support the idea
of motivational thick concepts, but not of being motivated by substantial
principles of reason. If motivational anti-Humeanism were true for such
psychological reasons, then it seems to me that the Internal Reasons View
must be true as well.
I conclude, then, that the Internal Reasons View may be defended
upon both motivationally Humean and anti-Humean grounds. Despite
its possible exegetic inaccuracy, we shall see in the next chapter that the
Humean defense of the Internal Reasons View provides us with a sketch
of a solution to the Facts Problem. Interestingly, we have also seen that
the Humean defense is premised on the assumption that a solution to the
Disconfirmation Problem can be given. But as we shall see in the chapters
to come, solving the Facts Problem along the lines of the Internal Reasons
View does not make the Disconfirmation Problem go away. This means
that an independent account of disconfirmation is required, which I am
going to build in chapter 7. On the one hand, this account will stay within
the boundaries of the Internal Reasons View, as there will be no room
for external reasons. But the picture of the deliberative route will change
radically: instead of Williams’s focus on the scope of practical reason and
the room for constitutive imagination, my own account will give a central
role to the idea of empirical self-knowledge.

ii Facts about Reasons :
The Status Quo

4 Outline of a Relationalist Solution
In chapter 1 I have formulated five principles in order to articulate certain
intuitions about practical judgment. I started with the Facts Principle
and the Disconfirmation Principle, which led us to the Facts Question
and the Disconfirmation Question. We have seen that in conjunction
with the Authority and Distinctness Principles, the Facts Principle leads
to a paradox. Thus we arrived at the Facts Problem: the problem of
answering the Facts Question in a way that would resolve this paradox. In
a similar fashion, we arrived at the Disconfirmation Problem: the problem
of answering the Disconfirmation Question in a manner that would resolve
a paradox resulting from the conjunction of the Disconfirmation, Authority
and Distinctness Principles.
Because the Facts and Disconfirmation Principles are, in some sense,
two sides of the same coin, the Facts and Disconfirmation Problems are not
really separate problems. They are rather two different ways of approach-
ing the same problem. Nevertheless, there is a certain asymmetry between
these two perspectives. From the perspective of the Facts Question, the
problem takes a metaphysical form: the Facts Problem requires us to ex-
plain the nature of facts about normative reasons, which seems like a very
fundamental, but also highly abstract and theoretical undertaking. In con-
trast, from the perspective of the Disconfirmation Question, the problem
takes an epistemological form: the Disconfirmation Problem requires us
to explain what sort of things could rightfully make us change our minds
and our ways of behaving, which seems like a much more concrete and
practical issue.
Of these two perspectives, the perspective of the Facts Question may
seem to be the most fundamental one: it is about what normativity ulti-
mately is, whereas the Disconfirmation Question is merely about how we
can correct our mistakes about it. Making mistakes about practical norma-
tivity already presupposes the existence of practical normativity, which
may suggest that it is the Facts Question that really gets to the bottom of
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things. This view seems to be implicit in the literature, where questions
of disconfirmation are usually treated as derived from questions about
moral truth or moral facts. The best known meta-ethical “isms” that moral
philosophers defend, such as “cognitivism,” “realism,” and “relativism,”
are first and foremost about truth and truth conditions, not about the
circumstances under which we should revise our practical judgments. I
will briefly go along with this view in the current chapter and in chapters
5 and 6, discussing different solutions that may be extracted from the
literature in response to the Facts Problem.
However, in the last two chapters we’ve already seen that in order to
defend the Internal Reasons View, one of the most prominent views in the
literature on these matters, we had to make assumptions about disconfir-
mation at crucial points in the argument. First of all, it turned out in section
2.4 that Williams’s own argument for the view is premised on an implicit
proceduralism about disconfirmation. Secondly, I have shown in section
3.3.2 how a defense of the view within a motivationally Humean frame-
work must rely on the assumption that a solution to the Disconfirmation
Problem can be formulated.
In similar fashion, we shall see in this second part of the thesis that
the different possible solutions to the Facts Problem are often driven by
assumptions or ideas that concern disconfirmation. In my own view,
this means it will be much more fruitful to think of the Disconfirmation
Question as the primary question, and to approach the Facts Question as
derivative. Therefore, in part iii of the thesis, and especially in chapter 7 the
Disconfirmation Question will become our starting point, and solving the
Disconfirmation Problem will be our primary objective. In the end, finding
a satisfactory answer to the Facts Question might still be seen as the most
fundamental goal, but it is through a theory of practical disconfirmation
that we must get there. Or so I will argue.
Nevertheless, in order to get a grip on the status quo, let us first take a
closer look at the Facts Problem. Because the problem involves a paradox,
there are essentially two types of solutions: we must either reconcile
the principles that gave rise to the paradox by explaining away their
apparent inconsistency, or we must reject one of the principles and explain
away its apparent plausibility. Let us call solutions of the former type
“reconciliatory” and those of the latter type “dismissive.” Among the
reconciliatory solutions, we can make further distinctions depending on
whether they are relationalist or nonrelationalist about the Intersubjectivity
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Principle, and on whether they are proceduralist or nonproceduralist
about the Disconfirmation Principle. Among the dismissive solutions, we
must of course distinguish different views depending on which of the
Principles they are dismissing. Thus, the Distinctness Principle is rejected
by motivationally anti-Humean views, the Authority Principle by the ‘no
reasons’ forms of externalism, and the Facts Principle itself is rejected by
noncognitivism, quietism, and what I will call “radical error theory.”
The solution that I favor, and which I shall defend throughout this
thesis, is reconciliatory, relationalist, and proceduralist. If we compare
this type of view to the other options that I have distinguished, then the
fact that it is a relationalist type of view stands out as its most distinctive
feature. As we shall see in the next chapter, there seems to be little reason
for proponents of a nonproceduralist reconciliatory solution to subscribe
to relationalism, and the same applies to those who are dismissive of the
Facts and/or Authority Principles. It might be possible to defend rela-
tionalism from within a motivationally anti-Humean framework—Bernard
Williams, as we have seen in the previous chapter, was a relationalist with-
out being unambiguously committed to a Humean theory of motivation.
Nevertheless, most philosophers who are more explicitly anti-Humean
about motivation—including those anti-Humeans who do subscribe to the
Internal Reasons View, such as Alan Thomas—are nonrelationalists about
intersubjectivity.
In this chapter, I will present an outline of the relationalist view that I
favor, and explain how that view solves the Facts Problem. The solution is
based on a “dispositional” approach to practical normativity, an approach
that has become very popular in the literature, in widely different varieties.
The dispositional solution that I propose is based, more or less, on the
relationalist, motivationally Humean version of CIRV that I defended in
section 3.4 of the previous chapter, but in the present chapter I shall define
the solution in my own terms, so that we can leave all the disambiguations
and exegetical disclaimers with respect to Williams’s work behind us.
Nevertheless, the reasons why we are being pushed towards relationalism,
at this stage, are basically the ones that I articulated in section 3.2, including
Williams’s anti-formal content skepticism, a further discussion of which
must await chapter 5.1 In the present chapter, I will simply stick with a
relationalist understanding of the solution, and take stock of the challenges
that the relationalist must be able to meet in order to make his solution
1See section 5.4.
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work. One of the goals of this thesis will be to address those challenges. We
return to nonrelationalist reconciliatory solutions in the next two chapters.
4.1 The Dispositional Approach
In order to reconcile the intuitions behind the Facts, Authority and Dis-
tinctness Principles, various authors have tried to defend a “dispositional”
or “response-dependence” theory of practical normativity. According to
such a theory, the facts about our normative reasons for action are facts
about what our motivations and affective responses would be under certain
ideal conditions of agency (Firth, 1952; Brandt, 1979; Williams, 1980/1981a;
Smith, 1989, 1994, 2002/2004c; Lewis, 1989; Johnston, 1989; Jackson &
Pettit, 1995). These conditions typically include self-government, correct
reasoning, and access to the relevant information. The general idea is
simple: we remove the mystery about why we would be motivated, under
ideal conditions, in accordance with our normative reasons, by analyzing
normative reasons in terms of the motivations that we would have under
those conditions.
Note that the general formulation of dispositionalism that I just gave
presupposes the Facts and Authority Principles (because it identifies facts
of practical normativity as facts about normative reasons), but not neces-
sarily the Distinctness Principle: it only refers to our motivations under
ideal conditions, without saying anything substantial about how those
motivations would have to be constituted or generated. This is reflected in
the literature: some dispositionalists and response-dependence theorists
are self-proclaimed Humeans about motivation (Lewis, 1988, 1989; Smith,
1987, 1989), some are anti-Humean (McDowell, 2001; Thomas, 2006), and
some are difficult to classify (Bernard Williams is a notable example, as we
have seen in the previous two chapters). Furthermore, we have already
seen that CIRV, which we may now understand as a variety or subclass of
dispositionalism, can be formulated and defended independently of the
dispute between Humeans and anti-Humeans concerning motivation.
Nevertheless, the dispositional approach is a very attractive one for
Humeans about motivation who wish to reconcile our Principles, because
it provides a formula to synthesize facts about normative reasons with
the analysis of motivation in terms of instrumental beliefs and intrinsic
desires. The motivationally Humean dispositionalist idea is, again, simple:
we remove the mystery about why we would be motivated, under ideal
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conditions, in accordance with our normative reasons, by analyzing nor-
mative reasons in terms of the intrinsic desires, the instrumental beliefs,
and the derived desires that we would have under those conditions. From
now on, when I speak about dispositionalism, dispositional theories, or
the dispositional solution, I will have this more specific, motivationally
Humean version of the dispositional idea in mind.
If the Humean is right about motivation, then why, we may now ask,
should the content of our intrinsic desires be any different under ideal
conditions from what it is under the actual conditions? According to
the Distinctness Principle, no intrinsic desire can be refuted by belief, no
matter how true and justified. So what could there be ‘less than ideal’
about our actual intrinsic desires? The answer is that even though no
intrinsic desire is subject to criticism when considered in isolation, there
are certain combinations of different intrinsic desires that an ‘ideal’ agent
would never have. Thus, it seems hardly ideal for an agent to have very
strong intrinsic desires that are simply inconsistent with each other. This
insight does not really go against the Distinctness Principle: the reason
why it is undesirable to have such inconsistent desires does not depend on
any beliefs about the state of the world.
By itself, this insight does not yet provide us with an answer to the
Facts Question. From the mere fact that my actual set of intrinsic desires
is less-than-ideal, it does not follow that there are positive facts about
what my ideal set of desires would be. Instead, this might simply remain
undetermined. After all, suppose that I desire both that P and that not P,
that these desires are equally strong, and that the rest of my desire set is
completely neutral about whether to prefer P or not P. In that case, it seems
that we could think of two ideal versions of myself, of which one would
still desire that P but not that not P, while the other would desire that
not P and not that P. It seems completely undetermined which of these I
would be under the ideal conditions. Hence, these considerations do not
provide me with a fact about whether I should approve or disapprove of P.
However, in practice things are usually not so symmetric. Not just
because one desire might be stronger than a conflicting desire, but also
because one of the conflicting desires might be more coherent with further
desires that we have. Thus, we might be able to understand facts about
normative reasons as facts about certain asymmetries within the sets of
our intrinsic desires. On the basis of such asymmetries, some idealized
versions of ourselves might be considered ‘nearer’ to our actual self, and
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then our normative reasons could be analyzed in terms of the desires of
our ‘nearest ideal self.’2
This line of thought leads us back to the dispute between relationalist
cognitivism and nonrelationalist realism. If it depends on my actual set
of desires which ideal self is nearest to the actual me, then it would seem
that my normative reasons might have been different if my actual set of
desires were different. Consequently, it seems no longer guaranteed that
different less-then-ideal agents have normative reasons to approve of the
same states of affairs. After all, since their actual desire sets differ, their
nearest ideal selves might have different desires as well. Their conflicts
in the actual world might persist, so to speak, among their nearest ideal
selves. Which would commit us to relationalist cognitivism. In contrast,
if the nonrelationalist realist wants to develop a dispositional solution to
the Facts Problem, then he would have to show that the ideal selves of
all agents must always desire the same states of affairs. We have touched
on this matter in section 3.2, and I will return to the possibility for a
nonrelationalist dispositional solution in chapters 5 and 6, while pursuing
the relationalist solution in the current chapter.
Aside from the dilemma between relationalism and nonrelationalism,
there may also be certain problems that affect dispositional solutions
in general. Some philosophers may find the notion of ideal conditions
troubling, or have skeptical worries about the very idea of dispositional
facts and truth conditions. If the dispositional solution would fail for such
reasons, then perhaps another type of solution might be devised—it is not
obvious that the dispositional approach is our only option for reconciling
our Principles. Furthermore, there are meta-ethical views in the literature
that do not explicitly reject a dispositional solution, but which also do not
explicitly make use of it, even though they do seem to combine all the
Principles, which puts them in the ‘reconciliatory’ camp. Harry Frankfurt’s
view, which I will discuss briefly below, and extensively in chapter 8, might
be an example of such a position. However, as I will argue in this chapter,
one of the things that makes Frankfurt’s view attractive is the contribution
that it may have to offer to the dispositional account. And as we shall see
2That does not mean we should deny the possibility of ‘symmetric’ cases. Instead, we
may simply conclude that the symmetric cases constitute genuine dilemmas, which cannot
be resolved on the basis of sound deliberation. In order to uphold the Facts Principle, we
need only show that there are facts about normative reasons that resolve some cases, not that
they resolve all cases. I will return to this matter in section 9.2.2.
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later on,3 Frankfurt’s view has problems of its own that are perhaps most
easily solved along dispositional lines. With these considerations in mind,
I shall proceed by treating the dispositional approach as our principal
strategy for solving the Facts Problem in a reconciliatory manner.
4.2 Type-i Dispositionalism
What are the ideal conditions of agency? In the light of CIRV, we may
think of these ideal conditions as constituting the endpoint, or limit, so
to speak, of the deliberative route that an agent might take: the point at
which no further deliberative improvements could be made. In section 2.2
I have discussed Williams’s take on this, which involved both instrumental
reasoning and deliberation about ends. With respect to the former, I have
argued against Williams’s proximity condition on instrumentally relevant
facts. In line with my argument there, I will include in my proposal that
the agent holds all the relevant true beliefs, and no false beliefs, about the
means to his ends, under the ideal conditions of agency.
With respect to non-instrumental deliberation, CIRV claims that it must
be ‘route like’ and start from actual elements of the motivational set rather
than from any substantial principles of practical reason. I have argued that
this criterion can be defended on the basis of the Motivational Continuity
Thesis, and that the latter thesis could in turn be supported independently
on the basis of the Distinctness Principle. Furthermore, we have seen
that the combination of ‘route like’ deliberation and proceduralism leads
to relationalism unless we can make some kind of convergence strategy
work, but the informal convergence strategy is incompatible with the
Distinctness Principle, while the formal strategy would be ruled out by
anti-formal content skepticism. Thus, even though Williams may not have
been a motivational Humean himself, and even though his own reasons for
defending relationalism may have been different, we can now see how the
criterion of ‘route like’ deliberation plays an intermediate role in a chain of
arguments from the premises of proceduralism, the Distinctness Principle,
and anti-formal content skepticism, amongst others, to the conclusion of
relationalism.
If we now omit the intermediate steps in this argument chain (the
Motivational Continuity Thesis and the Internal Reasons View), and focus
instead on the relationalist conclusion and the premises that gave rise to
3See sections 8.3 and 8.4.
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it, then we get an answer to the Facts Question along the following lines.
The facts which make the true practical beliefs of an agent true are facts
about the actual intrinsic desires of the agent, such that those beliefs might
have been false had those desires been different. More specifically, the fact
that makes the practical belief in approval of P true is the fact that the
actual intrinsic desires of the agent would give rise to the resultant desire
that P if the agent would deliberate correctly upon those desires, rejecting
all instrumentally relevant false beliefs and acquiring all instrumentally
relevant true beliefs with respect to P in the process, and applying any
valid methods of non-instrumental deliberation to his self-adopted ends in
such a way that, had his intrinsic desires been different, such deliberations
might not have given rise to the resultant desire that P.
This answer is sketchy at best, and further clarifications will be needed.
However, I first want to propose a terminological modification. I have
already mentioned self-government as one of the necessary conditions
of ideal agency, and various considerations pertaining to self-governance
have played an important role in the previous two chapters. An agent
whose practical beliefs are true but who fails to act accordingly is not very
ideal, and neither is the agent who is motivated in accordance with his
normative reasons even if his beliefs are at odds with them. Now Williams,
but also Michael Smith, for example, have used notions like “deliberation,”
“deliberative route,” and “correct deliberation” in a very broad sense that
already presupposes a match between motivation and practical belief at
the end of the route, so to speak, and the formulations in the paragraph
above are consistent with that. But a more common usage of the term
“deliberation” does not seem to presuppose self-government. Consider
Frankfurt’s example of the “unwilling addict” (1971/1988b, p. 17). The
addict is enslaved by a desire that he fails to control, yet his practical
judgment opposes this desire. There seems to be no reason why the
unwilling addict might not get his judgment right, and even have the
justification for it.4 Under those conditions, we might say that the unwilling
addict knows he has a normative reason not to take the drugs, even though
he fails to act upon it. His deliberations are correct, yet he doesn’t have
the desires to act accordingly. Therefore, it seems we should distinguish
the requirement of self-government from that of deliberative correctness in
4This point is closely related to my argument, in section 1.4.1, for preferring the reference
to “self-governance” in my Authority Principle to Smith’s reference to “practical rationality”
in his practicality principle.
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order to specify the conditions under which the desires of the agent match
his normative reasons for action. Thus, our modified answer to the Facts
Question becomes as follows:
Type-i dispositionalism. The fact that makes the practical
belief in approval of P true is the fact that the actual intrin-
sic desires of the agent would give rise to the resultant de-
sire that P if (1) the agent would deliberate correctly upon
those desires, applying any valid methods of instrumental and
non-instrumental deliberation to them, and rejecting all instru-
mentally relevant false beliefs and acquiring all instrumentally
relevant true beliefs in the process, and if (2) his desires them-
selves were modified according to those deliberations, so as to
maintain or establish the state of self-government, while (3) his
actual intrinsic desires could have been different in such a way
that (1) and (2) might not have led to the resultant desire that
P.
I am calling this type of answer “type-i dispositionalism” because it is the
first of three types of dispositionalism that will play a major role in the
rest of this thesis. I will introduce “type-ii” and “type-iii” dispositionalism
in the next chapter.
Now let us see whether type-i dispositionalism allows us to solve
the Facts Problem: what sort of facts could make beliefs true in such a
way that (a) self-governing agents who had those beliefs would have to
be motivated in certain ways, if it is also true that (b) their motivation
depends on intrinsic desires that could have been different regardless of
their beliefs? Note first that the problem refers to an agent who is (i)
self-governing and (ii) knows the facts about his normative reasons for
action. Thus, the problem is about an agent under ideal conditions. But
according to type-i dispositionalism, the facts about his normative reasons
are the facts about his desires under those conditions. Thus, if the intrinsic
desires mentioned under (b) had been different, then the facts about his
normative reasons for action would have been different as well. Which
means that the truth conditions for his practical beliefs would have been
different too. But that means that in order for the agent to still be an agent
who knew his normative reasons, his practical beliefs would have to be
different too. Instead, if the agent had different intrinsic desires but the
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same practical beliefs, then some of his practical beliefs would have been
false.
This means that there is an ambiguity in the formulation of the Facts
Problem. Yes, it seems contradictory to say that an agent who has to
be motivated in a certain way, could have been motivated differently.
But rather than one paradoxical claim, there are actually two perfectly
compatible claims that now follow from our Principles. The one claim is
that a self-governing agent who knows his normative reasons for action
could have had different intrinsic desires and still be a self-governing agent
who knows his normative reasons—but with different practical beliefs.
The other claim is that a self-governing agent who knows his normative
reasons for action could have had different intrinsic desires and still have
the same practical beliefs—but then he would no longer be a self-governing
agent who knows his normative reasons for action. On the basis of type-
i dispositionalism, these two claims follow from the conjunction of the
Facts, Authority and Distinctness Principles, and there is no contradiction
between them at all.
4.3 Semantic Pluralism
Note that from the claim that all reasons are internal reasons, it does
not follow that the external interpretation never portrays what people
actually mean when they utter statements about reasons. On the contrary,
Williams’s example of Owen’s family is meant to illustrate that people
really do make judgments about external reasons. Could this be a problem
for the relationalist? If an agent A has a normative reason in the internal
sense to φ, then if the relationalist line of argument is sound, this can only
make it true that A shouldA φ in the relationalist sense, not that it should
be the case in the nonrelationalist sense that A does φ. But the same does
not apply to the statement that A has a normative reason in the external
sense to φ. When Sir Philip Wingrave tells his son that there is a reason for
Owen to join the army no matter what he desires, he seems to be implying
that any man in Owen’s position would have had the same reason. Thus,
Sir Philip is not saying that Owen’s belief that he should not join the army
is false in a relationalist sense. Furthermore, it would also be strange to
say that Sir Philip is expressing a relationalist practical belief of his own.
We may have good reason to think that Sir Philip is trying to push his
own preferences onto his son, but we should acknowledge that that is not
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what Philip Wingrave means. At least on Williams’s interpretation of the
play, it would be very odd to suppose that even though Sir Philip claims
that there is a reason for Owen to join the military, by that he really just
meant that Owen shouldPhilip join the military, and that, furthermore, he
might have agreed that it was false that Owen shouldOwen join the army. It
seems much more plausible to claim that Sir Philip simply believes that
it should be the case that Owen joins the military, in the nonrelationalist
sense. Hence, it would seem to follow from Williams’s analysis that at least
some practical beliefs are to be interpreted in the nonrelationalist sense,
and that relationalism is therefore false.
Rather than as a relationalist about all practical judgments, we might
think of Williams as a kind of ‘partial error theorist,’ because his view
was that insofar an agent is saying that he has a reason in the external
sense, his statement must be “false, or incoherent, or really something else
misleadingly expressed” (1980/1981a, p. 111). However, once we have
removed this error from our thinking, we may understand our practical
judgments in the internal sense exclusively, and then, according to the
Internal Reasons View, we might very well get them right, and adopt true
beliefs about our normative reasons.
In fact, this may not be so far apart from John Mackie’s view, even
though his error theory is often presented as the thesis that all practical
beliefs must be false, period. For in his own writing, Mackie merely stated
that most people make moral claims in a manner that renders them false
because of the error theory:
The claim to objectivity, however ingrained in our language and
thought, is not self-validating. It can and should be questioned.
But the denial of objective values will have to be put forward
not as the result of an analytic approach, but as an ‘error
theory’, a theory that although most people in making moral
judgements implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing
to something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false.
(Mackie, 1977, p. 35, my emphasis)
In other words, Mackie allowed that some people might make their moral
judgments without being implicitly committed to this false claim. And
indeed, he allowed for this possibility explicitly in order to demonstrate the
logical independence of first-order judgments from meta-ethical judgments:
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A man could hold strong moral views, and indeed ones whose
content was thoroughly conventional, while believing that they
were simply attitudes and policies with regard to conduct that
he and other people held. (p. 16)
We may wonder whether the “attitudes and policies” in this passage, which
do not presuppose the error of objective prescriptivity, could nevertheless
still be understood, on Mackie’s own account, in more or less cognitivist
terms. At first we may be inclined to think that they cannot, but note that
later on in the book, Mackie did also write that the “attempt systematically
to describe our own moral consciousness” is a “legitimate kind of inquiry”
that “must not be confused with the superficially similar but in purpose
fundamentally different attempt [...] to advance [...] to an objective moral
truth” (p. 105). Surely, “describing” our moral consciousness sounds
like a cognitivist enterprise, to which we might apply our Facts and
Disconfirmation principles, and construing it as an “attempt” suggests
that this enterprise is not trivial, but that there is really something to be
gotten right or wrong about the moral consciousness of ours that Mackie
is referring to. Let me stress that I am not saying that Williams was an
error theorist in Mackie’s sense or that Mackie was an internal reasons
theorist in Williams’s sense. But it follows from the cited passages that
both authors recognized the need to leave some room for what may be
understood as the central idea behind the other’s view.
Note that all this does not really go against the spirit of the relationalist
account, though. Sure, some people mean their judgments in a nonrela-
tionalist sense on certain occasions, but if we can say that those judgments
will always be false, then the tension between Williams’s view and rela-
tionalism as I have defined it may be merely terminological. The point
of the relationalist account is that those practical judgments that satisfy the
Facts Principle must be understood in a relationalist sense, because the
only facts that can make practical beliefs true are facts about relations
between the judging agents and the objects of their judgments. In order to
disambiguate our terminology, let us distinguish between the “r-practical”
and the “nr-practical”: r-practical judgments are judgments that have
relationalist content, whereas nr-practical judgments have nonrelationalist
content. We can then reformulate type-i dispositionalism as a view that
provides (a) an answer to the Facts Question for r-practical beliefs, and (b)
an error-theory for nr-practical beliefs. The real issue, of course, is that
this involves what we might call a “semantic pluralism” about practical
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judgment: the idea that different people follow different meta-ethical rules.
I will discuss this idea in greater detail later in this thesis.
4.4 Problems for Type-i Dispositionalism
We have now seen an outline of a relationalist solution to the Facts Problem.
If type-i dispositionalism is correct, then the paradox generated by the
Facts, Authority and Distinctness Principles dissolves, which means that
we can hold on to all three principles and thereby honour the intuitions
that motivated these principles. However, the type-i dispositionalist has
his own problems to solve, in order to really make his account work.
The first problem is that in its current form, the account largely depends
on a promise. The promise is that the desires of a person—the elements of
his “subjective motivational set,” understood in the context of the Distinct-
ness Principle—are such, that valid deliberative strategies, when applied
to these desires, will be able to resolve the conflicts among them in a ratio-
nally compelling manner. Not all of those conflicts, perhaps, but enough
of them in order not to become skeptical about our deliberative efforts.
However, it is not immediately obvious why this should be the case. Given
the non-rational nature of intrinsic desires, it is a philosophical challenge
to explain why deliberation could give us a rationally compelling reason to
prefer one desire over another, when all that there is for deliberation to be
based upon are simply those desires themselves. In section 4.1 above I have
speculated about ‘asymmetries’ in the ways our desires are interrelated,
which might allow us to construct a function of proximity between the
actual, incoherent set of desires of some agent, and the different coherent
desire sets that preserve elements of the original incoherent set. But this
idea would have to be worked out in further detail, and we should be able
to show that such an account makes sense of what we actually do, or at
least try to do, when we deliberate in practice.
4.4.1 Four Concerns with respect to Unclarity
Williams does not offer such an account in the “Internal and External
Reasons” article. On the contrary, Williams is purposefully vague both in
his characterization of what goes into the subjective motivational set and
in his characterization of the deliberative route from the actual set to the
idealized set:
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But here it may be objected that the account of deliberation
is very vague, and has for instance allowed the use of the
imagination to extend or restrict the contents of the agent’s S.
But if that is so, then it is unclear what the limits are to what an
agent might arrive at by rational deliberation from his existing
S.
It is unclear, and I regard it as a basically desirable feature
of a theory of practical reasoning that it should preserve and
account for that unclarity. There is an essential indeterminacy in
what can be counted as a rational deliberative process. (p. 110)
However, there are a number of concerns involved here that need to
be disentangled. The first concern is to be able to account for certain
indeterminacies in the reality of our normative reasons themselves. As I
have anticipated before, sometimes there may not be a fact that renders
a single practical judgment true and all the alternatives false. Later on
I will distinguish different sorts of scenarios that feature this type of
indeterminacy, all of which need to be accounted for by a plausible theory
of practical judgment. One of these sorts of scenarios is where ex ante, the
best choice between two options is indeterminate, but where deliberation
towards one of the options changes the underlying reality in such a way
that ex post, the option arrived at has become the determinate right answer.
Such a constitutive role for deliberation with respect to the truths about
our reasons seems also prominent in Williams’s account, especially in view
of his appreciation for the role of the imagination. However, from the need
to explain the vagueness or indeterminacy in certain matters of practical
deliberation, it does not follow that our theory of deliberation must itself
remain vague. There is no reason why a highly detailed, well-worked
out theory of practical deliberation could not still produce the result that
the correct answers to practical questions will be indeterminate in certain
scenarios. The same applies to the idea that our deliberative activity itself
might be partly constitutive of our reasons for action in certain scenarios.
There is no reason why our account of what it means for deliberation to be
valid should be vague in order to be able to account for this possibility.
The second concern, implicit in this passage, but nonetheless an im-
portant theme in Williams’s work, is that we should be suspicious of any
deliberative methods or normative ethical theories that attempt to reduce
practical reason to the systematic application of a simple set of universal
rules, principles or procedures. Although my purpose in this thesis is not
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to take a stand on this matter, we shall see later on that the account that
I will defend allows us to think of deontological, utilitarian and virtue-
ethical approaches as “interpretative strategies” that may be more or less
useful in different areas of practical deliberation.5 Furthermore, I will
acknowledge the important role that intuition and unconscious cognition
have to play for us in order to better understand our normative reasons
for action. However, from the fact that we should not be narrow-minded
about the appropriate psychological processes of deliberation, it does not
follow that we must be vague in our meta-ethical explanation of what it
means to say that we have reason to act upon certain desires but not upon
others. Even if we could spell out, for once and for all, with the utmost
philosophical clarity, why certain desires could have a normative status
that other desires lack, then we might still have to rely on methods much
less spelled-out in order to judge which of our actual desires are the ones
that have that status. The idea that our methods in normative ethics might
be bound to be muddy and imprecise does not preclude us from at least
striving for maximal clarity and explicitness in meta-ethics.
Nevertheless, there is a third reason why Williams might have wanted
to remain vague in his meta-ethical specification of the deliberative function
from the actual desires to the idealized set. His purpose in “Internal and
external reasons” was first and foremost to argue that there could be no
such things as external reasons. It was not to argue that there can be such
things as internal reasons. The sort of view that Williams is attacking
is the view that internal reasons are not enough, not the view that they
are too much to ask for. The view that there are external reasons is the
view that no account of internal reasons, regardless of its details and
inner workings, could give us what we want in moral philosophy, and
that we should therefore allow such things as external reasons. Against
this view, Williams argued, first, that external reasons are impossible, and
second, that there is nothing worth wanting in ethics for which internal
reasons would not suffice. In keeping the deliberative function alluded
to in the definition of internal reasons purposefully vague, Williams stays
away from any restrictions that might be specific to certain accounts of the
nature of internal reasons, but which do not follow from the general idea
of an internal reason.
However, some philosophers may feel that internal reasons actually are
too much to ask for. I am thinking of the skeptical sort of view according
5See section 7.4.4.
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to which there is no rational way of rejecting any sort of desire, not even
on the basis of other desires, simply because there is no rational way to
take sides with respect to conflicting desires. This is what we might call
a “flat” desire-based view of reasons for action, according to which every
desire constitutes a reason for action, and the question which of these
reasons are “normative” simply does not make sense.6 The only measure
of desire, on such a view, is simply that of strength: if two desires conflict,
then the one that leads to action is apparently stronger, and that is the only
relation of precedence among desires that reality allows. On such a view,
moral reasons, for example, are not reasons derived from the construction
of some ideal self on the basis of deliberative principles. Moral reasons
are simply constituted by our “moral sentiments”—desire-type attitudes
that happen to have a strong influence on our behavior as a result of either
natural selection or cultural conditioning. But the only thing that counts in
favor of such sentiments is that they are strong in those situations where
they are strong. In other situations, however, where egoistic or violent
sentiments motivate our behavior, there would be no way of arguing that
the weaker sentiments of altruism or compassion would still be the more
reasonable ones.7
The challenge posed by such a view is a fourth concern for our pro-
posal, which we should distinguish from the three concerns mentioned
above, and which is not addressed by Williams himself in “Internal and
External Reasons”—perhaps because it might be specific to the motiva-
tional Humean assumption behind my current approach, although this is
something I am not sure of.8 In any case, if the type-i dispositionalist is
6This is more or less the same as the radical account according to which the dependence
relation between normative reasons and intrinsic desires is merely instrumental, which I
mentioned and rejected in section 3.3.1. Note however that I rejected it for being a wrong
interpretation of what metanormative Humeans usually want to defend. That does not mean,
of course, that the view may not be considered as a skeptical alternative that non-instrumental
metanormative Humeans must be able to defend themselves against. It is in that latter role
that I am invoking the view in the present section.
7Note that such a view would be much more relativistic than the view that I have called
“relationalism,” which is one of the reasons why I prefer to use the term “relationalism”
instead of “relativism” myself.
8In particular, I do not immediately see how the argument from thick concepts, which
we discussed as part of a possible anti-Humean interpretation of Williams’s views in section
3.5.1, would make one immune from this sort of skepticism. The motivational disposition
implicit in my concept of bravery might clash with the disposition implicit in my concept of
carefulness—why think there is anything over and above their occurrent relative motivational
strengths to determine which of the two should precede the other on any particular occasion?
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to meet this challenge, then he must be able to explain, and not merely
promise, that there is a certain normative pressure that deliberation can
bring to bear upon our intrinsic desires in a way that does not simply
collapse into a “might is right” of the strongest desire at the moment in
question. What are the normatively relevant relations between the elements
of the subjective motivational set that deliberation should work with, and
why? Does not any criterion that gives some desires a normative status
at the expense of others, introduce some normative source beyond the
desires themselves, thereby undermining the very idea of the relationalist
solution?
4.4.2 Identification and Self-Disclosure
Here we may draw on the work of Harry Frankfurt. In his early essays,
Frankfurt proposed that we should understand the different status of
different desires in terms of how they relate to us as persons: some desires
are “internal to the person,” whereas others are “external to the person”
(1971/1988b; 1976/1988c). When a desire is external to a person, and he
is motivated by it, then he is motivated against his will. An example of
this is the “unwilling addict” who does not really want to take the drugs
but cannot overcome the addictive desire which motivates him to use the
drugs anyway.
As Frankfurt put it, the unwilling addict does not identify with his
desire for the drugs. In his view, a person faces two tasks whenever her
desires pull her into different directions and she is not yet decided about
what to do. First of all, she must identify with some of her desires—she
must decide which desires express what she really wants as a person,
and which do not. And second, she must prioritize among the desires she
identifies with—she must decide what she wants most as a person. The
second task implies that she may have to decide whether realizing one
desire is more important to her than realizing another if they cannot be
realized both, or not both at present, even though she does identify with
both.
The idea that a person can really want something as a person is often
taken to imply that if he wants something in this way, then what he wants
must tell us something about who he is. It follows that if he acts upon
What is there to deliberate? I am not saying that there is no answer to this question—far from
it—but only that it could still be asked, and that it would still be a sensible starting point for
philosophical reflection.
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what he wants in this way, his action expresses something about his identity,
something which is characteristic of him being the person he is. Such an
action, we shall say, exhibits self-disclosure (Watson, 1996/2004c, p. 261).
But what are we disclosing when we disclose our “selves” or our
“identities” as persons? In his later work, Frankfurt has proposed that
we should understand the self, or the identity of a person, in terms of
what that person cares about. It is because we care about things in general,
that we are persons, and it is what a person cares about specifically that
determines his identity as an individual (1999c; 2004). In Frankfurt’s view,
caring is a complex motivational structure, and if a desire fits into that
structure, then it expresses what the agent really wants.
Michael Bratman and Gary Watson have incorporated similar ideas
about self-disclosure into their accounts of self-government. Roughly, their
view is that the two go hand in hand: for an agent to really want something,
or to care about it, is for that agent to adopt it as a goal for deliberation
(Watson, 1996/2004c; Bratman, 2006). There is something to say for this
view: clearly, when a person acts upon his self-adopted goals, this may tell
us something about what kind of person he is. However, if we accept the
Facts Principle and the Authority Principle, then it would follow from this
view that what a person cares about must somehow be on a par with his
beliefs about his normative reasons, and not necessarily with the facts about
those reasons. Thus, it would follow that what we care about need not be
what we should care about. But Frankfurt has complained that it does not
make sense to ask what we should care about independently of what we
actually do care about (Frankfurt, 2004, 23–28). Thus, Frankfurt seems to
have taken a more or less Humean view about caring: what we should
care about is itself a function of what we do care about. He concludes that
caring is a source of reasons: it is on the basis of knowledge about what we
care about that we should answer practical questions.
The challenge for such a view comes mostly from the direction of the
Disconfirmation Principle: if the facts about our normative reasons are
facts about what we care about, then it follows from that Principle that
we can be mistaken about what we care about. Frankfurt embraces this
conclusion (2006, p. 33–34, 49–50), but the question is whether he can
account for it, and furthermore, whether mistakes about what we care
about can fully explain the ways in which our practical judgments might
be false. I will return to this matter in chapter 8.9 For now, let us conclude
9See section 8.3.
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that Frankfurt’s ideas offer some prospect for a solution to the problem
that we raised for the type-i dispositionalist: the normative pressure that
correct deliberation may bring to bear on some desires at the behest of
others may be grounded in facts about how certain elements of an agent’s
subjective motivational set constitute what that agent cares about, while
other elements may be considered external to him as a person and thus as
having no intrinsic normative force.
Despite all this, there is a second problem for the type-i dispositionalist,
which is the problem that any form of relationalist cognitivism must solve:
how to account for the Intersubjectivity Principle in the light of the claim
that the content of a practical belief includes a reference to the agent having
the belief. We have briefly discussed this problem in section 1.3.2: when
different agents make conflicting practical judgments, then it seems that
according to relationalist cognitivism, their beliefs do not really contradict
each other, because each agent is merely making self-ascriptions about
his own attitudes. This implication has seemed counterintuitive to many
philosophers, including certain proponents of the dispositional approach.
They prefer the alternative of a nonrelationalist version of the dispositional
theory. In section 3.2 of the previous chapter, we briefly explored the
difficulties that nonrelationalists must face. In the next chapter, we are
going to discuss them in greater detail.

5 The Nonrelationalist Alternative
In the previous chapter I have outlined a dispositional solution to the
Facts Problem according to which we should be relationalists about the
intersubjectivity of practical reason. This is the view that I favor, and I
will develop it in further detail in part iii of this thesis. However, in the
following two chapters I will first consider the alternatives to such a view.
I will discuss nonrelationalist dispositionalism at length, because like the
view from the previous chapter, it aims to provide what I have called a
“reconciliatory” solution, accommodating all of our Principles from chapter
1. In section 5.1 I will discuss how this view attempts to solve the Facts
Problem, and in section 5.2 what the challenge for this solution amounts
to. Then, in section 5.3 we will see that in order to meet this challenge, two
very different versions of the view may be distinguished, which I will call
“type-ii” and “type-iii dispositionalism.”
Type-ii dispositionalism gives rise to many problems, which I discuss
in the final section of this chapter, section 5.4. In chapter 6 I return to
the type-iii alternative. This will complete our overview of the status
quo in the light of the principles from chapter 1. Although it is not my
purpose to refute nonrelationalist accounts, I do intend to explain why
type-i dispositionalism should not be easily dismissed, given the sort of
problems that the other views are facing.
5.1 Nonrelationalist Dispositionalism
The idea of a nonrelationalist dispositional theory goes back at least to
Firth (1952), and is being defended in the contemporary literature by Smith
(1994, 2002/2004c) and Jackson & Pettit (1995). I shall focus on the version
defended by Smith, but the problems we shall discuss apply equally, in
my view, to any other account of this type. In a nutshell, the view is this:
that P should be the case if and only if every agent would, under ideal
conditions, desire in the resultant sense that P. If P is a proposition of the
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form “A does φ,” then, given our Principles, the view yields the claim that
A has a normative reason to φ if and only if every agent would, under
ideal conditions, desire that A would φ. So construed, however, the view
may seem a bit odd, because first of all, it would be weird to require that
under the ideal conditions, every agent would have to be acquainted with
A, and second of all, it would seem strange why the ideal desire set of
every agent would have to feature desires tailored to A. Therefore, in order
to make sense of the view, we might want to add a requirement such as
“when made to consider whether A should φ” or something to that effect.
However, in Smith’s view it is an essential feature of reasons for action
that they are universalizable along the following lines: that whenever A has
a normative reason to φ, this is in virtue of certain circumstances in which
A finds himself, such that every agent would have a normative reason to φ
under the same circumstances. Therefore, the desires of our ideal selves
about the actions of ourselves and others need not be understood, on
Smith’s view, as desires about individual, particular persons. Instead, they
may be construed as desires about circumstances: that any agent would
φ under circumstances C and that no agent would ψ under circumstances
D. This means that we can reformulate the nonrelationalist dispositional
account of normative reasons as follows, for any agent A, action φ, and set
of circumstances C: A has a normative reason to φ under C if and only
if every agent would, under ideal conditions, when made to consider C,
desire that any agent would φ under C.
5.1.1 The Nonrelationalist Solution to the Facts Problem
The solution that this account provides to the Facts Problem is similar to
the solution provided by the relationalist, type-i dipositionalist view that
we discussed in the previous chapter, although there is a slight difference.
Again, the general idea is to remove the mystery of why agents under
ideal conditions would be motivated in accordance to their normative
reasons by analyzing those reasons in terms of their desires under those
conditions. In the case of the relationalist version, we explicated this
solution by disambiguating the apparently contradictory result of the Facts
Problem into two consistent and perfectly compatible claims. The first
claim was that a self-governing agent who knows his normative reasons
could have had different intrinsic desires and still remain self-governing
and knowledgeable, but only if his practical beliefs had also been different.
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The second claim was that a self-governing agent who knows his normative
reasons could have had different intrinsic desires without having different
practical beliefs, but then would no longer have been a self-governing
agent who knows his normative reasons.
Now, in the case of the nonrelationalist solution, we would have to
change these two claims somewhat. The second claim needs the least
alteration: the possibility of an agent having different intrinsic desires
while having the same practical beliefs still obtains. The implication that
the agent would then no longer be self-governing also still follows. But
when it comes to moral (i.e., taste-independent) practical content, then
the nonrelationalist will want to claim that such an agent would still be
as knowledgeable as before; the object of his knowledge would not be
different if his intrinsic desires were different.
The first of the two claims must be qualified in a much more significant
manner in the case of a nonrelationalist solution. Because according to the
nonrelationalist dispositionalist, there are intrinsic desires with contents
of the form “that anyone will φ under circumstances C” that all agents
would have under ideal conditions. And therefore, with respect to those
intrinsic desires the first of the above two claims no longer holds: the non-
relationalist dispositionalist must simply deny that a self-governing agent
who knows his normative reasons could have desired differently while
remaining self-governing and knowledgeable of the relevant fact about
normative reasons. Therefore, the nonrelationalist dispositionalist solution
involves the claim that, for certain intrinsic desires, there are conceptual
reasons why ideal agents could not possibly desire otherwise, despite the
conceptual distinctness of these desires from matters of belief. This means
that we do not really have a full solution yet. Like the relationalist proposal,
the nonrelationalist solution depends upon a kind of promise: the promise
that such conceptual reasons can be provided for these desires.
5.1.2 Weak Dependence
In fact, it might seem that this must now apply to all the desires of my
ideal self, and that they do not depend upon the desires of my actual self
at all, on this view, since the ideal self of every other agent is supposed to
have the same desires, regardless of how the actual desires of that other
agent might have been different. However, that conclusion does not follow,
because some of my desires may be elements of the relevant circumstances
132 The Nonrelationalist Alternative
of my actions in non-moral cases where my particular tastes are relevant,
as we already discussed in section 1.3.2. Thus, every agent might desire,
under ideal conditions, that all agents who prefer green shall paint their
walls green, and all agents who prefer white shall paint their walls white.
If I prefer white, then that might give me a normative reason to paint my
walls white, since even the ideal selves of agents who do not prefer white
would still desire that the walls in my house would be white, if not in theirs.
In terms of our terminology from section 1.3.2, what Smith’s view requires
is similarity between ideal selves, not isomorphism. Therefore, the first of the
above two claims that resolve the paradox of the Facts Problem still applies
to intrinsic desires that are matters of taste in this way: according to the
nonrelationalist dispositionalist, a self-governing agent who knows his
normative reasons could have had different tastes, and therefore different
intrinsic desires that would reflect these different tastes, while remaining
a self-governing agent who knows his normative reasons, provided that
some of his beliefs would also be different (such as his beliefs about what
color he should paint his walls).
Nevertheless, nonrelationalism does put severe restrictions on the way
that our normative reasons may depend on our actual attitudes. First of
all, if they depend on attitudes that others need not share, not even under
ideal conditions, then there must be something essentially indexical about
them. Their not being shared by others is brought out only if we represent
them in a form like “I desire to φ(me).” Thus, if I have a normative reason
to paint my walls green, then other agents do not have to share my attitude
in the sense that under ideal conditions, they would not have to be able to
truthfully utter the sentence “I desire to paint my walls green.” Second,
a normative reason can only depend on such an ‘indexical’ attitude if it
is ‘backed up,’ as it were, by a corresponding ‘extensional’ attitude: a
resultant desire that any agent x will φ(x) if x has the aforementioned
indexical attitude towards φ-ing and if x’s circumstances do not count
against φ-ing in any other relevant respects. Third, and most importantly,
the normative reason can only depend on the actuality of the indexical
attitude if the ideal selves of all agents would have that corresponding
extensional attitude, regardless of whether those agents actually have that
attitude.
In other words, according to nonrelationalist dispositionalism, my
actual attitudes provide me with normative reasons only if those who do
not share those attitudes would still have a reason to wish me the best of
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luck in acting upon those attitudes. Let us call this type of dependence
upon actual attitudes “weak dependence.” In contrast, according to the
relationalist dispositionalist, it is possible that my normative reason to φ
depends on my attitudes in such a way that an agent who does not share
those attitudes might have a normative reason to disapprove of my doing
φ. Let us call that “strong dependence.” Thus, the crucial disagreement
between these two forms of dispositionalism is about whether normative
reasons for action strongly depend on our actual attitudes.
5.1.3 The Advice Model
Through his deployment of the notion of circumstances, Smith has tried
to incorporate as much actual attitude dependence into his account of
normative reasons as he possibly can within the nonrelationalist restrictions
that I have outlined. I have called this “weak dependence,” and so far we
have only seen examples of it that involved differences in taste. However,
weak dependence allows another type of example that we have not touched
upon yet: normative reasons may also depend on actual dispositions that
constitute a lack of self-government. Smith discusses the example of a
person who’s suffered a humiliating defeat in a game of squash, and who
feels intense anger and frustration as a result of this, which might lead
him to smash his opponent in the face if he were to approach him close
enough (Smith, 1995/2004d, p. 19). According to Smith, the ideal self of
this person would presumably not have this problem at all, because he
is “fully rational.” In my view, this would rather be a matter of the ideal
self being fully self-governing, but the result is the same: since there is no
reason for the ideal self not to approach his opponent, we may suppose
his ideal self would indeed approach him, out of good sportsmanship,
in order to congratulate him on his victory. In contrast, the actual less-
than-ideal person might not have a normative reason to approach his
opponent. Instead, it might be wiser for him to take his own imperfect self-
government into account, and to just leave as quickly as he can, without
making a scene.
Smith argues that we should distinguish between the desires that the
ideal self of this person would have regarding himself and the desires
that the ideal self has with respect to his less-than-ideal self. In order to
accommodate this distinction, Smith proposes an “advice model” of the
dispositional solution: I have a normative reason to φ if and only if my
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ideal self has a resultant desire that I—that is my actual, less-than-ideal
self—would φ. Thus, I have a normative reason to do what my ideal self
would ‘advise’ me to do. If our ideal selves would walk the earth, we
would have to do as they say, not as they do.
But of course, they do not walk the earth. Smith conceptualizes the
advice model in terms of a distinction between two possible worlds, the
evaluated and the evaluating world. The former contains the actual self,
while the latter contains the ideal self. We can then distinguish between
what the ideal self would do in the evaluating world, and what the ideal
self would have the actual self do in the evaluated world. I have some
problems with this, because I do not think that ideal selves are possible,
and so I do not think we can quantify over possible worlds in which they
exist. I rather view the ideal self as a helpful construct, a perspective from
the point of view of perfection that we can reason about in a manner similar
to the way we reason about the limits of functions in mathematics—there
is no possible value that instantiates the limit, but under the appropriate
conditions, the limit outcome can be determined nonetheless.1
What I can agree with, however, is that the construct of an ideal self is
helpful along the lines of the advice model, and that our imperfections need
to be taken into account in order to determine what normative reasons for
action we have. Note, by the way, that the advice model is not exclusive to
nonrelationalist dispositionalism. Relationalist forms of dispositionalism,
including our type-i dispositionalist proposal, may be understood along
the lines of the advice model as well.
5.2 Nonrelationalism and Conceptual Possibility
According to nonrelationalist dispositionalism, it should be the case that P
if and only if every agent would, under ideal conditions, desire in the re-
sultant sense that P. It is important to understand that in this claim, “every
agent” means every conceptually possible agent who is capable of having nor-
mative reasons for action. Because according to the dispositional approach,
for every such agent we should be able to reason about a corresponding
ideal self—a ‘nearest’ idealized version of the agent, a modification in
which all his flaws have been adjusted for. What this means is that not
only Nazis and psychopaths would have to share our values under ideal
1I will return to the matter of what exactly to make of an “ideal self” later on in this
thesis.
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conditions, but also extraterrestrial aliens whose psychologies might be as
different from ours as they could possibly be. No matter what their actual
“subjective motivational sets” would look like, if we would adjust for all
the flaws therein, they would have to end up promoting the same values
that we would end up promoting if the flaws in our motivational sets
were corrected for. And because we are talking about conceptual rather
than physical possibility, we should even include wholly fictional creatures,
so long as they remain the sort of creatures capable of having normative
reasons for action and their descriptions are conceptually coherent. Devils
and demons, Sauron and the mighty Cthulhu—under ideal conditions of
agency they would all be motivated to help those in need, to promote
equal rights for minorities, and to incorporate environmental concerns
into their intentions and policies. In terms of Smith’s advice framework,
if Cthulhu inhabits a possible world, then there is an evaluating world in
which Ideal Cthulhu is feeling really sorry about the acts of his lesser self.
Note that this is not a consequence of nonrelationalism in general.
The nonrelationalist externalist can simply claim that fictional creatures
like Cthulhu represent the very possibility that externalists have been
stressing: of a self-governing creature that simply does not care about
being moral, or perhaps even desires to embrace evil for evil’s sake. In fact,
externalism about good and evil seems to be the ‘preferred meta-ethics’
of most fantasy literature: supernatural creatures are usually members of
either Team Good or Team Evil, and the captains of Team Evil can be just
as self-governing and aware of the evilness of their projects as their goody
two shoes opponents.
However, despite this built-in externalism in the fantasy literature,
it is not a general consequence of dispositionalism either that Cthulhu
would have normative reasons to donate to famine relief. Because as
long as dispositionalists are also relationalists, they can hold that what
is referred to as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in such stories is not to be understood
in a practically normative sense, but rather in a purely descriptive sense,
such that it may be practically normative for some agents to do the ‘evil’
thing. In the Dungeons and Dragons universe, for example, ‘good’ and ‘evil’
are best understood as a kind of supernatural energies that a creature
can be ‘aligned’ with. And for an ‘evil-aligned’ creature, ‘evil’ is just as
normative as ‘good’ is normative for a ‘good-aligned’ creature. From the
type-i dispositionalist perspective, we might say that the ideal selves of
‘evil-aligned’ creatures will desire their lesser selves to be as ‘evil’ as they
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can. Of course, we do not believe that there is room for such supernatural
properties in the actual world, but that is what makes it fantasy fiction.
The idea that all conceptually possible deliberators must have normative
reasons to uphold the same values is, therefore, a specific implication of the
combination of dispositionalism with nonrelationalism—the view defended
by Smith. The implication may be summarized as follows: Smith must
either bite the bullet and admit that Cthulhu would, under ideal conditions,
use his powers to bless people with happy dreams rather than nightmares,
or he must claim that creatures like Cthulhu are not conceptually possible.
In order to block the latter option and to avoid Lovecraft exegesis, let us
now consider a different type of creature.
5.2.1 The Case Against Nonrelationalist Dispositionalism: Mars Attacks!
In the comic movie Mars Attacks! our planet is invaded by aliens who
lure us into thinking they come as friends, and then crush us with their
advanced technology. A technology that also allows them to perform the
most perverted experiments on human beings, animals, and combinations
of both. Why are they doing this to us? First of all, it seems they simply
have no disposition whatsoever to care about our well-being. But second,
they have a further, positive reason to treat us like this: they find it
simply hilarious. The Martians are driven by their sense of humor, and not
susceptible to any mercy that would hold them back. Their psychology,
although cruel and inhuman, seems conceptually possible. In fact, even
though Mars Attacks! does not obey the laws of physics as we know them, I
can think of no reason why it would even be physically impossible for alien
beings to have these psychological features. Perhaps there are exobiological
reasons why the evolutionary history of such creatures would require
some pretty bizarre physical and social environments, which might not
exist anywhere in the universe, but that does not make them physically
impossible in the nomological sense.
With respect to the Martian invaders, then, Smith seems committed to
the claim that there must be rational flaws within their sets of attitudes
such that, if these flaws were corrected, they would no longer desire to
torture us. This sort of claim is very tough to defend, for there seems to be
no conceptual reason why the Martians could not be utterly without the
disposition for mercy, and if they do not have such a disposition whatsoever,
then it seems hard to explain how purely rational considerations could
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make them adopt a merciful attitude after all.2 Several of Smith’s critics
have rejected the idea that rationality alone could have such implications.3
Let us now turn to Smith’s options for defending this idea.
5.3 Smith on Systematic Justification
Smith defends nonrelationalist dispositionalism by extending the notion
of “correct deliberation” in Williams’s account of internal reasons (Smith,
1994, pp. 155–161, 164–174; 1995/2004d, pp. 17–18, 20–34). Indeed, as
Smith presents his view, it involves “an endorsement of the claim that all
reasons are ‘internal,’ as opposed to ‘external,’ to use Williams’s terms”
(1995/2004d, p. 17). Clearly, then, Smith thinks of himself as an internal
reasons theorist. In chapters 2 and 3 I have been sketching how the Internal
Reasons View can figure in a chain of arguments from a Humean theory
of motivation to the conclusion of relationalism, flagging various premises
along the way that nonrelationalists might want to deny. Before I attempt to
classify Smith’s brand of nonrelationalism within this framework, however,
let us first discuss his account of deliberation in his own terms.
The crucial aspect of deliberation that he thinks Williams has underesti-
mated is that of “trying to find out whether our desires are systematically
justifiable” (Smith, 1994, p. 158–159). What does he mean by this?
I mean just that we can try to decide whether or not some
particular underived desire that we have or might have is a
desire to do something that is itself non-derivatively desirable.
And we do this in a certain characteristic way: namely, by
trying to integrate the object of that desire into a more coherent
and unified desiderative profile and evaluative outlook. (1994,
p. 159)
By saying that he means “just” this, Smith seems to be suggesting that
the first sentence contains a fairly trivial and innocent, perhaps even
deflationary, explication of the sort of justification that he has in mind.
However, I find the notion of something “that is itself non-derivatively
2Compare Street (2009, p. 293): “If a group of intelligent, ideally coherent aliens descended
upon us and began trying to kill us for food or torture us for sport, would we feel intuitively
convinced that they were making a mistake about the normative facts? Would we be more
inclined to say ‘They shouldn’t be doing this’ or rather just ‘How can we stop them?’”
3E.g. Sobel (1999) and Enoch (2007), which I will discuss in section 5.4 below.
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desirable” extremely puzzling, and I doubt that many people would simply
nod their heads in agreement if I would tell them that this is what they try
to get at when they deliberate. Instead, the first sentence seems loaded with
one or two philosophical claims that are precisely at stake in our discussion.
The first claim is that deliberation is about desirability regardless of who is
making the practical judgment. This claim simply builds a nonrelationalist
semantics of practical judgment into the account of deliberation, which
begs the question against the relationalist. The second claim is that the
notion of deliberation already presupposes a notion of “desirability in
itself” which makes the dispositional solution a non-reductive one at best,
and a viciously circular one at worst. After all, the dispositional approach
explains desirability in terms of what an ideal agent would desire, and
the Internal Reasons View in turn explains the desires of an ideal agent
in terms of how that agent would deliberate—so if explaining correct
deliberation would presuppose a notion of desirability in itself, then we
would be back at square one.
For the moment, however, let us assume that this is just sound non-
reductionism about normativity, and take a look at the second sentence.
How does one integrate a desire into a “more coherent and unified” profile,
and why would that be more rational? The basic idea, as I understand it,
is that we should try to improve the simplicity and regularity of the set
of our intrinsic desires, such that we end up having many derived desires
that all derive from a few very general ones:
Suppose we take a whole host of desires we have for specific
and general things; desires which are not in fact derived from
any desire that we have for something more general. We can
ask ourselves whether we wouldn’t get a more systematically
justifiable set of desires by adding to this whole host of specific
and general desires another general desire, or a more general
desire still, a desire that, in turn, justifies and explains the more
specific desires that we have. (1994, p. 159)
Note that this is not just a matter of removing logical inconsistencies from
the desire set: even a desire set that is fully consistent might be eligible to
the above sort of improvement. Furthermore, once a more general desire
has been added, new derived desires may be arrived at which had not
been part of the original set, motivating new behavior. A desire set that
exhibits this kind of generality is “more unified,” in Smith’s view, than a
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desire set that just contains a jumble of various logically compatible but
highly specific and independent desires.
5.3.1 The Analogy Between Desires and Beliefs
But why, we may now ask, would it be rational to prefer such unity?
The answer, according to Smith, may be found in a simple analogy with
beliefs: in the case of beliefs we also prefer a system of beliefs that exhibits
this kind of unity. The paradigm example, I suppose, would be that of
parsimony in empirical science: we prefer a theory with a few very general
laws to a theory that contains just a jumble of many different and more
specific laws. The big question, of course, is whether this analogy really
makes sense, and whether it makes the inference valid that what is rational
for beliefs must be rational for desires.4
If it would be rational to strive for desire sets that are “more coherent
and unified” in this sense, then we may infer that our ideal selves would
have, as Smith has put it elsewhere, “maximally coherent and unified”
desire sets (1996, p. 160; my emphasis). At this point, however, the analogy
between desire sets and scientific beliefs begins to work against Smith’s
case. Because surely, in science, multiple maximally coherent and unified
belief sets are conceivable, which contradict each other on substantial
questions about the way the world is, and it is a matter of contingent
empirical fact that most of these belief sets are false. However, Smith’s
nonrelationalist dispositionalism requires that deliberation will decide
between conflicting desire sets on the basis of rational considerations
alone—considerations which must be valid a priori, because they must be
valid for conceptually possible deliberators. Hence, Smith is asking much
more from rationality with respect to desires than scientists expect from
rationality in the case of beliefs. In contrast, if the constraints exerted
upon desire sets by the requirement of maximal coherence and unity were
comparable to those exerted upon beliefs by a similar requirement in the
case of empirical science, then we should expect the ideal selves of all
conceptually possible deliberators to have widely different and severely
conflicting maximally unified desire sets.5
If empirical science proves to be dis-analogous in this manner, then
perhaps we should pursue an analogy with mathematics instead, which
4For criticism of this analogy, see Enoch (2007, section 2, pp. 103–105).
5Similar problems have been raised for Smith’s view by Sobel (1999) and Enoch (2007,
section 3, pp. 105–108).
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does seem to involve settling matters of belief on conceptual grounds alone.
The idea of understanding ethics in comparison to mathematics has a rich
philosophical tradition, of course, but it is not clear to me that such a
comparison can be used to support the idea that disagreements between
conflicting desire sets can be settled on the basis of a priori considerations
alone. Rather, such an analogy seems to presuppose this idea. Since our
web of belief in general requires empirical justification, focusing on the
small subset of those beliefs that could be settled conceptually would no
longer be motivated by the wish to maintain a general symmetry between
beliefs and desires, but rather by the specific idea that desires are more
like a priori beliefs than like empirical beliefs, which does not follow from
the idea of a general symmetry at all, but rather presupposes the idea that
needed to be justified: that desire criticism must be a priori.
Furthermore, even if the analogy with mathematics could be supported,
then it is not at all clear that it will even provide the sort of coherence
constraint that Smith is looking for. At least at first sight, mathemati-
cians employ deductive reasoning in order to determine which conclusions
follow from their premises, and such reasoning does not involve the appli-
cation of a principle of parsimony. One might suggest that mathematicians
often work abductively in a manner that resembles empirical science, how-
ever, and that their aim is really to find the most parsimonious set of
axioms that will still allow them to prove desirable theorems about mathe-
matical concepts that strike us as intuitively plausible. A Platonist about
mathematics might hold that such axioms are themselves a priori truths,
and such a view would at least provide a mathematical analogue to what
Smith seems to have in mind for ethics. Nevertheless, mathematical Pla-
tonism is deeply problematic, and many philosophers would rather argue
that the only truths established by mathematics are truths about which
theorems follow from which axioms, not about which axioms are correct
in themselves. The merit of parsimonious axiomatization schemes, on this
view, lies not in their Platonic correctness, but rather in their usefulness for
the application of mathematics to real-life problems and situations.
I shall return to the question of whether ethics should be understood as
a formal discipline (like mathematics) below. For now, the most important
conclusion is that, even if it is plausible that desire sets should be like
belief sets in the sense of being subject to a demand for maximal coherence
and unification, then it is still not at all clear why this should provide us
with one set of desires that all conceptually possible agents are rationally
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required to have. In most, if not all, areas of belief formation such consid-
erations of unity and coherence leave the choice between various sets of
belief undetermined. Hence, further argument would be needed to show
that coherence and unity can do so much more in the field of ethics.
5.3.2 Type-II vs. Type-III Dispositionalism
It is hard to see, therefore, how merely extending the repertoire of rational-
ity from strict logical consistency towards such requirements as “maximal
coherence and unity” could block the line of reasoning from motivational
Humeanism towards the relationalism that I have been sketching in the
previous chapters. In the end, even maximally coherent and unified desire
sets seem to allow for more diversity than nonrelationalism permits. Let us
now try to situate this problem within the framework that I have developed,
and figure out which premises Smith would be forced to deny.
As it turns out, the view that a demand for maximal coherence and
unity will push us towards a single normative desire set, which I have
discussed in Smith’s own terms in the previous subsection, may now be
translated into two rather different theoretical options within our frame-
work. As we have seen in section 2.4, the defense of the Internal Reasons
View required a procedural understanding of normative reasons for action,
which I could derive from the procedural interpretation of my Disconfir-
mation Principle in conjunction with the Authority Principle. Because the
argument for relationalism was in turn built upon this defense, the nonpro-
ceduralist objection against this defense might also be employed to undercut
the relationalist argument. In the light of this, Smith’s extension of the
Internal Reasons View in terms of his notion of systematic justification
may now be understood in one of two ways. Either it remains within the
boundaries of proceduralism, in which case it must attempt to block the
argument towards relationalism without making use of the nonprocedural-
ist objection in this manner. Or it revises the Internal Reasons View in a
more fundamental manner, by dropping proceduralism and understanding
nonrelationalist practical normativity in a nonproceduralist way.
Let us call the former option “type-ii” and the latter “type-iii dispo-
sitionalism.” We have now divided the motivationally Humean disposi-
tionalist approach into three versions, depending on whether we accept
proceduralism and/or relationalism:





Because relationalism does not seem to entail proceduralism, a fourth
motivationally Humean variety of dispositionalism may be defined, which
rejects proceduralism while accepting relationalism. From the perspective
of our current discussion, this view does not seem very attractive however,
as it combines the burdens of both the type-i and type-iii views without
offering in return any obvious advantage over either. Perhaps there could
be independent reasons for wanting to defend such a view, but if there are,
then they are beyond the scope of this thesis. I will therefore proceed on
the assumption that the types i, ii, and iii are the most plausible candidates
for a dispositional, reconciliatory solution to the Facts Problem.
Because of Smith’s explicit allegiance to the Internal Reasons View, and
because of the implicit proceduralism in at least Williams’s defense of the
view, one might be inclined to interpret Smith’s proposal as proceduralistic.
Furthermore, there are several passages in Smith’s work, both in The Moral
Problem and in subsequent articles, that seemed to me to suggest a type-ii
account, especially where he employs the notion of “convergence” (more
on this below). However, from personal communication it now seems to
me that Smith actually means to defend a type-iii account. In his view, in
order for us to be able to know what we should do we must be blessed
with a kind of epistemic luck that some of us might actually lack.6 For the
epistemically unlucky, there are no internal justifications which, from their
own point of view, could rationally compel them to see the errors of their
ways.
5.3.3 Proceduralism and Epistemic Luck
I think this appeal to the notion of epistemic luck is interesting, but it
needs to be qualified in order to properly distinguish between type-ii
and type-iii dispositionalism. The type of epistemic luck that we are
interested in is known as “veritic luck,” which may be characterized as
luck on the part of the agent that he has adopted a true belief, given the
internal justification that he has for that belief (i.e. the justification from
his own perspective). Much of the discussion on veritic luck has focused
6Again from personal communication.
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on beliefs about contingent facts, and a popular way to define it is in terms
of possible worlds in which those facts are different: an agent is veridically
lucky, according to such a definition, if (a) he holds a belief that is true
in the actual world and (b) his internal justification for this belief leads
him to hold the same belief in nearby possible worlds in which it is false
(Pritchard, 2005).
However, such a “world-centered” definition does not allow for veritic
luck with respect to beliefs that are true in all possible worlds, including
beliefs that are necessarily true on a priori grounds. In order to accommo-
date such “armchair luck,” as he calls it, Nenad Miščević has proposed
an “agent-centered” account of veritic luck (2007). The idea behind agent-
centered accounts is not that the same belief might have been false, but
that the same agent might have held a different belief on the basis of the
same, or a sufficiently similar, internal justification. Interestingly, Miščević
uses the term “procedure” to capture this idea of a way of thinking that
sufficiently similar internal justifications have in common, which fits in
nicely with our distinction between proceduralism and nonproceduralism,
as we shall see below. His proposal for “procedural veritic luck” is as
follows:
Procedural veritic luck: It is a matter of luck that the procedure
used by the agent has resulted in true belief.
The agent’s belief is true and has been justifiably arrived
at in the actual world, but in a wide class of nearby possible
worlds in which the relevant initial conditions are almost the
same as in the actual world—and this will mean, in the basic
case, that the agent at the very least forms her belief in the
sufficiently similar way as in the actual world—the agent arrives
at a false belief (or no belief at all). (2007, p. 61)
Note that this account allows for armchair luck: the procedure that I
followed in the actual world to arrive at a belief that is true a priori might
have resulted in a different belief, and one that is false, if the initial
conditions of my efforts of reasoning had been slightly different.
Before we can apply this account to the case of type-iii dispositionalism,
however, a further qualification must be made. For much of the discussion
on epistemic luck is held in the context of the more general epistemological
problem of how to account for the possibility of knowledge for agents
with finite and imperfect cognitive capacities, like us. Put differently, it is
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about the problem of how to come up with a standard for justification
that is on the one hand high enough to license talk of knowledge, while
on the other hand keeping that standard low enough so as to include the
sort of justifications that we are actually capable of giving for our beliefs.
This problem does not only arise with respect to knowledge about the
muddy empirical world, but also with respect to the crystal realm of the a
priori. Miščević gives the example of a mathematician, Jane, who makes
two mistakes in her calculation that cancel each other out, resulting in the
correct solution. The errors are “extremely hard to detect, so that (...) Jane
is justified in trusting her calculation” (p. 49). The point of the example, of
course, is that we never know that we are making such mistakes until we
discover them, which means that from our own perspective, we can never
know whether our justifications are flawed. Hence, we must either accept
a standard for justification that allows some such possibility for error, or
conclude that we’re never in a position to know that we know.
The Jane example is an example of armchair luck, but it is not an
example that can serve as an analogy for Smith in order to clarify type-iii
dispositionalism. Because surely, it is less than ideal for an agent to make
these kinds of mistakes. In other words, the ideal self of Jane would not
be susceptible to this type of error, and therefore, neither to this kind of
luck. This means that we must make a further distinction: between veritic
luck that we are susceptible to in virtue of our imperfect capacities, and
veritic luck that even our ideal selves would be susceptible to. Let us call
the former “eliminable” and the latter “ineliminable” luck. Of course, the
point of ineliminable veritic luck is not that our ideal selves might still
have beliefs that happen to be false, because ideal selves hold true beliefs
by definition. What ineliminable luck means, rather, is that our ideal selves
have ‘unlucky twins,’ so to speak, who share the cognitive capacities of
their lucky siblings, but nevertheless arrived at false beliefs instead.
However, in order to explicate the latter idea using Miščević’s pro-
cedural account, we would once again have to place ideal selves inside
possible worlds, assuming that ideal selves are possible agents. For the
sake of explicating Smith’s view, this is not a problem, as Smith is already
committed to the idea that ideal selves are possible agents. Nevertheless, I
did express skepticism about the possibility of ideal selves, earlier on, and
I do not think that the case for nonrelationalism should depend on it.
In order to circumvent this problem, we might want to think of ine-
liminable luck as a type of veritic luck that we must necessarily have, for
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conceptual reasons, if our beliefs are to be true. This way, we do not need
to refer to ideal selves at all. Then, using Miščević’s procedural account, in-
eliminable veritic luck may be defined in terms of the absence of a possible
world in which an unlucky twin manages to correct his false belief on the
basis of procedures that could be justified from his own perspective at the
time when he still held that false belief. Undoubtedly this will give rise to
various technical issues that need to be resolved in further detail, but to do
so would go beyond the scope of this thesis.7 For the sake of the argument,
let us for now simply grant the type-iii dispositionalist that the general
concept of ineliminable veritic luck can be worked out properly, and focus
instead on the question of whether it makes sense in the case of practical
judgments. In the light of this and in the interest of simplicity I will also
continue to speak loosely about veritic luck in the case of ideal selves.
With this terminology in place, we may redefine the procedural view
of disconfirmation as the view that practical beliefs are not susceptible to
ineliminable veritic luck. In contrast, the nonprocedural view holds that
practical beliefs are susceptible to this kind of luck. Note, however, that
proceduralism is perfectly compatible with the idea that practical beliefs
may be susceptible to eliminable veritic luck. Note also that proceduralism
is compatible both with the view that eliminable veritic luck does, and
with the view that it does not, rule out knowledge. The same goes for non-
proceduralism, but nonproceduralists must at least accept that ineliminable
veritic luck is compatible with knowledge. Otherwise they would have to
give up the idea of knowledge in matters of practical normativity.
In the case of nonrelationalist dispositionalism, we may narrow this
down a bit further to a dispute about the existence of ineliminable armchair
luck. According to type-ii dispositionalism, practical normativity does
not give rise to this type of luck. In contrast, type-iii dispositionalism
is the view that in order for our practical beliefs to be true, we must be
blessed with ineliminable armchair luck. Furthermore, in order to avoid
epistemological skepticism, the type-iii dispositionalist must defend the
claim that ineliminable armchair luck is compatible with knowledge.
With this further clarification of the difference between type-ii and type-
iii dispositionalism at hand, consider how Smith originally formulated
some of his premises at the beginning of The Moral Problem:
7An alternative would be to reformulate the agent-centered account of veritic luck in
such a way that it does not invoke possible worlds in the first place.
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[T]here exists a domain of moral facts; facts about which we
can form beliefs and about which we may be mistaken.
Moreover, the way in which we conduct ourselves in living
the moral life seems to presuppose that these facts are in prin-
ciple available to all; that no one in particular is better placed to
discover them than anyone else. That we have something like this
conception of moral facts seems to explain our preoccupation
with moral conversation and moral argument on the one hand,
and novels and films in which the different reactions people
have to moral questions are explored on the other. (1994, p. 5,
my emphasis)
To me, this passage reads like a straightforward denial of ineliminable
epistemic luck in moral deliberation. But perhaps Smith changed his mind
on this matter, or perhaps the passage can be read in a different way.
Nevertheless, we can think of the distinction as presenting him with a
dilemma, because as we shall see below, both accounts have their own
difficulties. Either he must accept proceduralism, and face the problems
of the type-ii account, or he must reject proceduralism and solve the
difficulties that the type-iii account will give rise to. I will finish this
chapter with a discussion of the former account in the next section, and
return to the latter in in the following chapter.
5.4 Problems for Type-ii Dispositionalism
There are two sets of problems that I want to raise for type-ii disposition-
alism. The first set of problems is specific to this type of account, and
concerns the worry that it does not have the resources that are needed to
make nonrelationalist realism plausible. I have already briefly discussed
these problems, and some attempts to solve them, in section 3.2. I will
now discuss arguments put forward by David Sobel and David Enoch that
undermine such attempts. These arguments support the anti-formal content
skepticism which I introduced in section 2.5.2. I will elaborate on their
criticisms, but even though I myself consider them to be very strong, I do
not mean to present them as conclusive. My current purpose is merely to
explain why, in view of the literature, type-ii dispositionalism does not
provide us with an easy way out of the status quo surrounding the Facts
Problem.
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The second set of problems concerns the account of disconfirmation
that type-ii dispositionalism requires, which I shall call the “Principles
of Reason View,” and which type-ii dispositionalists share with propo-
nents of other views, as it is a fairly standard account of disconfirmation.
Nevertheless, as I will argue in chapter 7, the Principles of Reason View
faces serious problems.8 Furthermore, there are independent reasons for
accepting an alternative account of disconfirmation that I shall propose,
the “Affective Response View,” which is hard to combine with type-ii
dispositionalism. However, all of this must await chapter 7. For now, I will
restrict my discussion to the first set of problems.
5.4.1 Problems for the Formalistic Convergence Strategy
If Smith means to defend a type-ii dispositionalist view, then his account
would be a nonrelationalist, motivationally Humean version of what I
have in section 3.1 called the “Comprehensive Internal Reasons View” (or
CIRV), which combines the Internal Reasons View with proceduralism and
rejects the ‘no reasons’ form of externalism (in my framework through
the Authority Principle, in Smith’s own framework by means of his Prac-
ticality Principle). Recall also that my definition of CIRV is in line with
Smith’s formulation of the Internal Reasons View in that it does not accept
Williams’s proximity requirement on instrumental deliberation (a choice
that I defended in section 2.2.1). In order to see whether nonrelationalism
can be made plausible on the basis of CIRV, I discussed two strategies in
section 3.2: the convergence and the constitution strategy. With respect
to convergence, I made a further distinction between a belief-based con-
vergence approach which required an anti-Humean theory of motivation,
and a ‘formalistic’ convergence strategy that would also be available to
motivational Humeans. I then discussed the first approach, as defended by
Thomas, in some detail, but the second approach I mentioned only briefly.
Instead, I shall now focus on the second approach, as it is the only type of
convergence available to the type-ii dispositionalist given his commitment
to the Distinctness Principle. Below, I will also return to the constitution
strategy, and to the prospects for a strategy that combines both aspects of
convergence and constitution.
But first, let us briefly rehearse why only ‘formalistic’ convergence can
aid the motivationally Humean nonrelationalist. According to Thomas’s
8See section 7.1.
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anti-Humean convergence view, there are substantial beliefs that produce
motivations without the help of intrinsic desires, and it is in the light of
convergence of such beliefs under appropriate conditions that motivational
convergence may be expected under such conditions as well. But the
motivational Humean cannot explain convergence of motivations in this
manner. Instead, he must explain why rational deliberation will change the
intrinsic desires of agents in ways that lead to convergence between them.
Perhaps he can still argue on the basis of an analogy between beliefs and
desires, as Smith has proposed, but we have seen in the previous section
that such an analogy would only explain convergence across conceptually
possible worlds if we restrict the analogy to the small subset of beliefs that
are true or false a priori, and such a restriction demands a further argument
for the very idea that is at stake here: whether or not intrinsic desires are the
sort of things that would converge on the basis of conceptual requirements
alone. Hence, if the type-ii dispositionalist wants to argue for convergence,
then he must employ a formalistic convergence strategy, which involves
the idea that no substantive information gets imported into the subjective
motivational set of the agent during the process of convergence, and
which therefore rather aims to show that through reflecting on the formal
consequences of the elements already in the S, the required motivational
changes can be achieved.
Even though the distinction between what counts as “formal” and
what as “substantive” in this context may ultimately rest on an intuitive
understanding of these notions, there is one crucial ambiguity in the
distinction that we can and must address at this point, because it involves
once more the difference between proceduralism and nonproceduralism.
Recall that when I defined proceduralism, I hastened to add that it does
not require ‘procedures’ in the sense of discrete sequences of concrete
steps that we can capture in a formalized system. This same disclaimer
now also applies to the sense in which I have been using the term ‘formal’
itself: the formalized convergence strategy is not meant to be ‘formal’ in
the sense of formalized language. It is merely ‘formal’ in the sense of
‘lacking substance,’ i.e., being due entirely to conceptual relations and
considerations. However, even with this clarification made, we might still
think of that sense of formality in two ways.
The first way in which we might understand it is that, even though we
might not be able to fully capture formal considerations as discrete steps
in a finite procedure, we may nevertheless think of them as requirements
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of rationality that could in principle be justified to an agent from the
perspective of his prior attitudes to which these requirements need to be
applied. This understanding of some requirement’s being formally rational
captures the idea that it must lack substantive content in terms of its being
internally justifiable from all conceptually possible sets of prior attitudes.
Thus, its internal justification does not depend on the specific content of the
agent’s prior attitudes, and in that sense lacks all substance. It is therefore
consistent with a proceduralist understanding of disconfirmation: every
set of attitudes that violates a formal requirement in this sense is eligible
to disconfirmation in the proceduralist sense.
By contrast, the second way in which some requirement might be said
to be “formal” is simply that the requirement be valid a priori, but without
being committed to the idea that this validity can be demonstrated or
arrived at in the proceduralist sense. This understanding captures the
idea that formal considerations lack substance in terms of their not having
empirical commitments. To be sure, note that the first conception of some-
thing’s being formal also rules out dependence on empirical results, but in
addition to that, it has the further requirement that formal considerations
can be demonstrated. Thus, the first conception is stricter than the second
(though of course proponents of the first conception are not required to
acknowledge the second as coherent or intelligible).
With this distinction between two conceptions of formality in place, we
might perhaps now also construe two conceptions of the idea of conver-
gence on the basis of formal considerations, depending on which notion
of formality we invoke. The first notion leads to a procedural idea of
convergence, where every agent could in principle, by revising his set of
intrinsic desires on the basis of needs for improvement justifiable from
the perspective of that set, converge onto the same subset of desires that
all maximally coherent and unified desire sets must include. Because
type-ii dispositionalism is proceduralistic, only this type of convergence is
available to it.
By contrast, we might wonder whether a type-iii dispositionalist might
not favor a notion of convergence based on the second concept of formality.
I will return to the merits of this idea in the next chapter. For now, however,
let me remark that without such qualification, the prototypical idea of
convergence, to me, already suggests a kind of proceduralism. Conver-
gence implies that all agents change from widely different states towards
states that are more similar, with all changes pointing in the direction of a
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common focal point. Convergence upon formal considerations, therefore,
suggest that such considerations could in principle make all agents change
their initially different states. But that is precisely what the nonprocedu-
ralist denies. In other words, nonproceduralist convergence would mean
that there are ways that all agents ought to have changed their states in the
light of those states that were epistemically lucky. Which is not the picture
I initially have in mind when I think of convergence.
I think this is another reason why I took Smith to be defending a
proceduralist, type-ii account when I originally read The Moral Problem,
and I suspect many others with me. For example, in his critique of Smith’s
view, Sobel introduces the account as follows:
Michael Smith . . . claims that (1) “convergence in the hypotheti-
cal desires of fully rational creatures is required for the truth of
normative reason claims” and (2) we have reason to “have some
confidence [. . . that] there will be a convergence in our desires
under conditions of full rationality” . . . The plausibility of the
claim that the desires of all agents will converge after proper
deliberation hinges crucially on how one characterizes such
deliberation. One could simply claim that a person only counts
as having deliberated properly if she reaches certain approved
conclusions. This path would assure Smith’s first thesis at the
cost of invoking a substantive, nonproceduralist conception of
proper deliberation. The interest in Smith’s claim stems from
his willingness to invoke an understanding of proper delibera-
tion which is not conceptually tied to the deliberator arriving
at any particular motivations. (1999, p. 136)
Should Smith favor a nonproceduralist, type-iii dispositionalist account
instead, then he might perhaps object that nonproceduralism does not
commit him to substantial particular approved motivations that are con-
ceptually prior to the convergence. However, he would be committed to
general principles of motivation-revision that must be established prior to
the convergence without being justifiable from the perspective of the initial
states of all agents. And that, at least, does not seem to be the view that
Sobel has, in the above passage, set out to engage with.
Let us now focus on the type-ii account, however, and the procedural
idea of convergence on the basis of formal considerations. The problem
for this approach, as I already indicated in section 3.2.1, is how to pull
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substance out of form, especially in view of the seemingly unlimited variety
in the conceptually possible intrinsic desire sets that agents might start
their deliberations with. To get a bit of grip on the problem, we may
understand it as involving the following three aspects: (1) the diversity
of the starting points that agents must converge from, (2) the difficulties
in arriving at any formal considerations beyond logical consistency at all,
and (3) the difficulty in showing that any such considerations would yield
convergence upon ethically interesting conclusions.
The first aspect greatly diminishes the relevance of our experiences
with interpersonal convergence in real life, because such convergence is
almost always explained against a common background that includes
shared attitudes. Thus, Sobel points out that Smith’s appeal to thick ethical
concepts, in this context, is not helpful: thick concepts indicate the absence
of certain diversity in attitudes, not the power of rationality to overcome
such diversity (Smith, 1994, p. 188; Sobel, 1999, p. 146). As we have
already seen, thick concepts might drive convergence if an anti-Humean
theory of motivation could be made plausible, but motivational Humeans
must always allow the conceptual possibility of rivalrous systems of thick
concepts that correspond to the sheer logical possibilities for intrinsic desire
variation.
Smith has also pointed to the massive disagreements among human
beings in the past that seem to have been more or less settled in the present.
Here, at least, the process of reasoning may have had a role. However,
it may still be in the light of certain attitudes that already were shared
amongst us that the desire sets of some parties in such disagreements
turned out to be inconsistent. As I have indicated in section 5.2 above, the
challenge for nonrelationalist dispositionalism lies especially in the realm
of counterfactual, but conceptually possible, agents such as the sardonic
aliens from Mars who lack any intrinsic desire towards our well-being
whatsoever. In the words of David Enoch:
There are, it seems to me, infinitely many coherent sets of
beliefs and desires. Perhaps Smith’s own beliefs and desires
comprise one such set. Perhaps the null set (or perhaps a set
with many beliefs but no desires) is another, for where is the
incoherence there? And there seems nothing in the very idea
of coherence to exclude infinitely many other coherent sets
of beliefs and desires. How is it, then, that all rational agents
converge on the same set? Isn’t this an amazing miracle? Surely,
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it cries out for explanation. And absent such an explanation it
will be too much to believe. (2007, p. 106)
Perhaps Smith need not even deny that infinitely many coherent desire
sets are possible. Depending on how we construe the notion of a desire
set, he may not need to claim that all agents would convergence on the
same set, but merely that there is some non-empty set of intrinsic desires
D such that all agents would converge on a coherent superset of D. Then
all desires in D would give rise to normative reasons for action, and
no other desires in the superset of any agent would be in conflict with
them. Furthermore, all desires that express particular tastes of some agent
may also give rise to normative reasons for action, as long as they are
‘sanctioned’ by general, non-indexical desires in D that make those tastes
part of the circumstances of action in the manner which I discussed in the
section on weak dependence above. Finally, there is nothing in Smith’s
view that prevents him from allowing a third class of ‘dangler’ desires, so
to speak, which are not in conflict with anything but are too arbitrary to
be shared by all fully rational agents.
The hard part, of course, is to show why all coherent desire sets would
have to be supersets of D. This brings us to the second aspect of the
problem, as by now it seems obvious that if we merely restrict ourselves to
the class of all logically consistent desire sets, the intersection of all those
sets would be empty, if only because this class would seem to include the
empty set, as well as desire singleton sets. However, an agent with only a
single desire, let alone with no desires at all, might not be conceivable, due
to the holism of the mental for example, and various other reasons that I
will discuss below when we turn to the constitution strategy. Nevertheless,
conceivable agents, it seems, might in principle be fully consistent in their
desire sets and still be in conflict with each other interpersonally, which is
why Smith has employed the notion of a “maximally coherent and unified”
desire set. We have already seen that the idea of maximal coherence and
unification of desires may be explained by analogy to the epistemic virtue
of parsimony for belief sets, and perhaps this would take care of the second
aspect of the problem, i.e. why there would be formal considerations in
favor of more unified desire sets. Nevertheless, we have also seen that
this analogy cannot explain, but rather presupposes the really hard part of
the view to defend: that intrinsic desire sets converge on a single (sub)set
when made to conform to the constraints of maximal unity and coherence.
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Perhaps it is actually trivial that D will be non-empty. Perhaps, for
example, it could be demonstrated that D includes the desire to be coherent
and unified in one’s desires. However, this offers little help. First of all,
this seems only trivial when we construe these desires in indexical form: I
would desire that my desire set be coherent. However, as I have already
argued, nonrelationalism requires similarity of desires in extensional form.
But even if Bob would desire that his desires were unified, why should
John also desire that Bob’s desires were unified? Furthermore, and this
brings us to the third aspect: if we want to make it plausible that there are
normative answers to ethical questions, then the type-ii dispositionalist
must show that D includes desires that settle such questions. And that is
clearly not a trivial matter.
For example, consider the following formulation of Smith’s principle of
parsimony for desires:
Reason requires that . . . (If someone has an intrinsic desire that
p, and an intrinsic desire that q, and an intrinsic desire that r,
and if the objects of the desires that p and q and r cannot be
distinguished from each other and from the object of the desire
that s without making an arbitrary distinction, then she has an
intrinsic desire that s). (2007, p. 138)
He points out that this is the sort of principle that deals with “Future Tues-
day Indifference,” Parfit’s example of an agent who cares about his future
experiences except for those he will have on future Tuesdays (Parfit, 1984,
pp. 124–125). The strength of the example is that we immediately feel that
such a preference scheme would be unreasonable, even though we do not
immediately see why it should be inconsistent.9 Nevertheless, the strength
of the example in showing how coherence might exceed consistency, is
at the same time its weakness in making convergence towards morally
relevant desires plausible. Not only because actual moral disagreements
or dilemmas never feature such proposals. But also, and more importantly,
because we have no trouble constructing thought experiments, such as
my example of the Martians, in which the villains are not susceptible to
these types of unreasonableness. My Martian invaders might be oddballs,
9But see Street (2009) for a defense of the idea that an ideally coherent agent can be Future
Tuesday Indifferent. For the record I suppose I am undecided about this matter. But for the
sake of the argument, my purpose here is to argue that if Future Tuesday Indifference cannot
be coherent, that does not give us enough to establish nonrelationalism.
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but they’re not stupid. If morality really does derive from rationality, it is
not because all sinners are fools. So if we keep the meaning of the term
“arbitrary” in the principle so extreme as to only cover cases as absurd as
Future Tuesday Indifference, then the principle does not offer interesting
guidance. But if we loosen the meaning of “arbitrary,” then we may feel
that the support derived from the outlying examples is no longer sufficient
to justify the principle.
The same problem threatens other principles, even those which may
seem more ethically ambitious. An example is the idea that moral judg-
ments should be universalizable. As John Mackie has argued, this notion
is deeply ambiguous (1977, ch. 4, pp. 83–102). He therefore distinguished
between different “stages” of universalization, where each stage was more
restrictive compared to the previous one. But whereas the early stages
could be considered candidates for conceptual requirements, they turned
out far too weak to be ethically significant, whereas the later stages were
ethically substantial, but impossible to derive from conceptual require-
ments.
Recently, Smith has attempted a more ambitious line of argument,
based upon the idea that there is an ethically relevant symmetry between,
on the one hand, the fact that an agent must trust his past self, and that his
future self must trust him, and on the other hand, the fact that different
agents must trust each other. In particular, the idea is that as a matter
of conceptual necessity, I must trust my past self not to have intended
to deceive me, or I could not any longer trust the attitudes that I have
inherited, so to speak, from my past self. Smith has tried to make the
idea plausible that it would be more unified for my desire set to therefore
feature equal interest in not deceiving my future self and not deceiving
others.
Now I am just sketching an outline of the argument here, and Smith’s
detailed version of it has yet to appear in print. Nevertheless, I do not see
how the requirement for one’s desire set to be symmetric in this sense could
be justified from the perspective of someone whose desire set does not,
initially, contain any attitudes geared towards such symmetry. Suppose
that there is one Martian amongst us, appearing like a human, with many
people caring for him and making sure not to deceive him. Nevertheless,
he deceives them all the time, constraining his actions only in ways that
prevent others from discovering his intent. If there are no attitudes in his
desire set that are geared towards being symmetrical in Smith’s sense, then
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how could we possibly demonstrate to him the errors of being egoistic in
his sense? At least in the proceduralistically formal sense, this does not
seem to work as a formal requirement.10
5.4.2 Problems for the Constitution Strategy
The second strategy available to the type-ii dispositionalist is to argue
that the conceptual possibilities for variation in attitude sets are not as
wide as they might initially seem to be, because they are constrained by
certain requirements that are constitutive of being an agent in the first
place. The purpose of the strategy is to derive a set of attitudes from these
requirements that all agents must have.
In section 3.2.2 I raised the problem for this strategy that even if such
common attitudes can be derived, they turn out to be common in the
wrong way. They would be isomorphic between agents, whereas nonrela-
tionalism requires attitudes that are similar between them (a distinction
I have introduced in section 1.3.2). The example of the desire for one’s
desires to be unified, which I discussed in the previous section, illustrates
this: if it should be the case in the nonrelationalist sense that Bob’s desires
are unified, then we must show that John would also desire Bob’s desires
to be unified, not that John would desire that John’s desires be unified.
I have not much more to add to my earlier argument, except this: even
if there might nonetheless be ways to arrive at similar attitudes across
all agents through some constitutive requirement, then they would have
to satisfy the further demands of being proceduralistically formal and
consistent with the Distinctness Principle, in order for them to help the
type-ii dispositionalist. But this reduces their likelihood even further. A
motivational anti-Humean might, for example, argue that having certain
beliefs about the world is constitutive of being a believer at all, and that
these include motivationally efficient beliefs that yield similar motivations
across all agents. This is no help to the type-ii dispositionalist, who must
demonstrate similarity of intrinsic desires.
Perhaps nonproceduralists could propose a ‘rich’ concept of agency that
would itself already harbor somewhat substantive intuitions about what it
means to really be an agent, or a self-governing agent, for example, from
which some nonrelationalist implications could then be derived. Again, the
10Smith, in personal communication, seems to agree with this, opting for the nonprocedu-
ralist, type-iii dispositionalist interpretation of this argument instead.
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type-ii dispositionalist cannot make us of this approach, unless he could
show from the perspective of those who profess not to share the respective
attitudes that it is impossible for them not to have them.
But Enoch (2006) has employed a strong argument to show that the
latter cannot be done, since any concept of agency that is substantive
enough to imply similar attitudes shared by all agents will also be so
substantive as to invite the response from some that they simply are
not, and do not care to be, agents in that sense. Instead, the are happy
being “schmagents,” thereby re-introducing a less substantive conception
of agency under a new name.
Enoch’s own view is that all dispositional accounts of practical nor-
mativity must be rejected, and there of course I disagree with him. Fur-
thermore, I think that the schmagency-argument does not establish the
uselessness of a dispositional approach based on ideas about what is con-
stitutive of agency: in particular, I have already relied on various ideas
about what is constitutive of self-governing agency to build the type-i
account that I favour, and I shall be relying on such ideas even more in
the chapters to come. But at least with respect to the type-ii account,
the schmagency-argument helps to show, in combination with my own
argument based on the similarity–isomorphism distinction, that we can-
not put nonrelationalist content in the subjective motivational sets of all
conceptually possible (schm)agents.
5.4.3 Problems for the Combined Strategy
At the end of section 3.2.2 I suggested that the convergence and constitution
strategies might be combined in a way that would reduce each of their
problems somewhat. We have seen that it is a problem for the convergence
strategy that the class of logically possible intrinsic desire sets includes such
immense variety that convergence to substantial results seems hopeless.
However, if the constitution strategy can narrow that class down a bit,
from the class of logically possible desire sets to the class of desire sets that
only conceptually possible agents might have, then perhaps there will be
more for the convergence strategy to latch on to. Enoch has made a similar
suggestion:
There is another possible explanation of the miracle of con-
vergence that is, it seems, available to Smith, an explanation
Smith himself hints at (2004a, pp. 27, 205). According to this
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explanation, convergence of all possible rational agents emerges
as the result of features that are necessarily shared by rational
agents, as the upshot, that is, of features that are constitutive
of rational agency. If the details of such an explanation could
be filled in, convergence would, of course, no longer be at all
surprising. (Enoch, 2007, p. 107)
Conversely, we have seen that the constitution strategy fails to accomplish
the jump from isomorphic attitudes to similar attitudes, but perhaps it
can outsource that task to the convergence strategy. In other words, the
combined strategy is a two stage process: in the first stage, the type-ii
dispositionalist attempts to squeeze as substantial isomorphic intrinsic
desire structures out of the conditions constitutive of agency as he can,
and then in the second stage, he must try to show why the process of
rational deliberation, when applied to these structures, would make all
agents converge on a set of similar attitudes.
So what sort of isomorphic desires can we derive from the concept of
agency? In fact, we need not even look at the general concept of agency,
but we can move a bit further by starting out with the concept of self-
governing agency. I have hinted at this idea before; let me now explain
why. Recall that I have argued for the notion of self-government as an
element of the ideal conditions of agency that should be distinguished from
the requirement of rationality, on the grounds that certain motivational
deficiencies are intuitively compatible with the agent being fully capable
of thinking rationally. The problem of such agents is not that they fail to
deliberate properly, the problem is that they fail to control themselves.
Since ideal agents do not have this problem, whereas actual agents
do, the convergence process on the basis of rational deliberation need not
depart from our actual attitude sets, but rather from what our attitude
sets would be if we were fully self-governing. Thus, it is from the class of
intrinsic desire sets that conceptually possible self-governing agents might
have, that the convergence must be achieved. A similar strategy has been
proposed by Christine Korsgaard, who argues that Kant’s transcendental
analysis of agency as self-legislation yields the interest in acting in a law-like
manner (1996, p. 97–99), from which Kantian ethics may then attempt to
deliberate rationally towards nonrelationalist altruistic conclusions that all
agents would be rationally required to accept (e.g. in Korsgaard, 2006).11
11Although her strategy for establishing her brand of moral rationalism bears this similarity
to the combined strategy in support of type-ii dispositionalism, it is not clear to me whether
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There may well be all sorts of interesting intrinsic desires that ideal
agents would have as a result of such deliberation upon what is constitutive
of their self-governance, but there are two reasons why I think they still
cannot give rise to nonrelationalist realism. The first, and most important
for our current discussion, is that the gap between isomorphic attitudes
of self-governing agents on the one hand, and similar attitudes that settle
interesting moral questions on the other, will still be much too large for
the formalized convergence strategy to breach.
It might be that every self-governor will turn out to have a normative
reason to be critical of his past assumptions, for example. Or to strike a
wise balance between experimenting with new policies for action on the
one hand and sticking with old policies that have proven worthwhile in
the past. But it is hard to see how we go from these kind of interests to a
view about whether we should care for the fate of future generations, say,
or about whether we should refrain from harming animals that have the
capacity to suffer, if that transition must be made on the basis of formal
principles of reasoning alone. Remember that even the Martian invaders,
when made to consider their self-directed interest in being the best self-
governors they can be, would have to be forced by correct reasoning from
their own perspective, to conclude that they had better let us live in peace.
So what about Kantian ethics, then? Briefly, I think many problems
that have often been raised for Kantian ethics are ultimately related to the
same issues I have been summarizing here, though the various distinctions
and disambiguations that I would need at this point in my framework in
order to do justice to Kantian theory are beyond the scope of this thesis.
Nevertheless, the bottom line, I suspect, for a marriage between Humean
motivation and Kantian deliberation would be the aforementioned worry
about universalization. Many philosophers doubt that the categorical
imperative (which, if ascribed to all agents, would yield interpersonal
similarity) could be derived from the mere idea of subscribing to action
that is regular in a law-like manner (which by itself merely involves inter-
personal isomorphism), and furthermore, that the different formulations
of the categorical imperative could even be derived from each other. The
I should classify Korsgaard as a type-ii dispositionalist herself. In her own terminology,
Korsgaard rejects moral realism in favour of constructivism, but I do not know her work
well enough to determine whether that rules out practically normative facts on the extremely
minimal notion of facts that I have employed in order to state the Facts Principle. Nor is it
clear to me, despite her being a card-carrying Kantian, whether her account would really
violate my Distinctness Principle.
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reason to be skeptical about this, in my view, is closely related to Mackie’s
dissection of lesser and more substantial stages of universalization.
Furthermore, it is also often doubted that even the categorical impera-
tive yields enough moral substance to guide action, and it is controversial
whether Kant intended it to do so. The categorical imperative rules cer-
tain maxims of action out, but it is not clear whether it rules anything in
such that convergence would ensue. Finally, we should question the idea
that self-governance requires one’s rules of conduct to be law-like in the
manner that Korsgaard implies. Self-legislation is just another word for
self-governance, but not in a sense from which an austere legalism about
the language of practical reasoning can be derived. According to Williams,
this is a core problem for the Kantian project:
Why should one adopt such a picture? Why should I think of
myself as a legislator and—since there is no distinction—at the
same time a citizen of a republic governed by these notional
laws? This remains a daunting problem, even if one is already
within ethical life and is considering how to think about it. But
it is a still more daunting problem when this view of things is
being demanded of any rational agent. (1985, p. 63)
But perhaps it is no surprise that we cannot derive Kantian ethics in this
manner, preventing convergence from our proceduralist perspective, as
many Kantians take the “Factum der Vernunft” (the moral law as known
to us) to be an example of synthetic a priori knowledge. In their view, we
just find this knowledge within ourselves, but we cannot demonstrate
its truth analytically to the theoretical skeptic who professes to know no
such thing. The question whether nonproceduralist epistemology and
the epistemology of the synthetic a priori amount to the same thing is a
complex one, however, as the analytic–synthetic distinction is by no means
univocal any more in the contemporary literature. I will remain neutral
about this matter, and stick to my own terminology of proceduralism
versus nonproceduralism.
So to summarize our first reason for doubting the combined strategy,
what all these considerations show is that, even though the constitutionalist
stage of the combined strategy may seem to address the first two aspects of
the problem for the convergence strategy—the wide range of priors and the
establishment of conceptual requirements beyond logical consistency—it
does not offer much solace in view of the third aspect—the problem of
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arriving at morally significant conclusions. And so our worries about
the convergence strategy still motivate anti-formal content skepticism: no
formal derivation of substantial moral conclusions from premises whose
conceptual necessity can be demonstrated seems possible.
The second reason is that I am not even sure that constitutive require-
ments of self-governing agency ever provide us with isomorphic normative
reasons for concrete actions or choices. Consider the example of the interest
in being critical about one’s own views. Too little of this motivation, and
one loses important opportunities for disconfirming one’s false beliefs. But
too much of this motivation, and one would spend too much time and
energy on it. However, in particular cases, the optimal balance between
these two extremes may not depend on empirical facts about the case alone.
They may also depend on one’s contingent intrinsic desires in ways that,
once again, do not converge across all agents. I shall return to this matter
later on in the thesis.12
For now, however, the first of these two reasons is the most important
one. Despite all the intricacies that we have discussed in this chapter—the
weak dependence construction to accommodate different tastes, the adviser
approach to incorporate awareness of our imperfections into deliberation,
the belief-desire analogy in order to establish a parsimony principle for
practical reason, the two-stage combination of the constitutive and the
convergence strategy, and the license to deliberate on what is constitutive
of self-government—there still does not seem to be any rational argument
that could in principle convince my Martians to stop torturing human
beings for fun, given that they lack the intrinsic desire to promote or
respect our well-being.
One way for Smith to accommodate this result is to adopt the type-
iii account instead. On that view, normative reasons for action are still
determined by purely rational considerations alone, but it is no longer seen
as a feature of rational considerations that they can be justified internally
to all conceptually possible agents. However, as I will explain in the next




In the previous chapter I have distinguished two interpretations of Michael
Smith’s nonrelationalist alternative to the type-i solution from chapter
4. The type-ii approach accepts proceduralism, but we have seen that
this is very hard to combine with nonrelationalism. Instead, type-iii
dispositionalism rejects proceduralism. On this view, some desire sets are
irrational even though the conceptual necessity of the principles in virtue
of which such desire sets ought to be revised cannot be demonstrated from
the perspective of those desire sets themselves.
The epistemological upshot of type-iii dispositionalism, as we have
seen at the end of section 5.3.3, is that for every agent, there are intrinsic
desires that the agent is either epistemically lucky or unlucky to have, in
the ineliminable armchair sense. This suggests two ways in which the view
might be criticized by proceduralists. The first would be to argue in general
against the very idea of ineliminable armchair luck. The second is to argue
more specifically against the idea that intrinsic desires are susceptible to
such luck.
Although I am sympathetic to the first line of argument, discussing
it properly would require me to address some of the most fundamental
questions in epistemology, which would take us far beyond the scope of
this thesis. Instead, I will restrict myself to a brief discussion in section 6.1
of what it would mean for a dispute in theoretical philosophy to involve
ineliminable armchair luck. The defense of type-iii dispositionalism relies
on the idea that such a theoretical dispute will be analogous to certain
disagreements in normative ethics in relevant respects.
In section 6.2, I will address the question whether type-iii disposi-
tionalism is still an Internal Reasons View, which will help us to get a
better sense of how this view relates, exactly, to the various philosophical
positions that we have been considering so far. In section 6.3 I articulate
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various worries that I have concerning the aforementioned analogy, which
make the solution unconvincing for me even if the notion of ineliminable
armchair luck would be coherent.
6.1 Armchair Luck in Theoretical Philosophy
Smith has suggested that the dispute between nominalists and realists on
the existence of universals might be a matter of ineliminable epistemic
luck.1 He imagines that their debate might reach a point where both sides
have succeeded in making their views internally coherent and completely
immune from objections. If that would happen, he insists, we would have
to conclude that one side must have reasoned from ineliminably unlucky
priors.
Note how this differs from verbal disagreement. Suppose that A claims
that determinism rules out free will, while B holds that they are compatible.
However, as it turns out, A holds that free will is the ability to do otherwise,
whereas B holds that free will is that which makes us responsible for our
actions. If B agrees that determinism rules out the ability that A has in
mind, while A agrees that this ability is not required for the responsibility
that B has in mind, then their disagreement may be resolved using what
David Chalmers (2011) calls the “method of elimination”: A substitutes
“free will” with “free willA” while B substitutes it with “free willB.”
Metaphysics seems to resist this method. Chalmers discusses the
dispute over the existence of mereological wholes (2009). If there are two
cups on my table, does that mean there are two or three objects on the
table? If one applies the method of elimination, one might say that there
are two objectsA and three objectsB on the table, such that objectsB existB
while they do not existA, but those who subscribe to ontological realism will
still disagree amongst each other about the question whether existenceB is
real existence.
The same applies to the existence of universals. However, if both sides
on the mereology dispute would be capable of formulating internally
fully coherent theories, then it seems we could simply choose how to
use the ‘real’ existential quantifier after we’ve agreed about the relevant
empirical facts, without this choice affecting much of importance, except
that in certain contexts it may seem more practical to talk about the
mereological wholes as existing while in other cases it seems the other
1From personal communication.
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way around. This leads Chalmers to defend ontological anti-realism with
respect to mereological existence: the view that there are no ontological
facts about this matter that make the claim that mereological wholes exist
true or false. Which rules out ineliminable armchair luck.
Perhaps it is less intuitive that the existence of universals might be inde-
terminate in this sense, because nominalism and realism about universals
seem less philosophically isolated, so to speak: they are intertwined with
many other theoretical issues. However, this also makes it less plausible
to expect that fully coherent formulations of both theories will be possi-
ble: the more dependencies they have elsewhere in philosophy, the more
justified we can be in hoping that a requirement of coherence in another
discipline might ultimately settle the universals debate as well.
Furthermore, note that such resolution does not presuppose that all
philosophy must be analytic. Many philosophers have argued that our
knowledge has certain assumptions that we are a priori justified in making,
because their negations, even though not formally contradictory, would
nevertheless be practically or performatively self-defeating for us to en-
dorse. If realism about universals could be shown to rely upon such an
assumption while nominalism would violate it, then the dispute could be
settled.
Hence, to claim that the universals dispute involves ineliminable arm-
chair luck is to claim that it is on the one hand not so isolated from other
issues in philosophy as to make ontological anti-realism about the issue
itself plausible, while also claiming on the other hand that these philosoph-
ical interrelations cannot ultimately be exploited to resolve the debate on
the basis of assumptions that no one could reasonably deny.2
2I am inclined to think that these requirements cannot be combined, because I favor a
pragmatist philosophy of language according to which disputes can only be understood as
meaningful in the context of the sort of inquiry that would in principle allow us to resolve
them, if not in actual practice. The defense of such a general account of meaningful disputes
in philosophy is surely beyond the scope of this thesis, though nevertheless closely related to
my main line of argument here: that we should think of understanding disconfirmation as
the primary issue, and of understanding facts as derived from it. The pragmatist approach
that I have in mind would generalize this idea from meta-ethics to questions about meaning,
knowledge, and existence in theoretical philosophy.
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6.2 Is This Still an Internal Reasons View?
In section 2.4, we have seen that Williams’s defense of the Internal Reasons
View required a proceduralism concerning our knowledge of reasons for
action. This made it possible to formulate a nonproceduralist objection
against the defense, based on the idea that external reasons might exist
in the light of facts that would remain epistemically inaccessible to us
should we have started out with certain incorrigibly misguided attitudes
in our subjective motivational set. Therefore, if Smith is also rejecting
proceduralism, and if his argument also turns on the idea that the facts
about their normative reasons may be inaccessible to some agents in this
sense, doesn’t that then make him an external reasons theorist? Isn’t that
simply what external reasons are?
The answer is that it depends on how nonproceduralists understand
the notion of correct deliberation in terms of which internal reasons are
defined. If the nonproceduralist agrees with the proceduralist that cor-
rect deliberation is a procedural notion, then the nonproceduralistically
construed reasons for action may lie outside the reach of deliberation,
depending on the prior attitudes of the agent, which would make them
external reasons. However, if the nonproceduralist maintains that correct
deliberation may itself be nonprocedural, in the sense that it will be impos-
sible for certain agents to revise their deliberative practices from their own
perspective so as to arrive at methods of deliberation that are correct, then
the nonproceduralist can still defend the claim that all reasons for action
are within the reach of a sound deliberative route, even if they may not lie
within the reach of procedural inquiry for some agents. If Smith means to
reject proceduralism, then this would seem to be his view.
But does it make sense, we may now ask, to understand the notion of
a deliberative route in this sense? Doesn’t the very idea of a deliberative
route imply a proceduralist understanding? What would be the difference
between an internal reasons view construed in terms of this nonproce-
duralist route, and the nonproceduralist defense of the external reasons
view sketched above? I think the reason why Smith thinks of himself as
an internal reasons theorist is that he really wants to stress the transitional
function of the principles of reason that he believes in. Consider again his
parsimony principle which we discussed in section 5.4.1:
Reason requires that . . . (If someone has an intrinsic desire that
p, and an intrinsic desire that q, and an intrinsic desire that r,
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and if the objects of the desires that p and q and r cannot be
distinguished from each other and from the object of the desire
that s without making an arbitrary distinction, then she has an
intrinsic desire that s).
I have argued that the problem for this principle lies in the notion of an
“arbitrary distinction” which may receive more or less substantial interpre-
tations. Whereas the less substantial interpretations may be justified to all
agents from their own perspective, the more substantial interpretations
may not, while the latter would be needed to arrive at ethically interesting
conclusions. In order to circumvent this problem, Smith may defend a
nonproceduralist type-iii account according to which this principle, under
a fairly substantial interpretation, will still be a priori correct, but neverthe-
less epistemically inaccessible to some agents from their own perspective.
Note, however, that despite being nonproceduralistically substantial in
this manner, the principle would nevertheless still be transitional in that
it requires a prior set of attitudes to operate on, yielding a revised set of
attitudes as a result. And the same would apply to a substantial version
of a universalization principle, for example. It is in this sense that type-iii
dispositionalism may still be understood as a ‘route-like’ account.
In fact, we may think of this account as the diametric opposite of the
sort of external reasons view that one might wish to defend in the light of
the ‘non-route-like’ deliberation objection. As we have seen in section 2.5,
this objection was based on the idea that agents can acquire new attitudes
in a rational manner that does not yield these attitudes on the basis of
some deliberative continuation upon the previous attitudes of the agent.
Hence, the ‘non-route-like’ External Reasons View is compatible with
proceduralism, while rejecting the idea that principles of deliberation must
be ‘route-like.’ By contrast, type-iii dispositionalism rejects proceduralism,
while being compatible with the idea that principles of deliberation are
‘route-like.’
Nevertheless, the distinctions involved in carving out the type-iii view
as an Internal Reasons View are somewhat vague. Consider a deontolog-
ical prohibition such as “Thou shalt not lie.” Is this a concrete, ethical
imperative? Or it is a transitional principle that only yields substance in its
revisionary operation, eliminating attitudes in support of lying from the
subjective motivational set in order to produce a motivational configura-
tion that will not lead the agent to tell lies? Both answers seem somewhat
arbitrary.
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Furthermore, the distinction between nonproceduralists who take delib-
eration to be procedural and those who do not is also somewhat suspicious.
Are these really different logical options, or is this another example of a
verbal disagreement? Using Chalmers’s method of elimination, type-iii
dispositionalists might distinguish between deliberationP (for procedural-
istically reachable deliberation) and deliberationNP (for deliberation on
the basis of principles that may not be justified proceduralistically to all
agents), on the grounds that both conceptions capture some of the intu-
itions about deliberative correctness that nonproceduralists may want to
take into account, while each notion can be employed to play a different
conceptual role in their theory. In that case, the distinction between the
Internal and the External Reasons View turns out to be ambiguous: in
relation to deliberationP the type-iii dispositionalist must be an External
Reasons Theorist, but in relation to deliberationNP he can be an Internal
Reasons Theorist.
6.3 Problems for Type-iii Dispositionalism
Is type-iii dispositionalism a convincing alternative to the type-ii account
we discussed in the previous chapter? We have just seen that the type-
iii dispositionalist may still want to insist that normative reasons for
action are determined by principles of reason that are transitional in
nature, giving rise to a ‘route-like’ conception of correct deliberation. Note
that on the basis of this assumption, the type-iii dispositionalist would
still need a convergence, constitution, or combined strategy in order to
establish nonrelationalism. This means that the problems that the type-ii
dispositionalist is facing will not automatically melt away before the type-
iii dispositionalist. However, the latter may seem better suited to handle
them, because he may employ more substantial interpretations of such
principles of reason, as I have explained in the section above.
But in return for this theoretical advantage over the type-ii account, the
type-iii dispositionalist must face a number of additional problems that
proceduralistic dispositionalists need not worry about. Furthermore, upon
closer examination the advantage over type-ii dispositionalism may turn
out to be a bit of a poisoned chalice, as it immediately gives rise to a new
dilemma that restores the predicament of the type-ii view. I will explain
this latter problem first, and discuss the other problems afterwards.
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6.3.1 A Poisoned Chalice: The Economy Problem
Let us once more suppose, for the sake of our discussion, that there is such
a thing as ineliminable armchair luck in theoretical philosophy, and that
the nominalism–realism dispute over universals turns out to be a matter
of such luck. Suppose furthermore that universals exist: the realists have
been lucky in their prior beliefs; the nominalists unlucky. Because it is
armchair luck we are talking about, it is important that we do not think of
realism as being made true by some brute metaphysical fact that, despite
its being inaccessible through empirical investigation, could have been
different. The realist in our example is claiming that it is conceptually
necessary that universals exist—not even God could have made a world
without them. On a conceptual level, the story of the nominalist just does
not make sense, even though it cannot be proven why.
Belief in such a scenario would have to be justified on the basis of the
idea that for various philosophical reasons, it would not make sense if both
stories made sense, nor if neither made sense, and so it follows that one
and only one of them must make sense, even if we cannot refute either.
However, we should be wary of the philosophical temptation to invoke this
strategy whenever we want to postulate conceptual truths that we do not
know how to demonstrate logically. If the dispute over universals involves
ineliminable armchair luck, then we must accept that there is a certain ‘gap’
between that which makes sense conceptually and that which cannot be
disconfirmed internally, but even then we should consider it a theoretical
virtue to be able to keep this gap as small as possible. Accepting something
as a matter of conceptual truth without being able to explain to one’s critic
why it is conceptually necessary should not be our favorite dialectical move
in the game of philosophy. Note, once more, that we are not talking about
actually being able to convince one’s opponent, at a conference, say, or
in the journals. That only shows that there is eliminable epistemic luck,
which all parties may, for our present purposes, accept. The point is that
one would be claiming a certain truth to be conceptually necessary while
being unable, in principle, to attribute the belief of one’s opponent in the
opposite claim to any imperfection in their thinking. It involves biting the
bullet that one’s theory is based on a certain dogmatism, which I think
philosophers should want to avoid whenever possible.
In other words, to suppose that one knows that one’s opponent is wrong
as a matter of ineliminable armchair luck is theoretically expensive. Allowing
certain disputes in philosophy to be lucky in this manner is a very big deal,
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the sort of result comparable in its significance to Gödel’s incompleteness
theorem in mathematics, say, except that no philosopher has ever made
a proof of it. Furthermore, note that even though Peano arithmetic is
incomplete, completeness in logic has not become an outdated commodity.
Complete formalisms are valued for their theoretical neatness, so to speak,
and if a complete formalism can do a certain job, then this is still preferable.
In general, conservative formalisms are always preferable to more exotic
systems of logic when they are equally useful, and when they are not, then
there is always a trade-off between the desirable properties of conservative
formalisms versus the added expressiveness of the more exotic frameworks.
In essence, this is just another application of a principle of parsimony in
mathematics, but now applied at the meta-theoretical level. A similar
principle, it seems to me, should be applied at the meta-theoretical level in
philosophy: we should try to be economical about the a priori.
Hence, it might be that a conceptually indemonstrable truth about the
existence of universals is still acceptable, while believing in such a truth
about the existence of mereological wholes goes too far. But in the light of
this, it now seems quite a leap from being a nonproceduralist about the
universals debate in order to keep it a priori to being a nonproceduralist
about morality in order to keep it a priori. This means that the third aspect
of the problem for the convergence strategy—the problem of arriving
at ethically significant substance—is coming back in the form of a new
dilemma. Because the more substantial we make our interpretation of
transitional principles of reason, the less economical it would be to include
them in the realm of ineliminable armchair luck. But the less substantial we
make them, the harder it becomes to establish convergence upon ethically
interesting results.
And here the analogy to the nominalism–realism debate offers little
solace. For suppose that the Martians subscribe to a weak interpretation of
the universalization principle that allows them to torture humans, while
their victims subscribe to a stronger interpretation that would allow them to
argue that the Martians should not torture them. Intuitively, does it really
seem on a par with the idea that there must be an a priori truth about the
existence of universals, that there must also be an a priori truth about which
interpretation Martians and humans should give to the universalization
principle, if neither truth can be arrived at through internally justifiable
methods of inquiry? Without further argument, I do not see why I should
accept that the moral prohibition of torture is just as conceptually necessary
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as the existence of universals.
At this point, the type-iii dispositionalist might want to insist that he
does see these issues as properly analogous, and wonder why the burden of
proof would be on him. However, the reason why he does have the burden
of proof is because of the economy problem: other things being equal, the
position that implies the least amount of ineliminable luck in philosophy
is preferable. Against this insight, it is hardly a convincing move to simply
declare that the price paid for making altruism nonproceduralistically a
priori feels just as cheap as the one paid for the existence of universals. On
the contrary, that would just seem like an ad hoc assumption of the very
thing that the type-iii dispositionalist has to make plausible.
6.3.2 Epistemic Luck and Direction of Fit
In the case of a motivationally Humean theory such as type-iii disposition-
alism, there is a further dis-analogy between the dispute over universals
in theoretical philosophy and the normative ethical dispute between Mar-
tians and humans concerning the latter’s extermination. According to
the dispositional solution, we explain the truth conditions of our practical
beliefs in terms of our intrinsic desires under ideal conditions of rational,
self-governing agency. In the case of the type-ii account, the idea was that
just like there is a logic for beliefs, so there is also a logic of desires, and
if we apply this logic to the intrinsic desires that we start out with, then
we will ultimately converge upon the intrinsic desires that constitute our
normative reasons for action. Now the type-iii account is supposed to
be similar, except that it makes the principles of rational desiring more
substantial, such that they have at least to some extent already to be built
into the prior desire set, with the implication that other prior desire sets
will not converge proceduralistically upon the desires that rational agents
must have.
Hence, if the desires of the Martians will not converge proceduralisti-
cally upon the desires of their ideal selves (but rather upon the desires of
the unlucky twins of their ideal selves), their intrinsic desires are ‘getting
it wrong’ in a manner that cannot be, in principle, explained to them
from the perspective of those desires. But this feature, it seems to me, is
hard to combine with the very idea of an intrinsic desire. For what is this
proceduralistically unreachable ‘it’ that the desires are getting wrong, if
not something extrinsic to them? And if there is something external to
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them that these desires have to get right, then it would seem their direc-
tion of fit (Smith, 1994, p. 111) is no longer exclusively that of ‘fitting the
world to the mind.’ Instead, nonproceduralist dispositionalism seems to
imply that desires must have both directions of fit: even though they aim,
motivationally, at making the world fit their content, they must also be
understood as aiming, epistemologically, at having their content fit the
substantial a priori principles of desirability.
In response to this, the type-iii dispositionalist might wish to object that
the formulation of the Humean theory of motivation in terms of directions
of fit is to be understood only as a motivational, and therefore explanatory,
rather than a normative, justificatory thesis. Thus, beliefs differ from
intrinsic desires in their having a ‘fit the mind to the world’ direction of
fit in the sense that, when actually encountered with evidence indicating a
mismatch between the world and his belief, the agent will be moved to
alter his belief, a move which is explained by the insight that beliefs have
this direction of fit. Clearly, the type-iii dispositionalist’s commitment to
nonproceduralism does not require him to say that intrinsic desires are
belief-like in this sense, because insofar an agent is ineliminably unlucky
in his desires he will never be moved to alter them in the above sense.
However, note that the same thing would apply to the belief in the exis-
tence of universals that cannot be justified to the defenders of nominalism
from their own perspective, if the analogy is to hold, and we would still
consider this belief to have the ‘fit the mind to the world’ direction of fit
in a manner that distinguishes beliefs from intrinsic desires. Perhaps the
type-iii dispositionalist would be tempted, at this point, to argue that such
a belief is not really about ‘the world’ because of its a priori character, but
what he cannot deny is that it is a belief, that it has truth conditions, and
that therefore, the belief is to be understood as an attempt to be ‘fitting’
rather than a goal to be ‘fitted,’ so to speak. The idea that the nominalist
might never be moved to change his belief about universals does not make
a difference in this respect. So the analogy on which the type-iii disposi-
tionalist is relying seems to require that there is something that the desires
must fit in a manner analogous to the way in which there is something
that the belief in the existence of universals must fit.
Furthermore, we have already seen that the explanation of action has
a justificatory aspect as well: even without presupposing the normativity
of normative reasons for action, explaining actions in terms of beliefs and
desires does presuppose the normativity of beliefs and desires themselves:
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the normativity of the sort of minimal rationality that we must ascribe to
an agent in order to be able to attribute beliefs and desires to her in the
first place. The different directions of fit are articulations of the different
ways in which beliefs and desires have to make sense in explanations of
the agent’s actions, and what the type-iii dispositionalist seems to have
committed himself to is that something similar to the direction of fit needed
to make sense of a belief in the existence of universals may also be applied
to the concept of an intrinsic desire.
Is this still compatible with the Distinctness Principle? Strictly speaking,
it may depend on how one wishes to construe the notion of “belief.” In
Michael Smith’s view, beliefs aim at the truth, while desires aim at the
good. However, one might argue that the very idea of aiming at something,
or of having a ‘mind to something’ rather than an exclusively ‘something
to mind’ direction of fit, involves the idea of truth. Furthermore, we have
already seen that the very idea of being ineliminably lucky in the armchair
sense involves the idea of truth, because it is a form of veritic epistemic
luck. So if intrinsic desires must aim at something that lies beyond that
which can be justified from their own perspective, and if an agent can
therefore be epistemically lucky or unlucky in the desires that she starts
out with, then we may wonder how distinct such desires still are from
what we might attribute to the agent as her beliefs about what is true and
false. Instead, it seems rather that this view is going in the direction of the
idea of having “besires,” which is something that Smith has clearly not
wanted to defend. We may therefore wonder whether the motivationally
Humean type-iii dispositionalism is such a stable option. Can it still be
distinguished from motivationally anti-Humean dispositionalist accounts,
and even if it can, does it still account for the Distinctness Principle in
‘spirit,’ so to speak—does it harbor the intuition behind the Humean theory
of motivation? Of course, motivational Humeans may differ a bit amongst
each other about what that intuition really amounts to. This matter is
beyond the scope of this thesis, but as I have briefly speculated in section
3.4.2, my own view about this intuition may ultimately boil down to the
idea of the disinterestedness of truth, which does seem hard to reconcile
with the idea of there being a truth about the rationality of desire that
certain desires can be ineliminably unlucky about.
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6.3.3 Nonproceduralism Does Not Explain Intersubjectivity
I have introduced the distinction between relationalism and nonrelational-
ism in the context of the Intersubjectivity Principle (section 1.3.1). One of
the advantages of nonrelationalism, I claimed, was that it offers a straight-
forward account of intersubjectivity. However, in a sense, this only applies
insofar one subscribes to proceduralism as well. If one appeals to nonrela-
tionalism in order to explain the purpose of a moral discussion in terms of
reaching a conclusion that is valid for all through reasoning and argument,
then this purpose would be defeated if nonrelationalism merely holds
in virtue of the postulation of truths that are beyond the reach of such
methods when these truths are themselves disputed.
In a sense, what type-iii dispositionalism delivers is nonrelationalistic
objectivity in the absence of nonrelationalistic intersubjectivity. If humans
and Martians cannot overcome their difference, in principle, through meth-
ods of inquiry starting from their different initial perspectives, then what-
ever intersubjectivity there is between them is not explained by the facts
that make the views of only one of the species true. Against this, one might
hold that they are at least agreeing that what they are disagreeing about is
a nonrelationalist matter of fact, in the same way that the nominalist and
the realist agree that they disagree about facts considering real existence,
and that it is this agreement that explains the intersubjectivity.
However, I find this sort of intersubjectivity rather meager. If I were a
nonproceduralist nonrelationalist about my disagreement with the Mar-
tians, for example, there would no longer be a point in my trying to
convince them of their mistakes through reasoning and argument. By
analogy, if realists and nominalists about universals really believed their
dispute to be explained by a difference in ineliminable epistemic luck, it
would no longer make sense for them to try to eliminate this difference.
Of course, they would still be actual philosophers and not their ideal
selves, so their discussions might still serve the purpose for both sides to
perfect their respective theories. In similar fashion, a putative discussion
between the Martians and us might help us make our moral theories more
coherent before they finally kill us. Furthermore, in practice the Martians
do not exist, and even if we subscribe to type-iii dispositionalism we may
never know which actual disputes with real human beings are due to
ineliminable luck. In fact, we might even believe that all human beings
have started out with the lucky priors, while admitting that Martians
which started out with the wrong ones are at least conceptually possi-
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ble. In the end, it is really the problem about conceptual possibility that
nonproceduralism needs to address.
These arguments make sense, but they carry one implication that
may be unfavorable to type-iii dispositionalism: namely, that the type-i
dispositionalist can make use of the exact same explanations to account
for the Intersubjectivity Principle. If the type-iii dispositionalist can say
that the practice of moral discussion still makes sense, in the absence
of a proceduralistically reachable nonrelationalist truth, because it helps
both sides make their respective theories more coherent, then the type-i
dispositionalist can say the same thing. The only difference is that he
believes that the truth cannot be reached because there is no such truth,
rather than because of its unreachable nature, but this does not affect the
explanation of the usefulness of the discussion. And the same applies to
those discussions where in practice all parties may have sufficiently similar
prior attitudes to be able to reach, in principle, conclusions that will be
valid for all participants. After all, what matters for the explanation of
the intersubjectivity, in this case, is that they contingently happen to have
attitudes that are sufficiently similar to make commonly valid conclusions
reachable through proceduralistically understandable means. Whether
those attitudes are successfully aiming at further nonrelationalist facts
about what is a priori rational to desire, as the type-iii dispositionalist
believes, or whether they are just the attitudes they happened to be without
aiming at such nonrelationalist facts, as the type-i dispositionalist holds,
once again does not affect the explanation of intersubjectivity.
In fact, these are precisely the sort of explanations that I will develop
in further detail, later on in this thesis, to make my own type-i account
plausible in the light of the Intersubjectivity Principle.3 But regardless of
how successful these explanations will turn out to be, what we can conclude
for now is that the type-iii dispositionalist will be equally successful or
unsuccessful at explaining the principle as the type-i dispositionalist.
Against this conclusion, the type-iii dispositionalist may want to object
that his explanation does offer something extra: the common understand-
ing between any two agents discussing reasons for action that there is
some nonrelationalist fact about such reasons at stake in their discussion.
Meager or not, this does seem to be a feature that type-i dispositionalism
3I discuss the idea that we contingently share dispositions in section 10.2 and the idea
that we can improve our own theories by contrasting them with the views of others in the
absence of common ground in section 10.3.1.
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must lack. However, we should wonder whether this feature is really part
of the explanandum that all meta-ethical accounts must share. First of all,
in order to claim that this common understanding is part of the actual
moral discussions that we have involves ascribing nonrelationalism to lay
men as their implicit ‘folk meta-ethics,’ and I will argue later on that this
assumption is unjustified.4 Second of all, if the argument is not meant
to be about what people actually think and mean, but rather about what
they should think or mean in order to make sense of their discussion,
then it seems to me that the argument simply begs the question against
the very idea of relationalism. If people do not always actually believe
there is something nonrelationalist at stake in their moral discussion, then
the assumption that they should believe this is not something that the
relationalist has to account for. Rather, it is precisely the thing that the
nonrelationalist has to make plausible.
But what if type-i dispositionalism would be equally successful in ex-
plaining intersubjectivity? As long as the type-iii dispositionalist is able to
explain it too, and just as well, why does this pose a problem for type-iii
dispositionalism? The reason is that the ability of nonrelationalists to give
an account of intersubjectivity that is more straightforward than the one
that relationalists must cook up is, at least in my understanding of the
meta-ethical debate, one of the major selling points of nonrelationalism. We
have already seen that, where two theories can explain the same phenom-
ena, we should favour the one that is most economic about ineliminable
armchair luck. Because type-i dispositionalism does not postulate such
luck, losing his advantage over that view in explaining intersubjectivity
makes it that much more difficult for the type-iii dispositionalist to justify
his metaphysical expenses. So the argument about explaining intersubjec-
tivity is not so much an independent objection, but rather a consideration
that intensifies the economy problem.
6.3.4 Type-I Dispositionalism Isolates Nonproceduralistic Values
We can elaborate a bit further on the last argument in order to make it even
stronger. The comparison between type-iii and type-i dispositionalism
becomes especially important if we can work out a type-i theory that is
plausible on its own terms. In section 4.4 I have formulated two problems
for type-i dispositionalism. The second problem was the problem about
4See section 10.5.1.
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intersubjectivity, which as we have just seen does not seem to discriminate
between the two views. The first problem was the problem of coming up
with a plausible story about how to reject certain intrinsic desires in favour
of other intrinsic desires from the perspective of the subjective motivational
set as a whole. It may seem that this, at least, is a problem specific to type-i
dispositionalism, and that a failure to solve this problem would give us a
reason to opt for type-iii dispositionalism instead.
But actually, I do not think this follows at all. If realists are right about
the existence of universals, and nominalists are ineliminably unlucky about
it, then it follows that nominalists must at least be able to come up with a
pretty impressive theory about why universals do not exist, and how to
construe various other philosophical concepts and claims in the light of
that. In terms of proceduralistically distinguishable measures of success,
there would have to be an ultimate nominalist theory that performs just as
well as the true realist theory. For one thing, this impressively powerful
and wonderfully coherent nominalist theory must clearly outperform lesser
nominalist theories, and get a lot of things right that they get wrong, or
at least make a lot of things work that other theories fail to make work.
If this were not the case, then the nominalist project would remain stuck
at some point, whereas realism would continue to improve, eventually
persuading all philosophers to reject nominalism for proceduralistically
justifying reasons.
In other words, it turns out that the nonproceduralist, in order to
make sense of the idea of ineliminable luck, is committed to a somewhat
substantial notion of proceduralistic success. This also applies in the case
of ethics. To return to our favorite example, consider a bunch of Martian
invaders who have a rather poor ethical theory, conceptually speaking.
It is just a mess and incoherence is all over the place. But suppose that
this is not because they are not serious inquirers—rather, they just have
not been very good at it so far. Or perhaps ethics is just hard. In any
case, suppose that we manage to demonstrate some of their incoherent
conceptual commitments to them. Impressed with our arguments, they
cease their practices of torture, and start working to improve their theories
about their reasons for action. If nonproceduralism is true, and if their
prior intrinsic desires happened to be ineliminably unlucky where ours
have been lucky, then it might be that with a lot of conceptual effort, they
will reach a theory about what their normative reasons are that is now
immune against all our arguments, and nevertheless still tells them to
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torture and eliminate us. And so they do, and we still die.
The type-i dispositionalist will simply allow that agents which would
have normative reasons to torture us are conceptually possible. Whatever
story the type-i dispositionalist comes up with in order to solve the afore-
mentioned problem of discrediting some intrinsic desires at the behest of
others must be a story that explains how Martians can go from a poor
theory to a much better theory in the above example. Because the type-iii
dispositionalist also needs to be able to explain this, it may now seem that
the latter could in principle agree with the former on such a story, except
that the type-iii dispositionalist would not want to call the successful
theory of the Martians a correct theory about their normative reasons. In
order to be able to express their common ground, the type-i and type-iii
dispositionalist may now agree that the best theory the Martians could
arrive at proceduralistically on the basis of their intrinsic desires would
correctly describe their “p-reasons.” Furthermore, the type-i dispositional-
ist may agree to refer to the nonproceduralistically justifiable reasons that
the type-iii dispositionalist believes in as “np-reasons.” Then, the disagree-
ment between the two views may be reformulated as a disagreement about
whether p-reasons are normative reasons, and about whether np-reasons
exist.5
However, given the fact that there is room for p-reasons in the type-
iii theory—a need for them, even—the dispute between Martians and
humans, from the perspective of type-iii dispositionalism, would now
seem less analogous to the dispute over universals, and more to that over
mereological wholes, in the sense that it has become relatively isolated.
Humans and Martians may now agree with each other about what their
respective p-reasons are. In particular, we may have to agree that the
Martians do have a p-reason to torture and exterminate us. There is only
a residual disagreement about whether their reason to do so is also an
np-reason, but what is the import of that, if we already know that if they do
5This distinction between p-reasons and np-reasons bears a certain resemblance to our
earlier distinction between the r-practical and the nr-practical in section 4.3. Whereas that
distinction introduced a semantic pluralism regarding the difference between relationalism
and nonrelationalism, the distinction employed here introduces such a pluralism with respect
to the difference between proceduralism and nonproceduralism. Furthermore, since type-i
and type-iii dispositionalists agree that proceduralism cannot reach nonrelationalism, they
may also agree that the type-i dispositionalist’s r-practical judgments map onto p-reasons,
while nr-practical judgments presuppose np-reasons. By contrast, the type-ii dispositionalist
would hold that nr-practical judgments are made true by p-reasons, and agree with the type-i
dispositionalist that np-reasons do not exist.
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have an np-reason not to torture us, they are in principle precluded from
ever knowing that they do? Furthermore, the Martians will be perfectly
capable of understanding why we feel violated, and why this feeling is
internally justifiable from the perspective of our intrinsic desires in terms
of our p-reasons (or p-values). The only role left for the np-reasons dispute
is that it would allow us to say to ourselves: “they are not only wronging
us in the light of our human values, they are wrong conceptually!” Will that
help us maintain our posture in our final moments of anguish? I am not
so sure.
Metaphysically speaking, any truths about np-reasons may now seem
to have become just as disconnected from the real world, and from our
understanding both of Martian and human moral practices in terms of their
knowledge of their respective p-reasons, as the truth about the existence of
a mereological whole consisting of two cups on a table seems disconnected
from both the empirical facts about the cups and our linguistic options for
referring to them.
Summarizing, the problem is that just like the isolated situation of
the question concerning the existence of mereological wholes pushes us
towards a “metametaphysical” theory of ontological anti-realism about
an ontological fact of the matter in this matter, so the isolated situation
of the question concerning the existence of np-reasons seems to push us
towards the anti-realism concerning np-reasons defended by the type-i
dispositionalist.
6.3.5 Contemplating a World Without Value
This brings me to a feature of Michael Smith’s position that has puzzled
me a great deal. Smith has appreciated the skepticism from others about
the ability of his account to really explain the existence of nonrelationalist
value and normative reasons for action, and indeed already anticipated
such skepticism in The Moral Problem as something that may turn out to be
justified. Thus, even though he is usually “optimistic” about the prospects
for his brand of realism, he wants to take anti-realism very seriously as
an alternative to his account. However, what puzzles me is that he feels
that we should subscribe to error theory in such a case, and reject our entire
moral vocabulary, including our concepts of value and normative reasons
for action, as having been misguided:
In deciding whether or not our moral talk is legitimate, then, it
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seems to me that we have no alternative to admit that we are
venturing an opinion on something about which we can have
no cast-iron guarantee. (1994, p. 187)
If someone asks me why I believe that there are rational prin-
ciples that underwrite the fact that we would all desire the
happiness of our loved ones if we had a maximally informed
and coherent and unified desire set, then I find myself unable
to give a good answer. I am unable to give a good answer
because I cannot think of any convincing reasons to suppose
that there are rational principles capable of delivering anything
that we would all desire if we had a maximally informed and
coherent and unified desire set. And when I contemplate this
fact, I find my confidence that anything has value diminishes
by the second. (2006, p. 102)
What puzzles me about this, in particular, is why he would want to stick
to his nonrelationalist conceptual analysis, if it would turn out that this
analysis delivers no truths for our practical judgments to get right, given
that he might instead also switch to a relationalist analysis in order to
make sense of our moral practices in the light of the absence of any
nonrelationalist values in the fabric of the world or the realm of the a priori.
Now of course, Smith would not be the only error theorist in meta-ethics.
However, there are two aspects which make the error theory that Smith
seems open to rather different. The first is that it is defended in the light
of a failure to make sense of our moral vocabulary. A meta-ethical theory
such as the one defended by Mackie is best understood as being in some
sense revisionist about how we should understand our own usage of moral
language. In contrast, Smith’s contemplation of error theory is the result
of a stark conservative attitude towards his own conceptual analysis of the
linguistic practice of ethics.6
Secondly, whereas Mackie seemed quite happy about making the the-
oretical move that he proposed, Smith really considers the prospect of
error theory to be deeply disturbing. As I read Mackie’s book, there is
a sense of optimism in it, and the meta-ethical part breathes the sort of
light-heartedness typical of analytical philosophers when dealing with
6I return to the distinction between conceptual conservatism and revisionism in sections
10.5.2 and 10.5.3.
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meta-theoretical questions. Furthermore, the rest of the book is very con-
structive and positive about doing normative ethics. Now in general,
Michael Smith has a similar style in his metaphysical writings, except in
some of those passages where he discusses error theory. To him, it seems,
this is not a meta-ethical question about how to construe moral talk. No, it
is an existential question about whether we live in a bleak world without
value. The error theory he considers is a form of nihilism:
Similarly, the coherence of our evaluative concepts is a condition
of the importance of everything that we do. This means that if
our concepts are incoherent, then nothing we do is important
at all. That is why abandoning all evaluation has nothing
positive to recommend it. To be sure, if we were in a position
to know that our evaluative concepts are incoherent then we
would have to come up with something else that we want to do
independently of our beliefs about what’s important and what
it not. (2006, p. 102–103)
We might do something else entirely, but no longer something that would
deserve being referred to as “ethics” or “practical reason,” it seems, or that
could be constructed as a continuation or revision of what Smith currently
understands those terms to mean. If convergence fails, then our moral
vocabulary would be broken beyond repair.
But given our distinction between p-reasons and np-reasons, that just
doesn’t make sense. Even if we should become anti-realists about np-
reasons, then the type-iii dispositionalist may still agree with the type-i
dispositionalist that our moral practices provide us with knowledge about
our p-reasons, which would show that those practices were up to something
all along even in the absence of np-reasons.
In response, Smith might argue that it is only on the assumption
that np-reasons exist that the type-iii dispositionalist has to accommodate
something like p-reasons in order to explain the degree to which np-reasons
involve ineliminable luck. If it turns out that there are no np-reasons, then
it might be that we cannot remove the nonrelationalist presuppositions
from our moral language without crippling that language in such a way
as to make knowledge of p-reasons impossible as well. The very idea
of a p-reason might only make sense as that of a nonrelationalist np-
reason modulo ineliminable armchair luck. It may be that the concept of a
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relationalist p-reason cannot make sense of its own accord, let alone fulfill
the conceptual role of a normative reason for action.
However, without further argument in support of this idea, I see no
reason to accept it. Moreover, to some extent the proof will simply be
in the eating: if the type-i dispositionalist can come up with a plausible
and coherent theory that makes sense of our moral practices, then the
impossibility of nonrelationalist value will not threaten the possibility
of relationalist value. This is exactly how I mean to argue for type-i
dispositionalism in the rest of this thesis: by showing it to be plausible on
its own terms, given our background knowledge of the problems that the
alternative views are facing.
iii Practical Disconfirmation :
A New Perspective

7 The Affective Response View
In part ii I have discussed three reconciliatory solutions to the Facts Prob-
lem: type-i, -ii, and -iii dispositionalism. We have seen that each of these
views gave rise to its own set of further problems. Hence, the status quo
appears to be a kind of dialectical stalemate. It should be noted, though,
that my discussion of the problems for the latter two accounts has been
the most extensive. In chapters 5 and 6, I have not only identified their
problems, but also discussed various ways in which they might be dealt
with, only to conclude that none of these seemed satisfactory. By contrast,
in the much shorter chapter 4 I have mostly done constructive work, artic-
ulating the two central remaining problems for the type-i dispositionalist
in section 4.4 without yet going into much detail concerning their possible
solutions. This is because these problems are much more likely to receive
plausible solutions, in my view—solutions which I set out to develop in
the chapters to come.
However, as I have already explained in the introduction of chapter
4, even though the Facts Problem seems to represent the fundamental
nexus around which the various positions in the meta-ethical literature
are organized, in my own view we should shift our focus to the Disconfir-
mation Problem as the proper dialectical starting point of our discussion.
The first reason is that we have already seen how questions concerning
disconfirmation have played a crucial role at almost every juncture during
our investigations of how to construct a convincing dispositional account.
But there is a second reason, which is that I think I can provide an
account of practical disconfirmation that seems rather plausible on its own
right, without depending so much on metaphysical assumptions about
normative facts, truths about reasons, or the nature of moral properties.1
According to the “Affective Response View,” as I shall call it, we disconfirm
our practical judgments on the basis of affective experiences that we did not
1I have defended this account in “On the Disconfirmation of Practical Judgements” (2011).
The present chapter is an adaptation of that article.
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expect ourselves to have. This may be understood as an alternative to
the “Principles of Reason View,” the view that we disconfirm practical
judgments by showing that they violate a priori principles of reason, which
is not only implied by type-ii and type-iii dispositionalism, but also widely
held amongst moral philosophers more generally.
In section 7.1 I will argue that the Principles of Reason View is deeply
problematic, and that it is hard to see how the Disconfirmation Problem
can be solved on the basis of this view. Then, in section 7.2, I introduce the
Affective Response View. In section 7.3 I will argue that this view implies
relationalism, and more specifically, that if we accept the Principles from
chapter 1, it implies type-i dispositionalism. I continue to develop the view
in section 7.4 by articulating a concept of “volitional interpretation,” as I
call it, which will play a crucial role when we return to the Facts Question
in the next chapters in order to address the remaining issues that the type-i
dispositionalist must deal with. Finally, in section 7.5 I will argue how the
Affective Response View solves the Disconfirmation Problem.
7.1 Problems for the Principles of Reason View
As I explained in section 1.5.2, the Disconfirmation Problem is the problem
of answering the Disconfirmation Question in non-instrumental cases. If,
as the Distinctness Principle implies, motivation requires intrinsic desires
that are entirely non-cognitive attitudes, which are not subject to matters of
belief, then how could there be any X such that X would both disconfirm a
belief, as the Disconfirmation Principle requires, and diminish an intrinsic
desire of a self-governing agent, as the Authority Principle requires?
I have already noted that the Facts and Disconfirmation Problems are
really two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, it is not obvious from
the dispositional solution to the Facts Problem how we might solve the
Disconfirmation Problem as well. Dispositionalism makes a claim about
agents under ideal conditions of agency, conditions that are never actually
fulfilled, which gives the dispositionalist a lot of room for speculation
about what might be true under those conditions. However, in order to
provide a ‘reconciliatory’ solution to the Disconfirmation Problem (i.e., one
that accepts the Disconfirmation, Authority, and Distinctness Principles),
we must explain how the progress of our understanding of our normative
reasons for action could be connected to changes in our motivations as a
matter of actual fact.
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This challenge has implications for the answer to the Disconfirmation
Question that type-ii and type-iii dispositionalists are committed to: the
view that practical beliefs are disconfirmed by showing that they violate a
priori principles of reason. Let us now call this the “Principles of Reason
View.” We have already discussed this view at great length in chapter
5. However, in our earlier discussion we have focused on the question
whether disconfirmation on the basis of a priori principles would lead to a
convergence of all agents in their intrinsic desires as they approach their
ideal selves. Even on the assumption that we do disconfirm our practical
judgments on the basis of such principles and that under conditions of
sustained self-government such disconfirmation would change our intrinsic
desires, it turned out to be very difficult, if not impossible, to explain why
this would make the desires of different agents converge. In this chapter,
we shift our attention to that assumption itself: do we disconfirm our
practical beliefs in this way, and does that make our desires change?
To be sure, the two questions, whether principles of reason yield intrin-
sic desire convergence under ideal conditions, and whether they explain
intrinsic desire change in actual practice, are closely related. But whereas
the former question applies specifically to nonrelationalist dispositionalists,
the latter question applies more widely, to all moral philosophers who
think practical deliberation is essentially a matter of applying reasonable
principles to one’s attitudes. Furthermore, whereas a positive answer to
the first question is highly controversial in the literature—recall that even
the champion of this view, Michael Smith, has become somewhat skeptical
about its plausibility—, a positive answer to the latter question is fairly
common, I think, and often assumed implicitly.
In particular, note that type-i dispositionalists may also adopt the
Principles of Reason View. The resulting account would basically be
the relationalist counterpart to type-ii dispositionalism: on both views,
normative reasons for action are determined by applying a priori principles
of reason to the subjective motivational set of the agent insofar those
principles may be justified proceduralistically from the perspective of that
set. The only difference would be that according to the type-i proponent of
the Principles of Reason View, this would not yield convergence amongst
all conceptually possible agents.
Note also that a defender of such an account need not claim that this
is the only way in which the process of deliberation may change our
intrinsic desires. Because, as Williams argued, deliberation may also have a
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constitutive role, through the employment of the imagination, for example,
generating new or more specified intrinsic desires where there were none
or only non-specific desires before. But it is important to realize that such
developments of the subjective motivational set are not disconfirmatory. In
such cases, nothing is rejected from the initial set, and none of the agent’s
prior beliefs turned out false.
Many philosophers feel that such a view is too relativistic, however,
because it does not seem to allow us to settle any substantial moral disputes.
After all, if only internal incoherence is a reason for rejection, and the
standards of coherence are such that they do not guarantee convergence,
then it seems that on any substantial moral issue, both opponents can
rationally keep their views as long as they keep them coherently. This
is another reason why I prefer the label “relationalism” to “relativism.”
Because whereas this implication is associated with relativism, the type-i
dispositionalist can avoid it by rejecting the Principles of Reason View
and adopting the Affective Response View instead, as I will argue in
the chapters to come. For now, note that the Principles of Reason View
has already led us to an unattractive dilemma: if we combine it with
relationalism, then we get a view that is too relativistic, but if we combine
it with nonrelationalism, we run into the problems of convergence that we
discussed in chapters 5 and 6.
7.1.1 Disconfirmation in Actual Practice
We have already seen that the substance of principles of reason poses
dilemmas for both type-ii and type-iii dispositionalists. The dilemma for
the former is that the more substantial we make these principles, the less
likely they are to be justifiable in the procedural sense to all conceptually
possible agents, while the less substantial we make them, the less likely
they are to make all those agents converge upon ethically interesting
conclusions. The dilemma for the latter is similar, but based on the idea
that increased substance also increases the cost of postulating a priori
knowledge of that substance as a matter of ineliminable luck.
To these we may now add a third dilemma, which all proponents of the
Principles of Reason View must face: while less substantial principles are
less likely to yield ethically significant disconfirmations, more substantial
principles are less likely to explain changes in the agent’s intrinsic desires in
terms of the agent’s insight into conceptual necessity. Of course, each dilemma
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exploits the same basic conceptual tension, but I think it is helpful to
approach the problem from all these different perspectives in order to
appreciate the vulnerability of the delicate idea that there would be some
intermediate level of substantiality that is substantial enough to be ethically
significant while at the same time remaining ‘formal’ enough to qualify as
a priori.
Now in the case of less substantial principles of reason, it should be
clear why the application of such a principle may change our intrinsic
desires under conditions of sustained self-government. When I have two
goals and I suddenly would realize that they contradict each other, for
example, this may certainly alter my motivations, and it seems reasonable
to say that I have in such a case applied my understanding of a conceptual
requirement. But what about the principle of universalization? Consider
Mackie’s general formulation of the principle as the requirement that
anyone who judges in approval or disapproval of some action “is thereby
committed to taking the same view about any other relevantly similar
action” (1977, p. 83). Different interpretations of the phrase “relevantly
similar” then lead to different universalizability principles. Thus, in the
case of the ex-racist bus driver, it might be argued that allowing a white
person to occupy a certain seat would be relevantly similar to allowing a
black person to occupy that seat.
Considerations of universalizability play an important role in our think-
ing about poverty and distributive justice, about racism, gender equality,
and gay rights, and about the treatment of animals of different kinds
(which display similarities and dissimilarities to us in different respects).
When the bus driver disconfirmed his prior judgments, this may have in-
volved the making of the new judgment that allowing white passengers to
sit on certain seats and allowing black passengers to sit on those seats were
relevantly similar. In that sense, the bus driver may have disconfirmed his
segregationist judgments on grounds of universalizability. But from this
we might simply conclude that honoring this level of relevant similarity
is among his substantial ends, and that he has disconfirmed his prior
judgments by discovering the implications of this end, or perhaps even the
very end itself, if we can come up with an account of disconfirmation that
would explain the discovery of ends.
It is quite something else, however, to suppose that it is an a priori
truth that differences in skin color are irrelevant in this context, and to
claim that it was the discovery of this truth that led our bus driver to the
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disconfirmation of his prior practical beliefs. From the common sense
understanding of universality in terms of relevant similarity as a principle
used in deliberation, it does not follow that this principle is conceptually
necessary and that our understanding of it is a priori. On the contrary,
it sounds rather implausible to me to say that racial discrimination and
segregation are matters of poor conceptual intuition or insufficient logical
skills.
7.1.2 The Disconfirmation Problem Remains Unsolved
Let us once more consider the parsimony principle that Smith has sug-
gested and that we discussed in sections 5.4.1 and 6.2:
Reason requires that . . . (If someone has an intrinsic desire that
p, and an intrinsic desire that q, and an intrinsic desire that r,
and if the objects of the desires that p and q and r cannot be
distinguished from each other and from the object of the desire
that s without making an arbitrary distinction, then she has an
intrinsic desire that s).
Suppose that a self-governing agent A desires that p, q, and r, but not that
s. Suppose furthermore that we could give an interpretation of “arbitrary
distinction” that would make the principle a priori, and that A would
discover that the difference between desiring that p, q, and r, on the one
hand, and desiring that s, on the other, is arbitrary under that interpretation.
If dispositionalism is true, then this means that A has a normative reason
to bring it about that s. Therefore, dispositionalism removes the mystery
about why normative reasons and motivations go hand in hand under the
ideal conditions. But that does not explain why in the actual world, A would
acquire an intrinsic desire that s. In the actual world, intrinsic desires
do not just spontaneously burst into existence. Therefore, the defender
of the Principles of Reason View still has to explain how reflection on a
principle of reason would create a desire that s in the mind of A without
presupposing that, contingently, A already happened to desire that his
desires wouldn’t be arbitrary in the relevant sense.
Once again, it seems that an intuitive difference between more and less
substantial interpretations of the relevant principle are relevant here. As
we have seen in sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.1, the concept of self-government
will give us certain non-instrumental revisions ‘for free,’ so to speak. When
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I am making plans which require me to revise some of my earlier plans, I
might decide to shift some task from a Monday to a Tuesday in a manner
that would perhaps reflect the fact that I am not Tuesday indifferent, for
example, and we get this sort of revisions for free even if it would turn out
that we cannot derive them from strictly means-end requirements.
Now, the point is that the concept of self-government makes sense of
the idea that intrinsic desires would be updated accordingly, in such a
case, independent from our commitment to the Authority Principle. Our
understanding of the idea of self-government explains how the Authority
Principle can be true in such cases. But our understanding of the concept
of self-government does not, prima facie, explain how an intrinsic desire to
treat white people as superior to black people could be diminished upon
a priori reflection. Instead, it is part of the burden of defending the view
that racism is an a priori violation to make it plausible that it is rational
reflection under conditions of sustained self-government that has really
changed intrinsic desires and thereby reduced racist behavior.
I am not sure that this burden of proof for the Principles of Reason
View is often recognized or fully appreciated. Smith’s notion of systematic
justification, which we discussed in section 5.3, is in his words “the most
important way in which we create new and destroy old underived desires”
(1994, pp. 158-159). In his subsequent discussion of this idea, he talks
freely about how agents may “add” an underived desire to their existing
desires. It seems to me that with all this talk of “creating” or “adding”
underived desires on rational grounds, Smith may be stretching the limits of
the Humean theory of motivation too far.
It may be less obvious why this would be a problem in the case of
type-iii dispositionalism. As we have seen, this view is not committed
to the idea that deliberation has to be proceduralistic, and may therefore
allow that some rationally required desire revisions cannot and need not
be explained in actual practice, because they will never actually happen.
However, even though this sort of response might take care of the Martians,
it does not explain our example of the ex-racist bus driver. Practical
disconfirmation really does happen, even in morally substantial cases, and
insofar it does, no ineliminable luck had apparently been involved.
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7.1.3 Personal Choices Are Not Disconfirmed By Principles
Many of the decisions that we make about our personal lives concern
options that would be equally permissible from any “principled” point
of view, but that nevertheless may not be trivial to us. If we change our
minds about such matters, then we may want to speak of disconfirmation.
It is an unfortunate fact, for example, that many couples break up their re-
lationships shortly after they made decisions towards further commitment.
People come to realize that it’s not going to work just after they bought the
new house, or went on their honeymoon, or had gotten pregnant.
If a woman spends seven years of her life with a man, and after much
deliberation decides to marry him and to sell her apartment in order to
move in with him, then it seems plausible to say that she got it wrong if after
three months she decides to go looking for her own apartment again. It
would be odd to argue that at the time of her initial decision it was actually
best for her to agree to the marriage, but that as a matter of unlikely
and unpredictable misfortune, her preferences concerning husbands and
housing, which had been stable for the past seven years, suddenly changed
shortly after she made her decision. Nevertheless, it also seems implausible
to insist that she must have violated some principle of reason in her
deliberations when she was thinking about marriage and living together.
What would be the conceptual mistake in such a decision? Principles of
reason may constrain our thinking, but they cannot dictate the choices that
we should make in our personal lives. Therefore, the Principles of Reason
View cannot explain how these kind of judgments can get it wrong.
To be fair, it may be that even though the Principles of Reason View
fails to handle these cases, this may be accounted for by nonrelationalist
dispositionalists if they would subscribe to a ‘mixed’ or ‘hybrid’ account of
practical disconfirmation, according to which moral disconfirmations are
based on reasonable principles, while disconfirmations in other practical
matters are disconfirmed in some other way. As we have seen in sections
1.3.2 and 5.1.2, the distinction between relationalism and nonrelationalism
does not apply in matters of taste. However, this does mean that we do
need to look for a new account of disconfirmation in order to handle
the cognitivism of personal choice and preference, so to speak. Further-
more, once we would have such an account, we may wonder whether it
would not outperform the Principles of Reason View in explaining moral
disconfirmations as well.
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7.2 The Affective Response View
According to the view that I want to propose, our practical beliefs can be
disconfirmed by our own affective responses to our self-governed actions, or
to the intended consequences of those actions, insofar as we did not expect
ourselves to experience those responses. If a thief judges that he has a good
reason to steal from someone, and does not expect himself to feel very
guilty about it, then he may come to doubt his initial judgment if after the
theft he gets overwhelmed by feelings of guilt. On my proposal, this is
because such feelings have the power to disconfirm practical beliefs. I call
this the “Affective Response View.”
First, let me explicate the notion of an “affective response.” By this I
mean any affective attitude, experience or sensation that can be understood
as a response to an event that preceded it. This might be any sort of event,
but our discussion concerns affective responses to actions or the conse-
quences of actions. Whether an affective experience should be understood
as a response to a certain event may be a subject of interpretation. If the
affective experience is an intentional attitude of remorse about having
murdered someone then the experience is clearly a response to the murder,
but if the affective experience is a general feeling of joy without any specific
content, then it may not be clear whether or not this is a response to a
certain previous act or event. I will say more about the interpretation of
responses in section 7.4 below.
Since affective responses are backward-looking attitudes, as it were,
they may be thought of as a kind of counterparts to desires, which are
typically forward-looking. The feeling of satisfaction as a result of an action
is such a counterpart to the feeling of desire that motivated the action.
However, sometimes forward-looking desires may also be understood
as affective responses themselves. For example, suppose one decides to
become a vegetarian. If, subsequently, one’s desire for meat increases, this
may be interpreted as a response to the (consequences of the) decision.
Furthermore, every affective response to an event may be understood
as a desire in a very loose sense—as the desire that P, where P is the
proposition that the event occurred (in the case of a positive response)
or the proposition that the event did not occur (in the case of a negative
response). Finally, every affective response contributes to the resultant desire
of the agent at the time of the response in the sense defined in section
1.4. For example, suppose that I have eaten seven slices of pizza and I am
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wondering whether or not to eat the eighth slice. My affective attitudes
might be mixed. On the one hand, I desire to eat it because I want to taste
some more. On the other hand, the way my stomach feels tells me that I
have already eaten too much. This affective response may outweigh the
desire to eat the last slice and make a decisive contribution to my resultant
desire not to finish the pizza. Hence, affective responses can be efficacious
motivational states.
Let us now turn to the role that affective responses play in practical
disconfirmation. Common examples of affective responses that sometimes
make us rethink our prior judgments are feelings of regret, remorse, guilt,
shame, embarrassment, jealousy and boredom. Nevertheless, disconfir-
mation is not intrinsic to these responses. Rather, whether an affective
response disconfirms a prior judgment depends on how that response
is related to other affective states. The general idea behind the Affective
Response View is that self-governing agents will expect a kind of “match”
between the affective states that motivate their actions on the one hand,
and their overall affective responses to the consequences of those actions
on the other hand. If John desires to see Rome, and judges that he should
spend his money on a holiday to Italy’s remarkable capital, then he will
expect his visit to Rome to be a pleasurable and rewarding experience. If
the holiday would fail to meet these expectations, then John might start to
think that his money would have been better spent differently.
However, we will rarely expect our responses to completely match the
desires that we decided to act upon. If Carol deliberates about whether or
not to quit her job and accept another one, then she will probably both
have desires in favour of quitting and desires in favour of staying. Should
she decide to make the change, then in the light of her multitude of desires,
she may expect both positive and negative responses. In the short term,
she might even expect the negative responses to be stronger because of the
stress and the various difficulties of adjustment. Nevertheless, it seems
plausible that if she decides to quit, her expectation will be for her overall
response to be more positive in the long run than if she would have stayed.
Should her actual responses, after a while, give her reason to believe that
she would have been happier if she had kept her old job, then her responses
may disconfirm her prior judgment.
This does not mean that the Affective Response View commits us to a
hedonistic egoism about maximizing one’s own happiness—at least not
under any shallow interpretation of the terms “hedonism,” “egoism” or
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“happiness.” Suppose that Jack is in a hurry, and decides not to help
an injured person on the street. If Jack would feel ashamed of himself
afterwards, and if he were to conclude that he should have helped the
injured person, then a defender of the Affective Response View might
argue that the feeling of shame disconfirmed Jack’s prior practical belief
and made him adopt the practical belief that he had a normative reason
to help the injured person. But that does not mean that Jack merely had
a normative reason to do so in order to prevent himself from feeling bad
about himself, which would have been a purely instrumental consideration.
Rather, it means that his feeling of shame informed him of the fact that
helping the injured person was more important to him than he initially
thought.
7.3 Relationalism and the Normative Will
Although the Affective Responsive View does not commit us to shallow
egoism or hedonism, it does imply relationalism. The practical beliefs
of agent A about what she has normative reason to do are subject to
disconfirmation by her affective responses, which may tell her something
about what is important to her. Nonrelationalist dispositionalists might
want to object that affective responses could be intuitions about substantial
a priori principles of reason, which would carry us back to the Principles
of Reason View. But it is not clear how this suggestion would make
the problems for the Principles of Reason View any easier. Our affective
responses are a result of contingent psychological mechanisms, and without
a proper explanation of why their content would involve a priori truths
about reasons for action, we have no reason to think that they constitute
anything other than a matter of empirical fact.
Moreover, even though the experience of an unexpected affective re-
sponse must be understood within the context of deliberative activity on
the part of the agent, as I will argue in the next section, the deliberative
modus operandi is nevertheless hardly that of the formal application of
conceptually necessary principles to prior ends in order to revise those
ends. Perhaps the nonrelationalist could simply accept this, and opt for an
account of moral perception. But what is unexpected about the affective
response is precisely the affective, non-cognitive part of the response. If
we accept the Distinctness Principle, then what is perceived is the fact that
the agent turns out to have that particular non-cognitive attitude under
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these circumstances, but this attitude is not itself a percept of some further
substantial fact or principle existing independently of the agent. Prima facie
then, for any agent A, the content of A’s affective responses seem to give
empirical information about A, rather than a priori information about all
conceptually possible agents.
Thus, suppose that Sharon is a vegetarian. She becomes friends with
Marc and David, who are both used to eating meat and never felt bad about
it. However, once Marc gets to know Sharon better, and starts to consider
things from her perspective, he discovers that he begins to experience
negative feelings about eating meat. He starts to feel guilty about the idea
that animals were killed in order for him to enjoy a particular eating habit,
even though that habit is not necessary in order for him to live a healthy
life. On the basis of these feelings, Marc starts to disapprove of the killing
of animals by humans for food, thereby disconfirming his prior belief that
it was okay to do so. Should it be the case, in virtue of empirical facts
about Marc, that this is also how Marc would feel under ideal conditions of
rational agency, then it does not follow that any conceptually possible agent
would have to feel the same under those conditions. Thus, suppose that
David does not develop negative feelings about killing animals for food at
all, not even after extensive discussion with Marc and Sharon. Under ideal
conditions of rational agency, David may still have a resultant desire to eat
meat, even though Marc and Sharon may have the resultant desire under
those conditions that nobody would eat meat.
However, it may well be an empirical fact about human psychology
in general that there are certain actions that all of us do have normative
reason to disapprove of. For example, it may well be an empirical fact that
every human being would under ideal conditions of rational agency have
the resultant desire that no sentient being ever be tortured. Therefore, the
Affective Response View does not prevent us from arguing, say, that the
Nazis got their practical judgments wrong. Psychologically, the Nazis had
so much in common with us that it seems plausible that under different
circumstances, they would have had the same feelings of horror about
the Holocaust that we do. We may ascribe the fact that they did not
actually feel this way to a type of upbringing and training that, effectively,
removed them further away from the ideal conditions of rational agency,
and thereby made it impossible for them to fully understand their own
affective dispositions. In other words: every SS officer who believed that
he had a normative reason to torture and murder his victims may have
Relationalism and the Normative Will 195
gotten himself wrong.2
What the Affective Response View does rule out is that every conceptu-
ally possible agent would get it wrong when judging in approval of torture
and genocide. If, as a matter of empirical fact, the Martian invaders would
have no disposition whatsoever to sympathize with us, then it will be
impossible, on the Affective Response View, to disconfirm their practical
beliefs. What this means is that if the Nazis got their practical judgments
wrong, they got it wrong precisely because they were not alien monsters:
they got it wrong as human beings.
Allow me to introduce some additional terminology at this point. Ac-
cording to the type of relationalism that we have been discussing, every
agent has his own source of normative reasons for action, which consists
in certain empirical facts about his psychology. Let us call this source the
“normative will”: let us say that A wants to φ under circumstances C in
the “normative sense,” or that φ-ing under C is “part of the normative will”
of A, if and only if under the ideal conditions of rational, self-governing
agency, A would desire in the resultant sense that under the circumstances
C, he would φ. One may think of the normative will as a complex of the
agent’s deepest attitudes of caring and love, which establish what is most
important to him. In this respect, the proposal bears similarities to recent
work by Harry Frankfurt (2004; 2006), which I will explore in the next
chapter. For now, however, note that these attitudes may be phenomeno-
logically opaque. The normative mode of wanting is a mode of wanting that
we may ourselves be ignorant of: at the time, Jack did not know that he
wanted, in the normative sense, to help the injured person, and SS officers
did not know that in the normative sense, they did not want to torture and
kill their victims.
Thus, the view that we have now arrived at is a form of type-i disposi-
tionalism: normative reasons for action are constituted by our desires under
ideal conditions, and what our desires would be under such conditions is
‘strongly dependent’ (see section 5.1.2) on contingent empirical facts about
our actual selves. However, note also that the view is clearly different from
the combination of type-i dispositionalism with the Principles of Reason
View. On that account, the facts about normative reasons were merely
2The idea that his training prevented the SS officer from understanding his ideal self
raises the question of whether it would have been possible to make that training undone. If
not, then we may wonder what sort of counterfactual life histories we should consider in
order to construe his ideal self. At what point would it become the ideal self of a different
person? I return to this matter in section 9.1.4.
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facts about what the coherent version of one’s actual views would look
like. Instead, on the type-i account that I am proposing, the facts about our
normative reasons include contingent facts about ourselves that are not
directly accessible through introspection, but require our interaction with
the outside world in order for us to discover them. Thus, by interacting
with the outside world, we not only learn empirical information about the
world that may be relevant to our instrumental deliberations, but we also
learn empirical information about ourselves that allows us to deliberate on
our ends.
7.4 Volitional Interpretation
I have claimed that a self-governing agent will expect the intended con-
sequences of her actions to generate the most positive overall affective
response, in the long run, compared to the alternatives that she might
have chosen. The underlying intuition is that in the long run, our overall
responses to our actions tell us something about what we want in the
normative sense: that they will approach the resultant desires of our ideal
selves, so to speak. However, the notions of “overall response” and “in
the long run” are of course totally vague and abstract. In practice, our
responses change from moment to moment and from situation to situation,
and it is often hard to determine which of our affective experiences are
responses to which consequences of our actions. Therefore, whether an
affective experience disconfirms a practical belief is always a matter of
interpretation: we must judge what the experience means to us.
Suppose, for example, that a student feels an unexpected embarrass-
ment after having asked a question during a course meeting (perhaps it
turned out that it was not a very intelligent question). Does that mean
that he shouldn’t have asked it? Perhaps it does, but perhaps it doesn’t.
The student might also conclude that this merely reveals that his questions
can be as unintelligent as those of anybody else, and that perhaps he may
be more easily embarrassed about this than he thought he would be. But
since he won’t get any smarter by not asking such questions, he might
reason for himself, it was still a good idea to ask the question anyway. In
other words: the negative response of embarrassment about his action does
not intrinsically have higher normative authority than the positive affect of
curiosity that initially motivated the action.
In fact, the judgment that an agent must make in order to determine
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whether a response disconfirms an action is of exactly the same kind as
the judgment that he had to make before the action in order to determine
whether he wanted to act upon the desire that motivated the action: it is
just another practical judgment, a judgment about whether the affective
experience is an expression of his normative will. Our concern to get
our practical judgments right brings with it a concern to know whether
our affective responses are appropriate or not. The point of the Affective
Response View, however, is that it is only on the basis of other affective
responses that an agent could be justified in judging that his current
affective response is inappropriate.3
Let me illustrate. Suppose that the student does conclude that he
shouldn’t have asked the question. The next time that his curiosity arises,
he remembers the unpleasant embarrassment, which is itself an unpleas-
ant experience that counteracts his motivation to ask another question.
Suppose that he decides not to ask the question this time, and that he is
self-governing—i.e., the unpleasantness of his memory of the previous
time is stronger than his desire to ask another question. By not asking
the question, he might save himself another embarrassment, but when
the course is finished, his curiosity is unsatisfied, which makes him feel
frustrated. Perhaps, again, more than he would have expected. And again,
this is an experience that requires interpretation. What does it mean?
Perhaps it means that he should visit the Wikipedia and try to find the
answer to his question for himself. But it might also mean that he does not
want his fear of embarrassment to prevent himself from asking what he
really wants to know, and that he should have asked the question after all.
In that case, the judgment that the embarrassment was a disconfirmation
would itself be disconfirmed, and the initial judgment which led him to
ask the first question would be confirmed. This shows that deliberation
3Some people might also believe that most of their affective responses are inappropriate,
that their overall affective response is inappropriate, or perhaps even that their overall response
would still be inappropriate under ideal conditions of rational agency. An unmarried man
might have an overall affective response in support of his promiscuous life, for example, and
still believe that he should not be living such a life, because his religion teaches that sex is
only allowed within marriage. Such an agent would have to reject the Affective Response
View, but that does not mean the Affective Response View is false. Instead, it means that
if the Affective Response View is true, then given that his overall response is in favour of
his lifestyle, his practical judgment must be evaluated in terms of a pluralistic semantics
that explains its falsehood in terms of a misunderstanding on the agent’s part about what it
means to make a practical judgment. I have briefly discussed this idea in section 4.3, and will
return to it at the end of this thesis in section 10.5.3.
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is an ongoing process of what I shall call “volitional interpretation”: the
interpretation of our affective experiences in order to determine which of
them express our normative will.
Let me now make a number of brief additional remarks about the
notion of volitional interpretation, in order to give a better overall idea
of what I am driving at. I will elaborate on each of these remarks in the
chapters to come.
7.4.1 The Normative Will as an Explanatory Pattern
First of all, note that we are now dealing with two directions of explana-
tion. The moral philosopher who wants to answer the Facts Question is
interested in knowing whether we can explain the existence of normative
reasons for action in terms of facts about the affective attitudes of agents.
But the idea of volitional interpretation is that as deliberating agents, we
often reason in the opposite direction: we want to know whether a certain
reason for action would explain the affective attitudes we are experiencing.
If I have a normative reason to φ, after all, then insofar I am rational, well-
informed and in control of my own agency, I should expect to find a certain
pattern in my actual experiences in support of φ. Thus, the hypothesis that
I have such a reason may be explanatory relevant, in a structural sense, to
my actual motivation to φ. Metaphysically, then, the nature of normative
reasons for action will be something like patterns or structures of affective
dispositions.
7.4.2 Volitional Interpretation as a Social Practice
A second point that I want to highlight is that the analysis of delibera-
tion as volitional interpretation allows us to understand deliberation as
a social practice, even though the core of the analysis is individualistic.
For one thing, different people often display similar responses in similar
situations as a result of underlying psychological structures that we all
have in common due to our shared environment and biological ancestry.
Therefore, we can learn from each other’s mistakes, and we can search
for “human values”—things that all human beings would want under
the ideal conditions of rational agency as a result of the empirical facts
about human psychology. This allows us to argue that the Nazis got their
practical judgments wrong, for example, as I have outlined in the previous
section. Furthermore, once you come to believe that you have even more
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in common with a specific group of people, or with a particular person,
then it becomes even more plausible to expect similar responses in the
situations which pertain to those commonalities. I will develop this idea
later on in the thesis, when we return to the problem of squaring type-i
dispositionalism with the Intersubjectivity Principle.
Note that we may also improve our interpretation of what we really
want on the basis of discussion with those who want something different.
Such discussion often forces us to articulate more precisely the reasons
that we have for our practical beliefs, which may lead us to revise those
beliefs in subtle ways and to make them more sophisticated and precise.
Furthermore, there may be cases where someone close to me understands
what I really want before I understand it myself, even though it need not
be something that she really wants.
In fact, we often do not take alternatives seriously until they are being
demonstrated or suggested to us by certain individuals, groups, or media.
In the absence of any social pressure to change their views, people generally
stick with their initial gut feelings, and self-confirmation bias is everywhere
in our psychology (Haidt, 2001). That is why we rarely disconfirm our
beliefs about what we care about most. The problem is not just that we
protect our self-image by ignoring evidence, or by giving heavily biased
interpretations of unexpected affective responses. The problem is also
that we rarely experience unexpected responses concerning our most
cherished practical beliefs in the first place, because our responses do not
arise independently of those beliefs.4 Thus, it is possible that an agent
experiences no affective responses against φ-ing, and that there is no doubt
in his mind that he has a normative reason to φ (“he knows what he
wants”), while his normative will is actually opposed to φ-ing, in virtue of
the fact that he would eventually experience massively adverse responses
with regard to φ-ing, once he would start taking the possible reasons not
to φ more seriously.
Therefore, volitional interpretation may benefit from attempts to break
out of dogmatic self-assumptions, and social influence can be a way of
making people consider new alternatives. Of course, in reality, social prac-
tice often only makes things worse, because people will prevent each other
4An analogy may be drawn with issues concerning the theory-ladenness of observation
in the philosophy of science. This analogy between science and ethics is pursued, to some
extent, in Churchland (1995, ch. 6, esp. p. 146–147). See also his (1989, pp. 188–196) on the
theory-ladenness of observation in general.
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from starting to doubt the views that constitute the identity of their group.
Nevertheless, many of our most fundamental changes in our practical
beliefs have occurred in the context of social developments. The case of
the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the rise of the civil rights movement
would be an example of such a development. Thus, we might argue that
as a result of this development, people like our fictitious bus driver did not
just start taking a different point of view seriously, but they also started
experiencing different affective responses to established practices, includ-
ing their own actions, which eventually led to the disconfirmation of their
segregationist practical beliefs.
7.4.3 The Hypothetical Nature of Volitional Interpretation
A related point about volitional interpretation is that it never reaches final
results. Practical beliefs, on this view, are always hypothetical: they are
forever subject to revision in the light of new experience. This does not
rule out that an agent may have good reason to be “fully resolved” in some
of his practical judgments, as Frankfurt has put it, in the sense that the
agent may have the “belief that no further accurate inquiry would require
him to change his mind” (1987/1988d, p. 169). Sometimes we do know
what we want. For example, nowadays we may well believe that no inquiry
will ever disconfirm our practical belief that people should be treated
equally regardless of the color of their skin or their sexual orientation,
say. Nevertheless, in the light of the theory of volitional interpretation, it
would probably be wise for most of us to keep an open mind and to take
alternatives to most of our present practical beliefs seriously. Furthermore,
the hypothetical nature of volitional interpretation does rule out Frankfurt’s
notion that any particular affective experience could reveal a “volitional
necessity,” a directly experienced constraint, imposed by the normative
will of a person, on what he can and cannot bring himself to do (2004,
pp. 46–49; 2006, pp. 33–34). Instead, on my account, if we cannot bring
ourselves to do what we had judged that we should do, then it is always a
matter of interpretation whether we are experiencing disconfirmation or
merely an impairment in our self-government. I will develop this criticism
in further detail in the next chapter.5.
5See section 8.3.1
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7.4.4 Interpretative Strategies and Normative Ethics
Another point to note about the concept of volitional interpretation is that
it is compatible with different methods and approaches to deliberation,
and that it also allows us to combine those approaches. Thus, it might be
that in certain areas of ethics and political theory, it will be very useful
to try to formulate individual or shared practical beliefs using principles,
such as principles of universalizability. Note that in order to make sense of
these principles, we can make our interpretations of notions like “relevant
similarity” or “arbitrary difference” as substantial as we want, without
having to worry about keeping them formal enough in the way that
nonrelationalist dispositionalists have to do so. Note also that we might
want to adopt certain principles but admit that we want to allow certain
exceptions to them. On other moral issues, however, we might have better
luck if we try to describe values, or if we reflect on how we might embody
certain virtues. Perhaps that in certain domains of our personal lives, it
would help if we took a narrative approach, by trying to articulate what
kind of story we would want to tell about ourselves. From the point of
view of will interpretation, these are merely different interpretative strategies,
and every strategy is valid as long as it yields disconfirmable expectations
about our future affective responses.
7.5 The Disconfirmation Problem Solved
Let us now return to the Disconfirmation Problem. According to the Af-
fective Response View, our practical beliefs may be disconfirmed by unex-
pected affective responses. So why should that result in a non-instrumental
change in our motivations? The answer is that the unexpected affective
responses are the changes in our motivations. After all, affective responses
are themselves motivational experiences, which influence our future be-
havior. If they come unexpected, then it is likely that we were not used to
having them, which may signify a change, and alter the balance of affective
attitudes in such a way as to lead to a new resultant desire. If we judge
that they nonetheless express what we really want, then the motivational
change and the belief change may correspond to each other in such a way
that we maintain the same level of self-government.
Recall the example of the student who got embarrassed after having
asked the unintelligent question. Suppose that the student judged that
he should not have asked the question, and decides that he won’t ask
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such a question again. Then the embarrassment, through his unpleasant
memory thereof, will have changed his motivational disposition, and—if
it is stronger than the curiosity—will prevent him from asking another
question.
Note that this solution is very much in the spirit of the dispositional
solution to the Facts Problem as I introduced it in section 4.1. We remove
the mystery about why the disconfirmation would imply a motivational
change, under conditions of sustained self-government, by claiming that
under those conditions, the disconfirmation simply is the motivational
change.
8 A Normative Reality Within
Ourselves
The argument in the previous chapter lead me to the notion of a normative
will, which I briefly characterized as a complex of the agent’s deepest
attitudes of caring and love, which establish what is most important to him.
The idea that caring and love are constitutive of practical normativity has
been defended by Harry Frankfurt in some of his recent work (2004; 2006).
Frankfurt rejects what he calls “normative realism,” the view that some
things are inherently important regardless of whether we care about them
(2006, p. 33), which I have called nonrelationalist realism in section 1.3.2,
and of which type-ii and type-iii dispositionalism are varieties. In contrast,
Frankfurt proposes to understand mistaken practical judgments in terms
of mistakes about what we actually care about: that there are contingent
empirical facts about our own attitudes that our practical judgments get
right or wrong. Thus, there is a normative reality, but this reality is “within
ourselves,” as he puts it:
In matters concerning practical normativity, the demanding
objective reality that requires us to keep an eye out for possible
correction of our views is a reality that is within ourselves (2006,
p. 34).
Let us call this the “Inner Reality Thesis.” It is a version of relationalist
cognitivism, and as we shall see in this chapter and the next, my brand of
type-i dispositionalism is a version of the Inner Reality Thesis. Frankfurt’s
version of the thesis is different, however. In this chapter I will raise a
number of problems for his account and sketch how my own proposal can
solve them. I develop my own account in further detail in the next chapter.
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8.1 Inner Reality Theories
In section 7.3 I have argued that the Affective Response View commits me
to a version of type-i dispositionalism, according to which every practical
reasoner has a normative will, which is constituted by empirical facts about
his actual self. I have not said much about the nature of these facts so
far, but I did note an important difference in comparison to the version
of type-i dispositionalism that one might defend in combination with the
Principles of Reason View. According to the latter, ‘principle driven’ type-i
dispositionalism, the facts about our normative reasons would simply be
facts about what we get when we apply certain principles to our actual
motivations. As we have seen, this is just type-ii dispositionalism minus
the convergence, so to speak. But without convergence, such a view seems
too subjectivist or relativist: whatever motivations you happen to have
provide you with normative reasons as long as you have them coherently,
and the standards of coherence are too weak to settle moral disputes.
By contrast, the ‘response driven’ type-i dispositionalism that I am
proposing assumes that there are facts about opaque attitudes that we
may not be actually experiencing yet, or be motivated by so far, but that
may reveal themselves on future occasions, so to speak, through our
unexpected responses to the consequences of our own actions. These facts
belong to our contingent psychological make-up, and so they can only
satisfy relationalist truth-conditions: the Martian invaders will not share
them. Nevertheless, because the attitudes in question are opaque, making
judgments about them is not so subjective any more: our responses may be
unexpected in ways that we could not have derived by a priori means from
the prior attitudes that we were aware of so far. Instead, these responses
may constitute truly empirical discoveries about ourselves.
Furthermore, because the opaque attitudes may be shared among
agents whose experienced attitudes are more opposed, the account is not
so relativistic any more either: if A and B make conflicting, yet internally
coherent, sets of judgments on the basis of the attitudes that they are
subjectively aware of, it may turn out that their opaque attitudes are
nevertheless shared in such a way that A may disconfirm his judgment and
come to agree with B. Thus, even if conflicts between Martian and Earthling
cannot be resolved through deliberation, conflicts between different human
beings might.
The idea that a relationalist may appeal to such empirical, ‘inner’ facts
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in order to account for practical disconfirmation is precisely what the Inner
Reality Thesis claims. Thus, it seems to me that Frankfurt is looking for the
same middle-ground between realism and relativism that I am aiming to
achieve, even though he does not argue for it on the basis of a commitment
to a dispositional theory of value. Nevertheless, his defense for the thesis
is driven by concerns that are similar to the intuitions behind my own
line of argument. In particular, Frankfurt argues that the substance of our
reasons can never be derived from pure rationality alone, and that a more
substantial source of normativity cannot be external to our attitudes as
that would fail to explain the feature of normative truths that they “require
that we submit to them” (2006, p. 34). Furthermore, Frankfurt has spent a
great deal of his writing trying to explicate the relations between higher-
order attitudes and desires, while his concept of desire seems to reflect a
broadly Humean independence from matters of belief, even though this
latter point is never made very explicit. Finally, Frankfurt wants to defend
the account against the charge of being “unacceptably noncognitive and
relativistic” (2006, p. 26), despite its strong dependence on contingent
attitudes, by arguing that those attitudes may be common features of
human psychology:
People care about many of the same things because the natures
of human beings, and the basic conditions of human life, are
grounded in biological, psychological and environmental facts
that are not subject to very much variation or change (2004,
p. 27).
Thus, the view allows that all human beings have normative reason to
promote equal rights for same-sex couples in comparison to heterosexual
couples, for example, even though many people, especially in non-western
cultures, currently believe otherwise. In its general form, then, the Inner
Reality Thesis is completely neutral about how much of our moral dis-
agreement reflects differences between our respective inner realities, and
how much reflects a misunderstanding of those realities.
Although the thesis is meant to avoid the “queerness,” to use Mackie’s
term, of an external normative reality, the idea of an inner reality of course
raises metaphysical and epistemological questions of its own. How is this
normative reality constituted, exactly, by the empirical facts about our
attitudes? How do we access this reality within ourselves, how do we
“keep an eye” on it so as to correct mistakes in our practical views? And
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why should we submit to this reality, i.e., how does this reality make it
required for us to act in accordance with its normative implications? Let
us call comprehensive attempts to answer these questions “inner reality
theories.”
In Frankfurt’s own inner reality theory, the attitude of caring does much
of the explanatory work. Caring is a matter of contingent empirical fact,
yet on Frankfurt’s view, it may resist a reductive analysis in terms of the
content and motivational weight of desires. Caring is neither affective
nor cognitive: rather, it is a volitional attitude, as Frankfurt puts it. This
volitional attitude involves treating certain things as reasons, yet it also
establishes the objective normativity of reasons. I will argue that a single
type of attitude cannot fulfill all these roles at the same time. Furthermore,
I will argue that volitional attitudes cannot be accounted for empirically
if they resist analysis in terms of either cognitive or affective attitudes. In
order to resolve these problems, I will propose to distinguish two types of
volitional attitude. The first, which I shall call the “cognitive will,” is to
be analyzed in terms of what the agent believes. The second type is the
normative will, which is to be accounted for in terms of empirical facts
about the agent’s affective dispositions. Which of the two is referred to
when we say that someone cares about something depends on the context
of the utterance.
8.2 Frankfurt’s Volitional Inner Reality Theory
Since 1971, when he published “Freedom of the will and the concept
of a person,” Frankfurt has been developing an insightful theory about
the different ways in which an agent can be said to “want” something
(1971/1988b; 1999b). One of the goals of this theory is to account for the
intuition that a human being can want something “as a person,” and that
this mode of wanting is richer in its psychological structure than that of
merely desiring something in the sense of being attracted to it. Frankfurt
called this richer mode of wanting “volitional,” and set himself the task of
analyzing its structure—first in terms of higher order desires, later in terms
of ideas about wholeheartedness, caring, and love. Moreover, the theory
was meant to explain freedom of the will, since Frankfurt argued that a
person acts of his own free will whenever he manages to act upon his
volitions. Thus, Frankfurt’s work has often been discussed in the context
of the free will debate.
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In Frankfurt’s more recent publications, the analysandum of the theory
seems to have shifted. Although a certain notion of free will is still
accounted for (2004, p. 20; 2006, pp. 14–16), the main purpose of the theory
has become to explain practical normativity. According to Frankfurt, the
question of how we should live is, properly understood, a question about
what it is that we care about:
The totality of the various things that a person cares about—
together with his orderings of how important to him they
are—effectively specifies his answer to the question of how to
live (2004, p. 23).
This means there are only two ways in which practical judgments can get
it wrong: they may involve instrumental errors about the world and how
to achieve one’s goals in it, and they may involve errors of self-knowledge
in the form of misunderstandings of what we care about:
Once we have learned as much as possible about the natural
characteristics of the things we care about, and as much as
possible about ourselves, there are no substantive corrections
to be made. There is really nothing else to look for so far as the
normativity of final ends is concerned. There is nothing else to
get right (2006, p. 50).
Hence, the notion of caring plays the central role in Frankfurt’s inner reality
theory. We can therefore understand the theory as consisting of two parts:
first, the account of normative reasons in terms of attitudes of caring; and
second, an account of the nature of those attitudes of caring themselves.
These two accounts may be evaluated more or less independently, because
the notion of caring may be thought of as a philosophically interesting
analysandum in its own right. It is philosophically interesting because
“caring about something is essential to our being creatures of the kind
that human beings are” (Frankfurt, 2004, p. 17). Thus, one may agree that
Frankfurt’s analysis of caring correctly captures this essential feature, but
disagree with his analysis of normative reasons in terms of caring, or even
disagree that normative reasons are to be analyzed in terms of caring at
all. Conversely, one may agree that Frankfurt’s intuitive concept of caring
does explain normative reasons for action, but reject the way in which he
analyzes the nature of caring itself. Let us first take a look at the latter part,
Frankfurt’s account of caring.
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8.2.1 The Meaning and Nature of Caring
The first thing to note about caring is how it differs from mere desiring.
One may desire something without caring about it at all. In fact, an agent
may not care about anything and yet desire all sorts of things. One may
disagree about which entities belong to this class—perhaps mice and rats,
perhaps spiders and insects, or maybe thermostats and chess computers—
but the point is that in an important sense, such agents are not persons.
They are “wantons,” who do not care about what it is they want (Frankfurt,
1971/1988b, p. 16). This gives us a clue about the analysandum for a theory
of caring: it must be a theory that accounts for “strong” agency—the type
of agency that is distinctive of personhood.
A second thing to note is that even agents who are persons may not
always be motivated to act in accordance with what they care about.
Frankfurt’s example of the unwilling addict illustrates this: he cares about
being healthy, but he keeps using drugs because he is driven by a desire
that is too strong for him to resist, even though he does not want to be
driven by this desire at all (1971/1988b, p. 17). The example shows that
the affective strength of a desire does not by itself determine whether
that desire speaks for the agent—whether it carries “agential authority,”
as Michael Bratman calls it (2009, p. 430). Various phrases have been
employed by Frankfurt and his commentators to articulate the meaning of
this form of authority: the agent “identifies with” the desire, he is “fully
behind” the desire, or the desire expresses what the agent “really wants”
(Frankfurt); the desire is “endorsed” by the agent (Watson, 2002/2004d,
p. 112); or it is a desire “of his own” (Bratman, 2003). In contrast, desires
such as the craving of the unwilling addict, which do not carry agential
authority, are “external to the person,” in Frankfurt’s words (1976/1988c).
We “regard them as disconnected from us or as alien intruders by which
we are helplessly beset” (2006, p. 8).
In his recent work, Frankfurt distinguishes between a weaker and a
stronger sense of agential authority. The weaker sense is that of “accepting”
a desire and “consenting” to being driven by that desire. Accepting desires
in this way means that we have “taken responsibility for them as authentic
expressions of ourselves.” Any desire that is authoritative in this sense is
therefore not regarded as external or alien. If one acts upon desires that
one accepts in this sense, one acts out of free will, in Frankfurt’s view.
We may wonder whether the kind of responsibility that this notion
of free will delivers is equivalent to the sort of responsibility that would
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justify blame or retribution, however. It might not be necessary for blame,
as we may want to blame people for many acts, and the dispositions behind
those acts, that they weren’t too happy about themselves. On the other
hand, it might not be sufficient either, as certain conditions may undermine
blameworthiness without upsetting the psychological structure of agential
authority. To borrow Watson’s terminology, the concept of responsibility
that Frankfurt’s account may deliver is that of “attributability,” whereas
the one that underlies blame and retribution is that of “accountability”
(Watson, 1996/2004c).1
Nevertheless, attributability is an important notion of responsibility in
its own right, which can be found elsewhere in philosophy—it is what
Charles Taylor has called “responsibility for self” (1976/1982) and one
might argue that this notion is also closer to responsibility in Sartre and
other continental authors than the type of accountability on which analytic
philosophers tend to focus. Furthermore, the idea that an agent freely
wants what she wants when she can fully accept the fact that she wants
it is certainly intuitive, and may be traced back to the work of Spinoza
(Frankfurt, 2006, p. 16–17).
Consenting to a motivation does not imply, however, that one also has
to care about being so motivated. For example, suppose you usually prefer
a certain type of dessert when you have dinner in a restaurant—tiramisu,
say. As long as you’re not too much of a health freak you’re probably not
going to have any problems accepting the preference for tiramisu as your
own, but at the same time you’re probably also not going to care should
you start to prefer a different type of dessert. So caring seems intuitively to
involve a stronger, more obligatory form of agential authority than consent.
8.2.2 The Hierarchical Account
Let us now see how Frankfurt attempts to account for these two different
forms of agential authority in terms of what are, in his view, matters of
empirical fact. From his intuition that acting out of free will involves really
wanting to be driven by the desire that one is motivated by, Frankfurt
has argued from the beginning that it must be a necessary condition for
freedom of the will that the agent has a second-order desire for the relevant
1Frankfurt himself does not seem to make this distinction. Thus, his famous criticism of
the “Principle of Alternative Possibilities” (1969/1988a) clearly addresses what Watson would
call “accountability,” paving the way for a new type of compatibilism, and his discussion of
responsibility elsewhere suggest that his positive account of free will is meant to fit this bill.
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first-order desire to be efficient (1971/1988b, p. 16). This condition is not
sufficient even for the weaker mode of authority, though, because the
second-order desire may itself be lacking in authority. This raises two
issues, one technical and one fundamental. The technical issue is that
one might imagine another, conflicting second-order desire that would
challenge the authority of the first one. Frankfurt argued that this problem
would be resolved if the agent were to have a third-order desire for one
of the second-order desires to be effective, and no third-order desires to
back up the other second-order desire. As long as the agent is coherent
at the highest reflexive order of desiring, freedom of the will would be
established. Thus, a generalized formulation suggests itself: in order for a
first-order desire to express what the agent really wants, there must be a
desire of the n-th order to back it up, such that no other desires of orders
higher than or equal to n are in conflict with it.
But this solution does not address the fundamental issue, which is
whether a higher- or highest-order desire explains agential authority any
better than a first-order desire does (Watson, 1975/2004b). Perhaps Frank-
furt is right that in order to really want to do φ one must reflect on the
desire to do φ and then really want that desire to be effective. But if
we cannot reduce “really wanting to φ” to “desiring to φ,” then it seems
neither can we reduce “really wanting the desire to φ to be effective” to
“desiring the desire to φ to be effective.” I call this issue fundamental
because it forces a choice between fundamentally different approaches
to agential authority. One approach, taken by Gary Watson and Charles
Taylor, is to reject the naturalistic, Humean framework according to which
all motivation, even in cases of strong agency, must be explained in terms
of desires, i.e. in terms of non-cognitive, affective states which are “given”
as a matter of empirical, natural fact. But Frankfurt’s background meta-
physics is clearly naturalistic, and he seems to want to keep his account as
close to the Humean theory of motivation as he can.
The approach that Frankfurt initially adopted instead was to retain
the hierarchical desire structure, but with an added element of decision
by the agent about which desires to identify with (1976/1988c, pp. 67–
68; 1987/1988d, pp. 170–176). Thus, whereas the desire hierarchy is an
essentially passive structure, the relation of identification between the agent
and that structure is now understood as something actively performed
by the agent himself. When the agent identifies with the higher-order
desire to be motivated by a certain first-order desire, he makes a “decisive
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commitment” (1987/1988d, p. 167) to act upon that first-order desire. Let
us call such an act of identification a “volitional judgment.” In his early
writings, Frankfurt seems to be suggesting that such a judgment constitutes
the agential authority of the desire that the judgment endorses. Thus,
whether a desire expresses what the agent really wants is entirely up to the
agent himself—a way of thinking that seems to reflect a certain existentialist
intuition along the lines of the early Sartre. Or perhaps we should call
this a noncognitivist view of volitional judgment, as it understands the
judgment to express the authority directly, without the possibility for the
judgment to get it wrong. In any case, Frankfurt soon concluded that this
approach was misguided:
To be sure, a person may attempt to resolve this ambivalence
by deciding to adhere unequivocally to one of his alternatives
rather than to the other; and he may believe that in thus making
up his mind he has eliminated the division in his will and
become wholehearted. Whether such changes have actually
occurred, however, is another matter. When the chips are down
he may discover that he is not, after all, decisively moved by the
preference or motive he supposed he had adopted. (1992/1999a,
p. 101)
As critics of Sartre have pointed out before (e.g. Taylor, 1976/1982), some-
times it is not up to us at all to decide to care about something and not
care about something else. We cannot help caring about certain things, and
neither are we infallible in our volitional judgments: sometimes we do
not understand very well what it is that we really want. We can get the
volitional reality within ourselves wrong. Thus, Frankfurt is forced to
adopt a different approach, an approach that is cognitivist about volitional
judgment. The challenge for this approach is now threefold: first, it must
explain agential authority in a way that does not make it as arbitrary and
contingent as first-, second-, or higher-order desires; second, it must do
this within a naturalistic framework that preserves a broadly Humean
intuition about motivation; and third, it must do this in such a way that
we can explain what it means for an agent to be mistaken in his volitional
judgments.
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8.2.3 The Theory of Love
So what does the new account look like? Hierarchical desire structures still
play a role as necessary conditions, and Frankfurt now argues that whereas
free will merely requires a synchronic coherence of desires, caring requires
a diachronic coherence. Thus, in order for an agent to care about P, he
must not merely desire that he be motivated by a desire for P, but also that
he will remain so motivated in the future. However, Frankfurt does not
claim that the synchronic and diachronic structural requirements which
he sketches are sufficient conditions for free will or caring. In fact, he
now remains officially neutral about the question of whether any structural
requirement might be sufficient to reduce agential authority to a complex
of desires:
There are significant relationships, of course, between wanting
things and caring about them. Indeed, the notion of caring is in
large part constructed out of the notion of desire. Caring about
something may be, in the end, nothing but a complex mode of
wanting it. (2004, p. 11, my italics).
Note that this is quite a substantial matter for a theory to remain neutral
about. If caring is a complex mode of desiring, then the first part of the
challenge becomes pressing: why are the relevant desires more authorita-
tive than any other desires? On the other hand, if caring cannot be reduced
to a complex of desires, then it is the second part of the challenge that we
must worry about: how caring can remain a matter of empirical fact within
a naturalistic, broadly Humean framework. Although Frankfurt specu-
lates that an answer to the first lemma of this dilemma may be possible,
his own proposal is best understood as a response to the second lemma.
Rather than offering a sufficient explanation in terms of desires, Frankfurt
attempts to explain the nature of caring by accounting for a special type of
caring, of which other forms of caring are derived. This is the disinterested
notion of caring about something for its own sake, which Frankfurt calls
love.
Now love is probably a very good candidate for Wittgenstein’s idea of a
family resemblance concept: there are many different varieties of love, and
each variety will resemble the others in certain respects, but there may be
no central features common to all varieties that explain our correct usage
of the word “love” in ordinary language. Not every form of love is a form
of caring, for example. If someone says that he “loves ice cream,” then
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that does not necessarily mean that he cares about it. And when a student
tells you that she is “in love” with her teacher, she might be simply talking
about a crush which is not very important to her at all. So what sort of
love does, essentially, involve caring? Frankfurt’s paradigm examples of
facts about love that constitute agential authority are the fact that almost
all parents love their children and the fact that most of us “love living.”
These examples are also meant to illustrate the idea that facts about love
are natural facts: “The basis for our confidence in caring about our children
and our lives is that, in virtue of necessities that are biologically embedded
in our nature, we love our children and we love living” (2004, p. 29–30).
But what is it about their embeddedness in our nature that gives these
attitudes of love their authority? After all, the dispositions to be jealous, or
to seek revenge, or to humiliate others in certain situations, may also be
biologically embedded in the nature of our species, but it is not obvious
that that gives them agential authority. In many cases we might not want
to assign any authority to these dispositions at all. In fact, our disposition
to fall in love probably has an important species-wide biological basis, but
as mentioned above, being in love does not always involve the sort of love
that carries agential authority. Furthermore, not everything that we love in
the sense that does carry authority needs to have a species-wide basis. It
may instead be rooted in the particular nature of the individual: I really
love being a philosopher, but there are others who would hate it. That I
love philosophy says first of all something about me, not about human
nature. And Frankfurt does not deny this:
Needless to say, many of our volitional necessities and final
ends are far from universal. The fact that I care about various
specific individuals, groups, and ways of doing things is not
a function simply of generic human nature. It arises from my
particular makeup and experience. Some of the things that I
happen to love are also loved by others; but some of my loves
are shared only by, at most, a small number of people. (2006,
p. 48)
By saying this, I do not mean to retract my sympathy for the idea that
there might be features common to all human beings in virtue of which
we will ultimately turn out to care about the same things in a manner that
could resolve our moral disputes. My point is rather that in order to make
this idea plausible, one must first come up with an inner reality theory
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that explains which type of features of an individual agent determine
what that agent really cares about. Once we have such a theory, we can
then attempt to show that the features of different human individuals will
exhibit similarities in such a way that in moral cases, we will turn out to
care about the same things. If we would skip the first step and merely
claim that feature F explains what we all love, in the authoritative sense,
because it is so deeply entrenched in our biological nature, then we would
be guilty of a kind of naturalistic fallacy.
That does not mean that parental love is not a good paradigm case of
the authoritative type of love. A proper conceptual analysis of the relevant
sense of authority will probably have to account for the fact that parental
love is, at least in most cases, authoritative. Furthermore, the case of loving
philosophy is not meant as a counterexample to the idea that the type of
love that underlies practical normativity may exhibit similarity among all
human beings. After all, the view that the ideal selves of human beings
shall end up having similar desires will have the same conceptual resources
at its disposal to handle individual differences in taste that nonrelationalist
dispositionalists have at their disposal, which we discussed in sections
1.3.2 and 5.1.2. Thus, all human beings may turn out to ‘love’ the state of
affairs in which those of us who love philosophy may practice philosophy.
But what the example does show is that not all matters of ‘taste’ in this
sense—i.e., the sense of there being no practical conflict when tastes differ—
are like the preference for tiramisu which only exhibits authority in the
weaker sense. Instead, some of our individual preferences really seem to
have authority in the strong sense: I really hope I would not suddenly lose
my desire to do philosophy, for example. Therefore, we must begin with a
theory of authoritative attitudes at the individual level.
Now, the most important criterion that Frankfurt seems to give in order
to distinguish, at the individual level, the love that carries authority from
other types of love, is that the authoritative type of love involves treating
certain things as reasons for action:
Loving someone or something essentially means or consists in,
among other things, taking its interests as reasons for acting
to serve those interests. Love is itself, for the lover, a source
of reasons. It creates the reasons by which his acts of loving
concern and devotion are inspired. (2004, p. 37)
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However, this passage seems hard to reconcile with the whole cognitivist
notion that we are trying to account for: that of being mistaken about
one’s reasons. In fact, from the cognitivist perspective, the second and
third sentence of this passage would seem to contradict the first sentence.
If what we happen to treat as reasons might not really be our reasons,
and our real reasons reflect what we love, then what we love cannot be
explained solely in terms of what we happen to treat as reasons. A similar
criticism was formulated by Michael Bratman:
Love is a source of reasons, according to Frankfurt. Frankfurt
associates this claim with the idea that love necessarily involves
counting or treating certain things as reasons for action. I agree
with this connection between love and treating as a reason. But
this does raise the question of whether what we love could be
so bad—indeed, in other work Frankfurt has specifically noted
the possibility of wholeheartedly loving “what is bad, or what
is evil”—that, though we are thereby set to treat it as a reason,
it is not a reason. (Bratman, 2006, p. 81–82)
Bratman’s criticism already incorporates his own preferred way out of
this predicament: to understand the notion of love in terms of what
we treat as reasons, while understanding the idea of something really
being a reason with reference to what is good or bad in a manner that
is at least to some extent independent from what we love, such that
we can love the bad. Actually, his view is more complex, as Bratman
allows volitional judgments to go beyond, and sometimes even against, the
agent’s own judgments of what is valuable or normative, in a manner that
is incompatible with a volitional account of practical normativity.2 Let us
however first see whether Frankfurt’s account might offer ways to counter
the aforementioned critique. In the end I will argue that his account cannot
overcome this problem, but I will also disagree with Bratman, because I
think a different volitional inner reality theory can be devised that will not
fall prey to his argument.
8.3 Getting It Wrong
Despite the remark about love involving treating things as reasons, Frank-
furt remains clearly committed to the idea of the opacity of love:
2I return to these claims in section 10.5.5.
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In addition to the fact that our understanding of the things we
love may require correction, there is also the fact that we often
do not understand ourselves very well. It is not easy for people
to know what they really care about or what they truly love.
Our motives and dispositions are notoriously uncertain and
opaque, and we often get ourselves wrong. (Frankfurt, 2006,
p. 49)
In the light of this passage, the alternative interpretation that we might
give of the statement about treating things as reasons would be as follows:
what is defining of the type of love that carries authority, as opposed to
other types of love, is that such love involves our treating certain things
as reasons when we get it right. Suppose that someone realizes that he is in
love with his best friend’s wife. Depending on what sort of love it is, he
may or may not treat it as a reason to act in certain ways. If he knows that
he merely has a crush on her, then he may not attach much significance
to it, and simply enjoy or suffer the experience (depending on how bad a
case it is) without any further action. Instead, if he knows that this is the
real deal, then he may treat it as a reason to confess his feelings, perhaps
even propose a relationship, and face the drama.
But this interpretation would make the theory of love completely empty.
If an attitude L towards P is authoritative, then upon coming to believe that
he has attitude L towards P, an agent will thereby acquire a self-adopted
reason to promote, support, or approve of P. To say that authoritative love
differs from other sorts of love in the sense that knowing what he loves in
this sense will make the agent treat things as reasons is simply to repeat
what it means for an attitude to be authoritative. It does not give us a
substantial account of the attitude of love that would fulfill this conceptual
role. In particular, even if it is consistent with the opacity of love, then it
does not yet explain it: what sort of facts does this love consist in, what
does it mean to get them wrong, why are they hard to get right, and how
is it nevertheless possible to get them right in the end?
At some points Frankfurt seems to take a coherentist line in order
to address these worries: given that we care about certain things, there
are certain other things that we should also care about in virtue of their
relations to the things we already cared about. This gives us means-end
rationality and the sort of non-instrumental considerations that come ‘for
free’ with the attribution of self-governing agency, as discussed in sections
3.3.2, 3.4.1, and 7.1.2. However, to suppose that this is the only source of
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disconfirmation would simply take us back to the Principles of Reason
View. It does not truly give us an inner opacity as a matter of empirical,
natural fact about the individual. To be sure, Frankfurt does not advocate
a ‘full’ opacity, so to speak: we can never be completely and utterly
mistaken about what we love, or it would never be possible to improve our
knowledge about it:
If he [the agent] attempts to suspend all of his convictions, and
to adopt a stance that is conscientiously neutral and uncommit-
ted, he cannot even begin to inquire methodically into what it
would be reasonable for him to care about. No one can pull
himself up by his own bootstraps. (2006, p. 23–24)
But this insight, by itself, establishes not much more than that which
many philosophers hold to be true for knowledge generally: that we
cannot justify or improve our beliefs without assuming that, as Davidson
put it, ‘most of our beliefs are true.’ In his commentary on Frankfurt,
Michael Bratman compares this point to Otto Neurath’s famous metaphor
of scientific inquiry as the making of improvements to a boat while at
sea: one can replace certain planks while others are left in place, but one
cannot replace them all at once. Nevertheless, this does not mean that
all disconfirmations in empirical science are made by testing previous
beliefs against principles of reason, or it would not be empirical science.
Therefore, the Neurath/Davidson intuition about belief revision does not
preclude us from looking for disconfirmations that reveal a deeper opacity
of our attitudes than considerations of mere coherence would establish.
In section 3.2.1 I have already discussed a similar comparison between
continuity in empirical science and continuity in matters of practical de-
liberation. But there I argued that the Internal Reasons View actually
left less room for discontinuity in matters of practical reason compared
to theoretical empirical reason. However, if the Inner Reality Thesis is
true, then this comparison may involve another dis-analogy, depending
on how we understand Williams’s notion of the “subjective motivational
set.” Because if that set includes the opaque attitudes, then there is no such
discontinuity when efficient motivation changes upon discovery of those
attitudes. I will return to this point in the next chapter.3
For now, let us simply note that if Frankfurt is to make his inner reality
theory work, then he must explain what the opacity of love consists in,
3See section 9.4.
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and how disconfirmation regarding what we love is therefore possible,
beyond considerations of internal coherence. In his essay “Getting It Right”
(2006, ch. 2), Frankfurt makes two suggestions: the first is an appeal to
his notion of “volitional necessity,” the second involves a concept of the
“unthinkable.” I will now discuss these in turn.
8.3.1 Volitional Necessity
The paragraph quoted above, in which Frankfurt affirms the opacity of
love, continues as follows:
[. . . ] Our motives and our dispositions are notoriously uncer-
tain and opaque, and we often get ourselves wrong. It is hard
to be sure what we can bring ourselves to do, or how we will
behave when the chips are down. The will is a thing as real
as any reality outside us. The truth about it does not depend
on what we think it is, or upon what we wish it were. (2006,
pp. 49–50)
This passage reveals an important similarity to the Affective Response View
that I have proposed, but also an important difference. The similarity is that
Frankfurt, too, wants to explain disconfirmation in terms of unexpected
future affective experiences: experiences that surprise us in the light of
what we intended, given our deliberation upon our awareness of our
attitudes so far. Furthermore, it seems that Frankfurt agrees that the
possibility of being surprised by ourselves in this manner is what we need
in order to account for an inner reality that is “as real as any reality outside
us.”
The big difference, however, is that on Frankfurt’s suggestion we are
going to have this experience just before we were going to act, with the
result that we cannot bring ourselves to act as we had planned to:
Someone who is bound by volitional necessity is unable to
form a determined and effective intention—regardless of what
motives and reasons he may have for doing so—to perform
(or to refrain from performing) that action that is at issue. If
he undertakes an attempt to perform it, he discovers that he
simply cannot bring himself to carry the attempt all the way
through. (2004, p. 46)
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By contrast, on the Affective Response View it is possible that we do act
contrary to our normative will, only to find out about this afterward, in
response to the intended consequences of the act. This is an important dif-
ference, because it means that the opacity that Frankfurt can deliver on the
basis of the suggestion above is merely the opacity of our disposition to act
“when the chips are down.” Thus, no self-adopted reasons that motivated
any of the murders, rapes, or acts of enslavement and racial discrimination
that actually happened in human history could be disconfirmed in this
manner. But that makes the proposal entirely unsatisfactory. Consider
again our example of the ex-racist bus driver: he came to change his mind
after he had been discriminating against black passengers for years. Or
consider the example of the woman who disconfirmed her wish to spend
her life with her husband just after she married him and gave up her own
house.
Furthermore, as I already argued in section 7.4.3, it is not even clear
why, when it does happen that we cannot bring ourselves to do something,
this experience could tell us, by itself, whether it is volitional necessity
that’s preventing us to act, or rather weakness of will. We may be able
to categorize familiar examples, such as that of Luther proclaiming that
he could do no other, as cases where strength rather than weakness of
will is constraining the possibilities for action, but we do this on the basis
of all sorts of background information that we have about such cases—
for example, that Luther’s act reflected his elaborate deliberations on the
subject, and not just his experience of will when the ‘chips were down.’ By
contrast, consider Frankfurt’s example of the mother who has decided to
give up her child, but then finds herself unable to do so when the time
comes. It may be that her deliberations were indeed misguided, in which
case her experience of being unable to go through with her plan would
indeed reflect her inner reality. However, a similar example is possible in
which the deliberations were sound and the failure to comply was due to
weakness of will, and Frankfurt simply assumes that volitional necessity
would allow us to discriminate between these cases introspectively at the
time before the act.4 But why should we believe this?
4Gary Watson discusses yet another variation on the example, in which the mother does
succeed in parting with her child, but only after “severe volitional difficulty” (2002/2004d,
pp. 119–121). In Watson’s view, it is rather the presence of such a struggle, and not so much it’s
outcome, that may tell us something about how much the mother cares about keeping the child
independently of her having endorsed a plan to give it up for adoption. Therefore, if we insist
that her success in executing the plan does imply that keeping the child was not a volitional
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It might be that the ‘typical’ phenomenology of weakness of will differs
from the ‘typical’ experience of volitional necessity, but even then these
sort of experiences would be hardly infallible. Of course, the same goes
for the experiences that may disconfirm our practical judgments according
to the Affective Response View, but as I argued in the previous chapter,
the whole approach behind that view is based on the idea that, in prin-
ciple, disconfirmations are never final and certain. But again, this sort of
infallibility requires that we are able, in principle, to explain how further
disconfirmation, after the fact of the act, would be possible. Which brings
us back at the first, and most important, point of criticism: that volitional
necessity would fail to explain disconfirmation of judgments in favor of
acts that we already performed.
8.3.2 Unthinkability
So what are we to say about rapists, murderers and mass-murderers?
Frankfurt does not want to argue that their error lies in a violation of
formal logic. Furthermore, he cannot argue that their self-adopted reasons
are disconfirmed by volitional necessity, because murderers can bring
themselves to kill. However, Frankfurt does seem inclined to say that
something is wrong with them, at least in extreme cases. Before we move
to real-life cases, let us first consider a thought experiment from David
Hume that Frankfurt discusses: that “’tis not contrary to reason to prefer
the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.” Here is
what Frankfurt has to say about it:
Now it is true that this preference involves no purely logical
mistake. So far as logic alone is concerned, it is unobjectionable.
Someone who chooses to protect his finger from a trivial injury
at the cost of unlimited destruction elsewhere is not thereby
guilty of any contradiction or faulty inference. In this purely
formal sense of rationality, his choice is not at all irrational.
But what would we say of someone who made that choice?
We would say he must be crazy. In other words, despite the
unassailability of his preference on logical grounds, we would
consider both it and him to be wildly irrational. Caring more
necessity for her, then “we are taking her volitional activity to be fundamentally a matter of
what she stands for or endorses, rather than what she cares about in some independent sense”
(p. 120).
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about a scratched finger than about “destruction of the whole
world” is not just an unappealing personal quirk. It is lunatic.
Anybody who has that preference is inhuman. (2006, p. 29)
What does all this mean? Frankfurt goes on to explain that these qualifi-
cations are “literal denials that the person is a rational creature,” but that
this “mode of rationality” is not “exclusively defined by a priori, formal
necessities” (p. 30). It is not entirely clear to me whether these notions of
a “person” and a “rational creature” are meant to be applicable to human
beings only, or whether the same verdict of irrationality would also apply
to non-human agents, such as the Martian invaders. Perhaps Frankfurt
means that our concept of volitional rationality is a posteriori because it is
shaped by our experience of a world in which there are no Martians, and
that if there had been Martians, our concept of volitional rationality would
have been different. Perhaps the concept of volitional rationality cannot be
formal because the entire conceptual network of relevant terms cannot be
separated from considerations particular to our contingent nature and cir-
cumstances in a manner similar to Thomas’s conception of the “relativized
a priori” (see section 3.2.1). I am not sure, because much is left implicit in
the text.
What Frankfurt does tell us, however, is how we arrive at the judgment
that someone would be crazy or inhuman in this sense: by determining
that we could not bring ourselves to do the same thing:
An outcome from which we recoil in horror is, to him, positively
attractive. The critical point has to do with possibilities: he is
prepared to implement voluntarily a choice that we could not,
under any circumstances, bring ourselves to make. (p. 30)
Thus, the idea is closely related to the concept of volitional necessity, except
that the error in his motivation is not determined by the fact that it would
be impossible for him to go through with it, but rather that it would be
impossible for us to be like him. Furthermore, this impossibility for us
is not revealed “when the chips are down,” because we would not even
intend to act in such a way. Rather, the volitional necessity in our case is
revealed through the fact that such an act would be “unthinkable” for us
(p. 31).
But why, we may now ask, would the fact that some act or preference
is unthinkable for us be a reason to suppose that those for whom it is not
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must suffer from a “defect of the will” (p. 30)? The only way in which this
could be squared with the Inner Reality Thesis is if we assume that we, i.e.
those of us who are not mass murderers, are privileged in the sense that our
notion of what is unthinkable reveals something about an inner reality that
we share with the mass murderers, while their notion of what is thinkable
gets this reality wrong. However, without a further explanation of why we
should think we are so privileged, we do not even have a reason to think
that we share our inner reality with the mass murderers in the first place.
But I find no such explanation in Frankfurt’s work. In other words, even if
these claims about volitional irrationality and the unthinkable make sense,
then they do not serve to account for the opacity of the mass murderer’s
inner reality, but rather presuppose it.
Finally, even if we would have such a further explanation, then the
account would still only handle the extreme cases: Hume’s madman and
the mass-murderers perhaps, but not our reasonable political opponents in
disputes concerning patent law reform.5 Nor does it handle personal cases,
such as the case of the woman who discovers that she should not have
married her husband. Surely, marrying him was thinkable, but that doesn’t
mean she got it right. Hence, in such cases the volitional irrationality
approach does not fare any better than the volitional necessity approach.
Both approaches are unable to explain the opaque nature of the facts that
we got wrong when we disconfirm our practical judgments after we have
acted upon them.
8.3.3 Frankfurt’s Cartesian Preference for Immediacy
In view of these problems, we should wonder whether Frankfurt has really
given us an account of the volitional opacity that his view presupposes.
Rather than construing the metaphysics of an opaque attitude of love,
he has tried to come up with conditions under which such an attitude
turns transparent, so to speak. Thus, when the chips are down, what we
truly love may reveal itself through an experience of volitional necessity.
In similar fashion, the experience of the unthinkable is supposed to give
us knowledge of the volitional irrationality of an action suggested or
5And hence, we have no reason to believe that our own political views in such ‘reasonable
disagreements’ are volitional necessities for ourselves, an observation that has also been made
by Bratman: “Although my condemnation of torturing children may well be volitionally
necessary for me, my moral commitment to, say, a form of pacifism, or to political liberalism,
may be wholehearted and settled without involving an incapacity to change” (2006, p. 81).
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performed by someone else. Frankfurt, it seems, is still looking for those
unique transparent attitudes or phenomenal experiences that, like the
higher order volitions in his earlier work, could be blessed with a special
authority that other attitudes and experiences lack.
Recall Watson’s fundamental challenge for Frankfurt’s earlier account:
to explain why desires of a higher order would have a better claim to
authority than first-order desires, as their occurrence may ultimately be just
as contingent or arbitrary from the perspective of the self. In Frankfurt’s
later work, the experience of volitional necessity is supposed to have the
required features that set it apart from other motivating experiences in
a manner that can meet the challenge. By contrast, my own solution to
this problem lies in the opposite direction. On my view, no phenomenal
experience is more privileged than any other in terms of its likelihood to
reflect the agent’s normative will. I think that is crucially how my proposal
differs from Frankfurt’s account.
Why does Frankfurt keep looking for transparency? Perhaps he would
be skeptical about the prospects of construing the normative will as a
pattern across dispositions, as I mean to do, where none of the particular
experiences that we have as a result of those dispositions offer privileged
access to the will itself. However, I suspect there may be a deeper reason
why Frankfurt wants to secure privileged experiences, which is that he is
unwilling to give up on a type of certitude that such experiences would
provide. Let me explain.
Frankfurt has written extensively about the epistemology of Descartes.6
In an interview, Alex Voorhoeve asked him about how this interest might
be related to his thinking about agency:
Is Descartes’ search for ideas that you can hold in the face of
all attempts to doubt them paralleled in your work on the will?
(Voorhoeve, 2003, p. 70)
And Frankfurt replied:
It is in this respect: what Descartes was looking for were things
that you couldn’t help believing. Because it was his view that
what you are in the midst of clearly and distinctly perceiving,
you cannot help believing, that assent is constrained by clear
and distinct perception. What I have become interested in is
6See esp. his (1970/2008) and various essays (e.g. 1999b, chapters 2, 3, and 4).
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not what one can’t help believing but what one can’t help but
being moved to do; what constrains the will in action rather
than what constrains the will in belief. (p. 70)
However, as Frankfurt is now defending an inner reality theory, according
to which our practical views can be true or false depending on whether
they get the facts about our will right, the “rather than” in this quotation
seems slightly overstated. If the falsehood of our practical views can be
demonstrated by an experience of volitional necessity when the chips
are down, as Frankfurt argues, then clearly, volitional necessity not only
constrains action, but also a special and corresponding type of belief,
namely practical belief. To be sure, the mother could believe that she
wanted to give up her baby, but only to the point were she tried to go
through with it and found out that she couldn’t. If her experience of
volitional necessity is disconfirmatory, as Frankfurt wants it to be, then it
constrains what she can keep believing in the light of that experience.
I am not sure that Frankfurt would want to commit himself to the view
that volitional necessity is really a form of Cartesian clear and distinct
introspection, which forces intimate self-knowledge upon the agent beyond
the possibility of doubt. It sits uneasy with his remarks about us often
not knowing ourselves very well, unless he would be willing to argue that
amidst the opacity of everyday deliberation there are sometimes totally
different moments of pure clarity where our transparent experiences reveal
our innermost volitions with immediate certitude. Rather, I think these two
opposites reveal an implicit tension in Frankfurt’s thinking about agency.
On the one hand, his official view postulates an opaque will. This view
reflects his existential insights into the ambivalence of the human condition,
and the imperfections in our means of figuring out what we’re up to. But
on the other hand, he has been working from the beginning upon the
premise that such ambivalence and doubt are signs of unfreedom, and
inspired by his philosophical heroes Descartes and Spinoza, the tendency in
his work has always been to understand the resolution of doubt, and hence
the existence of freedom, in terms of establishing clarity and tranquility in
the mind of the agent.
Thus, in the hands of Frankfurt, notions like being “wholehearted,”
“fully resolved,” or having “decisive commitment” all breathe a certain
air of tranquility, which is in the end perhaps best understood as part
of a phenomenology of freedom that Frankfurt finds appealing. However,
the problems we have been discussing suggest that the epistemology of
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immediacy behind this picture is fundamentally flawed. In the next section
I will explain how it should be altered in order to build an inner reality
theory that may avoid these difficulties. This will set the stage for the
detailed formulation of my own proposal in the next chapter. I will also
return to Frankfurt’s work and discuss his concept of wholeheartedness
in the next chapter, arguing that we should in fact distinguish two no-
tions of wholeheartedness that can both be accounted for within my own
framework in a manner that does not presuppose epistemic immediacy.7
8.4 How Should We Modify Frankfurt’s Theory?
In section 8.2.3 above I have argued against Frankfurt that if he wants
to be a cognitivist about reasons, then he cannot analyze the attitude of
love—which is to be a source of reasons—in terms of what the agent treats
as reasons. We have seen that Michael Bratman offered a similar criticism,
allowing that love indeed involves treating certain things as reasons, but
rejecting the idea that love could be a source of reasons at the same time. In
contrast, I have followed Frankfurt in supposing that love, or at least some
opaque attitude for which Frankfurt has chosen to use the term “love,”
must be on the ‘source’ side of things. But from that supposition, it does
not follow that we cannot see the attitude of treating something as a reason
as an attitude of love in a different sense of the term. In fact, if we want
to take the inner reality theory seriously, then there are always going to
be two types of attitudes involved: first, the inner attitudes that we can be
correct or mistaken about, and second, the correct or mistaken attitudes
that we would then have about those inner attitudes. We can think of the
first as the love that is a source of reasons, and of the second as the love
that involves treating things as reasons. In line with my terminology from
the previous chapter, I will call the former the “normative sense” and the
latter the “cognitive sense.”
The same applies to caring, which in Frankfurt’s terminology is the
attitude towards either that which we love, or that which we care about
for the sake of something else that we love. Be it caring instrumentally
or caring for its own sake, we can now make the orthogonal distinction
between caring in the normative and caring in the cognitive sense. Hence,
what we care about in the normative sense is what we should care about in
the cognitive sense, and what we care about in the cognitive sense is what
7See section 9.3.
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we think we care about in the normative sense. However, instead of talking
about caring, and especially about love in this manner, which is somewhat
idiosyncratic on Frankfurt’s part, I prefer to talk about “volitional attitudes,”
which is a terminology that he also uses and that does not invite confusion
with the unauthoritative forms of love that we distinguished earlier on.
8.4.1 Normative vs. Cognitive Volitional Attitudes
Hence, my first proposed alteration of Frankfurt’s view is that we should
distinguish two types of volitional attitude: normative and cognitive voli-
tional attitudes. The tensions in Frankfurt’s approach that we discussed
above are largely due to his having a single type of attitude play too many
conceptual roles at the same time. Thus, whereas normative volitional atti-
tudes are opaque, cognitive volitional attitudes are, at least by comparison,
relatively transparent, since they involve our treating things as reasons,
while the former provide us with the normative reasons that we actually
have.
I have briefly introduced the idea of normative volitional attitudes in the
previous chapter: they involve wanting something “in the normative sense,”
and together, all the normative volitional attitudes of an agent constitute
what I have called his “normative will.” Conversely, when an agent has
a cognitive volitional attitude towards something, then we may say that
he wants it “in the cognitive sense” or that it is part of his “cognitive
will,” which consists of all his cognitive volitional attitudes combined. The
cognitive will, in other words, is the thing that has to get the normative
will right: the thing that gets updated, tested, and revised through the
process of volitional interpretation.
This may seem like terminological overkill: aren’t cognitive volitional
attitudes simply practical beliefs, on the view I am proposing? Well they
are roughly the same, except that there are three reasons to nevertheless
distinguish the two notions. First of all, I would prefer to say that a
cognitive volitional attitude towards φ-ing is a complex attitude, which
consists of both the agent’s belief that he wants to φ in the normative
sense, and whatever affective dispositions that may motivate him to φ that
accompany that belief. This preserves the idea that attitudes like caring
and love, in the sense of attitudes that direct our self-governed actions and
involve our treating things as reasons, are emotional attitudes: they involve
both thought and feeling. Of course, given our Distinctness Principle, we
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should say that the affective constituents are logically contingent upon the
belief: it should at least be conceptually possible for an agent to hold that
same belief without the same, and perhaps with utterly different, affective
dispositions.8 Furthermore, in practice, these beliefs may represent very
strong convictions and yet be accompanied by very weak motivations, or
vice-versa, depending on the psychological circumstances.
The second reason is that even the concept of the belief-part of the
attitude is not strictly identical to my concept of a practical belief. For
as I have briefly argued in section 4.3, and will argue more extensively
in chapter 10,9 we should adopt a pluralistic semantics of practical belief,
according to which practical beliefs are to be understood as relationalist
beliefs about the agent’s inner reality in some cases, and as incoherent
beliefs about nonrelationalist values or standards that do not really exist
in other cases, depending on the agent’s ‘folk meta-ethical’ views (so to
speak). To clarify the implication of this pluralism, let us refer to the
belief-part of a cognitive volitional attitude as a “volitional belief” (this is
consistent with the notion of a “volitional judgment” introduced in section
8.2.2 above: a volitional belief is adopted by making a volitional judgment).
Then it follows not only that some practical beliefs are not volitional beliefs,
such as the belief in a nonrelationalist commandment against homosexual
acts, but also that some volitional beliefs may not be practical beliefs, such
as when a homosexual man believes that even though some of the sexual
acts that he decided to commit did correspond to his volitionally normative
inner reality, they were in violation of what is practically normative in the
light of the nonrelationalist moral commandments that he erroneously and
tragically believes in.
Finally, the third reason is that we may also want to distinguish practical
beliefs from volitional beliefs in order to better explain how the proposed
view differs from views held by other philosophers. Recall that I divided
Frankfurt’s inner reality theory into two parts: the first part is the account
of the nature of caring itself; the second part is the account of practical
normativity in terms of the notion of caring, provided that some account
of its nature can be given. A philosopher who does not agree that caring
explains practical normativity may nevertheless agree that we can be
8Recall that motivational Humeans do not deny the existence of attitudes that have
intrinsically motivational as well as cognitive implications. We merely claim that such
attitudes are always complex in a manner that allows for a “two-factor analysis” (see sections
1.5 and 3.5.1).
9See section 10.5.3.
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mistaken about what it is that we care about, and therefore adopt the
framework of volitional beliefs, while denying that they are also practical
beliefs.
Nevertheless, if my view is correct, then in practice our volitional and
practical beliefs usually amount to the same thing. For even though belief
in nonrelationalist practical normativity is widespread, the content of peo-
ple’s nonrelationalist practical beliefs usually corresponds to that of their
volitional beliefs in terms of the thing being approved or disapproved of,
for reasons I will explain in chapter 10.10 The “perverse cases,” to use Wat-
son’s term, in which they come apart, are the exception. Such cases must
not be confused with the two far more common types of discrepancy that
our theory is meant to account for: (a) getting the normative will wrong,
where the volitional and practical beliefs are at odds with the agent’s nor-
mative volitional attitudes, and (b) lacking in self-government, where the
volitional and practical beliefs are at odds with the agent’s resultant desires.
In order to deal with these matters without over-complicating things, I will
from now on talk about practical and volitional beliefs interchangeably
as if they were the same thing except when it is necessary to distinguish
them.
8.4.2 Varieties of Authority, Freedom, and Responsibility
Now that we have distinguished two types of volitional attitude, which
of the two explains our original analysandum of agential authority, of an
attitude that speaks for the agent? I think the answer is that we must also
distinguish two types of agential authority. A political metaphor may be
helpful here. In a democracy, an elected government has the authority
to speak for the people. By analogy, that is the sort of authority that the
cognitive will has. I have already been using the term “self-government”
for the condition that an agent acts upon her practical beliefs, and hence
(setting perverse cases aside), upon her cognitive will. Even though she
may get her practical beliefs wrong, in which case what she treats as her
reasons are not really her normative reasons, they would still be her “self-
adopted reasons,” in our terminology from chapter 1. Recall our example
of the woman who decided to marry a man and move in with him, only to
find out afterward that this was a mistake. Even though her decision did
10See sections 10.5.3–5.
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not reflect her normative will, it was nevertheless her decision, in a manner
that did reflect her reasoning and her ideas.
However, returning to our metaphor, the authority of any elected
government is always derived, as it is a fallible means of the people to
exercise authority over itself and achieve freedom. In a different sense, the
will of the people itself is the deeper, underlying authority, but an authority
that can never be expressed directly, not even during elections. The will
of the people is opaque, just like the normative will, but it is nevertheless
with reference to the authority of the people’s will that a government
must justify its own authority amongst the various movements and forces
operating in a society, and in the same manner it is only as an attempt to
express the normative will that the cognitive will has a claim to authority
amongst an agent’s various motivations.
When the people perform badly in their attempt to express their will
during an election, say, and when the newly elected government proceeds
to act in ways that will turn out to be wholly against what the will of the
people had really been, then there is a manner in which the people were
free and a manner in which they weren’t. They were free in the sense that
they managed to rule themselves, and were hence not oppressed. They
weren’t free in the sense that the end result was not what they had really
wanted in the normative sense: the will of the people was not realized. In
similar respects, the unhappily married woman is both free and unfree.
Note that the distinction between these two types of authority cuts
across Frankfurt’s distinction between agential authority in the weak sense
of ‘accepting’ a motivation and the stronger sense of caring about remaining
so motivated. As we have seen, in Frankfurt’s view and terminology, it is
the weaker kind that establishes “freedom of the will.” In our modified
account, this notion of freedom may now be disambiguated into the two
types of freedom distinguished above. Nevertheless, one might also wish
to say that a more substantial type of freedom is achieved only once we
manage to implement the things we really care about, and there too, we
can distinguish between the cognitive and the normative sense. In my own
account, Frankfurt’s distinction between accepting and caring will not play
an important role.
What we should keep in mind, however, is our earlier observation that
what Frankfurt calls “freedom of the will” in this context may not be a very
plausible candidate for the sort of free will that would help justify praise
and blame. As I noted in section 8.2.1 above, if an agent would only be
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blameworthy for self-governed acts, then we could never blame people for
acting against their better judgments. Furthermore, even philosophers who
are skeptical about blameworthiness and the associated concepts of moral
responsibility and free will (e.g. Pereboom, 2001, 2007; Strawson, 2010)
usually subscribe to a weaker notion of accountability that does apply
to some of our lackings in self-government and yet requires the agent to
have willed the action in some sense that exceeds mere desiring (see esp.
Pereboom, 2002, section 1). Let us call the former, blame-including notion
“strong accountability” and the latter “weak accountability.”
As I mentioned in section 8.2.1, Gary Watson distinguished the concept
of accountability from what he called “attributability,” arguing that both
notions are important varieties of responsibility. The freedom that gives
rise to attributability is what Watson calls “self-disclosure” and it is this
notion that my concept of volitional interpretation is meant to make sense
of. In particular, the distinction that I am proposing between the cognitive
and the normative will should be understood as a further refinement of the
self-disclosure side of Watson’s taxonomy, by explaining how acting upon
the cognitive will discloses the views and ideas that the agent really endorses
as her own, while it is only when those views correspond to her opaque
normative will that they disclose, in a ‘deeper’ sense, the normative source
within herself that those ideas are supposed to represent. Let us say that
the former type of self-disclose gives rise to “weak attributability” whereas
the latter, ‘deeper’ variety constitutes “strong attributability.”
By contrast, the freedom that gives rise to accountability is often under-
stood as a kind of control that an agent can have over his actions. Let us
refer to the psychological structure exerting this control as the “executive
will.” Thus, when an agent acts upon his executive will, he may or may
not be acting in accordance with his cognitive will, but even if he is not,
then at least he is still controlling his action in a manner that allows us to
hold him accountable for it. The account of the cognitive and normative
will that I am developing here can remain pretty neutral about what the
nature of the executive will might be. For example, John Martin Fischer’s
concept of a “moderately reasons-responsive mechanism” would be one
account of the executive will with which my theory about the cognitive
and normative will is perfectly compatible.
Furthermore, the account of the cognitive and normative will can
also remain neutral about the question whether the executive will gives
rise merely to weak accountability, or whether it also justifies strong
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accountability. In fact, this allows us to capture the disagreement between
Fischer and Pereboom nicely, as Pereboom has claimed that he finds
Fischer’s notion of reasons-responsiveness a plausible candidate for the
justification of weak accountability. In our terminology, we can therefore
say that Fischer and Pereboom agree about the nature of the executive will,
but disagree about whether the executive will allows us to justify merely
weak accountability, or also strong accountability.
Our taxonomy of responsibility concepts is now as follows: we have
Watson’s distinction between accountability and attributability, Pereboom’s
further distinction between strong and weak accountability, and my further
distinction between strong and weak attributability. We have seen that
the normative and cognitive will explain these two forms of attributability,
that the executive will is whatever control-structure that allows us to
justify weak accountability, and that it is an open question whether such a
structure allows us also to justify strong accountability.
For the sake of completeness, however, we should also recognize that
the phrase “free will” is sometimes used in ways that do not presuppose it
to be a justifier of any sort of responsibility attribution in the first place.
For example, a lot has been written about whether “conscious will” might
be an “illusion” (Wegner, 2002), but it may be argued that conscious will is
neither necessary nor sufficient for responsibility attribution, and that it
does not correspond to either the executive, cognitive, or normative will
in our framework. Nevertheless, some researchers have used the term
“free will” to refer to ideas involving the immediate, conscious direction
of bodily movement (e.g. Libet, 1999), suggesting that at least for some
people, conscious will is part of their idea of freedom.11
Moreover, some philosophers seem to regard certain metaphysical
notions that play an important role in the debate on responsibility as
meaningful concepts of free will in their own right, regardless of whether
they do explain responsibility or not. Fischer, for example, argues that the
ability to have done otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility, but
nevertheless a meaningful concept of control that explains what people in
everyday life mean when they use the term “free will,” even though Fischer
11In our textbook on free will, Tjeerd van de Laar and I have divided the analysandum of
free will into the following three concepts (Van de Laar & Voerman, 2011): as a requirement
for moral responsibility (which is another term for strong accountability and thus concerns the
executive will); as a form of self-realization (which concerns the normative and cognitive will);
and as the conscious direction of action (which concerns conscious will in the Wegner/Libet
sense).
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believes that we may not have this ability and that it is incompatible with
determinism.
Summarizing, my proposal preserves Frankfurt’s idea that volitional
attitudes explain something that we call “freedom of the will,” but only
in a suitably qualified sense of the term, which should be distinguished
from a myriad of other, and very prominent, free will analysanda that the
theory remains neutral about.
8.4.3 The Affective Analysis of the Normative Will
As we have seen in section 8.2.3, Frankfurt has stated that “the notion of
caring is in large part constructed out of the notion of desire” and that it
“may be, in the end, nothing but a complex mode of wanting” (2004, p. 11).
He also writes, concerning love, that:
It is not essential to love that it be accompanied by any par-
ticular feelings or thoughts. The heart of the matter is not
affective or cognitive, but strictly volitional. The necessities of
love, which drive our conduct and which circumscribe our op-
tions, are necessities of the will. Their grip means that there are
certain considerations by which we cannot help being moved to
act, and which we cannot help counting as reasons for action.
What is essential to love is just these constrained dispositions
to reason and to act out of concern for the beloved. (Frankfurt,
2006, pp. 42–43)
At first glance, this passage seems to suggest the view that love cannot be
analyzed as, or reduced to, a complex of desires. Despite the ways in which
love is commonly associated with various desires, Frankfurt seems to be
saying, the “heart of the matter” or the “essence” of love is neither cognitive
nor affective, but “strictly” volitional in a sui generis fashion. However, he
also claims that this essence consists in dispositions to act in certain ways.
But note that in the broad sense of desiring explicated in sections 1.4 and
1.5, any disposition to perform an action φ under circumstances C, which is
not cognitive, counts as a disposition to have a desire to φ under C. Hence,
any analysis of volitional attitudes into dispositions that are not cognitive
must be an analysis of the volitional in terms of such desires by definition.
Perhaps we should conclude that when Frankfurt talks about the “af-
fective” and “feelings” in this passage, the notion he has in mind must be
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narrower than our desires in the broad sense. His reference to “feelings”
suggests that his purpose is rather to distinguish the volitional from a
certain type of phenomenally affective state, not from a motivational attitude
in a dispositional sense. Perhaps he merely means to express the claim
that love need not be associated with a very “passionate” or so-called “hot”
phenomenology, but that it may also exclusively involve rather “dispas-
sionate” or “cool” manners of going about one’s business that reflect one’s
loving something strongly or firmly. In that case, the claim seems true, but
also somewhat trivial, and rather uninteresting in the light of the prospects
of analyzing the volitional as a complex structure of more basic states or
attitudes that caring organisms share with the wanton organisms that act
exclusively upon first-order desires. After all, there is no reason why all
the first-order desires of the wanton should be accompanied by a ‘hot’ or
‘passionate’ phenomenology.
Maybe Frankfurt is claiming that love resists analysis in terms of phe-
nomenal states generally, not just the passionate states. In that case, his
view might be that whereas love cannot be analyzed as a complex of
feelings, it may perhaps still be analyzed as a complex of desires, on the
assumption that desires need not be phenomenal states themselves. Such a
conception of desires has been defended by Smith, who argues that actions
are sometimes explained by attributing desires with certain propositional
content to agents who do not phenomenologically experience themselves
to be desiring that content while acting the way they do (Smith, 1994,
pp. 104–111). Instead, Smith favors an account according to which desires
are themselves dispositions (pp. 111–116). However, on his view, at least,
these include dispositions to have certain feelings under certain situations,
not just behaviors. Thus, certain types of desires are essentially phenomeno-
logical, or essentially do have certain phenomenological implications. And
we may wonder whether it makes sense to speak of love, caring, or really
wanting something, without implying that the agent will at least be disposed
to experience certain feelings about what he loves under the appropriate
conditions.
To some extent, this issue depends on the analysis of phenomenal
consciousness itself. For example, consider the view that phenomenal
experience is an epiphenomenon, and that it is possible to conceive, without
incoherence, a world without experience whatsoever in which my “zombie
twin” is physically and functionally identical to me (Chalmers, 1996, 2003).
Although this is certainly not the majority view amongst philosophers of
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mind, it may be interesting to consider what it might mean for a zombie to
love something. To be sure, my zombie twin would have a similar inner
psychological structure that he might be mistaken about, albeit in a non-
phenomenological sense, compared to the structure of my normative will
that I might be mistaken about. However, given that zombie psychology is
just as functionally rich as ours, we might therefore also attribute various
‘affective’ states to my zombie twin, such as jealousy, anger, lust, or curiosity,
in order to explain his inner workings and behavioral dispositions, so
long as we keep these states functional. Therefore, epiphenomenalism
would not prevent us from wondering whether the volitional implies
affective dispositions understood as functional roles. At the same time,
even if a zombie were possible with a psychological structure identical
to the functional structure that constitutes my will, it seems that without
phenomenal experience, the things that my zombie twin and I both want
would not really matter to him as they do to me. They could not really
be important to him because there would not be a “him” in the relevant
sense. Thus, if the phenomenal does not reduce to the functional, then we
can give a weak interpretation of the affective that is purely functional and
a strong interpretation of the volitional that implies phenomenality. This
hardly shows that the volitional would a be less phenomenological concept
than the affective. Rather, it seems that both the volitional and the affective
can be approached in functional and phenomenological terms.
Furthermore, if we on the other hand consider analytic functionalism,
the view that an analysis of phenomenal consciousness in terms of its
functional role must be possible and that zombies are therefore logically
impossible (e.g. Lewis, 1990; Jackson, 1994; Dennett, 1991a, 2001), then
presumably an agent could not have the sort of dispositions underlying
love or caring without being disposed to have phenomenal states as well.
Again, it does not seem plausible to think that volitional states do not have
phenomenal implications when affective states do.
Another problem for this phenomenological interpretation of Frank-
furt’s claims about the irreducibility of the volitional to the affective is
that it seems to imply that Frankfurt’s concept of volitional necessity can-
not have a phenomenology either. However, without an experience of
volitional necessity from the inside, as it were, distinguishing a disconfir-
matory event of volitional necessity from a non-disconfirmatory event of
incontinence would no longer just be difficult, as I have argued in section
8.3.1, but outright impossible to do on the basis of the event itself. This
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leaves Frankfurt once again with the problem of explaining the opacity of
the normative will.
Finally, yet another interpretation of the above passage would be that
Frankfurt merely meant to say that the structure of love never reduces
to any particular affective type of attitude. Thus, no single type of affect
can by itself explain or establish the fact that an agent loves something.
Being jealous does not entail love, feeling romantic does not entail love,
and so on. But whoever said it would? As I see it, the whole idea behind
analyzing the volitional as a complex affective structure is that this would
involve multiple affective attitudes, and it seems plausible that these will
also be of different affective types. Hence, the complex structure of love
may lead to jealousy on one occasion, and to peace of mind on another.
Strangely enough, it seems Frankfurt himself who comes closest to the
view that a single type of experience might entail volitional love. As we
have seen in the previous section, the type of immediacy that Frankfurt
seems to associate with volitional necessity threatens to turn it into such a
privileged experience, and implausibly so.
In order to leave some of the confusion behind, let us call “affective” any
state or attitude that (a) may be understood as a motivational disposition
by attributing a desire in the broad sense and (b) is at least potentially
phenomenal in the sense that its motivational force may be experienced
phenomenally under certain conditions. Note that this does not mean
that its propositional content must be introspectively accessible. It merely
means that under the appropriate conditions, there will be something that
it is like for the agent to be motivated by this state. This is consistent with
Smith’s dispositional understanding of desires. It follows that thermostats
and chess computers do not have affective states even if we may attribute
desires to them, but also that all desires that enter into our practical
deliberations can be safely assumed to involve affective states in this sense.
Given this conception, I think the opacity of the normative will must
be explained by some analysis of normative volitional attitudes in terms of
complex affective dispositions. For let us assume the opposite. Assume, for
a second, that some normative volitional attitude could not, in principle,
be explained in terms of the various ways in which the agent might be
motivated, or might experience motivational pressure phenomenally, under
various conditions. Furthermore, since the normative will is opaque, the
agent is also unable to experience the content of this attitude introspectively.
Then how could the reality of this attitude possibly be a matter of empirical
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fact? What empirical reasons could there be to attribute it to him as part
of his normative will? What sort of biological or psychological properties
could imply that it is a fact that he wants this in the normative sense,
even though this will never translate into an effective and/or experienced
desire? Given our broad understanding of the notion of desire, any non-
cognitive mode of ‘wanting’ something that could not be analyzed in terms
of desires would amount to unwarranted mysterianism.
Or assume that the normative will could be analyzed as a structure
of dispositions that had no phenomenal implications whatsoever. Even
if the agent has phenomenal consciousness, there seems no reason why
such a structure should mean anything positive to him, in the same sense
in which it could not really mean anything to the unconscious zombie or
chess computer. On the contrary, from the perspective of his conscious
self, such a structure of behavioral dispositions whose motivational force
he is not able to experience phenomenally, if such a thing would even be
remotely possible, could only appear as something alien that is getting
in his way. In order for his will to mean anything to him as a conscious
agent, we must understand it in terms of dispositions that are affective. I
will attempt to provide such an analysis, and one that I believe explains
the opacity of the normative will, in the next chapter.
8.5 Modes of Normativity
In section 8.2 I divided Frankfurt’s inner reality theory into two parts: the
first part was his account of the nature of volitional attitudes, the second
his analysis of practical normativity in terms of such attitudes. In section
8.3 I have criticized the first part, and in section 8.4 I have explained how
it should be modified, setting the stage for my own account of the nature
of the normative will in chapter 9. Let us now take a brief critical look at
the second part of Frankfurt’s theory, in preparation for my own analysis
of practical judgments in chapter 10.
8.5.1 Moral, Volitional, and Practical Normativity
Consider the following example. John believes that animals are being
treated unethically in the factory farming industry. He also believes that
this gives him a reason not to consume meat that was produced by this
industry. Instead, he tries to buy meat that comes from so-called ‘organic’
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farms when he can, or to opt for vegetarian alternatives when they are
available. However, John is also not a fundamentalist about this and his
policy allows considerable leeway. He is happy to eat whatever meat is
served when he is a guest somewhere, and he allows himself to buy the
‘wrong’ meat when there is no ‘organic’ alternative available and he really
feels like eating that type of meat. Furthermore, let me stipulate that these
occasions do not involve weakness of will, or at least not all of them. In
other words, John has made the volitional judgment that he really wants to
allow himself this sort of leeway.
Suppose he has gotten this judgment right, would it then follow that
he also has a normative reason to buy the ‘wrong’ meat on the occasions
where he really wants to do so? Does the mere fact that he wants it in this
volitional sense make it right for him to do so? Several people, I believe,
would be inclined to feel otherwise. Whether we really want something is
one thing, they will say, and whether it is right or wrong is something else.
There are many ways to unpack this intuition, but what they all seem to
have in common is that they contrast the personal and perhaps partial ends
of the agent with the impartial and perhaps impersonal ends of morality.
For example, as we have seen in section 1.4.1, according to the type of
externalist who would reject the Authority Principle, morality is the object
of our practical judgments, but self-government does not require that we
act upon these judgments. A proponent of this view might argue that John
is self-governing when he follows his volitional judgment to eat the wrong
meat on occasion, while even John himself might at the same time, and
without contradiction, hold the practical belief that he should never eat
that kind of meat.
Or consider the external reasons view, which we discussed in chapter
2. If an external reasons theorist were to believe that there is a resultant
reason, in the external sense, for all of us never to eat any meat produced
by the unethical treatment of animals, then he may still allow that the taste
for meat could be so dominant in John’s subjective motivational set that
even after extensive reflection upon its unethical production, John might
remain motivated to buy the ‘unethical’ meat when the ‘ethical’ meat is
not available, which would constitute a resultant reason in the internal
sense. The external reasons theorist might say that the truth about John’s
internal reason establishes what he really wants, whereas the truth about
his external reason establishes what is right.
But even internalists who accept the Authority Principle and subscribe
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to a form of dispositionalism contrary to the external reasons view may
still distinguish between morality and volition, and hold that when the
two are in conflict, we should do what morality requires, rather than what
we personally want. The type-iii dispositionalist, for example, could say
that the volitional is the source of our p-reasons while morality establishes
our np-reasons (see section 6.3.4). And the type-ii dispositionalist might
want to argue that, whereas morality is nonrelationalist and a priori, there
nevertheless also is a relationalist and empirical inner reality of the sort that
Frankfurt and I attempt to describe, in such a way that the content of the
latter could conflict with the former. Finally, even a proponent of the Inner
Reality Thesis might argue that the volitional is not practically normative,
by claiming that the inner reality that gives us normative reasons should
not be analyzed in volitional terms like “wanting,” “loving,” or “caring.”
Now I think that all these views are implausible, for reasons that I
have, to a large extent, already discussed. However, the reason why I have
summarized these views here is that Frankfurt also makes a distinction
between the moral and the volitional. In fact, he makes two distinctions,
one between volitional judgments and moral judgments, and another
between volitional judgments and value judgments, that may both seem
similar to the sort of distinctions mentioned above:
[Y]our most fundamental problem is not to understand how
to identify what is valuable. Nor is it to discover what the
principles of morality demand, forbid, and permit. You are
concerned with how to make specific concrete decisions about
what to aim at and how to behave. Neither judgments of value
in general nor moral judgments in particular can settle this for
you. (Frankfurt, 2006, p. 27)
However, there is a big difference: whereas the aforementioned ways of
unpacking the division all took morality to be the practically normative
phenomenon, giving it a kind of precedence over the volitional, Frankfurt
instead argues that the volitional is practically normative in the most
fundamental sense, rather than the requirements of morality or the facts
about value. Let us consider morality first:
It is often presumed that the demands of morality are inher-
ently preemptive—in other words, that they must always be
accorded an overriding precedence over all other interests and
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claims. This strikes me as implausible. [. . . ] Morality is most
particularly concerned with how our attitudes and our actions
should take into account the needs, the desires, and the en-
titlements of other people. Now why must that be regarded
as being, without exception, the most compelling thing in our
lives? (Frankfurt, 2004, p. 7)
Does this mean that on Frankfurt’s view we might also claim that even
though John gets his volitional judgment right that he wants to be able
to eat the ‘wrong’ meat now and then, it would still be morally wrong
for him to do so? To be sure, Frankfurt only talks about the interests of
other people, not other animals, but presumably animals count as well (and
otherwise we could construct an example involving the unethical treatment
of workers in a factory, say). So I suppose this distinction between what
John wants and what is moral can be maintained on Frankfurt’s view.
Note that Frankfurt uses the term “morality” in a narrow sense, which
only involves the reasons we have for taking other people’s interests into
account. Therefore, morality is only one “mode of normativity” amongst
many others, including those involving “nonmoral ideals” such as “aes-
thetic, cultural or religious ideals” (p. 8). By itself, that is pretty much
in line with my own usage of the term in section 1.3.2. But the way in
which Frankfurt seems to be construing these modes of normativity is that
each of these only provides reasons in the non-resultant sense. Hence, after
each mode has contributed its reasons, there is still the general normative
question of how to balance them in order to determine one’s reasons in the
resultant, all-things-considered sense. And this is, apparently, not a moral
question even when moral considerations are among those at stake. Thus,
if John gets his volitional judgment right then Frankfurt only allows you
to say that John’s policy is not moral because it is an all-things-considered
policy and Frankfurt simply does not wish to call the all-things-considered
stuff “moral.”
Frankfurt’s terminology seems highly idiosyncratic: most philosophers
would say that morality is not only about what sort of things you might do
in order to care for others, but also about how much time and resources you
should spend on that, and how you should balance these considerations
against your other ends. Frankfurt does seem to admit that morality is
about balancing the needs of others against your self-interest, but he argues
that many of the other modes of normativity, such as religious or aesthetic
ideals, are not self-interested either. However, insofar these ideals need to
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be balanced against moral ideals, I think most philosophers would still call
that balancing a moral issue. And insofar various nonmoral ideals need
to be balanced against each other, morality is not being outweighed, but
simply neutral or irrelevant.
Hence, because of how he has construed the term, morality is not an
external practical normativity independent of our volitional attitudes, but
merely a non-resultant subdivision of practical normativity, which as a
whole is still understood in terms of the volitional according to the Inner
Reality Thesis.
8.5.2 Value Judgements and Volitional Judgements
Let us now take a look at the second distinction that Frankfurt makes,
between value judgments and volitional judgments:
Caring about something differs not only from wanting it, and
from wanting it more than other things. It differs also from
taking it to be intrinsically valuable. Even if a person believes
that something has considerable intrinsic value, he may not
regard it as important to himself. (Frankfurt, 2004, p. 12)
And the point is not that the agent simply judges that the thing of value
would be better pursued by someone else. Rather, the agent may be
perfectly happy to leave the value in question unresponded to:
Something that we recognize as having intrinsic value (a life
devoted to profound meditation, perhaps, or to courageous
feats of knight errantry) may nevertheless fail to attract us.
Moreover, it may be a matter of complete indifference to us
whether anyone at all is interested in promoting or achieving
it. We can easily think of many things that might well be
worth having or worth doing for their own sakes, but with
regard to which we consider it entirely acceptable that no one
is especially drawn to them and that they are never actually
pursued. (Frankfurt, 2004, p. 13)
I am puzzled about what these intrinsic values are supposed to be, on
Frankfurt’s view, or what the purpose would be for us to go about recog-
nizing them. Frankfurt seems to have some sort of modal claim in mind: a
value is something that it is possible for a reasonable, self-governing agent
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to love, even if nobody actually does, or has to. But if this would be mere
conceptual possibility, then making such value judgments in everyday life
seems otiose (except perhaps for philosophers who are trying to figure
out what is constitutive of self-governing agency). And if it is a more
restrictive mode of possibility, then Frankfurt should say something about
that, which he doesn’t.
Perhaps it is a kind of dialectical move, where he wants to grant his
opponents that they may have good reasons for believing in the existence
of mind-independent values, while restricting his own defense to the claim
that such values would not imply that we should care about them. But I
think this is not a prudent move, dialectically speaking. On the contrary,
the fact that it does not involve a metaphysics of mind-independent values
should be a major selling point of the Inner Reality Thesis. As Korsgaard
put it, “it seems a shame to go to all the trouble to deny normative realism
about values and then espouse a kind of nonnormative realism about them
after all” (2006, p. 71).
Nevertheless, the most important thing at this juncture is our observa-
tion that Frankfurt does not consider morality or intrinsic value, insofar
as these may come apart from the volitional, as practically normative. In
fact, his analysis of practical normativity in terms of our volitional inner
reality seems that of straightforward identification: practical judgments are
volitional judgments. I have already indicated that this claim is too quick,
because we need to account for erroneous nonrelationalist judgments as
well. We will return to this matter in chapter 10.12
12See section 10.5.

9 The Nature of the Normative Will
In section 4.4 I formulated two problems for the type-i dispositionalist.
The first was to account for the idea that some of our contingent desires
have the authority to discredit others. The second was to give a plausible
relationalist account of the intuitions behind the Intersubjectivity Principle.
In chapter 8 we have seen how a volitional inner reality theory might solve
the first problem. On such a theory, some of my desires are in accordance
to my volitional attitudes—the attitudes I have towards the things I really
want as a person—whereas others are not. However, I have argued that
Frankfurt’s own volitional theory fails to explain the opacity of normative
volitional attitudes: first, because he does not properly distinguish them
from cognitive volitional attitudes; and second, because he ultimately fails
to provide an analysis of them as structures of more basic and unprivileged
affective attitudes.
In this chapter I shall attempt to formulate a volitional inner reality
theory that does satisfy these requirements: an account of the nature of
the normative will, in accordance with the Affective Response View of
disconfirmation from chapter 7, that will address the first problem of type-i
dispositionalism. I return to the second problem in the next chapter.
9.1 The Affective Pattern View
According to the view I want to propose, volitional interpretation is essen-
tially a form of pattern recognition, and the normative will is the pattern
that the deliberating agent is trying to recognize: a pattern across her
affective dispositions. Let us call this the “Affective Pattern View.” I am
borrowing the general idea of a pattern as an ontological notion from
Daniel Dennett, who has argued that beliefs and desires are present as
patterns in our behavior (1991b). However, my purpose is to apply the
notion at a different level, which does not presuppose Dennett’s purely
behavior-based ontology of intentional states. Let me explain.
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As an example, Dennett discusses visual images, represented as bitmaps
of square pixels, that depict a ‘bar code’ of adjacent larger black and white
squares, except that there are also some white pixels within the black
squares and black pixels within the white ones (1991b, p. 31, figure 1).
What is important is that despite the fact that such an image is strictly
nonidentical to what a ‘pure’ bar code image would have looked like, we
can nevertheless recognize the bar code and reject the deviant pixels as
noise. Furthermore, it seems that we would have missed something about
the ‘impure’ image if we had not recognized the bar-code pattern in it,
and therefore, that the presence of this pattern is a matter of fact about the
‘impure’ image.
Now recall Harry Frankfurt’s terminology of desires that are “external
to the person.” In a nutshell, my suggestion is that such desires are like
the ‘noise’ in the image. When we get it right, we reject such desires as
not being part of our will, just like we ‘reject’ the deviant pixels in the
image as noise. Conversely, I propose that we may recognize how the other
desires that we have, the ones that are “internal to the person,” jointly
constitute a pattern of what we really want, just like the pixels in the image
that contribute to the bar code pattern. We try to form a picture of our
normative will by considering the totality of affective experiences from
different situations together. Even though our desires pull us into different
directions at different times, and sometimes even at the same time, we
search for recurring themes and for ways in which different emotions
might support each other and jointly point in some direction.
Instead, Dennett pursues a different analogy: he wants to compare the
individual pixels to our individual behaviors, and explain our beliefs and
desires as patterns across these behaviors, such that we can recognize the
behaviors that contribute to these patterns as actions, while once again
classifying the behaviors that do not fit into these patterns as a form of
noise. This is not a perfect analogy, however, because of some issues with
regard to attitudes and behavior that do not arise in the case of images
and pixels. Therefore, let us first discuss how Dennett’s application differs
from his bar code example, and see whether these differences also apply
to the application that I have in mind. After that, I will say more about
how my application of this analogy differs from Dennett’s.
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9.1.1 Limited Data and Predictive Success
In the case of the bar code image, all the relevant data—i.e., all the pixels
that make up the image—are presented to us at the same time and processed
by our visual cortex in parallel, unlike the data pertaining to the analysis
of propositional attitudes. Instead, we attribute beliefs and desires to an
agent, according to Dennett’s view, on the basis of our experience of that
agent’s behavior on different occasions through time. Rather than seeing
the pattern directly, we have to interpret the behavior that we are currently
observing in the light of our memory of the agent’s past behavior, by
attributing beliefs and desires from the “intentional stance” (Dennett, 1987).
Adopting this stance towards an agent involves the assumption that her
behavior can be made sense of in terms of rationally interrelated beliefs
and desires.
Below I will say a bit more about how Dennett’s intentional stance
theory squares with my own views concerning belief–desire psychology
and with the things I have said about motivational Humeanism earlier
on in this thesis. But first let us note that at least with respect to my
account of volitional interpretation, something similar applies to my own
view as applies to Dennett’s. As I have argued in chapter 7, we deliberate
upon our ends by considering the relations between our different affective
experiences on various occasions. One might say that on my view, the
deliberator adopts a ‘volitional stance’ towards himself, by assuming that
he has a normative will.
Furthermore, in contrast to the bar code example, Dennett’s interpreter
must always work with a limited set of data in order to make judgments
about an underlying reality. Thus, when we look at the bar code image,
we are in a sense fully informed: because we are able to see all the pixels,
nothing further about the image is hidden from us. Or, to put it differently,
the pixels are not just data about the image; they are the image. Instead, the
observed behaviors of an agent are never fully constitutive of his mental
states: they are merely the various manifestations of those states under the
particular circumstances that the agent has so far encountered. Even in so
far as intentional attitudes can be analyzed as behavioral dispositions, they
would still be constituted by all the behaviors that the agent would have
displayed under an infinite range of counterfactual circumstances that we
will never actually observe.
Hence, the behaviors that Dennett’s interpreter does observe are rather
like a statistical sample of the reality that the interpreter is trying to get
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right. The bigger the sample, the larger the chance that a pattern in that
sample reflects a real underlying pattern in the dispositions of the agent.
Because the intentional stance must, of course, lack any scientific rigor
or statistical method, Dennett gives a somewhat informal explanation of
the idea that an agent really has certain beliefs and desires in terms of
our success in predicting his future behavior by attributing those beliefs
and desires. If we achieve ‘above chance’ results, then we can explain our
predictive success by assuming that we recognized a “real pattern.”
Once again, a similar thing can be said with respect to my views
about practical deliberation. In chapter 7 I argued that it follows from
the Affective Response View of disconfirmation that we must analyze
our practical judgments in terms of predictions about our future affective
responses. The higher their predictive success, the more reason one has to
believe that the reality of one’s normative will must explain this success. Of
course, there are also uncritical ways of avoiding disconfirmation, which do
not count as predictive success—more on this later on. For now, however,
note that we can argue for the reality of the normative will on the basis
of the Affective Response View in a manner similar to Dennett’s line of
argument: if we were able to correctly predict our affective responses on
the basis of our practical judgments, and if our success in doing so was
not due to chance or to circumstances that undermined the possibility
for disconfirmation in uncritical ways, then it seems we would have missed
something about ourselves if we had failed to make those predictions.
However, we shall see below that the relation between predictive success
and correct interpretation is more complex in the case of my Affective
Pattern View, and therein lies an important dis-analogy between Dennett’s
application of the pattern concept and mine. But in order to explain this,
let me first say a bit more about how the two accounts are different even
insofar they are analogous.
9.1.2 Levels of Organization and Varieties of Attributivism
To begin with, the most obvious difference is the level of organization
at which the two theories operate: whereas Dennett analyzes beliefs and
desires as patterns of behavior, I propose to analyze the normative will as
a pattern of desires. Hence, while desires are the analysanda in Dennett’s
account, they are the analysans in mine. The two views may very well be
independent of each other: one might subscribe to only one of them, or
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neither, or both. If one subscribes to both, then one might think of the
normative will as a ‘second order’ pattern: a pattern of desires, which are
themselves patterns of behavior.
And the theories are even further apart, because as I argued in the
previous chapter, I do not think the normative will should be analyzed in
terms of the desires that even chess computers and thermostats might have,
which are amongst the desires that Dennett is presenting as real patterns.
Instead, I mean to analyze the normative will in terms of affective attitudes,
which I have defined as dispositions that, in addition to their motivational
impact on behavior, also imply a phenomenal experience of their motiva-
tional ‘pull’ under at least certain circumstances (although without thereby
necessarily providing introspective access to the propositional content of
the attitude).
To be sure, this constraint on the normative will is not incompatible
with Dennett’s philosophy of mind. After all, Dennett also accepts a
distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states. He thinks
this distinction can be made from the intentional stance using the method
of “heterophenomenology” (2003), which basically consists in taking verbal
reports of phenomenal experience at face value. And he argues that the
experience of consciousness that people report can be analyzed functionally
from the “design stance” (1991a; 2001). If this is correct, then the Affective
Pattern View of the volitional is fully compatible with Dennett’s pattern
view of the mental, and followers of Dennett who subscribe to both his
explanations of intentionality and consciousness may view the “volitional
stance” as a further extension to the “design stance” and the “intentional
stance.”
Nevertheless, I want to be clear that the Affective Pattern View does
not depend on such an approach towards consciousness and intentionality.
On the contrary, I myself think Dennett’s theory of consciousness is wholly
unsatisfactory, though for reasons that are beyond the scope of this thesis.1
What matters for now is that the Affective Pattern View analyzes the
normative will as a pattern of potentially phenomenal states, regardless of
how phenomenal experience should itself be analyzed.
1Briefly, my view is that although phenomenal states can only be understood in the
context of a functional, cognitive architecture implemented by the physical workings of the
brain, no physical description of the supervenience base of phenomenal states can capture
the full nature of that base on which the phenomenal character of our experiences supervenes
logically. Similar views have been defended by Peirce (1891/1992a, pp. 292–293) and Russell
(1927), and more recently by Strawson (2006) and Nagel (2000).
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Furthermore, I am also not convinced by Dennett’s account of inten-
tionality, although I am more sympathetic to it, in particular to the idea
that the propositional content of beliefs and desires should be understood
in an attributivist manner. However, unlike Dennett, I do not think that
attribution of beliefs and desires is what we usually do when we interpret
each other’s behavior in everyday life. As I noted in section 3.4.2, human
behavior may be easier to explain in terms of attitudes that do not represent
separately our understanding of the world and our goals for acting in it.
Instead, attitudes which are both cognitive and motivational may not only
be more psychologically realistic, but also more commonly attributed in
everyday life. By contrast, I have briefly alluded to an argument that the
purpose of belief–desire psychology is rather to reconstruct our attitudes
in relation to our ‘disinterested’ concept of truth. However, an extensive
defense of this idea is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Finally, let me note that even someone who would completely reject
the attributivist approach towards beliefs and desires, and who would
for example opt for a computationalist understanding of belief-desire
psychology and a much more traditional defense of the Humean theory
of motivation, may still subscribe to my analysis of the normative will as
a pattern in the desires that the agent will or would have under various
actual and counterfactual circumstances. Basically, my aim is to maximize
the plausibility of the views I put forward in this thesis by on the one
hand defending them in a manner informed by ideas and insights from
philosophy of mind and cognitive science, while on the other hand keeping
their formulations fairly neutral with respect to many of the disputes in
those fields.
9.1.3 Motivational Character vs. Normative Will
What does it mean to say that something is a pattern across our desires? An
important feature of desires is that we have many of them: some are only
incidental or present during a short period of time, others are recurrent or
stable during a long phase in the agent’s life. We can experience multiple
desires at the same time, even if they conflict, and we may note even
more conflicts between the desires, or affective responses, that motivate us
under different circumstances, or during different times of the day, week,
or year. Therefore, one way in which we might construe a pattern across
this multitude of attitudes towards conflicting propositions would be to
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identify the ‘largest’ coherent subset of those attitudes, so to speak, where
the ‘size’ of this subset would be measured in terms of the motivational
strength of its elements.
Thus, in a greatly oversimplified picture, suppose an agent has de-
sires d1–d5 towards propositions P1–P5 with motivational strengths m1–m5.
Suppose that P1 and P2 are compatible, but that P1 rules out P3, P4, and
P5. Suppose furthermore that m1 plus m2 make up more motivational
impetus than any other combination of these desires that do not feature
incompatible contents. Then {d1, d2} would be the ‘largest’ coherent subset
of the agent’s desires. However, the problem is of course that we cannot
individuate our affective states or dispositions in such a discrete and finite
manner. Nevertheless, we might be able to imagine a structurally similar
idea of the degree to which we find ourselves motivated, across different
circumstances, towards our various competing and even conflicting goals.
Then, we might think of the coherent subset of desire attributions which
collects the largest overall amount of motivational potential as the motiva-
tional character of the person. Think of the person with the lazy character
who usually decides to act in ways that minimize effort, even though he
will sometimes act otherwise.
But this idea raises many questions. For one thing, does it not depend
heavily on the type of circumstances this person will find himself in how
he will be motivated most of the time? Maybe if such a person became
a recruit with the Marine Corps, then he wouldn’t be so lazy after all.
Some philosophers2 argue that “situationist” social psychology3 has shown
that little, if any, of our behavior is explained by “global” (i.e. situation
independent) character traits, because the impact of situational differences
generally outstrips that of differences between individuals. And even if
we follow the more recent, and in my view more plausible, approach
in social psychology which focuses on the interaction of personal and
situational factors,4 then it still seems our dispositional construal of an
agent’s motivational character is going to depend heavily on how wide a
range of counterfactual situations we are going to include in our analysis of
the relevant dispositions. Add to that the formal complexities concerning
the ways in which we would have to individuate and weigh the myriad of
counterfactual situations in order to determine which of his dispositions
2E.g. Harman (1999); Doris (2002).
3E.g. Isen & Levin (1972); Milgram (1974).
4E.g. Van Zomeren et al. (2011); Skitka et al. (2005); Mullen & Skitka (2006); De Kwaad-
steniet et al. (2007).
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would be ‘strongest overall’ and it seems we can attribute to an agent
any motivational character we like, depending on how we set up our
framework.
Roughly, I think there are two ways out of this, leading to two different
concepts of a coherent “overall” dispositional pattern. The first is the
closest analogue to Dennett’s notion, for which I shall continue to use the
phrase “motivational character.” The second is the normative will.
Let us begin with the first notion. Recall that the evidence we have
about our dispositions is always a limited and contingent sample of the
underlying reality. Now as we have seen, in order to circumvent this
limitation, Dennett infers the reality of the underlying pattern from the
predictive success of the attribution. Furthermore, we have seen that when
we attribute beliefs and desires, we try to find a theory that would correctly
predict most acts of the agent by attributing conflicting desires in order to
account for his conflicting behaviors under different circumstances and,
we might add, for his verbal reports of experiencing conflicting desires
pulling him into different directions even in a single situation.5 But when
we attribute a motivational character to the agent, we abstract away from
those ambiguities and try to represent the dominant tendency in the agent
that retains as much predictive power as possible. In order to do so, we
aim for a model that works in the sort of situations in which the agent
already tends to find himself. Furthermore, we understand the notion of
motivational character in such a way that, should the agent’s situation
change radically (as in the case of the lazy person who becomes a Marine
recruit) then we would say that his motivational character will change
as well.6 Hence, the motivational character is a ‘conservative’ pattern
attribution aimed at explaining the agent’s behavior in his actual life in
5I am assuming that Dennett’s intentional stance does allow the attribution of conflicting
individual desires to a single agent, although it is not always clear from his writings that this
is what he intends. Nevertheless, without this possibility the intentional stance would seem
wholly unsuitable to explain the notion of desire in common parlance, as the possibility of
conflicting desires is so deeply entrenched in the human condition.
6If situationism is true, then the agent’s behavioral traits will be different ‘immediately,’
as it were, from the moment he sets foot in the military base. And if situationism is false,
then his behavior will still already be different when he starts his training on the basis of his
old dispositions, since the punishments and rewards of his choices will now be different. But
most likely, the discipline of military life is also something that recruits will get better at as
their training progresses, which means that the change in motivational character will also
involve a substantial physical development of the agent’s brain and body. Hence, the change
in motivational character is not just a conceptual flip, but also a real, causal process.
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terms of coherence.
Note that this coherence has nothing to do with practical normativity:
if we want to attribute a coherent desire set to the unwilling addict that
maximizes our predictive success, then that set may include his desire to
take drugs rather than his desire to resist it if, on average, the addict tends
to take the drugs when he has the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, note
also that we may expand this notion of coherence in ways that go beyond
strict logical consistency, which we have discussed earlier on in the context
of practical normativity.7 Thus, if we know that someone likes to eat
T-bone and rib-eye steaks, we may infer that she will probably like sirloin
steaks as well. On the other hand, if we know that she tends to respond
politely at work, she may well be aggressive at home, as the situationists
keep telling us. Since the notion of motivational character is construed in
terms of actual predictive success, all these things are allowed in so far as
they work: the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
By contrast, the normative will is only supposed to be predictive insofar
the actual circumstances do not deviate from the ideal conditions of ratio-
nal, self-governing agency, in line with the type-i dispositionalist approach.
Thus, suppose that the lazy person does not want to be a lazy person.
Every time he takes the lazy route, he had actually made a volitional
judgment to do something else. In order to make it possible that such a
judgment could get it right, we must cast the net of possible circumstances
much wider into the realm of the counterfactual. Thus, if the lazy man
believes that he would lose his lazy character if he were to join the Marine
Corps, and if not being lazy allows him to realize many other desires that
he has, then this might actually justify the volitional judgment that he
does not want to be lazy. It might even justify joining the Corps, if being a
Marine does not conflict with the desires that he has.
Volitional interpretation thus involves a survey of “alternatives of one-
self,” to borrow a phrase from Jan Bransen (2002). However, this also
7It may be argued that a notion of coherence beyond mere consistency is already pre-
supposed at the level of desire attribution. Without it, any set of behavioral data might
allow an infinite amount of attribution sets that are logically consistent with those data,
making inductive reasoning in order to predict future behavior impossible. Hence, like
any predictive empirical theory, a theory about the mental states of an agent must assume
empirical regularities that go beyond the data themselves. Furthermore, it is only in the light
of such regularities that the intuitive idea of conflicting motivations in different situations
can be made sense of. Otherwise, we could simply attribute desires whose content would be
tailored to unique situations and therefore conflict with no motivations in different situations
at all.
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implies a limit on the range of relevant counterfactuals. Replacing my
brain would no longer yield an alternative of myself. Neither would a
possible world in which my environment and upbringing had been radi-
cally different since my birth. Therefore, the notion of the normative will
involves a concept of identity: it is about recognizing a pattern in what
I could be, given the empirical facts about who I am. But note that the
implicated identity relation is not the often discussed notion of “personal
identity through time,” which is presupposed by our social relationships
and institutions of accountability. Rather, it is an identity relation that
holds between modal alternatives to my current, actual self at this point
or period in time, which captures the fact that all these alternatives are
manifestations of the same dispositions that are grounded in the empirical
facts about my actual self.8
This concept of identity has already been presupposed in our discus-
sions of “ideal selves.” If we think that the notion of an ‘ideal self’ refers
to a possible alternative of myself, then this identity relation must hold
between me and my ideal self, in order to establish that it is my ideal self
and not just ‘an’ ideal self. By contrast, if we think that the ‘ideal self’
does not depict a possibility, as I have suggested, then we might say that
the relevant identity relation must hold between successive alternatives
of myself that approach my ideal self in the limit, such that they approach,
once again, my ideal self, and not just ‘an’ ideal self.
9.1.4 Identity and Proceduralism
This last observation, that the dispositions in which the normative will is
present as a pattern must be determined in the light of a modality that
allows us to identify with our ideal selves, gives us a further clue about the
scope of this modality. If the ideal self is the limit of deliberative improve-
ment in the light of a proceduralist understanding of disconfirmation, as I
have argued, then it makes sense to think of my normative will as ranging
over dispositions that are constrained by proceduralism as well. Let me
explain.
8I am not sure whether this is simply identity across possible worlds. One might say
that the Sander Voerman who would have been given a radically different education from
the beginning would still be identical to me in some basic sense of identity across possible
worlds, even though this person would only share my genetic dispositions, which are too
shallow, and also too arbitrary, in order to establish the inner reality that we are trying to
analyze.
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Suppose that three SS officers in Nazi Germany, who committed
hideous acts during the Holocaust when they were, say, 30 years old,
had had sufficiently similar genes and early upbringing that their overall
dispositions were more or less the same when they were about 15 years old.
However, after that, their further development into 30 year old war crimi-
nals progressed in different ways. In the case of the first officer, despite his
atrocities, there remained a flexibility in his thoughts and motivations that
would lead him, long after the war, to regret his acts and disconfirm his
prior judgments. At the age of 60, let us say, officer 1 has arrived at the
volitional belief that his crimes were horrible mistakes.
By contrast, the other two officers never renounced their earlier actions,
and kept defending the Holocaust until their deaths. However, let us
imagine that in the case of officer 2, this was partly due to the circumstances
of his life after the war. If those circumstances had been different, then in
principle he could have been made to understand that he did not have good
reasons to act the way he did. We might say that his failure to appreciate
these facts was a matter of eliminable epistemic bad luck.
Instead, let us suppose that for officer 3, given the way in which his
psychology had developed between his 15th and his 30th year, there was
no longer any proceduralistically possible route that would have lead him
to disconfirm his support for Nazi Germany. If he would have been given
the medical treatment to overcome the biological limitations that make
us susceptible to diseases of old age, let us say, and if he would have
continued to live through the centuries, then still no requirement would
ever be demonstrable to him that would have showed him an error in his
ways. Ex hypothesi, then, officer 3 is quite like the Martians in this respect.
The question is, did these officers act against their normative will
during the Holocaust? Now even in the case of officer 1, a skeptic might
wish to deny that there were any such deep facts about the will of the
officer at that time, despite the judgments of his later self. Instead it might
be simpler to say that the will of the officer merely changed after the war
had been lost. But we have already seen how the Affective Response View
allows us to say more than that: if the practical beliefs of the 30-year-old
officer implied predictions that turned out to be false, then we have a
reason to think that the officer already did not want, in the normative
sense, to be a Nazi at the time. And it does seem plausible that there would
be such predictions. After all, Nazi education was not exactly a celebration
of critical thinking. SS trainees were not instructed to seriously attempt
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to love and cherish their Jewish or homosexual fellow human beings in
order to critically examine the Nazi theory that such a thing would be
pointless. If you would have told officer 1 that his life would have been
richer and more rewarding if he could have loved the people that were now
his victims, he would’ve laughed at you (or reported you to his superiors).
But he never tested those predictions, and his later self might well conclude
that his earlier self kept his views exactly because he never tested them.
Of course, it does not follow that life must have been more pleasant for
him as he reached his 60s. On the contrary, the immense feelings of guilt
that officer 1 must have gone through would have made his life absolutely
miserable. So the guilt-ridden 60 year old had no way of directly testing
how a different life for his past self could have been. But as we have seen,
volitional interpretation offers various roundabout ways. Perhaps the old
man recognizes how he was as a 15 year old teenager when he watches
his grandson grow up. And perhaps he can see how life is so much better
now for his grandson in a liberal democracy—something he was taught to
abhor during his indoctrination. Furthermore, he can now see how various
elements of the Nazi belief system that were blatantly false—concerning
the biology of race, for example—were designed to make it easier for him
not to feel horrible about torturing other people. None of these elements
were sufficient in their own right, but combined with the authoritative
pressure and the group thinking of the Nazi society, we now know how
our disposition to feel horrible about torture can be silenced. But that
doesn’t mean the disposition is no longer there. What it means is that the
relevant difference between the 60 year old ex-officer and his 30 year old
former self lies in their beliefs and circumstances. Hence, it seems justified
for the 60 year old to postulate an alternative of his 30 year old self that
would have recoiled in horror from his acts, and would have lived a better
life as a tolerant liberal.
So the point is not merely that his dispositions enabled a happy and
flourishing alternative of his 30 year old self in a different society, showing
that he has a disposition to favor such a life. The point is also that to some
extent, the affective manifestation of his 30 year old actual self does not even
count because if how strongly biased it is by, and dependent upon, his
ignorance. Rather, if we want to compare his disposition towards living
in a liberal democracy with his disposition to being an SS officer in Nazi
Germany we must project how he would have felt as an SS officer if he had
all the relevant knowledge about the psychological mechanisms mentioned
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above and if he had fully understood his alternatives. His normative will
is that pattern in his dispositions that will manifest itself across different
situations as the agent comes to understand himself.
This entails a certain non-straightforward dialectic of self-knowledge: it
is knowledge about how we would be if we were to have that knowledge.
One might object that this knowledge is therefore empty, or indeterminate,
or in principle inaccessible: if the state to be known is a state that does not
obtain as long as we do not know, then we can never gain that knowledge.
But that does not follow, because gaining knowledge is a gradual phe-
nomenon, and we may assume that we already have some knowledge about
the nature behind our own feelings, which means that the feelings we have
can at least tell us something about the feelings we would have if we knew
even more about them. Therefore, if by understanding our feelings, we
subsequently change our feelings, then the object of our knowledge does
seem to be a moving target, but the ‘curve’ of how that target will progress
may slowly approach a fixed point where the gap between the normative
and the cognitive will would finally be closed: the limit of the ideal self.
Of course, if the ideal self is not a real possibility, as I have suggested, then
this point is always infinitely far away, so to speak, and the ideal would be
like an asymptote to which the curve approaches ever nearer.
We can now see how the second officer also may have acted against
his normative will. As I briefly discussed in section 7.4.2, mechanisms of
self-confirmation bias are common. It may require special circumstances
to turn people into Nazis, but once we have settled on a belief set, we are
intrinsically inclined to stick with it, especially if rejecting it would imply
harsh criticism of our own actions, as in the case of officer 1. Therefore, it is
not surprising that many war criminals have never come to renounce their
acts. But from that it does not follow that they could not have disconfirmed
their views in principle. Because psychological mechanisms of bias should
be classified, I submit, as matters of eliminable epistemic bad luck. And
we can argue for this with respect to theoretical matters of fact that are
not response-dependent in the way that practical reason is. Many people
are so strongly biased that they fail to take the evidence for the theory of
evolution seriously, for example. Some people even insist, against all odds,
that the massive evidence for the idea that the earth is billions of years
old is merely staged by God to test our faith in a literal interpretation of
the Bible. Clearly, these failures are not matters of ineliminable epistemic
luck: they depend on the contingent limitations of people’s cognitive
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abilities. Our ideal selves do not have unlucky twins that fall prey to these
types of mistakes. Furthermore, the things that these unlucky twins might
falsely believe in, such as nominalism in metaphysics, would not really be
matters of bias, because in such a case there was no evidence to be assessed
that would have made a difference: there was just no way they could
have known. Hence, bias is a matter of bad procedure; it is in principle
eliminable. But given that psychological mechanisms of bias introduce this
sort of eliminable luck, we should expect the same thing in the field of
practical reason.
Thus, it seems plausible that many war criminals follow the course
of officer 2: even though they closed their eyes for it until their deaths,
the evidence about their inner dispositions was out there, just like it was
for officer 1, and would in principle have made it possible for them to
disconfirm their views. Once again, let me stress how this distinguishes
relationalism from superficial relativism: even with respect to Nazi war
criminals who never showed any signs of regret we can have reason to
believe that they were acting against their inner normative reality.
To be sure, the theory does not guarantee that all of them are like officer
2 either. It is at least conceptually possible that some remorseless criminals
are rather like officer 3. But can we say that officer 3 acted against his
normative will? Here I think the answer must be no. Of course, like
officers 1 and 2, officer 3 is a product of his upbringing, and insofar this
involved indoctrination and uncritical education, we must understand the
normative will of officer 3 in terms of how his dispositions would manifest
themselves under conditions of critical thinking and self understanding.
However, our upbringing does not only teach us how to think, it also
shapes our emotional nature. Therefore, if the nature of officer 3 has been
shaped in such a way that no procedure of inquiry could in principle
make him experience the sort of unexpected affective responses that would
disconfirm his views, then it simply no longer contains the ‘dormant’ or
‘latent’ sort of pattern in favor of tolerance that we attribute to officer 2.
It is an empirical question whether remorseless Nazis were mostly
like officer 2 or officer 3, and therefore, whether they acted against their
normative reasons. Were they so strongly and deeply influenced by years
of upbringing that their inner nature had become robustly in support of tor-
ture and genocide? Or was their behavior better explained by mechanisms
that do not presuppose such drastic psychological changes—and therefore
differences in comparison to us—at all? Interestingly, this is exactly the
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question that motivated the empirical research of social psychologists in
the 60s and 70s which I mentioned above. Insofar their situationist con-
clusions prevail, it seems that many of us could be persuaded to commit
atrocities in a manner of days, given the sort of circumstances that have
been demonstrated to elicit such behavior. Now one of the problems with
situationist experiments is that they tend to ‘hide’ individual differences
by randomizing their subjects. Of course, if we cannot randomize then any
causal attributions become problematic, which is why personality traits
are so hard to investigate scientifically. Thus, situationist experiments do
not show that individual characteristics cannot have strong causal influ-
ences, but what they do show is that we can construct circumstances under
which situational factors become clearly dominant. It is in this respect
that I believe situationist results can still teach us something about the
Holocaust.
To be sure, experimental subjects in the Milgram experiments, for exam-
ple, reported a lot of emotional difficulty and negative affective responses
afterward, in sharp contrast to those real life war criminals who remained
remorseless. However, given the apparent ease with which people are led
to violence and intolerance, we may speculate that the difficulty for people
in admitting wrongdoing—even to themselves—is better explained by the
mechanisms of bias alluded to above, than by a deep transformation of
their inner psychological nature as they came to commit their crimes. It
is one thing to be bothered by your own behavior during an experiment
and another to accept responsibility for years of horrible criminal behav-
ior. Furthermore, like the research participants, many soldiers did admit
that their course of action was wrong while explaining their reasons for
taking that course of action in terms of following orders and a transfer of
responsibility to the authorities whose commands they were following. I
realize that while this explains why those who where themselves in places
of authority may have been less likely to admit wrongdoing, it also makes
their situation different from the participants in the Milgram experiments.
However, not all situationist research is focused on the role of authority or
the circumstance of following orders.
Nevertheless, I do not mean to defend the claim that as a matter of
empirical fact, exactly 100% of all human beings, with no single exception,
share normative reasons against torture and mass murder. Psychopaths,
for example, may be so emotionally different from us that the affective
dispositions to which our practical judgments are attuned, are simply
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absent in their case. However, the empirical evidence in these cases seems
to suggest that the development of such persons already deviates from
ours in their early childhood, and often as a result of severe abuse and
neglect. Now it is conceivable that Nazi Germany was a suitable habitat
for some individuals with extreme antisocial personality traits to lead
successful careers in the military and the SS. Perhaps the top Nazi leaders
were among them. But as I understand the science, the common soldier in
the SS would have been psychologically more similar to you and me than
to Charles Manson or Richard Kuklinski.
9.2 Mild Realism
Suppose that Diane has finished high school and is wondering what she
wants to study at university. She has managed to narrow down her list
to two options: philosophy and chemistry. Both would involve many
things she would enjoy, or find rewarding, or that could help her find
an enjoyable career afterward (the latter maybe less so in the case of
philosophy). Both also involve things she might dislike, as well as risks
that could lead her to drop out. As Diane surveys these two alternatives she
tries to figure out which of the two would manifest most of the dispositions
for positive affect, and least of the dispositions for negative affect, that
she has known herself to have on the basis of her responses to all sorts
of things in the past. Perhaps she found chemistry interesting in high
school, but nevertheless hated to have to learn so many facts by heart.
Perhaps she enjoyed discussing and arguing on philosophical questions in
various online communities, but was sometimes frustrated by the seeming
impossibility to ever really settle a major philosophical question. And
the pattern that she’s looking for may extend to various other situations:
maybe she always finds herself reading the lists of ingredients on the
package labels of various products, intrigued by the chemistry behind
them. Or maybe she is always amazed when she sees pictures of giant oil
refineries and offshore platforms.
It may well be that on balance, she would like chemistry more than
she would dislike it, while she would also like philosophy more than
she would dislike it. But which of the two would she like most? Her
attempt to determine this is not exactly hard science. We do seem to have
preferences regarding the different things that we like, but in the above
example, without any exact methods to quantify, measure, and compare
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one’s attitudes towards the two options, the correct answer to her question,
if any, does not really seem to be a very ‘hard’ matter of fact.
But are there such things as ‘soft’ facts instead? Interestingly, in his
discussion of real patterns, Dennett does find ways to construe patterns
as matters of fact that are less determinate than the things in which these
patterns manifest themselves. First of all, the presence of a pattern is a
matter of degree. Second, sometimes rival patterns can co-exist in the same
set of data, which can render the correct attribution indeterminate. In
the light of these insights, Dennett calls himself a “mild realist” about
intentional attitudes. As I will argue below, similar observations apply to
the normative will. But in addition to that, we will see that there is an
interesting further phenomenon at the volitional level: when the facts are
less determinate at the time of choice, the choice itself can render them
more determinate.
9.2.1 Gradual Presence
Let us once again consider Dennett’s bar code images (1991b, p. 31, figure 1).
He describes how they are generated: each started out as a ‘pure’ bar
code, and then a certain percentage of pixels were randomly selected and
inverted to generate the noise. Image A has a noise ratio of 25%, for
example, while image D has only 1% noise. Finally, Dennett also added
an image F with a 50% noise ratio, just to demonstrate that in such a case
the pattern is lost completely. Note that these percentages correspond to
our success in predicting the color of a pixel on the basis of the bar code
pattern if we do not know how the noise has been distributed. In the case
of image F these would come out 50/50, which is the rate of chance for
binary options. In the case of A we’d stand a 75% of being right, and in
the case of D, 99%.
Now in image F, there simply is no real pattern. There no longer is a
fact about the image being an image of a bar code, because it isn’t. It is
just noise. On the other hand, even though A and D do seem to contain
real patterns, the fact about these images is not the ‘hard’ fact that they
are copies of the bar code image, because they are not. Instead, the facts
about them are facts about the degree in which the bar code is present in
these images, and this degree varies between A and D. Now suppose that
Diane really wants to study chemistry, and that even though she dislikes
some things about it, there are definitely many more things that she likes
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about it. From the point of view of the attribution that she wants to study
chemistry, the things she dislikes about doing that are the noise, and their
magnitude the noise ratio. In the absence of any specific knowledge about
these matters, on the basis of the claim that she wants to study chemistry,
we might guess for each aspect of chemistry that she would like it, and fail
to predict her affects when we hit upon the noise.
Now suppose that Diane got her volitional judgment right (which
would mean that any other choice would have raised the noise ratio, as I
will argue below). And suppose that Kevin also decided to study chemistry,
and that he also got that right. In that case, for both students, it would be
a fact that they really wanted this. Nevertheless, the noise ratios might be
different: Diane might dislike much more about chemistry than Kevin. In
that case, we should say that the pattern is stronger, or present to a greater
degree, in Kevin’s dispositions when compared to Diane’s.
9.2.2 Conflicting Patterns Can Co-Exist
The fact that real patterns admit of noise ratios implies that conflicting
overall patterns—conflicting in the sense that pattern A leads to predictions
that contradict those based on pattern B—may both be present in the same
set of data. There are roughly two different ways in which this might
happen. The first case is where pattern B is really just a more sophisticated
version of pattern A, such that many elements that appear to be noise
from the simple description of A can be accounted for as more complex
regularities in the light of B. Dennett argues that when one man (Jones)
bets on pattern A while another (Brown) bets on B, they are not really
in disagreement, but merely adopt different strategies: while Brown can
budget for a lower error rate, Jones requires less time or resources to do his
calculations, which might for example mean that he can make more bets
(p. 35–36). Still, one might be tempted to say that B would be the ‘more
real’ pattern in this case. However, suppose that one day, Brown does not
have the time or resources to employ his complex betting strategy. He
might still make money if on that day, he would simply bet on A (provided
that he can take the hit from the higher error margin). And thus, we might
still say that Brown would have missed a fact about his business if he had
overlooked the real presence of A.
Something analogous may apply to our analysis of the normative will.
We might think of Diane’s judgment that she wants to study chemistry
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as the attribution of a relatively simple pattern A with a fairly high noise
ratio. At least to some extent, Diane will be able to predict in advance
which parts of chemistry she is going to dislike. Perhaps she would say,
“What I would really want to do is chemistry, but without courses X and
Y, and with the addition of course Z that they teach in philosophy.” And
perhaps the university will allow her to do just that, in which case acting
upon this more sophisticated pattern B seems the right thing to do. But
even then, there will be an upper limit on how fine-grained she can make
her plans and policies. Therefore, the trade-off between precision and
simplification that Dennett wants us to acknowledge seems to apply to
volitional interpretation as well.
Nevertheless, in order to simplify my own theory, I will continue to
speak of the normative will as a single pattern in such scenarios, on the
grounds that if the different patterns are, despite their conflicts, not really
in disagreement but rather at different levels of simplification, then the
level with the lowest noise ratio would still be the most accurate depiction
of the coherent set of goals that the agent wants to pursue most. If it
would be in the interest of the agent to spend less time and energy on his
deliberations, then paradoxically one of the normative volitional attitudes
at this complex level of description will contain the prescription that the
agent deliberate on a less complex level of description. I think this can be
perfectly consistent, but I will not dwell on it any further at this point.
Now the second manner in which multiple patterns can co-exist is far
more interesting for our present purposes. Suppose again that there is a
pattern A in some set of data with a fairly high noise ratio of, say, 40%.
Then there would be enough room for a pattern B that would only partially
overlap with A in the 60% area that A is getting right, as long as B would
cover a substantial amount of the 40% that A is getting wrong. Suppose
that 30% is covered by both A and B, 30% only by A, 30% only by B, and
10% by neither. Then B would have a noise ratio of 40%, just like A, while
A and B would contradict each other in a majority of 60% of the data. But
if such a thing could apply to our affective dispositions, then how do we
determine the normative will?
For example, suppose that A captures what Diane would like about
studying chemistry while B captures what she would like about philosophy.
Then what would she ‘really’ want, if anything? First of all, I don’t think
patterns that conflict in the majority of situations would apply to this
particular example. After all, studying chemistry or studying philosophy
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are options that have a lot in common, and therefore the underlying
patterns would overlap substantially. Once Diane has narrowed down
her choice to these two options, it seems plausible that a coherent set of
dispositions that would be served by either option must already account for
a majority of her affective responses regarding her occupation, in contrast
to, say, working at a supermarket or joining the Marine Corps.
I realize that it does not make much sense to put numbers on these
things without any formal model to specify what those numbers would
mean, exactly. And although I would very much like to build a model
of the normative will in formal language, such a project is beyond the
scope of this thesis. For now, we can talk about noise ratios of 10% or
40% in the case of visual images and things like that, and merely treat
these as metaphors when applied to the normative will. Nevertheless,
a disagreement of 60% seems like a bad metaphor in the philosophy–
chemistry example. Rather, what I think the example illustrates is that
sometimes, when two options seem to receive equal amounts of support
from our dispositions, this merely indicates that we have already achieved
substantial deliberative success by narrowing our choice down to these
options. There must come a point where one’s normative will no longer
discriminates between different alternatives, but that hardly shows that
there are no facts to be known. In the example, Diane does know that
she wants to study at the university, that she does not want to join the
Marine Corps, and that she probably will be happy regardless of whether
she picks chemistry or philosophy.
Still, it does not follow that she has to toss a coin. Given the enormous
complexity of our psychological natures, there seems no reason to think
that the noise ratios of the two alternatives would ever be exactly the same,
in the same sense in which no two human beings are ever going to be
exactly of the same height or weight. Thus, it will probably still be true
that either philosophy or chemistry is what Diane wants most, and she
might still try to make an informed guess as to which one it is. However,
if the two patterns have nearly equal strength, then we should realize that
while the presence of the pattern in support of the disjunction is of a high
degree (because of their large intersection), the presence of her normative
preference of the one option over the other is of a very low degree (because
of the small difference between their noise ratios).
Of course, things start to look different when an agent has not narrowed
down his options very much, or when the options that remain are still
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so substantially different that the example of the patterns which disagree
on 60% of the data suddenly does become an applicable metaphor. For
example, suppose that Diane is wondering whether she would rather join
the Marine Corps than study philosophy. In that case she does contemplate
two very different alternatives of herself. If her dispositions seem divided
with respect to such alternatives, and if the noise ratios of the two patterns
happen to be comparable, then the presence of her normative will with
respect to the choice of her occupation would be rather indeterminate.
Technically, we might still say that the alternative with the slightly lower
noise ratio captures what she wants most, but if the difference in content is
so massive while the difference in support is so small then the big fact to
be appreciated is the absence of a dominant majority, not the fact about
which option slightly outweighs the other one.
Compare this to the outcome of an election where two candidates are
radically opposed to each other’s proposals, and one wins by a tenth of a
percent. Now suppose that, contrary to real life, the people actually man-
aged to vote exactly in accordance to their normative reasons. Furthermore,
the candidates managed exactly to formulate the proposals for which their
supporters wanted to vote. If the elected candidate gets to implement his
proposal in a ‘winner takes all’ sort of way, without any further need to
compromise, then we would hardly say that this policy reflected the reality
of the will of the people. Rather, the reality would be that the people had
been hopelessly divided on a question that apparently did not admit of a
middle ground.
Our analysis implies that this can also happen to a single individual.
But this is not a problem for our theory, even if it may be a big problem
for the agent in question (as it would be for the society in the example of
the election). The Facts Principle does not imply that there will be facts
to settle practical questions in all cases. It merely implies that there will
be such facts in some cases. Furthermore, this feature of the theory allows
us to account for a phenomenon that many moral philosophers have had
trouble dealing with: that of genuine moral dilemmas. The idea is that in
the case of a genuine dilemma, when the agent has to decide between two
options, both are morally required (or both are morally wrong) and so no
matter what the agent does, he must fail.
Thus, in Sartre’s famous example of the student who is torn between
joining the Free French forces and caring for his ailing mother, one might
suspect that which ever option he chose, remorse was the predictable
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consequence. And according to our theory it is now possible that in each
case, the remorse would reflect a pattern supported by a majority of his
dispositions. Hence, in each case the remorse would seem internal to him
as a person, to use Frankfurt’s phrase again. He could not but go against
himself. I will say more about this predicament when we turn to the matter
of wholeheartedness below.
9.2.3 The Snowball Effect
In my discussion of Williams’s remarks on deliberation about ends in
section 2.2.2, I noted his idea of “constitutive solutions, such as deciding
what would make for an interesting evening” (Williams, 1980/1981a, p. 104)
as an example of indeterminacy in our ends. Of course, Williams’s point is
that once a solution has been adopted, the indeterminacy may be resolved:
by having settled on a concrete intention or plan A, it may have become
unreasonable to subsequently switch to an alternative plan B, even if it
would have been reasonable to have initially settled for B rather than A.
The reasons in favor of option A gain weight, so to speak, as a result of
our commitments to and investments in that option. Following Michael
Bratman (1987, p. 82), I shall call this the “snowball effect.”
There are two complementary mechanisms behind this effect. First
of all, by directing our thoughts and ideas to a course of action that we
have chosen, and by getting accustomed to its implications or results, our
emotional lives may become ‘shaped’ in its favor. And secondly, once we
have invested a certain amount of effort in option A, there will be a cost of
transition associated with a switch to option B in terms of abandoning the
investment in A and making a similar effort for a second time in order to
get started with B, that may put B at a disadvantage.
These mechanisms operate both in the short and the long term. Thus,
in the short-term it is usually pointless to keep deliberating or switching
plans concerning what restaurant to pick, or whether to order pizza rather
than Chinese food for dinner. Instead, at some point you should just pick
something and stick with it. In the long-term, the snowball effect may have
a profound impact on the development of our normative will over time.
Suppose that Pete desires to become an academic philosopher, but that
he also desires to become a park ranger. As we have seen in the previous
sections, two conflicting affective patterns may be equally present in his
emotional life, such that the first desire is a constituent of pattern A and
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a piece of noise with respect to pattern B, whereas the second desire is
a constituent of pattern B and a piece of noise with respect to pattern A,
while the total noise ratios of A and B are comparable.
Suppose that Pete decides to become a park ranger, and that he suc-
ceeds in becoming one. After years of working in Sequoia National Park,
his motivational characteristics might have developed in such a way that
his normative will has become determinate: he wouldn’t want to become a
philosopher anymore. But this is perfectly consistent with the possibility
that, if Pete had become an academic philosopher, his motivational char-
acteristics would have developed in such a way that he wouldn’t want
to become a park ranger anymore. His normative will might settle for
whatever path he chooses.
Thus, the snowball effect illustrates that even though the cognitive
will is meant to get the normative will right, it also creates or shapes
the normative will over time. In other words, contrary to some of Harry
Frankfurt’s later remarks, the content of our normative will may sometimes
really be “up to us.” As Bransen put it, deliberation is both a matter of
“making ourselves” and “finding ourselves” (2002). Whereas existentialist
and decisionist approaches, such as the philosophy of the early Sartre, may
have stressed the aspect of self-making too much at the expense of self-
knowing, purely cognitive approaches to deliberation, which understand
the metaphysics of normativity in a matter completely independent from
the personal deliberative activity of the particular individual agent, run a
risk of neglecting the self-constitutive element. I take it to be an advantage
of my proposal that it clearly allows us to accommodate both aspects.
Sadly, however, the causal influence of the cognitive will upon the nor-
mative will need not always be self-fulfilling. It can also be self-defeating.
Suppose that A has to decide between φ and ψ. It might be that φ would
change his life in such a way that his normative will would become de-
termined in favor of ψ, and vice versa. If there would be no possibility of
reversing the decision, then the agent would have fallen victim to a kind
of inverse snowball effect, or what we might call the ‘grass is greener on
the other side of the fence’ effect. I think the snowball effect is usually
stronger, but I suppose the self-defeating scenario does really occur now
and then. This is no drawback of the theory, of course, but only another
tragic fact about life.
What these scenarios have in common is that prior to deliberation, there
really is no fact of the matter about which option the agent should choose.
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But we have also discussed several examples in which it did seem plausible
to say that there is a fact of the matter about what the agent had normative
reason to do, even when the agent himself did not recognize it—both in
moral and political contexts and within the context of the personal life of
an agent. The attractive feature of being a ‘mild realist’ about the normative
will is that we can deny that there is a fact of the matter with respect to
examples which make the Facts Principle look implausible, while at the
same time allowing that there is a fact of the matter with respect to the
examples that make it look plausible.
9.3 Two Types of Wholeheartedness
As I discussed in section 8.2.2 of the previous chapter, when Frankfurt
initially tried to solve the fundamental problem of explaining how any type
of desire could have agential authority—including a “second-order volition”
when understood simply as the desire that a certain first-order desire be
effective—he turned to the idea of “decisive commitment.” This approach
found its culmination in his essay “Identification and Wholeheartedness”
(1987/1988d), in which Frankfurt argues that an agent’s commitment is
decisive when it is “fully resolved,” by which he meant that the agent
identifies with his desire “in the belief that no further accurate inquiry
would require him to change his mind” (pp. 168–169).
In the same essay, Frankfurt also introduces the concept of “wholeheart-
edness,” which is the state of being coherent in one’s authoritative desires.
This notion is contrasted with the state of “ambivalence,” which involves a
“conflict within the authority itself,” an incoherence between desires that
both express what the agent really wants. Note that many conflicts of
desire are not cases of ambivalence: if the agent is wholly behind ‘one side’
of the conflicting desires, so to speak, then she remains wholehearted. The
conflict really has to be between desires with which the agent is identified.
But if identification is to be understood in terms of being fully resolved,
then we may wonder what it means to be fully resolved on both sides of a
conflict.
As we have seen, in his later work Frankfurt gives up on the idea
that decisive commitment really explains volitional authority. But he has
kept the notion of wholeheartedness as a kind of further analysandum
for which he wants his theory to be able to account. Thus, in his recent
writings on the authoritative nature of love, Frankfurt allows that we
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can either be wholehearted or divided in what we love, where what we
love is understood in the opaque sense. Echoing Spinoza’s notion that
satisfaction with oneself is the “highest we could hope for,” Frankfurt
presents wholeheartedness as a kind of ideal configuration of agency (2004,
pp. 97–98).
In this section, I want to accommodate a similar concept of whole-
heartedness within my own framework, which I shall call “inner whole-
heartedness.” And of course, I am in agreement with the later Frankfurt
concerning the inability to account for the volitional in terms of being fully
resolved. Nevertheless, I do think that the notion of being fully resolved
in one’s volitional judgments is also an important concept, and one that
may in fact be understood as another kind of wholeheartedness: it involves
being wholehearted in one’s assessment of the evidence in support of one’s
volitional judgment. Whereas inner wholeheartedness is a state of the
normative will, being fully resolved is a matter of the cognitive will, and
the two are independent phenomena. Let us now discuss each in turn.
9.3.1 Inner Wholeheartedness
We have already seen that conflicting patterns may be present in our
affective dispositions, in such a way that our normative will may be
indeterminate with respect to certain practical questions. The phenomenon
of ambivalence (i.e. the lack of wholeheartedness) may be explained in a
similar fashion, except that indeterminacy and ambivalence only partially
overlap: some cases of indeterminacy are not cases of ambivalence, and
vice versa. Sartre’s example of the student who has to choose between
fighting for his ideals and caring for his mother seems to be a case of both
indeterminacy and ambivalence. Whatever he decides, he cannot abandon
the other option wholeheartedly. However, it would be odd to say such
a thing in the case of the choice between ordering pizza or Chinese food
for dinner. Even when my normative will is indeterminate with respect to
those two options, I need not be divided about them: when I choose pizza
I am not going ‘against myself’ simply because I also would have liked
Chinese food.
More importantly, we can lack wholeheartedness even when our nor-
mative will is determined. Suppose that Henry has been in a relationship
with Janet for several years, and that he loves her very much. But he has
also fallen in love with another woman, Sarah, and as time goes by, his love
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for Sarah evolves to the point where it becomes impossible for him to make
judgments about which of the two women he ‘loves most.’ Answering that
question, for him, would be like a parent trying to answer the question
which of her children she loves most. Of course, in ordinary life parents
do not have to choose between their children: they can raise all of them.
By analogy, some people opt for a ‘polyamorous’ lifestyle, which involves
the agreement by all people involved that it is okay for someone to have
multiple romantic relationships at the same time. And in our example,
perhaps this is what Henry would want. However, like most people, Janet
and Sarah may not be open to such a thing, and even if they are, then it
might not work out, in which case Henry does have to choose between
them.
But from the fact that he cannot answer which one of them he loves
most, it does not follow that he may not have reasons for judging which of
the relationships he wants most. If he has children with Janet, for example,
then that may provide an additional reason to stay with her. But there
might be other reasons involved. If a relationship with Sarah would simply
work out better in the end, in his view, then Henry may have a resulting
reason to leave Janet. In such cases, using our framework of pattern
recognition, we might say that while the two options are supported by two
conflicting patterns, one of these patterns does outweigh the other in terms
of its lower noise ratio. Thus, suppose that the pattern in support of a
relationship with Sarah is the stronger one, and that Henry has recognized
this by making the volitional judgment that he wants to leave Janet. In
such a case, it seems there would still be a lack of wholeheartedness: by
making that choice, Henry would still be breaking his heart (not to mention
Janet’s).
What we should say, I think, is that there is a non-resultant sense of
identification that allows Henry to remain identified with both alternatives
even after he has made his decision and even when he is really convinced
that he did the right thing. The pattern in support of his relationship with
Janet harbors such a deep love, and such a robust structure of dispositions
in his emotional being, that losing her really means that he loses part of
himself. But by staying identified with that structure of dispositions, he
also manages to retain that part of himself in some way. He could not
honor, or do justice to, or perhaps mourn, the connection he had with Janet
without some mode of identification. Recognizing how divided his heart is,
even if one alternative does outweigh the other, is part of ‘getting it right.’
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Thus, inner wholeheartedness is a matter of fact about the normative will
of an agent: it is the case when all that the agent should identify with in
the above sense is captured by the normative will.
I suppose it is in some sense trivial that it is better to be wholehearted
in this inner sense. Nobody hopes that life will often force one to tear
oneself apart. In that respect, at least, I am in agreement with Frankfurt’s
appeal to the Spinozistic ideal of inner harmony and tranquility. However,
on my analysis, that does not mean that inner wholeheartedness must
be present in our ideal selves. On the contrary, it is only when multiple
patterns retain their strength in one’s ideal self that each of these patterns
carries an amount of authority that demands one’s identification with it.
By contrast, consider the case of the unwilling addict: his addiction may
be a very strong pattern in the ‘motivational character’ sense distinguished
earlier on, but because it would be absent in his ideal self, the addict can
be wholeheartedly against his addiction.
And from the fact that wholeheartedness need not be present in our
ideal selves, it also follows that it is not an ideal to be accomplished. When
the fact is that we are divided, I think we should simply recognize that
fact. Over time, when we choose one course of action over the other, it may
well be that the snowball effect, which we discussed earlier on, will reduce
the ambivalence by expanding the pattern acted upon while diminishing
one’s regrets over the path not chosen. Nevertheless, time does not heal all
wounds, of course. It may also be a sign of authenticity to be able to admit
that we keep carrying the remnants of some of our decisions with us.
9.3.2 Epistemic Resolvedness
The idea of making a judgment “in the belief that no further accurate
inquiry would require one to change his mind” does not only apply to
practical judgments, of course. Instead, it depicts a general epistemic
phenomenon which may in principle apply to all matters of belief. In the
terminology of William James, it involves the distinction between “live”
and “dead” hypotheses (1896/1979, p. 14): the latter are propositions that
we cannot seriously consider as candidates for truth anymore in the light of
our experience. Thus, when the proposition that not P is a dead hypothesis
for us, we are resolved in our belief that P. In the terminology of C.S.
Peirce, any attempts to doubt the truth of P would merely be “paper doubts”
(1877/1992b, p. 115). We have many beliefs that are resolved in this sense.
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For example, I do not think any future discovery is going to disconfirm
the idea that humans and chimpanzees share common ancestors, or that
the earth is much older than 7000 years. Of course, from the fact that I am
resolved in these beliefs it does not follow that other people cannot believe
otherwise, and in fact they do.
Frankfurt discusses the example of a mathematician who is checking
and rechecking his calculation (1987/1988d, pp. 167–169). If he keeps
getting the same answer, and cannot find any mistakes, then unless he
wants to keep doing this for the rest of his life, he must either decide that
his answer is correct, or abandon his activity without endorsing its result.
In Frankfurt’s view, the reason supporting the former option could be
either that he has come to believe with “full confidence” that no further
inquiry would turn out otherwise, or that the possibility of discovering a
mistake has become so small that the cost of further inquiry outweighs its
benefit.
However, in the case where the mathematician reaches full confidence,
even if it is up to him to decide that he is not going to do the calculation
another time, I do not think we should say that his confidence is itself
established by that decision. Instead, becoming convinced is something that
happens to him, while his decision is a response to that. Furthermore, if
he has really become fully convinced, then this decision is straightforward:
all the alternatives are dead. Let us therefore call this manner of reaching
full confidence “passive resolution.” It is the strongest sense in which we
can be resolved in our beliefs, and it lies outside our deliberative control.
The second, and weaker, sense in which we may become resolved
in our beliefs is when we judge between “live” hypotheses on the basis
of what we find reasonable to assume, given the evidence that we have.
Such a judgment is not straightforward: it is an act of reasoning, a jump
to conclusions, for which we take upon ourselves a kind of epistemic
responsibility to be able to justify the belief we have adopted. Beliefs
arrived at in this matter may vary in degrees of confidence, although I
shall not attempt to model or quantify that dimension. Instead, let me
just assemble them under the heading of “active resolution.” Together
with the beliefs arrived at through passive resolution, these beliefs make
up what we take ourselves to know. Of course, this self-attribution of
knowledge is fallible: some people may be extremely confident in their
false or unjustified beliefs.
Sometimes, however, we may be unable to settle our doubts in this
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manner. Sometimes we know that we do not know, that we do not have
a sufficient epistemic justification for any of the live hypotheses that we
are entertaining, and that we cannot make that jump to a conclusion. In
theoretical cases this may not be a problem: we simply confess to our
ignorance. But in practical cases our choice may be “imminent,” to borrow
another term from James: we may have to decide on a course of action such
that doing nothing would be making a choice as well. In such a case, we
may have to guess what is true on the basis of our subjective probabilities,
and adopt our guess as a kind of working hypothesis.9
Suppose that I am wondering whether I should φ, and that this depends
on whether P is the case, but I do not know whether P. If my subjective
probability that P is slightly above chance, then I may adopt the volitional
belief that I want to act upon the assumption that P (without adopting the
belief that P). Aside from the fact that this allows me to respond to
imminent dilemmas, it also allows me to make plans and act consistently
over time, even if my subjective probabilities keep fluctuating during that
time. Thus, if I keep flip-flopping between finding P most probable and
finding not P most probable, I can adopt the intention to act upon the
assumption that P as a matter of policy for a certain amount of time, after
which the question of whether P may again come up for review.
And of course, when deliberating about such plans and policies, we
should not only factor in our subjective probabilities—in the absence of
knowledge—but also the relative costs of our different choices should we
get our assumptions wrong. If I find P slightly more probable, but the cost
of acting upon the mistaken assumption that P greatly exceeds the cost
of acting upon a mistaken assumption that not P, then perhaps I should
act upon the latter assumption. However, the details of this matter are
beyond the scope of this discussion. What I merely want to illustrate is
that agential authority does not always require epistemic resolvedness: it
will often suffice to adopt working hypotheses about one’s normative will
9The analogy to working hypotheses in science re-establishes the symmetry between
theoretical and practical reason in this respect, which I think makes sense. An empirical
scientist cannot just ‘observe’ his data in order to look for patterns, because the statistical
significance of such exploratory research is always problematic. Instead, in order to establish
matters of empirical fact, a scientist must do confirmatory research as well: he must adopt a
hypothesis before he obtains his data in order to truly test its predictive success. And he even
runs a risk if his prediction fails, because then he must not only adopt a new hypothesis,
but also obtain new data in order to run another confirmatory test. In this respect, an
honest scientist is simply a practical deliberator who has a normative reason to figure out the
empirical facts in his domain of research.
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in combination with policies concerning volitional interpretation that allow
for revision and make practical disconfirmation possible. Note, however,
that such a plan does involve a practical commitment to the assumption
about what one really wants.
Nevertheless, in some cases this may not be enough, and we’ll want
to adopt volitional beliefs with the amount of confidence that warrants
thinking of it as knowledge. For example, most of us would want to know
that they want to marry someone before they make their vows, rather than
merely having committed themselves to a plan to give it a shot. However,
so long as the resolvedness is active, based on an epistemic judgment
concerning live alternatives, it does seem reasonable to keep some policies
in place that promote continued volitional interpretation and the possibility
of practical disconfirmation.
Finally, some of our practical beliefs may be fully resolved in the
passive sense. By definition, that means we won’t take the possibility of
their disconfirmation seriously. As I indicated earlier on, we may think
of this as a kind of ‘epistemic wholeheartedness’: there is no longer any
room for doubt in our cognitive will. Now in some cases there may be
nothing wrong with that. There is no doubt in my mind, for example,
that I have a normative reason to disapprove of the Holocaust, of slavery,
racism, oppression, and terrorism. And although, as a moral philosopher, I
am interested in the justification behind my disapproval of such atrocities—
in order to figure out whether it is relationalist or non-relationalist, for
example—I do not think that further inquiry could make me approve of
slavery or racism, and I do not invest my limited cognitive resources into
the possible disconfirmation of my disapproval in these matters.
This does not mean that I do not need a justification for my practical
belief, of course. In fact, as I have argued above, I think the Nazis had
normative reasons similar to mine, and that they got them wrong while
I am getting them right. I have sketched my reasons for thinking this,
though a full normative ethical discussion of racism and fascism is beyond
the scope of this meta-ethical thesis, of course. But what it does mean
is that my practical beliefs in these matters are on a par with my belief
in the general theory of biological evolution. Thus, every evolutionary
biologist should be able to give you the justification of this theory, but
their research time is not devoted to the possible disconfirmation of this
general theory. Instead, they are working on the details of evolutionary
mechanisms in a manner that takes the general fact that apes and humans
Two Types of Wholeheartedness 273
share common ancestors, for example, as empirically established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Some philosophers even hold that having beliefs beyond doubt in this
sense is constitutive of knowledge and intentionality in the first place.
The pragmatist tradition that started with C.S. Peirce, for example, is an
attempt to solve (or dissolve) skeptical problems by understanding why
certain doubts, such as the Cartesian doubt in the reality of the world
around us, must be “paper doubts” if we explain intentionality from a
practical point of view. We cannot ‘really’ doubt them in any sense that is
ever relevant to action, and from an attributivist understanding of belief
states, that may be the only sense that really makes sense.
In somewhat similar fashion, philosophers inspired by Wittgenstein
have argued that reasoning and criticism can only be understood against
a background of uncontested knowledge, an epistemic horizon of the life
form within which things make sense to us. It may be that our web of
volitional beliefs must have a similar structure, and that we are bound
to take certain ideas about our normative volitional attitudes for granted.
Consider once again Hume’s example of preferring the destruction of the
world to a scratch on one’s finger (section 8.3.2). Contrary to the sort of
view defended by Alan Thomas (see section 3.2.1) I do not think a Wittgen-
stinian approach to moral knowledge can establish nonrelationalism. But I
am open to the idea that some part of our knowledge in the relationalist
sense, i.e. the knowledge of our volitional inner reality, must be beyond
our doubt in a way that is constitutive of our being practical deliberators
in the first place. On such a view, it would always be presupposed that
we are ‘in touch with our inner selves,’ so to speak, and that this must be
reflected in an uncontested background of volitional belief.
It is in this sense, then, that some alternatives to our practical beliefs,
such as the idea that we might sacrifice the rest of the world in order
to prevent a scratch, may be “unthinkable” for us, as Frankfurt has sug-
gested. Nevertheless, this does not refute my argument in section 8.3.2
that unthinkability cannot explain opacity and disconfirmation. Instead, it
presupposes such an explanation when we judge that an agent is mistaken
for thinking what we find unthinkable. But with the Affective Pattern
View of opacity and the Affective Response View of disconfirmation in
place, we now have a framework that allows us to accommodate the idea
of unthinkability in terms of epistemic resolvedness.
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9.3.3 The Hazards of Passive Resolution
However, passive resolution of our practical beliefs is not always a good
thing. On the contrary, it can be a very bad thing. Recall that the Nazis did
not disconfirm their beliefs in part because they were so resolved in them
and didn’t take the alternatives seriously. As another example, consider
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. It depicts a society in which people
are engineered genetically, and conditioned socially, to never question the
roles they were meant to fulfill. They are prevented from accidentally
encountering the sort of situations that might provoke any remaining
disposition to feel unhappiness or discomfort with respect to the lives
they are supposed to be living. More importantly, they are not looking
for such situations. They are happy and satisfied. But the mechanisms
employed to achieve this state of affairs strike us as highly unethical: the
people destined to fulfill the ‘lower class’ roles were purposefully limited
in their cognitive development, while being grown as fetuses in biological
factories that replaced ordinary pregnancy. The idea behind Huxley’s
thought experiment is that people might accept this sort of thing if you
raise them to be used to it and prevent them from disconfirming their
assumptions. But the intuition that Huxley wants to invoke, of course, is
that even though these people may seem happy, they are not free. Not in the
sense of knowing, through critical self-examination, what they themselves
want in the normative sense, and acting upon that (recall that I identified
acting upon knowledge of one’s normative reasons with freedom in the
sense of ‘deep’ self-disclosure in section 8.4.2).
The problem with passive resolution, of course, is that once you are
resolved in this manner, then from your own point of view, there is no
reason to worry about the beliefs that you are so resolved in. That is what
it means to be resolved in this sense. Just like you cannot decide to become
fully resolved, neither could you decide to become unresolved when every
possibility of doubt has left your mind. So how can we prevent becoming
too resolved in too many of our beliefs if passive resolution is something
that basically happens to us?
The answer, I think, is twofold. On the one hand, there may be situa-
tions in which there is little that someone could have done to become more
cognitively flexible, given their social environment. In a sense the people
from Brave New World are helpless. I realize that it may be troubling to
draw a similar conclusion in the case of Nazi officers, or contemporary
religious fundamentalists, for example, but I do believe that a lot of evil is
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accomplished by people for whom the better alternatives were not even on
their radar anymore. Passive resolution can be a matter of epistemic bad
luck. But it is not ineliminable bad luck. Recall the example of the second
SS-officer, who did not disconfirm his views, but could have done so in a
different social environment. Passive resolution is not irreversible. It only
means that from one’s own epistemic point of view, one is not bound to
take the initiative for critical re-examination. It may still be true that under
the proper circumstances, a person who had been resolved could be lead
to open himself up for disconfirming experiences again.
On the other hand, even though passive resolution is something that
happens to us without our deciding for it to happen when it does, we can
of course make an effort to develop methods and habits of critical thinking
in advance, as it were, that will prevent us from easing into a state of full
resolvedness too quickly. As I see it, this is one of the primary goals of our
educational system. Nevertheless, finding the proper balance between a
necessary amount of trust in one’s epistemic background and a healthy
amount of doubt with respect to one’s unjustified assumptions remains
of course one of the deepest problems of practical reasoning. In other
words, it is a matter of virtue: we should attempt to avoid the extremes,
and find wisdom in the middle. Self-evident as this perhaps might sound,
it seems an important departure from the spirit of Frankfurt’s 1987 essay
on identification and wholeheartedness: decisive commitment can be as
much an obstacle to one’s freedom as a requirement for it. Frankfurt’s
later remarks about “keeping an eye out for the possible correction of our
views” reflect a similar development in his own thinking.
9.4 The Facts Problem Solved
In section 4.4.1 I argued that the type-i dispositionalist solution to the Facts
Problem involved a promise that we could make sense of the idea that some
motivational states have the authority to discredit others. I also argued
that Williams’s defense of the Internal Reasons View did not substantiate
that promise. His account of the imagination as an important resource
for deliberation about ends makes sense with respect to the “constitutive
solutions” that we discussed above, which resolve indeterminacies in the
subjective motivational set of an agent. But the problem was to explain
the cases in which the facts about our normative reasons are already
determinate in the light of a motivational set in which some elements
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overrule others.
Frankfurt’s distinction between desires that are internal and those
that are external to the person offered us an intuitive concept of why
some elements of the subjective motivational set might take precedence,
in a volitional sense, over others. But although Frankfurt’s solution of a
“reality within ourselves” seemed to carve out the right middle ground
between realism and relativism in matters of practical normativity, his
theory remained somewhat evasive with respect to the nature of this inner
reality as a matter of empirical fact. Furthermore, his Cartesian insistence
on privileged insight stands in the way of a true account of volitional
opacity.
By contrast, the Affective Pattern View that I have proposed in this
chapter requires no experience, ever, to be epistemically privileged. In
principle, every instance of being moved by desire, and every individual
emotional response, is as good as any other. It is for patterns in our
dispositions to have these responses that we must look in order to un-
derstand how we should live. This view answers the Facts Question in
a manner consistent with how the Affective Response View answers the
Disconfirmation Question. Thus, it allows that significant parts of our
actual dispositions have not yet revealed themselves in our experiences so
far and may surprise us in the future.
This idea forces another disambiguation of the Internal Reasons View.
If the subjective motivational set is construed as a set of experienced or
motivationally effective attitudes, then the Affective Pattern View would
violate the internal reasons requirement. Because with respect to such
attitudes, the Affective Response View requires the possibility of a discon-
firming discontinuity in relation to pre-existing motivations. Instead, if we
understand Williams’s notion of the subjective motivational set as a set
of opaque motivational dispositions that explain our motivations in future
and counterfactual, as well as past and actual situations, then the Affective
Pattern View is an Internal Reasons View. This is so because, at that level,
disconfirmation presupposes continuity. To be sure, the view allows dis-
positions to change over time at that level too. However, in cases where
such underlying changes offer the best explanation of discontinuities at
the transparent level, the proper volitional interpretation of the unexpected
experiences would be as evidence that one’s normative will has changed,
rather than as a disconfirmation of one’s prior judgments.
10 Intersubjectivity and Moral
Discourse
Now that we have seen how the Affective Response View solves the Dis-
confirmation Problem (chapter 7), and how the Affective Pattern View
(chapter 9) provides a type-i dispositional solution (chapter 4) to the Facts
Problem, the question that remains is whether we can square the relation-
alist implications of these views with our common sense understanding of
moral discourse.
I have already argued (in section 7.4.2) that my account of volitional
interpretation is not solipsistic at all, in view of the ways in which a social
practice of deliberation contributes to its purpose. Furthermore, I have
been stressing from the beginning that relationalism is perfectly compatible
with the idea that humans share some of the values they would uphold
under ideal conditions of rational agency as a result of their common
psychological dispositions (most notably in sections 3.2.1, 7.3, 8.1, and
9.1.4). In fact, this was the reason why I chose the term “relationalism”
instead of “relativism” in the first place: the latter is too often understood
as involving the denial of that possibility. But what relationalism merely
rules out, remember, is that all conceptually possible deliberators—like the
alien invaders from Mars Attacks!—would have to converge upon the same
values as us. Finally, I already explained (in section 4.3) that the view is
not even committed to the idea that all moral judgments made in practice
are to be evaluated in relationalist terms.
The purpose of this final chapter is to tie these different strands of
argument together into a comprehensive account of how to understand
moral discourse. Since I have developed my relationalism in contrast to
Michael Smith’s nonrelationalism, I will now articulate this account of
moral discourse in response to objections that he has raised against the
relationalist alternative. As we shall see, these objections are meant to
reflect and support his claim that relationalism violates certain “platitudes”
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about moral judgment, by which he means “prima facie” truths that capture
the “inferential and judgmental dispositions” of those moral language users
that have “mastery” of the moral terms they employ (1994, pp. 30–31).
Amongst these platitudes is the claim that “When A says that φ-ing is right,
and B says that φ-ing is not right, then at most one of A and B is correct”
(1994, p. 39), which, provided that A and B quantify over conceptually
possible deliberators, rules out relationalism from the get-go.
So what are Smith’s reasons for thinking that those, who have mastered
moral language, cannot follow relationalistic inference patterns? The first,
which I will discuss in section 10.1, is the idea that relationalism fails to
explain the purpose of moral discussion and argument: if relationalism
is true, then we would have no reason to engage in such discussions. I
respond to this objection in sections 10.2 and 10.3. The second objection, to
be discussed in section 10.4, is that relationalism fails to explain what we
mean when we use moral terms in real-life conversations. As I will argue
in section 10.5, this objection is based on a ‘conservative’ understanding
of actual discourse as already incorporating meta-ethically sound moral
concepts, against which I shall defend a ‘revisionist’ alternative.
10.1 The No-Purpose Objection
In addition to their rejection of “relativism,” nonrelationalist realists often
employ the language of “subjectivity” versus “objectivity” to distinguish
their view from, and defend it against, the relationalist alternative. Accord-
ing to Smith, for example, the aforementioned platitude that at most one
of two agents can be correct if one of them says that something is right
while the other says about the same thing that it is wrong, is a platitude
about objectivity:
There are platitudes that give support to our idea of the objec-
tivity of moral judgment: ‘When A says that φ-ing is right, and
B says that φ-ing is not right, then at most one of A and B is
correct’; ‘Whether or not φ-ing is right can be discovered by
engaging in rational argument’; ‘Provided A and B are open-
minded and thinking clearly, an argument between A and B
about the rightness or wrongness of φ-ing should result in A
and B coming to some agreement on the matter’; ‘The right-
ness of someone’s φ-ing is determined by the circumstances in
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which that person acts, circumstances that might be faced by
another’, and so we could go on. (1994, pp. 39–40)
Recall that this idea of objectivity is one of the three premises that in
Smith’s framework give rise to the “moral problem.” His formulation of
this premise was as follows:
We may summarize this first feature of morality in the following
terms: we seem to think moral questions have correct answers;
that the correct answers are made correct by objective moral
facts; that moral facts are wholly determined by circumstances;
and that, by engaging in moral conversation and argument, we
can discover what these objective moral facts determined by the
circumstances are. The term “objective” here simply signifies
the possibility of a convergence in moral views of the kind just
mentioned. Let’s call this the “objectivity of moral judgement.”
(1994, p. 6)
Thus, for Smith, the postulation of facts that make our practical judg-
ments true, and the nonrelationalist understanding of the content of those
judgments, are both part of the same idea of their objectivity. They are
aspects of the same feature of morality, and therefore presented as a kind
of package deal. By contrast, in order to represent the logical option of
my relationalist cognitivism, I have separated these two notions. On the
one hand, I have referred to the postulation of facts as the Facts Principle
(with the related assumptions concerning revision and discovery captured
in the Disconfirmation Principle). On the other hand, I have introduced
nonrelationalism as a possible interpretation of a different premise, the
Intersubjectivity Principle, with relationalism as a possible alternative
interpretation of this Principle.
Nevertheless, I think that Smith’s association of objectivity with non-
relationalism is quite common among moral philosophers. Furthermore,
and perhaps as a result of this, the relationalist alternative is often por-
trayed, and dismissed, as being implausibly subjectivistic. Consider Smith’s
discussion of “subjective vs. non-subjective definitional naturalism” (1994,
pp. 41–43). Smith distinguishes between two ways in which conceptual
analysis might be employed in order to identify the truth makers of moral
judgments with matters of natural fact: a reductive or “definitional” ap-
proach, and a non-reductive approach which he himself favors. With
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regard to the first approach of “definitional naturalism,” Smith presents
us with a dilemma that was originally raised by Alfred Ayer between sub-
jectivism and utilitarianism, which Smith generalizes to a choice between
“subjective” and “non-subjective” varieties:
[A]ccording to the subjective definitional naturalists, “x is right”
means “x has the natural property that is approved by so-and-
so.” Non-subjective naturalists, by contrast, focus in on the
natural properties of acts that subjective naturalists say we
merely approve of and define rightness directly in terms of one
of those properties. For example, non-subjective definitional
naturalists who are utilitarians think that we can define “x is
right” as “x is conducive to happiness.” (1994, pp. 41–42)
Smith’s discussion of this dilemma is a bit complicated. First he agrees
with Ayer that both options are unsatisfactory, but then he suggests that
they are not exhaustive of definitional naturalism in general, because there
is a further option of a “network style” analysis, as defended by Frank
Jackson, which is also reductive, and hence “definitional.” However, Smith
then proceeds to raise an objection against Jackson’s approach as well,
concluding that Ayer was right to reject definitional naturalism after all,
though “for the wrong reasons.”
From a terminological point of view this may seem a bit odd, since
“non-subjective definitional naturalism” is already Smith’s own general-
ization of the view considered by Ayer, and a term that suggests “any
old definitional naturalism except subjective definitional naturalism,” so
the reader may find it confusing when this dilemma is set up to be non-
exhaustive. Nevertheless, what matters for us at this point is that both
Smith’s statement of non-subjective definitional naturalism, as generalized
from Ayer’s original discussion, and Smith’s treatment of the network-style
alternative are formulated so as to honor his nonrelationalist conception
of the objectivity of moral judgment. By contrast, his objection against
subjective definitional naturalism is precisely that it violates this idea of ob-
jectivity, and that therefore, it cannot account for the purpose of discussion
and argument:
[S]ubjective definitional naturalism is completely unable to
account for either the objectivity of moral judgment or the
various procedures via which we come by moral knowledge.
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For if desires are beyond rational criticism, as Hume thought,
then the idea of a moral argument—an argument about the
rightness or wrongness of an action, as opposed to an argument
about the other non-moral features that might be possessed by
an act—simply doesn’t make a great deal of sense. An agent
either approves of some natural property of acts or she doesn’t.
Either way there is nothing much to argue about; nothing to
argue about in the way, and to the extent that, we argue about
the rightness or wrongness of actions. Moreover, if another
agent disapproves, then it simply isn’t true that they express
their disagreement with each other when the one says “This
act is right” and the other says “This act is wrong.” Rather,
each self-ascribes their different pro- and con-attitudes, a self-
ascription that the other can and perhaps should agree to be
correct. (1994, pp. 42–43)
Whether this criticism is valid depends on how precisely we interpret
Smith’s characterization of subjective definitional naturalism. Recall that it
is the view that “x is right” means “S approves of x” where S is whoever
utters the judgment. But what does that mean? Usually, when we say that
someone approves of something we mean that she has made a judgment in
support of it, but on that interpretation the view would be that judging x
to be right means something like “judging that you are judging in support
of x” which introduces a weird self-referential structure that doesn’t tell
us anything. Instead, the criticism suggests that it means “having a pro-
attitude” which might be a desire or something similarly non-cognitive.
However, on the basis of our discussion concerning opacity in chapters
8 and 9 we can already see that the first part of the criticism, that “there
is nothing much to argue about,” would only refute the view if the pro-
attitudes in question are fully transparent.
Instead, if we understand practical judgments as self-ascriptions of
opaque pro-attitudes that we may be deeply mistaken about, such as the
normative volitional attitudes that I have postulated, then, as we have seen,
a lot of argument and reasoning may be required as a matter of volitional
interpretation. Now perhaps Smith might be the first to admit this much,
as his criticism might have been intended solely against the view that
practical judgments are self-ascriptions of attitudes that are completely
transparent to the judger. To be sure, such a view would deserve the
label of “subjectivism.” But in that case, his discussion of definitional
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naturalism would have left out the middle ground of a relationalist inner
reality theory.
Furthermore, even if Smith would admit that this middle ground does
allow there to be “much to argue about,” he might still insist that the
second part of his criticism against subjective definitional naturalism, i.e.
that it does not allow participants in a discussion to argue against each other,
will refute volitional inner reality theories as well. The worry, then,—and I
think this is shared by many moral philosophers who hold nonrelationalist
views—is that relationalism undercuts the purpose of moral discourse. In
order to address this worry, we must be able to construct this purpose in
relationalist terms. Or, since it will turn out not to be a single purpose, we
must explain the reasons that we can have, according to relationalism, for
participating in moral discourse with each other.
10.2 Shared Psychology and the Intersubjectivity Principle
The first and most important reason should be familiar by now from my
discussions in the previous chapters: when A judges in approval of P
while B judges against it, then because of the opacity of their normative
volitional attitudes, those attitudes might favor P in the case of both A
and B. Furthermore, such a similarity of our volitional inner realities need
not be thought of as accidental or incidental, but can instead be explained
with reference to our shared genetic background, and when applicable,
our common environment or upbringing. Therefore, if A and B cannot
find specific reasons to suppose that their underlying dispositions with
respect to P are likely to be different, their moral discussion concerning
P may be founded upon their agreement that their normative volitional
attitudes towards P are most likely the same, even though they disagree
about whether those attitudes support P or not. I should now like to make
a number of additional remarks about this idea, with my eyes on both
the task of responding to the No-Purpose Objection, as well as the task of
accounting for the intuition behind the Intersubjectivity Principle.
10.2.1 Volitional Similarity Judgments
To begin with, it might be objected that on the proposed analysis, the
practical judgments that A and B express still do not strictly speaking
contradict each other. After all, logically speaking their dissimilar self-
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ascriptions of their attitudes towards P are still compatible, because it
is at least conceptually possible that the normative will of A favors P
while the normative will of B does not. It is only in conjunction with the
additional contingent assumption that A and B have the same normative
volitional attitude towards P, whatever that attitude turns out to be, that a
contradiction can be derived from their different practical judgments. But
even if A and B have agreed that this assumption is true, that does not
make the assumption part of what they are saying when they utter their
approval and disapproval of P. And that is an implausible consequence, the
objection might run, because our intuition is that the practical judgments
themselves contradict, regardless of further assumptions. Put differently, our
intuition is that they are talking about the same thing, while my analysis
would seem to imply that they are not.
My response to this objection is twofold. First, I think that in order to
understand disagreement and discussion in everyday conversations, we
must not focus on what is being said in such a strict sense in order to
construct a contradiction that would explain the disagreement. Instead, we
must look for the conversational implicature of each utterance in the course
of the discussion. Consider the following example:
John: “I don’t think I should take another pain killer tonight,
as I have already taken three earlier today.”
Sarah: “I have been taking those for years and going beyond
the regular dose never killed me, John.”
Aside from the fact that dying is probably not the side effect that John
is worrying about, Sarah has on the strictest mode of interpretation said
nothing about John at all. Logically, her claim entails a relation between
the painkillers and herself, which is compatible with the absence of such
a relation between the painkillers and John. However, saying that the
painkillers never killed her is Sarah’s way of telling John that he shouldn’t
be so sensitive about going beyond the official dosage once in a while. The
assumption that John’s body will be similar to hers in its response to the
painkillers can be inferred from the context of the conversation. Thus it
becomes part of the conversational implicature of her utterance.
By analogy, if in a moral conversation, B expresses her disapproval
of P after A has just made a statement in support of it, the context of
that conversation may include a similarity assumption that will turn the
conversational implicature of B’s disapproval into a contradiction of A’s
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approval. Regardless of the specific phrase that B may have used,1 this
implies that what B means to contribute to the conversation exceeds her
practical judgment itself, on the relationalist analysis. And this brings me
to the second part of my response to the objection: the relationalist is not
committed to the view that practical judgments are the only judgments
that we bring to the table in a moral discussion. Instead, we can construe
what I shall call a “volitional similarity judgment” in approval of P as a
judgment about a group or class of agents that they all share a normative
volitional attitude in favor of P. Thus, often when a person uses moral
language in a discussion, the implicature of his claim will be a volitional
similarity judgment about a group of people, or possibly the class of all
people, to which he himself belongs, such that the volitional similarity
judgment will still also entail a practical judgment on his own part in the
strict relationalist sense, while at the same time carrying implications for
the practical judgments that the other members of this group ought to
make.
Note that when A and B are expressing volitional similarity judgments
concerning a group of people to which they both belong, where A’s
judgment is in approval of P while B’s is in disapproval of it, we can
even literally agree with the intuition that A and B are talking about the
same thing: they are talking about how they might be similar in their
normative volitional attitudes towards P. Of course, there is also a further
intuition that nonrelationalists sometimes allude to, which is that A and
B must not merely be talking about the same thing, but that this same
thing they are talking about must be P rather than their attitudes towards
P. However, this is a much stronger claim which no longer seems to be
about establishing reasons for having moral conversations in the first place.
To that end, at least, the claim that the participants in the conversation
have the same normative volitional attitude towards P seems sufficient.
The stronger intuition may sometimes apply as a claim about the surface
grammar of moral discourse, which I will discuss in section 10.5.4 below.
However, if instead it is meant really as a claim about the truth conditions
of moral judgments, then it amounts to a statement of nonrelationalism
itself, which means once again that it no longer qualifies as a premise of
an argument against relationalism.
1A matter to which I shall return in section 10.5.4.
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10.2.2 Species-Wide Similarity: Human Values
With this response to the objection that the participants in a moral con-
versation would be talking past each other (so to speak) in mind, let us
now take another look at the Intersubjectivity Principle. According to the
principle, the same considerations which justify A’s approval of P may,
under the appropriate conditions, disconfirm B’s disapproval of P and
require B to judge in approval of P instead. Note that this formulation is
also consistent with the idea that both A’s approval and B’s disapproval are
self-ascriptions. The “appropriate conditions” for the possibility that A’s
justification disconfirms B’s self-ascription are simply those under which B
has reason to believe that she is volitionally similar to A, either because she
already had such a reason on independent grounds, or because she may
recognize how the considerations cited by A apply to her own emotional
life, or make sense of her own affective dispositions, as well, in a way that
would challenge her current self-ascription.
How often would it be plausible to say that these conditions obtain?
In sections 7.4.2 and 8.1 I have speculated that with respect to certain
issues, volitional similarity may be a matter of empirical fact about human
psychology as such, and thus apply species-wide, with possibly only a few
individual exceptions. In section 9.1.4 I have argued in greater detail how
such a species-wide volitional reality may be understood with respect to the
Holocaust. We have seen that there are psychological reasons, supported
by empirical findings, to believe that even most of the perpetrators of
the Holocaust have been similar to us in the relevant respects, and must
therefore have been acting against their normative will. I shall not repeat
the argument here, but I want instead to follow up on it with some
additional remarks, as my focus in chapter 9 was on establishing a strong
case of opacity, whereas now it is on investigating the extent and scope of
intersubjectivity.
If we assume that the Holocaust was indeed a violation of a species-
wide volitional inner reality, then how much does that tell us about the
extent to which a core set of moral values might be normative for human
beings generally? The Holocaust is about as extreme in its immorality as
our history has shown us to be capable of, and as most of us are willing or
even able to imagine. From our point of view, then, the normative premises
needed in order to disapprove of the Holocaust are fairly minimal, and
would not settle much else in the way of moral theory or ethical practice. In
the moral discussions we are used to having, its evil is not only universally
286 Intersubjectivity and Moral Discourse
agreed-upon, but even the suggestion by one participant that the view
defended by his opponent is in a relevant respect akin to Nazism will be
taken as a grave insult.2
Be that as it may, the awful historic fact, however, is that despite its
extremity the Holocaust has not been exceptional. The victims of atrocities
in Rwanda, for example, or more recently in Darfur, and on a longer
timescale in countless other displays of genocide, massacre, and massive
and collective torture and rape, have as much experienced the hatred and
malice that human nature can give rise to as did the prisoners in Nazi
concentration and extermination camps. The philosophical discipline of
ethics, including meta-ethics, should be as much about getting to grips
with this phenomenon, as about settling or conceptualizing subtle disputes
between sophisticated rival normative theories.
In the light of this, being able to solve the Facts Problem with respect
to such atrocities in a way that establishes the normative reasons that even
most of the perpetrators must have had to not have committed them, is in
my view a significant result. I do not claim to have achieved this result, as
my account has been programmatic in many ways, and as I am sure that
many counterarguments have yet to be dealt with. But my point is that
if a theory delivers this result that I have attempted to demonstrate, then
that result would be considerable.
Furthermore, I do think that we can be optimistic about a more inclusive
hypothesis concerning what values human beings generally would support
under ideal conditions of rational agency—what I have called “human
values.” I think these may include such things as school and play for
children, freedom from oppression and torture, standards of health and
nutrition, and so on. These values may constitute a psychological reality
that I think is presupposed in the justification of political ideals and
principles that purport to be “universal” in some sense, such as the Geneva
Convention or Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I am not saying
that these specific documents get it right exactly, or that the extent of
species-wide volitional similarity would cover the level of detail that such
documents tend to go into. But I am optimistic that various dispositions
which we may share as human beings pertain to their subject matter.
2In many Internet communities, arguing that one’s opponent is wrong by analogy to
Nazism is known as a “Godwin,” from Godwin’s Law which states that the probability of
a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1 as an online discussion grows longer.
Committing a Godwin is considered to be a fallacy that immediately causes one to have lost
the discussion as a matter of general etiquette.
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10.2.3 Psychopaths and Other Anomalies
My next remark concerns the status of the relatively small amount of
human individuals that would still not be volitionally similar to us even
in the aforementioned respects. As I noted during my discussion of the
Holocaust in section 9.1.4, even if it is empirically plausible that most Nazi
soldiers would share our normative volitional attitudes, it is implausible to
think that there would be no exceptions. Psychopaths may be an example
of this, but we should not equate deviation with pathology in this context.
For the sake of the argument, let us assume that there are some “successful”
individuals out there who are similar to dysfunctional psychopaths in their
lack of a disposition for mercy, but who suffer from no symptoms and who
manage to get along and cover their tracks. The consequence is that no
proceduralistic deliberative route would lead them to disconfirm whatever
crimes they commit. Whether their abnormal psychology has been caused
by some genetic anomaly, a highly unusual environment or upbringing,
or what ever may have been the case, is irrelevant in this example. The
question is, would such individuals be counterexamples to the claim that
there are human values?
And the answer, I think, is no, at least not in any reasonable sense of
the term. By analogy, consider other exceptional deviations within our
species from our regular biological and psychological properties. It is a
basic fact about human biology that we are born with ten fingers and
ten toes, even though cases of polydactyly occur in which babies are born
with more than ten, and even though having twelve toes need not be
pathological in the sense of posing a clinical problem to the person who
has them.3 Furthermore, in contexts where it is obvious that the subject
matter involves humans and not other animals, we can even leave out the
reference to ‘humans in general’ altogether and say something like “there
are five toes on each foot” even though this would be false for many animal
feet. The same goes for statements such as “500 mg of paracetamol will not
cause stomach problems,” “the liver is located in the right side of the body”
or “the prefrontal cortex is involved in mechanisms that cause merciful
behavior”: there may occasionally be a human being for which one of
these statements would be false, and they do not apply to non-human
3Polydactyly has a prevalence of one in every 500 births, but in most of those cases the
additional digits are not fully functional and may therefore be understood as pathologies
with reference to the ‘design’ of having 10 digits. However, rare cases where the sixth digit
on each hand or foot is fully developed and fully functional do occur.
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animals generally.
Of course, when a human being has been born with his liver on the
left side, he cannot be treated on the basis of the assumption that his
liver must be on the right side.4 And when it is known beforehand, the
surgeons better take it into account before they start cutting him open. In
this case, the adjustment is straightforward, but I suppose there can be
biological anomalies that would make common medical tools or practices
ineffective or nonsensical to use on the patient in question, even though the
anomaly may not be dysfunctional in itself. A similar breakdown might
be expected, I suppose, if one were to have a moral discussion with a
psychopath (or his more successful counterpart). However, that is hardly
an implausible implication of the theory: most of us have never been in
such a conversation, and conversations with incarcerated psychopaths that
have been recorded are certainly out of the ordinary in moral respects.
In a nutshell, then, my view is that where human values are involved,
the statements we utter in moral discourse can be just as objective and
intersubjective as those we utter in medical, psychological, or biological
discourse. This analogy even extends to the surface grammar of such
statements: the expressions that “the liver is located in the right side of the
body” or that “500 mg of paracetamol will not cause stomach problems”
hide the reference to the class of organisms to which they exclusively apply
in the same way that the expression that “genocide is wrong” may hide an
implicit relationalist reference to the class of deliberators for whom this
claim would reflect their inner normative reality. I will return to this point
in section 10.5.4 below.
10.2.4 Intracultural Similarity
Let us now go back to the question of when the conditions under which
the Intersubjectivity Principle applies would obtain. So far, I have argued
that they obtain when human values are involved, because then volitional
similarity is guaranteed among all participants in a moral discussion, the
rare psychopath being the negligible exception to the rule. But would it be
plausible to think that all moral disputes could be settled in such a species-
wide manner? I myself am not inclined to believe this: it is not empirically
4There is a condition known as situs inversus in which all internal organs are positioned
in the opposite lateral locations compared to normal human beings. If the inversion is ‘total,’
so to speak, then the condition need not pose any problems, and may remain undetected
until the person in question is examined for an unrelated medical matter.
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unlikely that the development of certain normative volitional attitudes will
depend on aspects of the individual’s environment and upbringing that
vary across different cultures, for example. Thus, while I think that certain
moral questions will have answers that are universally valid for human
beings generally, I accept that the correct answers to other moral questions
may be different for people with different cultural backgrounds.
However, note that this does not make me a cultural relativist in the
familiar sense that the correct answers would be those that accord with the
views or values commonly held within or definitive of a culture. My view is
still that they must instead accord with opaque attitudes of the individual,
and even if it is true that these would have been different should his
cultural upbringing have been different, then that doesn’t imply that they
must be straightforwardly identical to the views or values the individual
was raised to hold as part of that upbringing. Rather, they might depend
on cultural teachings in more subtle ways. Furthermore, who knows what
other environmental factors might have a developmental influence that
would be relevant in this respect: perhaps basic living conditions, the
amount of violence or disease people are used to seeing around them, or
even biological and behavioral facts about the mother during pregnancy.
The bottom line is that even if people in different cultures have their own
different normative realities, they might still be getting those realities
wrong. And that is not how I think cultural relativism is usually defended.
In fact, this picture allows us to account for a whole further range of
situations under which the conditions for the Intersubjectivity Principle
obtain. Because if many correct moral answers depend on cultural aspects
while remaining opaque in the sense of not being identical to the views
held within a culture, that means there can be a lot of intracultural volitional
similarity between members of some culture who disagree with each other
about the moral questions they have similar normative volitional attitudes
towards. More simply put: they could defend different volitional similarity
judgments against each other about people within their culture.
Of course, cultures are hard to individuate, the boundaries between
them are vague, and so is the very idea of belonging to the same cul-
ture. Perhaps it would be better to speak about the ‘amount of shared
cultural background’ that any two individuals might have with each other.
Then my claim would be as follows: even if human values may not be
forthcoming on certain moral issues, then the conditions which make the
Intersubjectivity Principle applicable will still obtain in many of the moral
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conversations we are actually used to having, because of the amount of
cultural background we tend to share with the people that we have such
conversations with.
Once again, the hard-core nonrelationalist may find this unsatisfactory.
But what he cannot deny is that this argument supplies the relationalist
with a reason for us to have moral conversations in such cases, which
means that in such cases, the objection that moral discourse would be
without purpose has been defeated. What the nonrelationalist can do,
by contrast, is question whether these cases of volitional similarity are
really as common as I have suggested. In particular, there are two possible
counterarguments which I think my account needs to address.
The first is that shared psychology with respect to the development of
normative volitional attitudes, either across the human species or within a
culture, need not always give rise to volitional similarity because it might
also merely lead to volitional isomorphism instead. This line of criticism
basically takes my own argument against the nonrelationalist constitution
strategy and uses it against me.
The second argument concerns cases where the shared psychology
itself is absent, either because it is a conversation between participants
with very different cultural backgrounds, or because it concerns a moral
question with respect to which we might expect affective patterns to differ
significantly even when cultural backgrounds are more or less the same.
Since it seems plausible to say that we have a reason to participate in moral
conversations in such cases as well, the objection against relationalism still
stands. I will now discuss these two arguments in turn.
10.2.5 Volitional Isomorphism Instead of Similarity
Recall the distinction between practical beliefs that are similar and those
that are isomorphic from section 1.3.2: if Barack Obama and Mitt Romney
both believe they should be president, then their beliefs are isomorphic
but not similar, whereas if Mr. Obama and his senior campaign advisor
both believe that Obama should win the presidency, then their beliefs
are similar, but not isomorphic. Let us also say that normative volitional
attitudes of different agents are similar when they make similar beliefs
true, and that they are isomorphic when they make isomorphic beliefs
true. Thus, if a wife and husband both prefer the wife to have a full-
time job and the husband to stay at home to care for their kids, then
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their attitudes are similar, whereas if both would prefer themselves to
stay at home and the other to have a full-time job, their attitudes would
be isomorphic. As this example illustrates, volitional isomorphism may
involve psychological similarities while volitional similarity may actually
be a result of psychological dissimilarities: it is because the spouses in the
former case are psychologically inclined towards different roles that they
can complement each other in a common arrangement, while the fact that
the spouses in the latter case are psychologically of the same type, so to
speak, requires them to negotiate an arrangement that will be less than
ideal for one or both of them.
Given this insight, it may no longer seem plausible to think that as a
general rule, psychological similarities between all human beings will lead
to volitional similarities between them. Instead, they constitute isomorphic
relations which may just as easily lead to conflict: when every human
being favors the interests of her own children, her own family, her own
tribe, country, or ethnic group. History shows us that at least at the level
of our cognitive volitional attitudes this phenomenon has been undeniable,
so what reason do we have to suppose that at the level of our normative
volitional attitudes, things would be so different?
A parallel may be drawn between this problem and the problem I raised
for the constitution strategy in sections 3.2.2 and 5.4.2. We have seen that
if a disposition which makes some practical belief true is constitutive of
being an agent, then all agents will exhibit isomorphism with respect to
that belief. But the only plausible candidates for such dispositions that
we have been made to consider seem to involve a crucial indexicality: in
order for some organism to succeed at being an agent it must want its
own attitudes to be means-end coherent, perhaps, or its false beliefs to be
corrected, but from that we could not derive an interest in the rationality
or knowledge of other agents. And it kind of made sense to expect that
any interest constitutive of agency would be likewise self-directed and
therefore ill-suited to breach the gap from isomorphism to similarity.
At this point, the nonrelationalist might be tempted to say that if the
constitution strategy fails for this reason, then my case for human volitional
similarity on the basis of shared psychology must fail for the same reason.
However, this objection would misrepresent my argument from shared
psychology. I am not saying that, merely because general features of
human psychology are likely to be constitutive of our normative volitional
attitudes, those attitudes must therefore exhibit similarity. I am not even
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trying to derive or construct particular human values from known human
psychological properties. Instead, I am arguing in the opposite direction: I
start from certain values that many different people seem to uphold, and
then argue that given the fact that much of our psychology applies species-
wide, the view that Nazis who do not uphold these values are getting
themselves wrong may offer a more plausible explanation of their behavior,
psychologically speaking, than the view that their inner normative realities
are radically different.
Furthermore, we should note that some of these values do not even
seem to involve the sort of indexical structure that makes the dissociation
between similarity and isomorphism possible. For example, the idea that
some people go through intense suffering is something that abhors me, but
so does the idea that nonhuman animals that are capable of suffering do
so as well. And if I were to believe that other types of agents are suffering
intensely, that suffering would abhor me just as well. Just there being a
subject of intense suffering is something that I value negatively, without this
involving any indexical reference back to me. Hence, whenever I have
reason to believe that the psychological feature which implements my
normative volitional attitude against such suffering is shared by someone
else, I can make a volitional similarity judgment against suffering about us
both.
Now I do not know how I came to have this attitude, neither ontoge-
netically nor phylogenetically. Perhaps it will be explained one day by
evolutionary psychologists, and then again, perhaps it never will, as its
evolutionary history may be too complex or at crucial turns too accidental
for us to uncover. Perhaps it will turn out that such attitudes are an al-
most inevitable by-product of the evolutionary processes that best explain
our level of intelligence and social cognition. If that were true, then the
Martians that we have been talking about would be an unlikely product
of natural selection, but that still would not make them conceptually im-
possible. Even though I am against suffering wherever it occurs, I see
no contradiction in the idea of an agent who has no reason to care about
the suffering of others or of members of a different kind. My argument
against the constitution strategy is meant to explicate why. It shows that
my attitude against suffering is essentially contingent. But given that I have
this attitude, it can be very plausible to think that it is contingently shared
by all human beings in the light of what we know about our psychology.
Of course, it does not follow that all normative volitional attitudes
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that we have as a result of shared psychological features will be similar
rather than isomorphic. Some of these attitudes will involve the sort of
indexicality mentioned above. For example, most people care more about
their own children than about those of others, and this may well be in
accordance with their volitional inner reality. By itself, this might not rule
out normative similarity: for it might be that all would value the state of
affairs in which each parent takes a special interest in their own child, in
a manner that is analogous to the sense in which similarity is compatible
with everybody keeping their own promises or pursuing their own tastes.
Smith discusses the following example:
Suppose you are standing on a beach. Two people are drowning
to your left and one is drowning to your right. You can either
swim left and save two, in which case the one on the right
will drown, or you can swim right and save one, in which case
the two on the left will drown. You decide to swim right and
save the one and you justify your choice by saying “The one on
the right is my child, whereas the two on the left are perfect
strangers to me.” (1994, p. 169)
He then goes on to argue as follows:
[I]f I had been standing on the beach instead of you, and if the
one on the right had been my child, then surely I too would
have been able to justify the choice of swimming right and
saving the one by saying “The one on the right is my child.”
Indeed, if we think that a parent who fails to save their child in
such circumstances fails to act on a reason available to her—as it
seems to me that we do—then we are in fact obliged to say this;
obliged to assume the non-relative conception of normative
reasons. (p. 169)
But this argument actually falls short of Smith’s conception of normative
reasons. The mere fact that I would do for my child what you would do
for your child under the same circumstances only establishes isomorphism.
What Smith’s conception of normative reasons requires, recall, is that in
order for someone to have a normative reason to φ under circumstances
C, the ideal selves of all agents would desire her to φ under C, and this
implies similarity, not isomorphism. But suppose that while you are the
parent on the beach whose child is drowning on the right, I am actually
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the father of the two children on the left (and I am not near enough to
save them myself). To say that you have a normative reason to save your
own child under these circumstances, on Smith’s conception of normative
reasons, entails that my ideal self must also desire you to save your own
child, rather than mine, just like I may desire you to keep your promises
rather than mine. But in the drowning children case that implication seems
false: if I care most about my own children, then it makes sense for me not
only to desire that they will be saved at the expense of others by me when
I am in a position to do so, but that they will be saved at the expense of
others regardless of who will do so.
Suppose that the parent who is in a position to save the children has the
sort of utilitarian view that tells him to save my two children in such a case
at the expense of the single child of his own. Now if I were to think that he
is mistaken in his view and that he actually has an all-things-considered
normative reason to save his own child, then I will be glad that he is so
mistaken. I certainly would not pick that moment to argue with him if I
could. It seems that I can have a normative reason to keep it so that he will
not act upon his normative reason. But note that if we find this intuitive,
that means we actually find the lack of normative volitional similarity in
such cases the more intuitive outcome, which means it would no longer
be a problem for the relationalist at all that his view would make such an
outcome likely.5
Furthermore, note that the absence of similarity would not make moral
discussion about such a case impossible. For suppose that this other parent
and I are merely discussing the example as a theoretical possibility. And
assume once again that he and I are psychologically isomorphic in the
sense that our ideal selves would each desire our own children to survive
at the expense of the other’s children. If I am making a volitional judgment
reflecting this fact about me, while he is making a mistaken utilitarian
volitional judgment that gets his normative volitional reality wrong, then
it seems that he and I can also make contradicting volitional isomorphism
judgments about the both of us, which explain our disagreement with
5On the contrary, this seems like a promising argument against nonrelationalist dispo-
sitionalism. Rather than merely showing that relationalism can account for moral practice
just as well as nonrelationalism but at a lower metaphysical or epistemological price, we
now have a case that is better accounted for by relationalism, challenging the nonrelationalist
dispositional analysis directly in addition to its implausible metaphysical or epistemological
implications. A further development of this argument is beyond the scope of this chapter, but
it deserves a full statement that I intend to give elsewhere.
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reference to our assumed normative volitional isomorphism.
10.2.6 When the Relevant Psychology is Not Shared
However, and this brings us to the second objection, what about cases
in which there is neither similarity nor isomorphism due to the absence
of any shared psychological features pertaining to the moral issue in
question? We have already seen that a substantial amount of shared
psychology underlying the common ground in many of our every day
moral conversations may be due to shared cultural backgrounds rather
than common biological ancestry. Therefore, intercultural conversations
may be more difficult to accommodate. And even in intracultural cases,
psychological differences may result in volitional dissimilarities.
Let us actually start with the latter type of case. Consider once again
the discussion about choosing between saving your own children or saving
more other children. Now suppose that both participants agree that it
is permissible, say, to save a school bus containing 34 children including
your own instead of another bus containing 35 children, assuming that
you cannot save both. Suppose also that both agree that it is no longer
permissible when the choice is between saving 1 child of your own or
10,000 other people.6 But they might not agree about where to locate the
cutoff point between these two extremes. And given the Affective Pattern
View it seems they wouldn’t have to. For the two imperatives in this
context, the imperative to save your own children first and the imperative
to save as many lives as possible, may be understood as rivaling patterns
in the web of our affective dispositions. When the difference in amount of
children saved is 35 vs. 34 the first pattern may dominate the second for
most of us. When it is 10,000 vs. 1, it is probably the other way round. So
far, the two participants may be isomorphic. But the precise point at which
the one pattern begins to overtake the other is likely to differ a bit from
agent to agent given the sort of view I have defended about the nature of
the normative will.
In fact, on the basis of that view it is first of all most likely that there
will not be a precise point for any human being at which the situation
would suddenly ‘flip.’ Instead, we should expect a gray area in which
the two patterns are of similar magnitude to such an extent that the truth
6Although somewhat theoretical, this sort of thought experiment does seem to appeal to
our imagination, as popular television series like 24 present us with people having to make
that choice every hour.
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conditions remain indeterminate. Nevertheless, the region in which we
encounter that area may still vary from individual to individual. Perhaps
some of us would already be in that area when the choice is between one
child of their own and three other children, while others would definitely
be getting themselves wrong if they gave up their own child under those
conditions. Let me stress that I do not mean to make any claims concerning
the specific numbers in this context. My point is entirely about the sort of
normative structure that we may expect, and can account for, on the view I
have proposed.
Although this analysis confirms the implication that intracultural nor-
mative volitional dissimilarity is likely to occur, I think it nevertheless
also undermines the objection somewhat. Because even though we are
used to having moral discussions, I am not sure that we are also used to
establishing, through reasoning and argument, where an intersubjectively
valid cutoff point should be drawn when it comes to weighing the amount
of sacrificed loved ones against the amount of saved strangers. Instead,
what we do know from experience, I think, is that even though we may
agree on the general values at stake, and even though we realize that this
means we sometimes have to weigh these values against each other in
particular cases, the task of determining a kind of exchange rate between
loved ones and strangers strikes us as patently absurd. Rather than clear
and precise cutoff points or exchange rates, I think we experience exactly
the sort of vague and gray area that the Affective Pattern View predicts.
Furthermore, when a moral conversation leads us into such an area, I think
most of us experience the limits of reasoning and argument. It is at that
point that we turn to intuitive judgment and say things like “you have to
follow your conscience” or “decide what feels right to you.” We may agree
on this method, but I do not think our everyday experience with moral
conversations carries an implicit commitment to the idea that normative
similarity must be guaranteed in such instances.
Nevertheless, I do not think this is sufficient to counter the objection
completely. For we do not always agree on the values at stake in every
particular discussion, not even when all participants share most of their
cultural background. Consider debates surrounding freedom of speech.
Some people think there is a trade-off between freedom of speech and such
things as nondiscrimination, respect and decency, or freedom of religion
in some cases. Others believe the freedom of speech to be absolute, and
take the issue of judgment rather to be about when a speech act involves
Shared Psychology and the Intersubjectivity Principle 297
more than just speech, such as when it is a call for action on the part
of others. And in the Netherlands, “freedom of speech” is not even the
phrase that we tend to use or that our constitution protects. Instead, we
have a “freedom of opinion expression” which some consider to have a
more narrow application. Now these sorts of differences we do experience,
I think, to be matters of reasoning and argument. And given the subtleties
involved, my relationalist proposal might not make it very plausible to
think that there will be no room for the affective patterns in our emotional
lives to vary from individual to individual with respect to these matters as
well. And so here we really have a case where the objection does seem to
kick in: without normative similarity, what would be the reason for us to
discuss these matters with each other?
Finally, in the intercultural case these differences become even more
pronounced. Sometimes we do enter into moral conversations with people
of very different cultural backgrounds. Suppose we talk about the impor-
tance of “honor.” If relationalism is true, then it might be that not only
the practical judgments, but also the truth conditions for those judgments,
are going to vary significantly from culture to culture when it comes to
things like the honor of the family, or honor as a reason to make personal
sacrifices, and so on. The relationalist must be committed to the view that
it is an open empirical question to what extent volitional similarity will
happen to be the case on such matters. But when it is absent, would there
then still be a reason to engage in intercultural moral conversation?
My answer to this question is going to be yes, both in cases where
much and where little cultural background is shared. In fact, there is not
just one such reason, but there are several. In section 10.3 below I will
articulate each of these reasons and explain their soundness even when
normative volitional similarity is absent. Now perhaps this might seem
as if I am changing my strategy: first I tried to account for the purpose
of moral discourse by making such similarity seem plausible, and now I
am going to say that such similarity is not needed in order to explain the
purpose of moral discourse. However, these two lines of argument are
meant to be complementary. With respect to moral discourse I think there
are two intuitions that we need to account for. The first intuition is that
it makes sense to us to have moral conversations, which means that an
intuitive account should explain the purpose of such conversations. The
second intuition is the more specific idea, captured by the Intersubjectivity
Principle, that considerations which give you a normative reason to support
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P may disconfirm my practical judgment against P. When normative
volitional similarity is present, then both intuitions are accounted for,
because the sort of intersubjectivity that the second intuition requires is
sufficient as a purpose of the sort that the first intuition requires. However,
what I think is intuitive about the Intersubjectivity Principle is that this
sort of intersubjectivity does exist, which means that it must play a role in
some moral conversations. But that does not imply that it will play a role in
all such conversations for which there is a purpose. Which means that we
may try to come up with additional reasons to have moral conversations
that are less demanding in the sense that they do not require normative
similarity, while having a wider application, in the sense that together
with the reasons in virtue of normative similarity, they can account for the
purpose of all moral conversations that seem intuitively purposeful.
10.3 Additional Reasons We Have to Discuss the Reasons We
Have
I will discuss four types of reasons that we may have to conduct moral
conversations that do not depend on us contingently sharing psychological
dispositions (pertaining to the moral issue under discussion) as a matter
of empirical fact. The first is that participants may improve their self-
understanding by contrasting themselves with each other. The second is
that other people may sometimes know us better than we know ourselves.
Third, moral discourse increases our awareness of the alternatives that we
might choose from. And forth, moral discourse could still focus on certain
principles of reason that, even though they cannot establish ethical simi-
larity, might make certain volitional isomorphism judgments conceptually
necessary.
I turn to each type of reasons below. Together with the type of reasons
that I discussed in the previous section on the basis of shared psychology,
the five types of reasons that we thus end up with provide the relationalist
with a purpose for moral discourse in a wide range of cases. Note, however,
that these reasons are meant to refute the objection that there would be no
purpose for moral discourse if relationalism were true. It does not follow,
and I am not claiming, that all participants of actual conversations always
have these reasons in mind when they talk about ethics. I return to this
latter issue in sections 10.4 and 10.5.
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10.3.1 Contrast
As we have seen in sections 1.3.2 and 5.1.2, there is no real disagreement
between relationalism and nonrelationalism about differences between
people as a matter of personal taste. If some people like baseball and
others like tennis, then the nonrelationalist can say that everybody should
approve of the state of affairs in which those who like baseball play baseball
and those who like tennis play tennis, and the nonrelationalist can agree
with the relationalist about whatever contingent psychological fact it is
that establishes whether someone likes baseball or not.
It is sometimes said that one cannot argue about taste. And in some
cases, this might be true: I like the taste of coffee, for example, but I do
not have arguments that establish why coffee tastes good, or why others
should like the taste of coffee as well. As far as I’m concerned they don’t
have to. Nevertheless, the range of cases for which the nonrelationalist
must invoke the above construction also includes less trivial matters of
preference, such as whether joining the Army is right for you or whether
you should revise your decision to study philosophy and enroll in the
chemistry curriculum instead. As I have argued in chapter 9, the attitudes
that determine what we should choose in such cases are opaque and
deliberating on them may require lots of reasoning. Furthermore, when
we face such personal choices, we do tend to discuss our options with the
people around us, even if we know that they do not share our preferences
in this matter. It is not useless for a person who wonders whether he
should join the Army to discuss this with someone that already knows
he wants to, or with someone who would never want to do such a thing
himself. Suppose that the doubting person realizes that he shouldn’t join
the Army by coming to see how he differs from the guy that already made
up his mind. In such a case, it is by contrasting himself with the other guy
that he better understands his own reasons.
So far, the relationalist and the nonrelationalist can agree. But given
that it makes sense in the nonmoral case, the relationalist can now argue in
similar fashion about moral cases where normative volitional similarity is
absent. Thus, if relationalism is true, then a moral debate may help a person
to explicate and understand his own moral values better by contrasting
them with the views put forward by others. We can understand the reasons
based on similarity and contrast as complementary ones: insofar as people
are alike, they can learn from each other by exploring what they have in
common, and insofar as people are different, they can identify their own
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normative volitional attitudes by investigating how they are different from
each other.
A moral debate often begins with different initial views about a concrete
case and then takes the form of a search for the source of the difference.
In this search, participants try to explain to each other why they have the
practical beliefs that they have. It is possible that that will reveal funda-
mentally different emotional response profiles, so that each participant can
understand why the other judges differently. However, explaining how you
arrive at your moral judgments to someone else, especially if that person
does not share your moral intuitions, will require you to explicate your
reasons very precisely. In the light of such a demand, you may discover
weak elements in your reasons, and be forced to revise your volitional
beliefs. And even if your initial judgement about the case at hand remains
unchanged, your self-understanding may have improved, and the degree
of conviction in your volitional beliefs may have increased.
10.3.2 Knowing Someone Better Than He Knows Himself
Sometimes we say that someone knows us better than we know ourselves.
People who live close to me for a long time may observe things about me
that I never noticed myself, or never realized were distinctive of me as a
person, simply because I am so used to being me. Discussion with such a
person may help me discover a pattern so obvious that I missed it all the
time. I may be in doubt about something, or lost in false presumptions
about myself, or hiding (unconsciously) behind excuses, when another
person may tell me that what I am about to do is, in her opinion, not what
I really want. Another example of such a case would be when a therapist
understands the predicament of her client better than the client himself,
for example because it may be part of his problem that he misunderstands
his own psychological state. And although the therapist may be relying
to some extent on her knowledge of general human psychology, she will
also observe the ways in which this client differs from other people with a
sharpness that even his closest friends or relatives might lack.
Now as I see it, this reason for conversation cuts across the similarity–
dissimilarity distinction. The things that my friend observes in me may
also apply to himself, or they may not. The point is that he observes them
in me and that I can learn about his observations by talking to him. And
this goes for moral cases as well. Perhaps in some moral cases the person
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who knows you better than you know yourself is not going to tell you
about it if the reasons she thinks you have conflict with her own. But
not all cases are like that, even if volitional similarity is not a given. For
example, my friend might face a moral dilemma so unique to his situation
that I will never have to face it myself, and which does not concern my
own interests as far as I know them. I may not have a clue what I would
want him to decide, and I may be happy that I do not have to make that
call. Nevertheless, he may want to talk to me about this problem, and
I may share my ideas about what I think matters to him in a way that
can contribute to his deliberations. In order for such a conversation to be
meaningful, it does not seem to be required that we assume normative
volitional similarity.
This especially applies to dilemmas involving the sort of trade-offs and
gray areas which I discussed in section 10.2.6 above. As we have seen,
volitional variations from person to person on moral issues are especially
likely in such cases. I already noted that we can experience the limits of
reasoning and argument when moral discourse touches on such gray areas.
Nevertheless, even if my friend and I are not strictly volitionally similar
with respect to the dilemma he is facing, and even if neither of the values
that he must weigh against each other clearly outweigh the other, then he
might still want to talk to me about his decision and I might still try to sort
of reflect back to him how I see this problem affecting him emotionally in
order to help him get through it and make his decision.
10.3.3 Increase of Alternatives
There are certain obstacles to volitional interpretation that we have already
discussed, which may be overcome by engaging in moral conversation. In
section 7.4.2 I referred to the psychological fact that human beings exhibit
a strong self-confirmation bias, not only in the sense that we are masters at
ignoring inconvenient evidence, but also in the sense that our experiences
themselves are influenced by our beliefs regardless of whether they are
true. Thus, even though the agent would, under the appropriate conditions,
experience an unexpected affective response to the intended consequences
of his action that would disconfirm the practical belief he acted upon, and
even if his disposition to have that experience makes it the case that the
belief is false, then in actual practice his current self may not experience
any such response whatsoever. That is because all his experiences are
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‘following the lead,’ so to speak, of his false practical belief. But one factor
that may alter this situation, I argued, is whether the agent is made to
consider alternatives to that belief by his peers.
In chapter 9 I developed this line of thinking a bit further with respect
to the Nazi example, which is a case involving species-wide shared psy-
chology, or so I have been arguing. But given that we know about these
mechanisms of dogmatism and self-confirmation, we may now assume
that these same mechanisms can play a role in cases where normative
volitional attitudes vary from individual to individual. If my father really
wants me to do X, then my own stubborn belief that I want to do Y may
prevent me from having the experiences that would lead me to discover
that I really want to do Z instead. And talking to my father may help me
to overcome this problem, even if Z differs as much from X as it does from
Y. Perhaps talking to him will temporarily convince me that I want to do
X but without the stubbornness with which I used to believe that I wanted
to do Y, so that I am now open to the experiences that will ultimately
teach me that I want to do Z. Or perhaps my father simply discusses
all the options with me, explaining the reasons that would justify, from
his perspective, X over both Y and Z, thereby introducing me to the Z
alternative as well.
Of course, the point is not just about being introduced to an idea
in the sense of simply never having heard of it before or never having
thought about it yourself. That seemed to be George Orwell’s notion
in 1984: the language of “Newspeak” was meant to prevent the future
citizens of Oceania from even formulating the views and ideas they were
not supposed to be having. By contrast, in Brave New World, which I
discussed in section 9.3.3, children are being thought about the awkward
customs of their ancestors, such as couples having long-term relationships
and raising their own children as parents, but of course they are being
taught to respond to the idea of such a custom with horror and extreme
embarrassment. And to go back to the real world, it is not as if the Nazis
didn’t know about liberal democracy. But they probably made fun of it
amongst each other.
So the point is really about taking alternatives seriously. And this also
applies in cases that lack normative volitional similarity. For example,
let us assume that as an English speaker, Mark of course knows about
vegetarianism. He knows what the word means, and he knows there are
people who do not eat meat. But if those people are always ridiculed in
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his peer group, he might not take the alternative seriously. Now suppose
his new girlfriend Janet turns out to be a vegetarian, and he finds himself
defending her against his friends. It might be that, as a result of this, Mark
eventually figures out that even though he does want to keep eating meat,
he no longer wants to buy meat from the factory farming industry. Now
it might be that Janet would really want no animals ever to be killed by
humans for food, in which case there is a dissimilarity between her and
Mark. Nevertheless, through his engagement with her ideas, Mark got to
correct his practical judgments.
10.3.4 The Discovery of Isomorphic Principles of Reason
I have argued in section 5.4.2 that the constitution strategy for defending
nonrelationalist dispositionalism has failed to demonstrate that it can lead
to similar rather than isomorphic desires under ideal conditions of rational
agency. That also means I have allowed, for the sake of the argument,
that it can lead to isomorphic desires. In fact, I had already argued in
section 3.3.2 that my Distinctness Principle is consistent with Williams’s
idea that certain desires or principles of deliberation may ‘come for free’
with the idea of self-governing agency. Now as we have seen in section
10.2.5 above, even in cases where shared psychology does not lead to
similarity but merely to isomorphism instead, what is being shared may
still be the focus of rival volitional isomorphism judgments that contradict
each other in a moral discussion. But since I have already allowed that
certain principles of reason may be isomorphic for all agents as a matter of
conceptual necessity, we may now conclude that such principles can also
be a target for volitional isomorphism judgments in moral discourse.
The most obvious example of such a principle is of course that of
means-end coherence. This principle is a requirement of rationality for any
agent, but only in the isomorphic sense: I should desire my attitudes to
be means-end coherent, you should desire your attitudes to be means-end
coherent, but I am not rationally required to desire that your attitudes
be means-end coherent. The principle itself is never questioned in actual
discussions, but a person’s moral views, or a well-known system of moral
views (such as those associated with a religious tradition or summarized
in the program of a political party) can be criticized in a discussion for
being incoherent in this respect.
Other principles pertaining to the coherent organization of one’s atti-
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tudes may be constitutive of self-governing rational agency as well, perhaps
involving considerations of prioritizing and scheduling various intentions
and plans through time. And if so, then again our views and plans may be
criticized for failing to comply with such requirements. In that case, the
validity of such criticism need not depend on the criticizer having similar
normative volitional attitudes, or even contingently isomorphic attitudes as
a matter of empirical psychological fact.
Finally, a certain willingness to reflect upon our imperfections and
the limitations of our faculties may be a rational requirement for any
conceptually possible agent, since a perfect agent with unlimited capacities
might well be conceptually impossible.7 Thus, it may be that the volitional
isomorphism judgment that every agent has a normative reason to be
critical with regard to his own practical beliefs, which I briefly discussed
in sections 5.4.3 and 9.3.3, is true for agents across all possible worlds.
In fact, the reasons for having moral conversations that I have been
discussing so far may be considered, in their most general form, as isomor-
phic requirements of this sort. Since every agent must be critical of his own
volitional beliefs, every agent may benefit from discussing those beliefs
with his peers. However, as I already explained earlier on, the problem
with the idea that self-criticism is a requirement of rationality is that insofar
it is rationally required, the resources that we are supposed to commit to
this task remain undetermined. For it depends on the contingent extent of
my limitations, as well as the contingent opportunities that my peers pro-
vide for me to improve myself through conversation with them, how much
of my energy it will be worth to invest in such reflective self-evaluation.
Thus, in practice, when we criticize a person, tradition, or institution
for being too dogmatic, our judgment that the agent or agents in question
should exhibit a greater amount of self-criticism must always tie in contin-
gent facts about them. Nevertheless, the ultimate reason behind it, we
might say, is conceptual: it derives from the finitude of all agency. There-
fore, I think it is important to note that the relationalist can accommodate
this principled aspect of moral discourse as well.
7Recall that on my view, the ideal self of a conceptually possible agent need not itself be
construed as another conceptually possible agent, but can instead be understood as the limit
of a succession of less erroneous alternative selves.
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10.4 The Semantic Objection
I have argued that there are several reasons for us to engage in moral
discourse if we understand our practical judgments as having relationalist
meaning. This refutes the no-purpose objection, but it also invites a new
objection. Because from the fact that people would have such reasons if
they did mean their moral statements in the relationalist sense, it does not
follow that people actually do mean their statements in that sense, and
therefore neither that they have moral conversations for those reasons. On
the contrary, the nonrelationalist might argue, there is a good reason to
think that they don’t, because that is simply not what moral statements
mean. The words in our moral vocabulary, such as “right,” “wrong,” “duty,”
“forbidden,” “good,” “evil,” and so on, have nonrelationalist meanings.
So when you use these words correctly, you are not making claims about
whether something is right-for-you-but-maybe-not-for-some-other-person.
Instead, you are making claims about what is right and wrong, period! And
so that is what our moral conversations, in which we use this vocabulary,
are about. Let us call this the “semantic objection.”
In response, we might ask the nonrelationalist how he knows that our
moral terms do not have relationalist meanings. Perhaps he would be
inclined to answer that “everybody knows this” because it is “common
sense.” I suspect that several moral philosophers have this intuition that
nonrelationalism is the view that takes moral discourse ‘at face value,’ so
to speak, and that the attribution of a property of rightness to an action,
for example, is a more straightforward interpretation of what people mean
when they call something right than the more complex attribution of a
right-for relation between the action and the speaker. Nevertheless, the
semantic objection would not be very strong if it relied on the assumption,
without further argument, that it is trivial that moral terms do not have
relationalist meanings. Instead, the objection becomes more interesting if
we understand it as another articulation of the idea that nonrelationalism
is a platitude about moral judgment. Smith, for example, has argued as
follows:
Let’s, then, confront the conceptual question head on. Is our
concept of a normative reason relative or non-relative? The
relativity of a claim should manifest itself in the way we talk.
[. . . ] The question to ask is therefore whether the way in which
we talk about reasons for action and rational justification reflects
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a relative or a non-relative conception of truth conditions.
One reason for thinking that it reflects the non-relative con-
ception comes from the broader context in which the question
is being asked. For it is important to remember that we have a
whole range of normative concepts: truth, meaning, support,
entailment, desirability, and so on. Between them these con-
cepts allow us to ask all sorts of normative questions, questions
about what we should and should not believe, say and do.
But how many of these other normative concepts are plausibly
thought to give rise to claims having relativized truth condi-
tions? As I understand it, none of them do. (1994, pp. 166–167)
As we can see, Smith thinks that the nonrelationalist semantics of practical
judgment is something that can be argued for with reference to the way in
which we use language. Thus, in the argument in this passage he tries to
make such a semantics plausible by showing how it would be similar to
the semantics of other normative concepts. I think this particular argument
is easily refuted, by the way. For there are many modes of normativity,
and each mode must have at least some unique features that distinguish it
from the others. One such distinguishing feature of practical normativity
is its conceptual relation to motivation and self government, as articulated
in my Authority Principle. And we have seen that Smith’s Practicality
Principle captures roughly the same intuition. Clearly, then, he does not
think that our moral concepts cannot have this motivational dimension
merely because it would set them apart from other normative concepts.
In the same fashion, relationalism might be a feature of moral concepts
that sets them apart from our concepts of epistemic normativity or logical
necessity, say. In fact, if my arguments for relationalism are sound, then it
is in virtue of the motivational aspect that sets them apart and that Smith
already acknowledges, that our concepts of practical normativity also have
a relationalist aspect.
However, what concerns me now is the more general idea that a nonre-
lationalist semantics of moral discourse could be argued for with reference
to the way in which we talk when we use moral language. Isn’t it rather
common for people to talk about morality in a way that follows nonrela-
tionalist inference patterns? For example, consider moral disagreements
about homosexuality. Isn’t it obvious that people who claim that “homo-
sexual acts are immoral” will infer from that claim that anyone, who judges
that it is okay for consenting adults of the same sex to have sex, is getting
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it wrong? And conversely, isn’t it equally obvious that their opponents
in the gay rights movement, who claim that “discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is immoral” will infer from their claim that nobody
can have a good reason to deny same-sex couples the same rights that
heterosexual couples enjoy?
Can it not be demonstrated, not just on the basis of the surface grammar
of such claims, but moreover from the way in which people make use
of these claims in moral and political debates, that they disagree about
them in the same manner in which people can disagree about whether, say,
homosexuality is partially determined by certain factors during pregnancy?
And if so, doesn’t that mean that nonrelationalism is a platitude about
moral judgment after all, and hence, that the semantic objection against
relationalism succeeds?
10.5 Conceptual Revisionism and Folk Meta-Ethics
As I have already explained briefly in section 4.3, my response to this issue
is not to deny that people sometimes mean their practical judgments in a
nonrelationalist sense, but rather to defend a semantic pluralism according
to which different people can mean their practical judgments in different
ways. Whenever they mean their judgments in a way that commits them
to nonrelationalism (“nr-practical judgments”), those judgments must
strictly speaking be false, if relationalism is true. But on other occasions,
our judgments may be assigned relationalist truth conditions (“r-practical
judgments”), in which case they can be true. In other words, I am a
realist about r-practical judgments and an error theorist about nr-practical
judgments.
I will now defend this approach in further detail. As we will see,
semantic pluralism upsets an assumption that has been implicit in much of
moral philosophy, which I will call “conceptual conservatism.” Rejecting
this assumption, I shall argue that we should be “conceptual revisionists”
instead. But before we go into that, I want to make a few preliminary
remarks about what we might call “folk meta-ethics” (in analogy to folk
psychology): the ideas about the nature of morality, insofar these can be
inferred from their speech acts in moral discourse, held by ordinary people,
bless their souls, whose mastery of the concepts they use may vary.
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10.5.1 How Nonrelationalist Is Folk Meta-Ethics?
Is the average moral language user a nonrelationalist realist? And if not,
would that undermine the semantic objection? One view would be that
most users of moral language do not have meta-ethical opinions in the
first place, just like most of us do not have opinions about disagreements
in specialized fields of medicine, aeronautics, or quantum theory. There
are many things that we can use without having opinions about their
inner workings or the principles that guide their application: I can use my
own eyes without having studied the physiology of human vision, I can
use my glasses without knowing the principles of optics, and in similar
fashion, we might be able to use moral language without having thought
about meta-ethical questions. On this view, proper meta-ethical scrutiny
of the way in which moral language operates might reveal that we mean
something nonrelationalist when we make practical judgments even if
most of us have never given this a thought.
However, it seems to me that many people actually do hold meta-ethical
views and that they do make meta-ethical claims in moral conversations.
For starters, many people have religious beliefs and many religious belief
systems include meta-ethical ideas. Thus, Catholic doctrine includes the
nonrelationalist idea that certain acts are morally wrong because they
are “intrinsically unordered.” More generally, all monotheistic traditions
seem to involve beliefs about an essential or conceptual relation between
morality and the will of God, and different views about the nature of this
relation have fueled heated theological debate throughout the centuries.
Now perhaps a proponent of the view that moral language use need
not involve meta-ethical reflection might want to object that neither need
religious practice involve theological reflection. Many religious people do
not worry about these questions very much. However, I do not think this
observation applies across the board. It is simply false that only theology
students would worry about theological questions: many people struggle
with a crisis of faith, or simply wonder whether God might exist even
if they lack specific religious commitments. When people change their
religious beliefs, or lose them altogether, they often have to evaluate the
manner in which they arrive at moral judgments or the sources that they
used to rely on for moral justification.
Furthermore, even if theology often involves nonrelationalist beliefs,
there are many cases in which people (including religious people) seem to
advocate relationalist ideas as well. In my experience a lot of people tend
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to be even far more relativistic in their claims than I have been in this thesis.
Of course, their formulations are usually less precise than those used by
academic philosophers who have specialized in this field. For example,
some people will say that moral judgments are “just opinions, not facts.”
This phrase can be used to claim that although these opinions are opinions
about facts, they have not been established as facts in a scientific manner.
But from the context it is sometimes clear that people actually mean that
there are no facts in ethics beyond the facts about the opinions themselves.
I have also heard several people who did not study philosophy say about
morality that it is “subjective”—often with an air as if this insight should
be beyond any doubt for someone who has given the matter some thought.
In fact, when friends and relatives want to know what my thesis is
about, I have experienced more trouble defending the idea that at least
some moral judgments might be true for all human beings including those
who currently make opposite judgments, than I have defending the idea
that there are no moral facts independent of the attitudes we happen to
have. Finally, I see people making all sorts of relativistic sounding remarks
in online communities. Whenever someone proclaims a certain moral
assumption or recommendation as true, people respond with claims like
“but that is your truth, I have my own truth.” When some cultural practice
is renounced, you can expect that somebody will not be able to resist
responding that “it is true in their culture.” And so on.
Of course, these observations are anecdotal. But my impression, at
least, is that people do have meta-ethical ideas, and that these are very
diverse, from extremely relativistic forms of relationalism to extremely
fundamentalistic versions of nonrelationalism. It does not follow that
people are also very clear in their views; in fact I think they usually aren’t.
So folk meta-ethics at least does not seem to be univocally nonrelation-
alist in the sense that not all the folk subscribe to nonrelationalism. But
could it perhaps still be nonrelationalist in the sense that most, if not all,
average moral language users follow nonrelationalist inference patterns,
even if those among them who have relationalist ideas about morality
apparently are not aware of this? After all, like so many dispositions, our
inferential dispositions might not be fully transparent to us. If they where,
then conceptual analysis would be easy, which it is not.
According to the Affective Response View that I have defended, how-
ever, one of the core inferential dispositions that we have with respect
to our practical judgments is that we expect our affective responses to
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the intended consequences of our actions to confirm the judgments upon
which we acted. And as I have argued in section 7.3, the presupposition
that our practical judgments are predictive of our affective responses in this
manner implies relationalism. So the Affective Response View essentially
postulates a relationalist inferential disposition as one of the most common
dispositions that we have with respect to practical normativity. And I have
been arguing for this view on independent grounds. If anything, I suspect
it will more often be the case that someone who proclaims nonrelationalist
ideas about morality turns out to have relationalist inferential dispositions,
than the other way around.
Nevertheless, I do not think that the meta-ethical ideas that people hold
cannot influence their inferential dispositions whatsoever. On the contrary,
the whole point of my semantic pluralism is to be able to account for the
fact that even though I think the Affective Response View is the proper story
about how we should, and often do, come to revise our practical views,
there will nevertheless be some people who are so explicitly committed
to their own epistemic and metaphysical assumptions about morality that
their inferential patterns will not be in accordance to what the Affective
Response View requires. For example, someone who very strongly believes
in a certain interpretation of the Bible according to which moral obligations
are to be established on the basis of Scripture alone and have nothing to
do with what we may happen to like or dislike, may be able to stick with
his moral judgments even in the face of overwhelming negative affective
responses that he has to endure as a result of his way of living. In such
a case, it no longer seems plausible to identify this person’s practical
judgments with volitional judgments, and I propose an error theory about
his judgments instead.
Summarizing, my conclusion about ‘folk meta-ethics’ is that we have
no good reason to believe that average moral language users are predomi-
nantly nonrelationalist, neither in their own ideas about morality nor in
their inferential dispositions. By itself, this does not yet refute the semantic
objection, however. Recall that on Michael’s Smith’s view, the meanings
of our moral concepts are to be determined on the basis of platitudes
about the inferential dispositions of those moral language users who have
“fully mastered” those concepts. Therefore, one of the things that Smith
might say at this point is that what is common or average in our moral
practice is completely irrelevant because average language users need not
have full mastery of their concepts. Even if the Affective Response View
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captures a common inferential disposition, the meaning of everybody’s
moral judgments may still be determined by a small minority of people
whose inferential dispositions strictly reflect the Principles of Reason View,
for example, if they are the ones who get the concepts right.
But is it plausible to say that certain people ‘mean’ their judgments in
ways that go completely against their own understanding and application
of the concepts they use to form those judgments? I will turn to this
question below.
10.5.2 Conceptual Conservatism
Recall that Mackie made a division in meta-ethics between conceptual and
substantial claims: the former provide the truth conditions for practical
judgments while the latter identify types of facts, if any, that satisfy those
conditions. The semantic objection is based upon a conceptual claim:
regardless of whether there really are any nonrelationalist facts about what
we should do, the objection is that the truth conditions of our practical
judgments require such facts because that is what it means to use the moral
concepts that we do. Should it turn out that there are no such facts, then
our judgments must be false, but it wouldn’t change the meaning of our
concepts.
In so far as concept mastery is not determined by contingent sociocul-
tural facts about which inferential dispositions or which interpretations of
the concept are most common among ordinary language users, it presum-
ably must be determined by considerations of conceptual necessity: any
widespread lack in mastery of some concept must involve some incoherence
in the application or understanding of the concept by the user. Otherwise,
we might just as well consider this widespread usage to be the ‘mastery’
and rival usages to be ‘lackings in mastery’ instead:
To say that we make inferences and judgments along these lines
is, of course, consistent with the possibility of our coming to
think that it is wrong to do so. Our prereflective inferential
habits are, after all, corrigible. We would, for example, change
our inferential habits if we were shown that the judgments
and inferences that we make as masters of the term “red”—the
platitudes themselves—were incompatible or inconsistent with
each other. However it is to say that it would take something
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like such inconsistency to make us change our inferential and
judgmental habits. (Smith, 1994, p. 30)
However, suppose that the substantial claim of nonrelationalism would be
false. And suppose that it would be false for the reasons which I have
discussed in chapters 5 and 6: in order for nonrelationalist values to exist,
they must follow from conceptual considerations of coherence, but such
considerations seem to leave no room for such values to exist. In that
case, it seems to follow from the falsity of the substantial claim, that the
corresponding conceptual claim must be false as well, for it would have
turned out that the very idea of nonrelationalist value is incoherent. Hence,
the conceptual claim might not be so independent from the substantial
claim after all.
This insight leaves us with a choice. For there are two things that
can happen when we detect some inconsistency in our inferential habits
pertaining to some concept. If we judge one of the conflicting inferential
dispositions to be not such an important part of the concept, then we may
improve our mastery of the concept by removing that disposition or by
adjusting it so as to remove the incoherence.8 But if we judge instead that
both of the conflicting dispositions reflect essential or core platitudes about
the concept, then we may instead feel compelled to simply abandon the
concept altogether. Let us now apply this choice to the idea that there will
be no convergence of all possible agents onto similar attitudes, and that
therefore, nonrelationalism cannot be reconciled with the Facts, Authority,
and Distinctness Principles. If we take the first option, we end up with the
revisionist error theory that I shall be defending in combination with my
semantic pluralism below. Instead, if we take the second option, we get
the nihilistic error theory that Michael Smith has been considering as the
most plausible alternative should his realism fail, which we have seen in
section 6.3.5.
So the conceptual claim that Smith is defending, and that the semantic
objection requires, is not just that nonrelationalism is part of our concept of
practical normativity, but rather that it is an essential part of the concept in
such a way that it cannot be removed from the concept should it turn out
to be part of an inconsistency. It is here to stay, so to speak, and if it really
must go, then it will take the entire concept down with it. Regarding the
8If we judge both of the conflicting platitudes to be unessential, we may also disambiguate
the incoherent concept into two coherent concepts: one which loses the one platitude and
one which loses the other.
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issue of nonrelationalism, on this view, our concept of practical normativity
is fixed and immutable. It cannot change. Let us call this view “conceptual
conservatism.”9
Furthermore, if nonrelationalism cannot be separated from the concept
of practical normativity, then any average moral language users who
did not have nonrelationalist inferential dispositions in the first place
presumably cannot become masters of their moral concepts until they
adopt such dispositions—or at least, that is how I mean to understand
“conceptual conservatism” here. It follows that conceptual conservatism
rules out my semantic pluralism. According to the conceptual conservative,
then, the semantic principle that assigns truth conditions to a judgment in
approval of P is always the same, regardless of who is approving of P or
when.
Note that a conceptual conservative can also be a relationalist: if he
favors a relationalist analysis of the meaning of practical judgments, then
his claim, which I shall call “conservative relationalism,” is that the truth
conditions of a judgment in approval of P will always be relationalist,
regardless of who is approving of P. Of course, that means the facts that
might satisfy those conditions do depend ‘strongly’ (as explicated in section
5.1.2) upon who is making the judgment, because that is what relationalism
tells us, but the thing that remains the same regardless of who that agent
is, is that those conditions always contain that reference to him or her.
By contrast, the “conservative nonrelationalist” claims that the meaning
of no practical judgment can ever involve such strong dependence, but
only weak dependence (again as explicated in section 5.1.2) upon attitudes
of the judging agent, regardless of who she is. What the conservative
relationalist and nonrelationalist have in common is that they both believe
their favored meta-ethical semantics should be applied to moral judgments
across the board.
In my discussion of folk meta-ethics, I have been talking about the
conceptual understanding and inferential habits of average moral language
users. But the most striking illustration of conceptual conservatism comes
from its application to the moral judgments made by leading academic
philosophers in the field of meta-ethics itself. Thus, according to the
9I realize that this label is not entirely satisfactory, as the willingness to eliminate rather
than modify something may seem like an odd way of “conserving” it, but I haven’t managed
to come up with a better term so far. In any case, “conservatism” does imply a resistance to
change and contrasts nicely with the label of “revisionism” that I am using for the alternative
to it.
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conservative nonrelationalist, whenever Gilbert Harman utters a moral
judgement in approval of P, he must be judging that there is an objective
nonrelationalist fact that P should be the case, even if Gilbert Harman
does not believe in such facts, does not believe his judgement to have that
meaning, and published many famous articles about why he does not
believe these things. Furthermore, suppose that as a trained philosopher,
Harman is at least consistent in the inferences he makes from his own
moral judgments with the relativism that he defends. Then even that
would not, on this view, make the meaning of those judgments relationalist.
Instead, what it would mean is that Harman has failed to master our moral
vocabulary. Conversely, the conservative relationalist thinks that even the
moral judgment of a staunch believer in objective nonrelationalist moral
facts such as Derek Parfit should be evaluated in terms of a relationalist
strong dependence upon Parfit’s attitudes. And if Parfit’s inferential
dispositions are strictly nonrelationalist, then the implication would be
that Parfit has not mastered his moral vocabulary.
I find these implications deeply implausible. Surely people like Harman
and Parfit must have mastery of our moral vocabulary? If they don’t even
know how to apply moral language, then who does? And surely, if Harman
does not believe in nonrelationalist values, then it would be odd to think
that when he approves of something, he is making a claim about something
having nonrelationalist value, even if he himself would never make any
nonrelationalist inference from his approval?
10.5.3 Conceptual Revisionism and Descriptive Conceptual Pluralism
Despite these strange implications, I take it that conceptual conservatism
is pretty much the standard view in analytic meta-ethics, and that it is
often assumed implicitly or without argument. However, some notable
philosophers have taken steps towards a somewhat different view. Richard
Brandt, for example, has made the following remark:
[T]here is no reason to think there is any language-wide single
meaning for these terms. In general, our meanings are entwined
with our total conceptual system, and as our total beliefs change,
our concepts change. Why should this not also be true of
practical concepts? Take the moral concepts of religious people.
Suppose a religious man says that what he means by “wrong” is
“prohibited by God.” Now, philosophers have used a dialectical
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device, as early as Plato in the Euthyphro, to show that this
theological concept cannot be what is meant by “wrong.” But
the dialectical device at most shows that religious people are
confused, not that their moral concepts are identical with those
of Bertrand Russell. Nor is there reason to think that the moral
concepts of unruly boys from the east side of London or New
York are identical with those of Moore or Sidgwick. (1979,
pp. 6–7)
From a conceptual conservative point of view, one might say that if the
religious man in Brandt’s example is confused in his understanding of
what is meant by “wrong,” then the man has simply not mastered the
concept, but the concept itself is still determined by the inferential habits
of those who do have such mastery. But what Brandt is saying is that the
religious man’s understanding of wrongness as that which is prohibited
by God counts as a concept of wrongness in its own right, even if this
concept turns out to be confused. Like Brandt, I want to claim there are no
single meanings for the terms in our moral vocabulary, and that whatever
analysis of these terms we propose as part of our philosophical theory
need not apply as the semantics for the judgments made by someone like
the religious man in his example.
Furthermore, we have seen in section 4.3 that Bernard Williams not
only allowed different people to have different concepts of a reason, but
that he also claimed that the reason statements uttered by these people
can therefore have different sorts of truth conditions. In particular, the
utterances made by those who mean them in the external sense have truth
conditions that cannot be satisfied by facts about reasons: these utter-
ances are all “false, or incoherent, or really something else misleadingly
expressed” (1980/1981a, p. 111). Finally, we have also seen that Williams’s
view resembles that of Mackie in this respect, and the remarks from Mackie
which I have discussed suggest that we should not understand his error
theory along the nihilistic lines considered by Smith, which presuppose
conceptual conservatism.
My own view, which I shall call “conceptual revisionism,” is that
we should extend Mackie’s classification of conceptual vs. substantive
claims in meta-ethics by making a further distinction between “descriptive
conceptual” and “prescriptive conceptual” claims. Descriptive conceptual
claims are about what people actually mean when they make practical
judgments, depending upon their concepts as they, possibly incoherently,
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understand them, their possibly false beliefs about the nature of morality,
and/or their possibly conflicting inferential habits with respect to those
judgments. By contrast, prescriptive conceptual claims are about how to
properly analyze practical normativity, which must be fully coherent and
cannot depend upon false beliefs or conflicting habits.
So the prescriptive conceptual thesis I want to defend is relationalist
(we could call it “prescriptive relationalism”), whereas my descriptive
conceptual thesis is the semantic pluralism according to which people
make r-practical judgments that follow a relationalist semantics as well as
nr-practical judgments that are nonrelationalist (let us call this “descriptive
conceptual pluralism”). The combination of these claims is revisionist in
the sense that the people who make nr-practical judgments should revise
their concepts and inferential habits in order to start making r-practical
judgments instead.10
Now the essential difference between revisionism and conservatism is
that the revisionist allows the confused concepts or conflicting inferential
habits of average language users to influence the truth conditions of the
judgments they express. However, this idea comes in two flavors, which I
shall call “hard” and “soft” revisionism.
Hard revisionism is the view that the truth conditions are fully deter-
mined by the descriptive conceptual thesis. Thus, if nonrelationalism is
incoherent, and if Derek Parfit is completely nonrelationalist in his beliefs
and inferential dispositions, then the hard revisionist must conclude that
all Parfit’s practical judgments are false. Only once Parfit allows himself
to be convinced by his opponents that relationalism is true, which will
never happen, could he start to make true practical judgments. Now at
first glance, this view may seem implausible, especially if we consider that
I rejected conceptual conservatism in part because it required me to say
that Parfit would not have mastery of his moral concepts. Trading the
conclusion that Parfit has no such mastery for the conclusion that Parfit
has no true moral beliefs may hardly seem to be an improvement.
10Note that this ‘should’ is essentially the ‘should’ of epistemic normativity: it is about
correcting our theoretical beliefs about what it means for something to be a normative reason.
Nevertheless, I suppose it might be argued that agents generally have an interest in not being
confused about what it means for them to have reasons, in which case my prescriptive claim
might imply a conceptually necessary volitional isomorphism judgment (as discussed in section
10.3.4 above) that all agents have a normative reason to make r-practical judgments instead
of nr-practical judgments.
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However, it all depends on how we think about truth and knowledge.
Consider the transition from Newtonian mechanics to relativity theory.
Some people would say that because relativity theory has changed the con-
cept of mass, all statements made from within the framework of Newtonian
mechanics must strictly speaking be false, since they refer to a property
that is never instantiated. But relativity theory can explain under which
conditions those statements are nevertheless approximately true, in the sense
that the predictions we infer from them are very reliable. Hence, even if
Newtonian mechanics produces false statements, it succeeds in capturing
the structure of reality to a certain extent, which may be understood as a
kind of knowledge.
A relationalist who takes such a view towards revolutions in physics
may have no trouble accepting hard revisionism about practical judgments.
On this view, saying that large amounts of beliefs are false is just really not
such a big deal. Furthermore, if the r-practical judgments that would have
been true about Parfit would still be in approval of the same things that
his actual judgments are in approval of, such that his actual judgments do
capture his volitional inner reality in the sense that they match his affective
responses, then the hard revisionist can say that Parfit’s actual judgments
are approximately true, which is perhaps all that anyone could hope for
anyway.
Nevertheless, if we do not like these implications we can also opt for soft
revisionism, the view that assigning truth conditions is a complex interplay
between the descriptive and prescriptive conceptual claims, depending
on the context of the utterance. Consider the physics analogy again.
Suppose we say that judgments derived from Newtonian theory are true
when they manage to interact with nature successfully, so to speak, in
the sense that they successfully predict or explain its behavior, even if the
theory itself is corrected by successive physical theories. From the point of
view of relativity theory, those are the circumstances in which Newtonian
statements about mass manage to say something about relativistic mass.
And from the point of view of whatever ultimate physical theory the
future will bring, as long as it will keep some revised concept of mass rather
than having completely eliminated the very idea, we might be able to say
that the true judgments derived from Newtonian theory manage to say
something about whatever mass really turns out to be.
Now the conditions under which we are allowed to do this are limited, I
think, by two contextual constraints. The first is obviously that Newtonian
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judgments are false when they deviate from their relativistic successors.
The acceptable margin of error is contextual: it depends, for example, on
the precision of the instruments we are using. Thus, the prediction that
the measurement will be “5.3 seconds” is successful if the deviation is less
than a millisecond and the instrument does not even indicate hundredths
of seconds anyway. The second constraint is that we might want to say
that the statement is false, or at least that it is not justified and hence not
knowledge, when it is made in a context where it heavily depends on
features of Newtonian theory that are eliminated by its successor.
If we apply the first constraint to nr-practical judgments, then we
will use the descriptive conceptual claim to render these judgments false
when the agent would have made a clearly different r-practical judgment,
for example when his belief in nonrelationalist value let him to ignore
certain of this affective experiences as irrelevant to morality, say. The
most interesting examples of this are the ‘perverse cases’ in which people
make volitional judgments that are different from their own nr-practical
judgments, which I will discuss below.
And if we apply the second constraint, then we can say that an nr-
practical judgment like “stealing is a sin” might be false, or at least unjus-
tified, when the speaker directly derives this from the Bible, say, without
having used insight in his own dispositions, even if his normative volitional
attitudes do happen to reject stealing. In such a case, the person is simply
not talking about or interacting with the facts that would have made a
volitional judgement against stealing true.
But in all other cases, we could use the prescriptive claim to interpret the
practical judgments of people with nonrelationalist beliefs as nevertheless
successful cognitive interactions with their inner volitional realities. In
other words, we apply a principle of charity from the perspective of our own
prescriptive meta-ethical theory in order to make as much sense of the
other person’s judgments as we can.
10.5.4 Surface Grammar and Quasi-Nonrelationalism
When someone says “Peanut butter is good,” most of us will understand
his judgment as including an implicit reference to his taste, preferences, or
perhaps human taste generally, but in any case, we will not understand this
claim as an attribution of a property that peanut butter has independent
of contingent human features (as we have seen, nonrelationalists can
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also accommodate this phenomenon, through the framework of weak
dependence). Therefore, all parties may agree that the surface grammar of
evaluative statements need not fully explicate the logic of the propositions
they express. In the same manner, philosophers who have defended
relationalist views usually note that a statement like “Charity is good” or
“Stealing is wrong” may hide an implicit reference to the speaker as well.
It follows that descriptive conceptual pluralism does not require us to
attribute nr-practical judgments whenever the surface grammar of some-
one’s utterance has such a ‘nonrelationalist looking’ form. Furthermore,
suppose that John says “Stealing is wrong” and Mike responds with “Not
always, for it is okay to steal if the alternative is starving to death.” In
that case, adding implicit references to their respective attitudes would
seem to break the inference that John’s judgment must be false if Mike’s is
true. But as I have argued in section 10.2.1 we must look for conversational
implicatures to explain such disagreements, which allows us to import a
shared assumption of volitional similarity into the context of the discussion.
So in this case the ‘surface’ also includes an apparently nonrelationalist in-
ference pattern which hides implicit inferential dispositions that are actually
relationalist.
This way of thinking resembles Simon Blackburn’s “quasi-realist” se-
mantics for moral discourse (1984). Blackburn is a noncognitivist about
practical judgments, of course, but what noncognitivism has in common
with relationalist cognitivism is that practical judgments involve affective
attitudes of the judger even if the surface grammar of their expression may
hide such involvement. Blackburn has been trying to show that realist
inference patterns which seem part of much of our everyday moral con-
versations can be explained pragmatically with reference to noncognitive
judgments and without postulating “real” moral properties in the external
world. In similar fashion, I propose that many seemingly nonrelational-
ist inference patterns can be accounted for by a “quasi-nonrelationalist”
semantics that translates them back into intersubjective relationalist infer-
ences.
But if this is possible, then we may wonder how much difference
there remains between situations in which we attribute relationalist beliefs
to agents who make use of quasi-nonrelationalist surface grammar to
express them on the one hand, and on the other hand, situations in which
we attribute nonrelationalist beliefs to agents but determine that their
judgments may be called true anyway because of the provision of soft
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revisionism which allows us to say that their judgments nevertheless
succeeded to capture their inner normative realities. My answer is that I
think there still is a difference: it is a difference between the nonrelationalist
meaning that Michael Smith has in mind when he says “this act is wrong”
and the relationalist meaning that I have in mind when I utter the same
sentence.
Nevertheless, what I can admit is that there may be a gray area of cases
in between. I have argued that some average moral language users mean
their practical judgments specifically in relationalist or nonrelationalist
ways, but this need not apply to all of them, or all of the time. I certainly
want to allow that people sometimes, or that some people, make their prac-
tical judgments in ways that leave the question of whether nonrelationalism
is true completely in the open.
This means that my semantic pluralism really allows for five types of
situations. 1. When someone uses relationalist formulations explicitly. 2.
When someone uses quasi-nonrelationalist surface grammar or inferences,
but clearly has a relationalist interpretation in mind. 3. When someone
makes a practical judgment without being clear or even thinking about
a relationalist or nonrelationalist understanding of what he is asserting.
4. When someone clearly has a nonrelationalist meaning in mind, but
the constraints of soft revisionism allow us to assign relationalist truth
conditions to his judgments anyway. 5. When these constraints are not
met, and the nonrelationalist judgment must be assigned nonrelationalist
truth conditions.
As it turns out, the revisionist account I am proposing only requires us
to adopt an error theory in situation 5. By contrast, in situations 1–4 we
can maintain that the judgments in question are satisfiable.
10.5.5 Perverse Cases
As we have seen in section 8.2, the notion of a volitional judgment, or
a judgment of “identification” or “endorsement” as it is often called, is
a significant philosophical analysandum in its own right, regardless of
whether it also serves as a proper analysans for the concept of a practical
judgement. In fact, Gary Watson and Michael Bratman have argued that
practical judgments cannot be volitional because we can make volitional
judgments that we want something despite our own practical, and in
particular moral, belief that it is not what we should do.
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When it comes right down to it, I might fully ‘embrace’ a
course of action I do not judge best; it may not be thought
best, but is fun, or thrilling; one loves doing it, and it’s too bad
it’s not also the best thing to do, but one goes for it without
compunction. Perhaps in such a case one must see this thrilling
thing as good, must value it; but, again, one needn’t see it
as expressing or even confirming to a general standpoint one
would be prepared to defend. One may think it is after all
rather mindless, or vulgar, or demeaning, but when it comes
down to it, one is not (as) interested in that.
Call such cases, if you like, perverse cases. The point is
that perverse cases are plainly neither cases of compulsion nor
weakness of will. There is no estrangement here. One’s will is
fully behind what one does. (Watson, 1987/2004a, pp. 168–169)
Bratman concurs, noting that “value judgment is one thing, ownership
another” (2003, p. 227). It may seem that these “perverse cases” are
counterexamples to the volitional analysis of practical normativity. But
I think not. Instead, my descriptive conceptual pluralism allows me to
accommodate these cases in the following manner. Consider a case in
which someone believes that a certain act is wrong because it is forbidden
in the Bible, but nevertheless judges that she really wants to do it. We can
then say that her moral disapproval of the act is in fact an nr-practical
judgment, while her volitional approval of the act expresses her cognitive
will which tracks her normative will (accurately or not). It does follow that
she must be mistaken in her idea that what she should do is not what she
really wants to do, but it seems to me that it is only plausible to think that
perverse cases are cases where something has gone wrong even if there is
no “estrangement,” as Watson put it, in the volitional judgment itself.
This solution may seem to have two limitations: it only works when
the practical judgment is clearly nonrelationalist, and consequently, it only
works when it is the judgment on the practical side, and not the one on the
volitional side, so to speak, that is going astray. Regarding the first issue,
it is true that I have only developed and defended conceptual pluralism
with respect to the difference between relationalism and nonrelationalism,
so far. But there is no reason why this approach cannot be extended to
other meta-ethical differences if it should turn out that people really seem
to be making, meaning, or inferring their judgments in correspondingly
different ways.
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Consider, for example, the distinction within relationalist cognitivism
between the cultural relativism according to which the truth conditions
of practical judgments are determined by cultural standards on the one
hand, and my own relationalism in terms of opaque volitional attitudes
on the other. It seems possible that a cultural relativist could make the
practical judgment that he should not do something because his culture
disapproves of it while also making the volitional judgment that it is what
he really wants. It may be true that his culture indeed disapproves of it,
but his practical judgment that that means he should not do it is certainly
false.
As for the second issue, is the error always on the side of the practical
judgment in such cases? Watson, at least, seems to be hinting at cases
where the practical judgment is actually rather sound, and where it is
the volitional choice that involves the ‘perversity’ by letting frivolous
considerations such as the “thrill” supersede “a general standpoint one
would be prepared to defend.”
In fact, I think we can account for this possibility as well by extending
our descriptive conceptual pluralism a little further. To say that the vo-
litional is a significant analysandum in its own right is to say that there
is this general idea of “judging what you really want” or “being behind
it as a person,” while our concepts of what that means may vary. The
notion of volitional opacity is one such concept, and my Affective Pattern
View articulates a more specific version of it. But as I discussed in section
8.2.2, before Harry Frankfurt made his move towards opacity, he defended
a rather decisionist account that made the decision itself the source of
volitional authority, in a manner resembling Sartre’s early philosophy. It
seems to me that someone who has such a view on what it means to want
something can be “behind” his choice, from his own point of view, even
when his practical judgments, which he is choosing not to act upon, are
inferentially sound along the lines of the Affective Response View and in
touch with his affective dispositions.
In general, my approach towards any distinctions between practical
normativity and volitional authority as different evaluative modes, so to
speak, is as follows. If my account is correct, then once we have revised our
concepts of what we should and what we really want, these concepts will
turn out to have the same meaning, because they are concepts of the same
normative will (though of course the distinction between the cognitive and
the normative will remains). But as long as certain revisions still need to be
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made, we can have different concepts for which we use words like ‘should’
or ‘want’ and there is no reason why only the concepts for which we use
‘should’ could be on the wrong track. Someone who applies her concept of
‘should’ in accordance to the Affective Response View, while her concept
of ‘wanting’ is that of a decisionistic radical choice, will have to revise the
latter in order to realize its equivalence to the former, if my view is correct,
and not the other way round.

Conclusion
I have proposed and defended a combination of two views: the Affective
Response View of practical disconfirmation (section 7.2), which answers the
Disconfirmation Question (section 1.2), and the Affective Pattern View of
the nature of practical normativity (section 9.1), which answers the Facts
Question (section 1.1). The former is the view that we disconfirm our
practical judgments on the basis of unexpected affective responses to the
intended consequences of our actions. The latter is the view that we get
our practical judgments right when they capture certain patterns in the
structured inner realities of our affective dispositions. The patterns in
question are those that manifest themselves in our resultant motivations
in so far as we approach ideal conditions of rational and self-governing
agency.
These views are attractive, first and foremost, because they allow us to
accept all five of the principles from chapter 1. Each principle articulates
a widely held intuition about practical judgment. Furthermore, many
philosophers who have nevertheless rejected one of these principles have
done so because they judged it to be incompatible with some of the other
principles. I have tried to capture these alleged incompatibilities in my
formulations of the Facts and Disconfirmation Problems (sections 1.5.1 and
1.5.2). I have argued that the Affective Response View solves the latter
(section 7.5), while the Affective Pattern View solves the former problem
(section 9.4).
To be sure, some philosophers may reject one or more of these principles
for independent reasons. The Humean theory of motivation, for example,
has been criticized for being psychologically unrealistic generally, rather
than merely for making moral knowledge inert. Against this, I have
suggested that the purpose of the Distinctness Principle is not to model
our psychological architecture but rather to explicate a core aspect of our
concept of truth (section 3.4.2). Further development of this argument must
await another occasion, however. A second example is the intuition that
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self-governing agents need not care about practical normativity. Moral
externalists have argued that they see no incoherence in the judgments
of the “amoralist” who distinguishes right from wrong but does not care
whether his actions are right (Brink, 1986). In somewhat similar fashion,
Watson has defended the possibility of “perverse cases” in which people
act against their better judgments without the “estrangement” associated
with ordinary weakness of will. Although I have provided an alternative
account of perverse cases that is compatible with the Affective Pattern
View (section 10.5.5), I have not attempted to refute the externalist intuition
on its own terms. In general, my main line of argument has simply
been premised on the assumption that each of the principles is prima facie
plausible on independent grounds, and that other things being equal, a
synthesis of these principles is therefore preferable, if possible, to any
theory that sacrifices one or more of them in order to account for the
others. My conclusions in support of the views I propose are conditional
on this assumption.
The Analysis of Normative Reasons
Regarding the Facts Problem, such reconciliatory solutions often involve
some version or modification of the Internal Reasons View. Although I am
roughly in agreement with the spirit, so to speak, of Williams’s defense
of this view, the devil is in the details, and there I have found much to
disagree with. Williams rejected the distinction between normative and
motivating reasons on the grounds that all reasons have both justificatory
and explanatory implications, but I have argued that he misunderstood
the distinction. Both types of reasons have both types of implications,
while differing in the nature of those implications (section 2.1.2). Williams
seemed to suggest that rejecting the distinction was part of his defense of
internal reasons, but I have argued that the defense actually presupposes
the distinction and that the Internal Reasons View is about normative
reasons. Williams also placed a proximity requirement on instrumental
deliberation, apparently as another step in his argument, which I have
criticized for being inconsistent with the whole idea of a deliberative route
that Williams employed in his later formulations of the Internal Reasons
View (section 2.2.1).
Most importantly, Williams did not explicate a clear premise concern-
ing motivation, but I have argued, contrary to Thomas, that without the
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premise of the Motivational Continuity Thesis, the defense becomes vul-
nerable to the non-route-like deliberation objection (section 2.5). I have
tried to show that this premise can be defended upon both Humean and
anti-Humean theories of motivation (sections 3.4 and 3.5), allowing me to
remain neutral about the exegetical question of whether Williams would
have accepted the Distinctness Principle or not. Finally, in order to block
the nonproceduralist objection (section 2.4), the defense requires procedu-
ralism, and it turns out that the motivationally Humean defense already
presupposes a solution to the Disconfirmation Problem (section 3.3.2).
Returning to the Facts Problem and my own preferred conceptual
framework from chapter 1, and incorporating the aforementioned criticisms
of Williams’s defense, I arrive at three possible reconciliatory solutions:
type-i, -ii, and -iii dispositionalism. Each is an attempt to synthesize the
Facts, Authority, and Distinctness Principles, but differs in its interpretation
of the other two principles: whereas type-i and -ii are proceduralist about the
Disconfirmation Principle, type-iii dispositionalism is nonproceduralist, and
whereas type-i dispositionalism is relationalist about the Intersubjectivity
Principle, type-ii and -iii are nonrelationalist (section 5.3.2).
I have argued that type-i attempts to solve the problem essentially
disambiguate the paradoxical implications of the Facts, Authority, and
Distinctness Principles into two fully compatible statements about the
dependencies between the beliefs and desires of self-governing agents
under ideal conditions (section 4.2). However, this strategy raises two new
problems: to explain the authority of some desires over others, and to
come up with a relationalist account of intersubjectivity, which is not as
straightforward as the nonrelationalist interpretation (section 4.4).
Nonrelationalist dispositionalism faces a different problem: it must
explain why all conceptually possible deliberators would have similar (as
opposed to isomorphic) desires concerning matters of ethics under ideal
conditions (section 5.2). I have discussed Michael Smith’s attempt to do so,
distinguishing between the proceduralist type-ii and the nonproceduralist
type-iii dispositionalism as possible interpretations of his view, concerning
which some of his comments seem ambiguous (section 5.3.2). So far, his
critics have typically targeted the proceduralist interpretation with very
strong objections (sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2). I have argued that the most
promising response would involve a combination of both convergence
and constitution strategies, but while this may allow us to construct an
interesting convergence of constitutive isomorphic desire sets onto coherent
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isomorphic desire sets, my ultimate conclusion has been that there still
seems no logical reason to suppose that this will give rise to similar desires
about substantial moral issues (section 5.4.3).
The type-iii solution adds a third element to the mix of constitution
and convergence: that of ineliminable epistemic luck. We have seen that this
must be a special type of veritic luck for two reasons. First because it
would be a priori, which requires an agent-centered rather than a world-
centered account of such luck. Secondly, in order to explain such luck as
ineliminable it cannot be due to the finite character of our limited cognitive
capacities (section 5.3.3). The idea, then, is that the prior desires from
which convergence would develop must not only be constitutive of self-
government, but also ‘lucky’ in this particular sense, if we are to arrive
at the moral truth. I have argued that even if we assume that certain
eternal disputes in theoretical philosophy might be susceptible to this type
of luck (section 6.1)—an assumption I myself do not share—then there
would still be important dis-analogies between such theoretical matters of
belief and practical matters of desire that make it unwarranted to postulate
ineliminable epistemic luck in normative ethics (section 6.3).
The Account of Practical Disconfirmation
Having examined the problems for each of the three types of dispositional-
ism from the point of view of the Facts Question, my subsequent argument
has been to shift our perspective to the Disconfirmation Question as the
dialectically prior issue in order to determine which answer to the Facts
Question is most plausible. We have seen that the account of disconfirma-
tion to which type-ii and -iii dispositionalists are committed, the Principles
of Reason View, requires rather substantial interpretations of such princi-
ples in order to explain the sort of actual revisions that we want to explain.
I have argued that the simplest way to explain why agents would revise
their attitudes in accordance to substantial principles is simply to count
those principles, contingently, amongst their intrinsically desired ends. It
seems an unnecessary explanatory burden to suppose that such revisions
and the corresponding motivational changes are brought about out of
sheer logical or conceptual insight (section 7.1.1). In fact, it seemed to
me personally—but this may be a rather idiosyncratic intuition—that it
really doesn’t do justice to the existential challenge of coming to grips with
the racist, sexist, homophobic, and xenophobic views people have acted
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and continue to act upon, simply to attribute these to their insufficient
conceptual or logical skills or capacities.
Furthermore, I have argued that even on the assumption that such
substantial principles could account for belief revisions on a priori grounds,
it would still be a mystery why intrinsic desires would then be updated
accordingly under conditions of sustained self-government. I explained
that the adoption of the Authority Principle does not take care of this,
but that on the contrary, this is something that needs to be resolved in
order to account for the Authority Principle (given our commitment to
the Disconfirmation and Distinctness Principles). Without such an expla-
nation, we would expect intrinsic desires simply to remain undisturbed,
breaking down self-government with every practical belief revision. I
have argued that the basic idea of self-government explains why certain
non-instrumental desire revisions of planning and scheduling come along
‘for free’ with the corresponding belief revisions, but that this does not go
for any principles under the substantial interpretations needed to explain
actual moral conversions. So it is hard to see how the Principles of Reason
View could solve the Disconfirmation Problem (section 7.1.2).
We have seen that these problems go beyond what is specific to nonre-
lationalist dispositionalism, since type-i dispositionalism may also, and is
often assumed to, be combined with the Principles of Reason View. The
resulting account is a form of relativism according to which our norma-
tive reasons are simply the a priori rationally transformed versions of the
desires upon which we deliberate, a view which shares the aforemen-
tioned problems of explaining actual desire changes on substantial moral
disconfirmations.
Finally, we have seen that all proponents of the Principles of Reason
View need an additional account of disconfirmation in order to handle
non-moral matters of personal life decisions that are susceptible to error
to a degree that is underdetermined by principled reasoning on any ac-
count (section 7.1.3). The Affective Response View is very well suited
to handle such cases, but once we adopt this view, it seems to provide
better explanations of disconfirmation on moral issues as well (section
7.2). However, the implication of explaining moral disconfirmations in
this manner is relationalism: if unexpected affective responses disconfirm
practical beliefs, then practical beliefs apparently entail predictions about
such responses, which makes them empirical and contingently attitude-
related. More specifically, given our Principles, the implication is a form of
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type-i dispositionalism according to which the attitudes that constitute our
normative reasons may be opaque to us (section 7.3). I have developed an
account of deliberation as “volitional interpretation” to make sense of this
idea from an epistemic point of view, arguing that no concrete experiential
or efficient motivation provides privileged access to our opaque normative
attitudes over any others, making every disconfirmation susceptible to
further revision in principle, and every practical belief a kind of hypothesis.
This account offers a surprisingly simple solution to the Disconfirmation
Problem: unexpected affective responses explain motivational changes
because they are motivational changes (section 7.5).
An Opaque Relationalism
Although this account of disconfirmation leads us back to defending
relationalism with respect to the Facts Question, the type of view we are
now looking at offers some new ingredients that the Internal Reasons View,
in Williams’s formulation, did not include or specify. Most importantly,
non-instrumental revisions are mostly not rational transformations of
known desires, but empirical discoveries of unknown affective attitudes that
reflect previously unexpected aspects of opaque volitional attitudes. As we
have seen, Harry Frankfurt’s recent account of normative reasons is much
closer to this view (section 8.1).
Nevertheless, I have argued that Frankfurt also, ultimately, fails to
account for the relevant real-life cases of practical disconfirmation. His
doctrine of volitional necessity cannot accommodate disconfirmations
after the fact of the act (section 8.3.1); furthermore, his appeal to claims
about unthinkability presupposes what it needs to establish and applies
only to extreme cases (section 8.3.2). At a more fundamental level, both
ideas explain disconfirmation of the opaque in terms of the occasionally
transparent, by postulating privileged experiential attitudes at the top of
the desiderative hierarchy or the core of the structure of caring. I have
argued that this problem traces back to Watson’s original criticism of
Frankfurt’s early views of free will and I have diagnosed it as being due to
an essentially Cartesian epistemology of practical reason (section 8.3.3).
Because the Affective Pattern View that I defend employs an episte-
mology of pattern recognition, it does not fall prey to Frankfurt’s problem
of coming up with some type of attitude we can deliberate upon that
outranks mere desires. There are, instead, only affective attitudes with
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which we deliberate that are equally unprivileged. It is the pattern in the
whole that constitutes the volitional authority in which its participating
parts are enshrined. I have drawn upon the work of Daniel Dennett to
make sense of pattern recognition in the context of attitude attribution
across time on the basis of imperfect information using predictive success
as the ultimate criterion for justification (section 9.1.1). But we have also
seen that the affective constituents of the pattern in my account exist at a
different level of organization than the behavioral constituents in Dennett’s
original proposal. Hence, both theories analyze different types of attitudes
in terms of different types of constituents. This makes the two theories
logically independent (section 9.1.2).
I have argued that the pattern that constitutes the normative will derives
its normative significance, in contrast to patterns that merely constitute a
motivational character of an agent, from the wider counterfactual context
in which it is to be determined. This context is constrained by a special
concept of personal identity that involves “alternatives of oneself,” loosely
borrowing a notion from Bransen (section 9.1.3). I have argued that this way
of defining the normative will makes sense of my proceduralist outlook. It
allows us to explain why even most remorseless Nazis were mistaken in
their practical beliefs (section 9.1.4).
An interesting result of this proposal is that it makes normative reasons
present to varying degrees in different cases, which fits nicely with our
intuition that not all matters of practical deliberation seem equally ‘hard’
matters of fact (section 9.2.1). Furthermore, as Dennett already observed,
such gradually existing patterns allow for pluralism and conflict within
the same set of data, which in my proposal allows us to accommodate
genuine moral dilemmas (section 9.2.2). Finally, I argue that we should
expect patterns to be loosened or strengthened as a result of changes that
may be caused by our own practical decisions, which allows us to account
for Bratman’s “snowball effect” and Williams’s stress on the imaginative
aspects of deliberation. And so we get an account that incorporates both
the cognitive dimension of finding oneself and what we might call the
existentialist dimension of making oneself (section 9.2.3).
In contrast to Frankfurt’s suggestion that the volitional might be a sin-
gle, sui generis branch of attitudes, reducible neither to affect nor cognition,
the Affective Pattern View comes up with two types of attitudes that are
metaphysically nothing over and above—in the sense that they supervene
on—our affective and cognitive dispositions (section 8.4.3). The normative
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will consists of attitudes that are constituted by patterns in affective dis-
positions, while the cognitive will consists of structures of practical beliefs
and accompanying desires at the motivational surface, so to speak (section
8.4.1). To complete this repertoire of volitional classifications, I have also
defined a third concept of the executive will, which embodies the idea that
some of our resultant motivations may be under our volitional control
even when we do not endorse them. That is, we do not endorse them in
the sense that they diverge from the practical beliefs and non-resultant
motivations that constitute our cognitive will.
On the basis of these three volitional concepts I have arrived at a tax-
onomy of free agency and responsibility ascription that extends earlier
distinctions from Watson and Pereboom (section 8.4.2). Action in accor-
dance to one’s cognitive will is free in the self-disclosing sense, which
warrants the ascription of strong attributability if it reflects one’s norma-
tive will and weak attributability otherwise. By contrast, if one’s action is
controlled by one’s executive will then it is free in a sense that warrants
the ascription of weak accountability. The familiar debate between compat-
ibilists and incompatibilists concerns the question whether this type of
control also warrants ascription of strong accountability, or whether that
would presuppose a further, indeterministic or perhaps even incoherent,
notion of control. Finally, I have distinguished all of these notions from the
concept of conscious will that psychologists and neuroscientists nowadays
often associate with free agency, but which is not immediately related to
discussions about responsibility at all.
The distinction between cognitive and normative volitional attitudes has
also led me to distinguish between two kinds of wholeheartedness: we can
have inner wholeheartedness with respect to our normative will and epistemic
resolvedness with respect to our volitional beliefs. I have argued that neither
are ideals to be pursued. If our normative will is not wholehearted, then
it may conflict with certain affective attitudes that, although we have
normative reason not to pursue them, we nevertheless do have reason to
identify with as a matter of authenticity. We thereby acknowledge their
right, so to speak, to remain part of our mental economy in a non-resultant
sense (section 9.3.1).
As for being resolved in our volitional beliefs, given the opacity and
various forms of bias inherent in our affective psychology, the risk is that
we prevent ourselves from disconfirming disastrous falsehoods if we ease
into a state of full resolve too quickly (section 9.3.3). However, this risk
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cannot be eliminated with a simple rule or principle for two reasons. First,
because this type of wholeheartedness is a form of passive resolution, over
which we have no deliberative control. Secondly, because it may even be
constitutive of practical reason that we have a resolved horizon against
which we deliberate. Instead, we can only try to develop the practical
wisdom of striking the virtuous balance between criticism and confidence
in our deliberative policies before passive resolve settles in, so that we have
good reason to depend on it when it does.
In contrast to passive resolution, I have distinguished two modes of
judgment that we can arrive at by deciding to do so: active resolution
involves the self-attribution of knowledge, while the adoption of working
hypotheses allows diachronic stability when our subjective probabilities
are in flux. The latter mode is the more critical or doubtful of the two,
but it restricts the adverse effects of uncertainty with a form of practical
commitment. The former mode is more confident, but this confidence
should be checked by policies for possible future revision (section 9.3.2).
It is in the proper mixture and application of these two types of decision
making that practical wisdom must be found.
And so we have arrived at a detailed reconciliation of the Facts, Au-
thority, and Disconfirmation Principles. For it is now understandable why,
the more an agent knows the facts about his normative reasons, the more
his capacity for self-government would involve desires to act upon those
reasons. Because the facts are about a pattern of desires that manifests itself
more fully as his knowledge increases and which seems the proper object
of his volitional interpretation, representing what he is really all about as a
person. Hence, it seems to make sense of the idea of self-government to say
that if his volitional beliefs capture this pattern, he will be self-governing
when his resultant desires participate in that pattern, and that he will
be lacking in self-government on the occasion when his resultant desire
constitutes noise relative to that pattern.
Let us now focus on the former type of occasion where he is both knowl-
edgeable and self-governing, and let us review the two disambiguated
implications of the type-i dispositional solution about how, given the
Distinctness Principle, his contingent resultant desire might have been
different. The first is that his resultant desire might have been different
and yet he still might have been knowledgeable and self-governing, but
then his beliefs would have been different. That must be so because his
knowledge and self-government would imply that the different desire
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reflected a different pattern and hence, different normative reasons. The
second is that his desire might have been different while his beliefs were
the same, but then he would no longer be self-governing. Nor is it true
that, if the different desire reflected a difference in the pattern as well,
he would still have been knowledgeable. Neither of these implications
are contradictions, nor do they contradict each other. The paradox has
thus been resolved. The Humean theory of motivation, as captured in the
Distinctness Principle, is indeed compatible with the conjunction of the
cognitivism specified by the Facts Principle and the internalism specified
by the Authority Principle.
Moral Discourse
In the final chapter I have explained how my relationalist theory can
account for the intersubjectivity of practical judgment, as manifested by
our participation in moral discourse. I have tried to capture the sentiment
that relationalism is at a disadvantage in this respect by formulating two
objections: the no-purpose objection and the semantic objection.
The no-purpose objection states that if relationalism were true, people
would be talking past each other in moral conversations, and therefore,
such conversations would be pointless (section 10.1). In response, I have
been discussing three types of interpersonal scenarios: those involving
volitional similarity, those involving volitional isomorphism without simi-
larity, and those involving neither similarity nor isomorphism. We have
seen that similarity is needed in order to account for the Intersubjectivity
Principle, but I have argued that it is sufficient to explain that some moral
conversations involve similarity as long as these include discourse regard-
ing core moral values, and as long as we supply additional reasons for
having moral conversations in the absence of similarity (section 10.2.6).
I have distinguished five reasons that explain the purpose of moral
discourse: shared psychology, contrast, knowing someone better than he
knows himself, increase of alternatives, and the discovery of isomorphic
principles of reason. Shared psychology obviously leads to isomorphism,
but because of their contingent empirical nature, our isomorphic atti-
tudes need not be restricted in their content to the sort of indexicality or
self-reference that would undercut similarity (section 10.2.5). Although
evolutionary forces have clearly selected for the trait to care first and fore-
most for our own, we may speculate that the need to recognize suffering
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and distress in our peers and children was most efficiently served by a neu-
rological architecture that has eventually provided us with a disposition
against suffering itself, which now motivates us to care even for those with
whom we do not have family ties or reciprocal relationships. Evolution,
after all, did not have to worry about whether the latter could be justified
a priori in terms of the former as a matter of principle.
My argument does not rely on such speculation, however. Regardless of
how we came to be the way we are, we have reached widespread agreement
in our disapproval of the Holocaust, for example, and we have situational
explanations for Nazi beliefs and behavior that make it more plausible
to assume they were getting their volitional judgments wrong than to
assume they were fundamentally different from us psychologically (section
9.1.4). In similar fashion, I have argued that we may reasonably assume
that the dispositions we share as a species are going to have implications
for other moral issues as well, including some that may yet be subject to
widespread disagreement (section 10.2.2). In many such cases we can give
a straightforward account of the disagreement in terms of contradicting
volitional similarity judgments about human values, human rights, and so on.
I have also argued that the occasional human being who may turn out to
be the exception to such species-wide regularities does not pose an obstacle
to this line of argument. Such cases are not a relevant counter-example
any more than anomalies in human biology, psychology or medicine upset
the idea that the regularities with respect to which they are anomalies are
nevertheless features of our species. If we think that we have objective
knowledge that the human hand has ten digits, then the Affective Pattern
View allows us to have, with the same level of objectivity, knowledge that
we should not torture children for fun even if the occasional psychopath
would lack the relevant dispositions (section 10.2.3).
Nevertheless, shared psychology does not need to involve species-wide
similarity in order to explain interpersonal contradictions in moral dis-
course. First of all, we often disagree in the context of a shared cultural
background, which merely requires intracultural similarity. Moreover, even
when the cultural scope is unclear or left implicit, then the conversational
implicature of their utterances may involve the assumption that the inter-
locutors are volitionally similar (section 10.2.1). Furthermore, since their
disagreement is not about what is commonly held within, or definitive
of, their cultural identity, but rather about what sort of opaque attitudes
each of them may have developed in a shared cultural environment, this
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account does not fall prey to the lack of objectivity commonly associated
with cultural relativism (section 10.2.4).
Second, we have seen that even in the absence of similarity, a shared
assumption about volitional isomorphism still gives us much to disagree
about (section 10.2.5), such as when we talk about the extent of our reasons
to care more for our own children than for those of others. In this type
of scenario, shared psychology may be one of our reasons to have such a
conversation. However, another possible reason would be the discovery
of isomorphic principles that could be a priori (section 10.3.4). After all, I
have not denied that there might be such principles of reason, but only
that they would secure similarity.
Finally, the Affective Pattern View does of course allow for the third
type of interpersonal scenario, in which neither similarity nor isomorphism
obtains. I have argued that this sometimes means we have reached the
limits of reasoning and argument, for example where individual differences
are involved regarding the grey areas in which the patterns supporting
rivaling values or principles fail to outweigh each other (section 10.2.6).
Nevertheless, in other cases the absence of shared psychology need not
make a discussion useless at all because the contrast between their different
dispositions may help participants to clarify their own points of view
(section 10.3.1).
Furthermore, there are two types of reason that may obtain in all
interpersonal scenarios, regardless of similarity or isomorphism: one
participant may have insights in the psychology of another that the latter
lacks about himself (section 10.3.2); and participating in moral discourse
increases our awareness of alternative possible viewpoints, which may
counteract some of our unhelpful biases and the theory-ladenness of
volitional interpretation (section 10.3.3).
In response to the semantic objection—that moral vocabulary simply
has nonrelationalist meaning—, I have defended a revisionism about prac-
tical concepts, which distinguishes between descriptive and prescriptive
conceptual claims in meta-ethics. The descriptive claim I have argued
for is that of pluralism: not all people mean the same thing when they
make practical judgments (section 10.5.1). Moreover, the conceptual con-
servatism according to which their truth conditions must nevertheless all
follow the same semantics leads to counterintuitive results (10.5.2). Instead,
revisionism allows me to argue that some people who have nonrelationalist
ideas about their own judgments simply make false judgments because of
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Explanations of Moral Discourse
Similarity Isomorphism Neither
A Priori Error theory Principles of
(10.5.3) reason (10.3.4)
Empirical Shared psychology (10.2) Contrast (10.3.1)
Knowing someone better (10.3.2)
Increase of alternatives (10.3.3)
that. According to hard revisionism, all such judgments must be evaluated
in terms of nonrelationalist truth conditions. Soft revisionism is a com-
promise between conceptual conservatism and hard revisionism: under
certain conditions we may use relationalist truth conditions to evaluate
the practical judgments of people with nonrelationalist ideas. It follows
that we only have to be error theorists with respect to cases in which their
nonrelationalist ideas have prevented their practical deliberations from
interacting with their affective dispositions (section 10.5.3). Though I favor
soft revisionism, the choice between these two options depends on general
assumptions about truth and knowledge that my line of argument in this
thesis can remain neutral about.
Finally, I have incorporated two insights into my account from different
corners in the meta-ethical landscape. The first is Simon Blackburn’s idea
that the surface structure of moral discourse, which includes both grammar
and inferential patterns, need not be mirrored in the underlying semantics.
Although Blackburn is an expressivist, I have argued that relationalist
cognitivism can use a similar approach to assign relationalist semantics
to ‘quasi-nonrelationalist’ discourse surface, which further minimizes the
amount of cases about which I must really adopt an error theory (section
10.5.4). The second is Gary Watson’s observation that people may dis-
tinguish between what they should and what their will is fully behind
in ‘perverse cases,’ which I have argued can be accounted for within a
volitional theory in terms of a further expanded revisionism about practical
concepts (section 10.5.5).
In summary, I have arrived at six explanations of moral discourse: five
that provide reasons on relationalist grounds depending on the type of
interpersonal scenario, and a sixth that involves an error theory about
nonrelationalist judgment (see table). My general strategy to account for
moral discourse has therefore been one of ‘divide and conquer’: there are
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many different intersubjective dimensions in play, and if anything I believe
the phenomenon is actually more complicated than I have sketched so far,
rather than being simpler and more unified.
In fact, a similar observation applies not only to my account of moral
discourse, but to the theory I have developed as a whole. I have often
sought to combine different insights about different scenarios instead of
making sweeping statements that would apply across the board. I have
tried to show that there are sometimes facts for our practical judgments to
get right, but I have also tried to accommodate cases in which it remains
indeterminate what we should do. I have explained the extent to which
it is not up to us what reasons we have, but I have also accommodated
cases in which we bring about our own reasons by choosing whatever we
decide to choose. I have acknowledged the value of principled deliberation,
and the moral significance of universalized rules, while maintaining that
deontology is only one of many interpretative strategies. Virtue-ethical,
consequentialist, and narrative approaches may also capture our inner
realities. Which strategy is best depends on the type of problem we are
dealing with.
Practical normativity, in other words, is an unclear business, where
absolute precision is unattainable. Or we might say that it is diverse and
colorful and multi-faceted, which makes it such an exciting subject. In any
case, it is a continuous challenge to understand what our passions tell us
about ourselves. Reason, therefore, is hardly in a position to obey orders.
It is the interpreter of the passions, and while the passions are free to be
cryptic, reason has the responsibility to make sense of them.
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Summary
As human beings, we are frequently confronted with questions about what
we should do or what we think others should do: questions of practical
normativity. In this thesis I develop a philosophical theory about how we
can know the answers to such questions and what the nature of practical
normativity is. My approach emphasizes the phenomenon of practical
disconfirmation: the possibility for us to discover that we got our practical
judgments wrong. I reflect upon both the manner in which we revise
our moral views—concerning altruism and political value, say—as well as
our non-moral decisions about what we want for our personal lives and
careers.
In order to account for these phenomena, I argue that we disconfirm
our practical judgments on the basis of unexpected affective responses
to the intended consequences of our actions. I call this the “Affective
Response View.” On the basis of this view, I argue furthermore that we
get our practical judgments right when they capture certain patterns in
the structured inner realities of our affective dispositions. I call this the
“Affective Pattern View.” The patterns in question are those that manifest
themselves in our resultant motivations in so far as we approach ideal
conditions of rational and self-governing agency.
The thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part I construct a
conceptual framework for thinking about truth, motivation, and reasons in
practical philosophy. Chapter 1 introduces five principles that articulate
intuitions about practical judgment that many philosophers have deemed
independently plausible. The combination of these principles gives rise to
two paradoxes, which I call the “Facts Problem” and the “Disconfirmation
Problem.” The first involves the following apparent contradiction. On the
one hand, knowledge of certain normative truths would seem to motivate
self-governing agents to act. But how can this be if, on the other hand,
motivation is driven by contingent intrinsic desires that are independent
from matters of truth or falsehood? The second problem involves a similar
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tension with respect to disconfirmation. On the one hand, information that
would disconfirm their beliefs about how they should act would seem to also
change the desires that determine how self-governing agents will act. But
how can this make sense, if they had those desires independently from their
beliefs in the first place?
One way to solve these problems is to reject one or more of the princi-
ples that give rise to the paradoxes. This leads to well-known philosophical
positions such as noncognitivism (which rejects the idea that practical
judgments can be true or false) or the anti-Humean theory of motivation
(which rejects the idea that action requires desires independent from our
beliefs). By contrast, the purpose of this thesis is to resolve the paradoxes
by explaining how all principles can jointly be true.
Regarding the Facts Problem, such reconciliatory solutions often in-
volve some version or modification of Bernard Williams’s “Internal Rea-
sons View,” which I discuss in chapter 2. According to Williams, reason
statements can only be true if they are reachable from the agent’s own
motivations by a “sound deliberative route.” Although I am sympathetic
to the gist of his argument, I explicate a number of crucial differences
between Williams’s view and my own. One of these is the fact that I
make a distinction between normative reasons and motivating reasons,
and I argue that even though Williams has rejected such a distinction, his
defense of the Internal Reasons View actually presupposes it. In chapter 3
I formulate a variety of the Internal Reasons View that follows from the
five principles from chapter 1.
This view provides us with a sketch for a “dispositional” solution
to the Facts Problem, which I discuss in part ii. The idea is that we
remove the mystery about why we would be motivated, under ideal
conditions, in accordance with our knowledge of our normative reasons,
by analyzing normative reasons in terms of the motivations that we would
have under those conditions. I distinguish between three versions of this
approach. According to “type-i dispositionalism,” which I discuss in
chapter 4, the truth conditions of practical judgments depend “strongly”
on our contingent desires, which means that it is conceptually possible,
if one agent approves of P while another disapproves of it, that both get
their judgments right. I call this implication “relationalism.” The problem
for this approach is twofold. First, conflicts in an agent’s desire set require
an explanation of how one contingent desire could enjoy the authority to
discredit another. Second, the possibility of irresolvable conflicts between
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different agents requires an explanation of the intersubjective scope of
validity that we attribute to moral discourse.
By contrast, “type-ii” and “type-iii dispositionalism,” which I discuss
in chapters 5 and 6, are “nonrelationalist.” This means that in order for one
agent to get his judgment in approval of P right, all conceptually possible
agents must desire P under ideal conditions—a view defended by Michael
Smith, amongst others. I argue that this leads to a dilemma, however. On
the one hand, it might mean that all conceptually possible agents could in
principle arrive at the same desires by eliminating incoherence from their
contingent desire sets. This is the “type-ii” view. In chapter 5 I argue that
it is not plausible to suppose that this would yield convergence upon any
desires of ethical substance. Alternatively, Smith could opt for the view
that certain desire sets are irrational in such a way that they preclude the
agent from ever deliberating onto the rational desires from his internal
perspective. This is the “type-iii” account. However, as I argue in chapter
6, this account requires unwarranted metaphysical assumptions that seem
redundant from the perspective of type-i dispositionalism.
In part iii of the thesis I develop a way out of the stalemate between
these three accounts by shifting our perspective to the Disconfirmation
Problem as the dialectical entry point for our discussion. I argue that
the emphasis on ideal conditions implicit in the Facts Problem leaves too
much to philosophical speculation, whereas reflection on disconfirmation
in actual practice may provide us with independent grounds for theorizing.
In chapter 7 I argue that type-ii and -iii dispositionalists are committed
to the “Principles of Reason View.” This view requires rather substantial
interpretations of rational principles in order to explain the sort of actual
revisions that we want to account for. But I argue that the simplest way to
explain why agents would revise their attitudes in accordance to substantial
principles is simply to count those principles, contingently, amongst their
intrinsically desired ends. It seems an unnecessary explanatory burden to
suppose that such revisions and the corresponding motivational changes
are brought about out of sheer logical or conceptual insight. Furthermore,
this account presupposes, but does not provide, a solution to the Disconfir-
mation Problem: it fails to explain why such substantial principles would
impact a change in the agent’s actual intrinsic desires.
My alternative proposal, the “Affective Response View,” is based on
the independently plausible idea that our practical revisions often go hand
in hand with our affective responses to the practical implications of our
352 Summary
prior views. I develop this view into an account of deliberation as “vo-
litional interpretation,” arguing that no concrete experiential or efficient
motivation provides privileged access to our normative reasons over any
others, making every disconfirmation susceptible to further revision in
principle, and every practical belief a kind of hypothesis. This account
offers a surprisingly simple solution to the Disconfirmation Problem: un-
expected affective responses explain motivational changes in line with
practical revisions, under conditions of sustained self-government, because
under those conditions they simply are the motivational changes that we
need to account for.
One implication of explaining moral disconfirmations in this manner
is relationalism: if unexpected affective responses disconfirm practical
beliefs, then practical beliefs apparently entail predictions about such
responses, which makes them empirical and contingently attitude-related.
Moreover, provided that we want to reconcile the principles from chapter
1, the implication is a form of type-i dispositionalism according to which
the attitudes that constitute our normative reasons may be opaque to us.
On this view, in contrast to the relationalism defended by Williams, non-
instrumental revisions are mostly not rational transformations of known
desires, but empirical discoveries of unknown affective attitudes that reflect
previously unexpected aspects of opaque volitional attitudes.
Harry Frankfurt’s recent account of normative reasons, which I discuss
in chapter 8, is much closer to this view. Frankfurt claims that there is a
“reality within ourselves,” consisting of empirical facts about what we love,
that provides us with normative reasons about which we can sometimes
be mistaken. He argues that love and caring are volitional attitudes which
involve a more complex mode of wanting than the affective attitudes of
mere desire, and he attempts to answer the question of how to authorize
some desires over others with reference to how they relate in such complex
volitional structures.
Although I broadly agree with this general picture, I argue that Frank-
furt fails to account for many cases of disconfirmation, because he relies on
special attitudes that grant us privileged access to our inner selves under
the appropriate conditions. Furthermore, he maintains that these attitudes
are neither reducible to beliefs or desires, which makes both their empirical
status and their motivational role mysterious. Based on this critique, I
make recommendations for an alternative theory: it should distinguish
between a “cognitive” and a “normative” will, such that the former can be
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analyzed as involving beliefs, while the latter may consist in structures of
affective dispositions.
In chapter 9 I propose an account of practical normativity that follows
the aforementioned recommendations. According to the “Affective Pattern
View” the relevant dispositional structures are patterns in our affective lives,
which manifest themselves as we increase our self-understanding. I borrow
the idea of an ontology of patterns from Daniel Dennett, but whereas he
has used it to explain desires as behavioral patterns, I incorporate various
adjustments so as to explain volitional attitudes as affective patterns.
The result is an account that allows me to explain intuitions about
both the determinacy and the indeterminacy of moral choice. On the one
hand, I argue that my view can account for the idea that most Nazi officers
in the Holocaust got their practical judgments wrong, without postulat-
ing nonrelationalist moral facts (leaving room for a possible divergent
psychopathic minority). On the other hand, my view accommodates the
experience of moral dilemmas, which leave the right choice indeterminate
even at the ‘intrapersonal’ level. Furthermore, my account also combines
intuitions about deliberation and decision-making as ‘self-finding’ and as
‘self-making.’ I argue that while the cognitive will can get the normative
will wrong in some cases, there are other cases in which the latter may be
shaped by the former, such that our deliberations also play a constitutive
role in the genesis of our normative reasons.
With this account in place, I reflect further on Frankfurt’s ideas about
wholeheartedness. I distinguish between “inner wholeheartedness” and
“epistemic resolvedness,” arguing that neither are to be pursued too fer-
vently. Instead, I claim that allowing ambivalence in our hearts may
actually be a form of authenticity, of being true to the divided nature of
our selves. Furthermore, I discuss the potential harm of eradicated doubt
in the light of our often heavily biased emotional mechanisms.
With the Affective Pattern View in place, it is now understandable why,
the more an agent knows the facts about his normative reasons, the more
his capacity for self-government would involve desires to act upon those
reasons. This is because those facts are facts about a pattern of desires that
manifests itself more fully as his knowledge increases and which seems
the proper object of his volitional interpretation, representing what he is
really all about as a person. Hence, it seems to make sense of the idea of
self-government to say that if his volitional beliefs capture this pattern, he
will be self-governing when his resultant desires participate in that pattern,
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and that he will be lacking in self-government on the occasion when his
resultant desire constitutes noise relative to that pattern. In this manner,
the view explains why some desires have authority over others, which
provides us with a type-i dispositional solution to the Facts Problem.
In chapter 10 I discuss the one remaining difficulty, which is the inter-
subjective dimension that relationalist theories are allegedly poorly placed
to explain. I formulate two possible objections against relationalism on
the basis of various arguments from Michael Smith. The first is that moral
discourse would be without purpose if relationalism were true. My first
counter-argument is that we have many good reasons to assume shared
volitional attitudes on many, if not most, occasions. In particular, it is
plausible that we share certain basic moral values as a species. Second, I
argue that there are several further reasons for engaging in moral discourse
even in those cases where our values may turn out to differ.
The second objection is that the words or concepts used by people
in moral discourse, such as “right” and “wrong” or “good” and “bad,”
simply have nonrelationalist meanings, regardless of whether purposeful
discourse about relationalist concepts would be possible or not. Rather
than simply denying this outright, I admit that some people may indeed
mean their judgments in a nonrelationalist sense. However, other people
do not: I propose a semantic pluralism about what people actually mean,
and a conceptual revisionism about what people should mean when they
make their practical judgments.
Thus, in chapters 9 and 10 I have addressed both of the difficulties for
type-i dispositionalism that were formulated at the end of chapter 4: the
authority of some desires over others and the intersubjective relevance of
practical judgments in moral discourse. The resulting account continues
the tradition of Humean thinking in moral philosophy, both with respect
to the distinctness of motivation and the relationalism about normativity.
But because of its strong emphasis on volitional opacity and interpretative
self-understanding, the account has provided us with a new way to tackle
some of the problems that have traditionally been associated with Humean
approaches.
